Most BJP, RSS, and VHP activists usually speak approvingly of aspirators like Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902); V D. Savarkar (1883-1966); Bankimchandra Chatterjee (1838-1894), and M.S. Golwalkar founder of the RSS and co-founder of the VHP itself.

From a sociological point of view  the  basic rhetoric of the RSS is telling when is foundation is intended; For the creation of men and women with muscles of iron and nerves of steel to fulfill their duties in the great up-hill battle of nation-building that await us today. - Anthony Elenjimittam, Philosophy and Action of the R.S.S. for the Hind Swaraj.

And earlier of course Vivekananda already announced that; “We have to conquer the world. That we have to! India must conquer the world, and nothing less than [that] is my ideal.... We must conquer the world or die. There is no other alternative.” (Jyotirmayananda (ed)., Vivekananda: His gospel of man-making with a garland of tributes and a chronicle of his life and times with pictures, Madras, 1992, p. 53)

Through its shakhas, publications, and speeches, the RSS circulates a master narrative emphasizing the need for an organized and united India represented by its valorization of the figures of Hindu soldier and warrior monk.

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (or VHP) draws on a similar interpretation of nation, yet aims to bring the image of a united, strong, and nonsectarian Hindu community to ordinary folk (Basu, T, P Datta, S. Sarkar, T Sarkar, and S. Sen, Khaki shorts and saffron flags: A Critique of the Hindu right. New Delhi,1993, p. 64).

On its website, the VHP clearly states that it aims "to consolidate, strengthen and make invincible the global [italics added] Hindu fraternity by following the eternal and universal life values based on Sanatan Dharma [ancient religion] and work for total welfare of humanity on the basis of the unique cultural ethos of Bharatvarsha " (VHP, Aims and Objects). The organization's focus on the masses as well as its global reach distinguishes it from the RSS. SEWA International does underline the RSS's move towards a more international profile; however, India, still remains its primary arena of mobilization.

A further difference as articulated by an official spokesperson of the VHP lies in the objective of each organization, while the VHP declares itself as a mass organization, the RSS through its shakhas, training camps, and pracharak system envisions the creation of an elite cadre of leaders devoted to patriotic duty. Through schools in rural areas, medical camps, cultural events, satsangs, plus encourages its young men and women to learn martial arts while pledging their lives in service to the Hindu nation.

Yet masculinity configured in the image of the warrior-monk and the Hindu soldier frames this organization's activities. For example, the VHP's headquarters in New Delhi-Sankat Mochan Ashram-is constructed as an ashram or a devotional retreat. Saffron flags are evident everywhere while a temple occupies the central courtyard. Our hosts kindly invited us to a vegetarian lunch served on the floor in traditional Indian style. However, when interviewed, his unconscious (or perhaps conscious) echo of the aggressive militarism advocated by Savarkar was unmistakable. When overcome with passion, he banged on the table in front of him to declare that if nonviolence did not enable national glory, then Hindus had to win back their respect with violence if necessary (personal interview, New Delhi, February 8, 2002).

This sentiment also reverberates on the VHP website: "Are Hindus cowards then? Are they forever going to take things lying down? Have centuries of Muslim conquests, rape, looting, forced conversion, razing of thousands of temples, imprinted so much on India's psyche, that we can only endlessly produce Vijay Amritrajes [Indian tennis player]; talented, nice, but unable to fight, to win, to defeat the opponent.... COME ON INDIA: Stand up and fight" (Gautier, http://www.vhp.org/englishsite/e.Special Movements/dRanjanambhumi%20M uti/ayodhyaafterdec6.html).

In his book “Hindutva”, Savarkar sketched the national boundaries he envisioned by distinguishing between Sindhustan-the land between the River Indus and the Indian Ocean-and Mlechhastan, representing the domicile land of foreigners outside these geographical boundaries.

Savarkar soon focused solely on Islam as the enemy:

That is why some of our Mohamedan or Christian countrymen who had originally been forcibly converted to Non-Hindu religion ... are not and cannot be recognized as Hindus. Their holy land is far off in Arabia or Palestine. Their mythology and Godmen are not the children of this soil. Their love is divided.... Nay if some of them be really believing what they profess to do, there can be no choice, they must set their Holyland above their Father-land in their love and allegiance. (Savarkar, The Indian war of independence. Mumbai, India: Dhanvale Prakashan. 1960, p. 94)

The Islamic "other," represented by millions residing within India, derives its malevolent energy from divided loyalty. The Christian and Muslim reverence for prophets and sacred spaces outside the ancient geographical territory known as Hindustan makes followers of these faiths suspect and potential traitors in Savarkar's eyes. He contended that Muslims and Christians (originally Hindus) can redeem themselves by freely choosing to reject their conversion and returning to Hinduism (p. 94).

In his narrative of the Hindu nation and Islam, Savarkar evoked a cul­ture based on masculine Hinduism that despite the valiant attempts of the Rajputs and Marathas failed to resist Islamic conquest and the forcible con­version of its people. In explaining this weakness, Savarkar returned to his former arguments against ahimsa (nonviolence). Whether because of its close contact with Buddhism or other forces, Hinduism during the various Afghan, Mongol, ind Persian invasions could not resist because its martial valor had been weakened by ideas of tolerance, kindness, chivalry, and forgiveness. Savarkar does not demean these values absolutely but argues that if one is to resist the "sword of Islam," a celebration of such ideas weakens (effeminizes) masculine Hinduism and makes a nation vulnerable. He illustrates this weak­ness with very explicit gendered imagery.

In his view, Muslim conquerors raped Hindu women both to sully the honor of Hindu national manhood and to spread Islam "and these [Hindu] women ... were distributed by fives or tens amongst the most faithful follow­ers of Islam. The future progeny of these conquered women were born Mus­lim" (p. 176). Even Muslim women "did everything in their power to harass such captured and kidnapped Hindu women" (p. 178). However, Hindus could not resist such threats "because [of] the then prevalent perverted reli­gious ideas about chivalry to women, which ultimately proved highly detri­mental to the Hindu community" (p. 179). Adopting the voice of the plain­tive, raped Hindu women, Savarkar chided the great Hindu warrior Shivaji: "Did not the plaintive screams and pitiful lamentations of the millions of molested Hindu women ... reach the ears of Shivaji Maharaj?" (p. 179).

In the above material, women signify national honor; the capture and rape of Hindu women highlights an effeminization of Hinduism as Hindu warriors, weakened by "perverted religious ideas," fail to resist this attack on their honor. Savarkar's denigration of Hindu notions of chivalry seems to indicate his belief that the only response to the sullying of national honor by Muslim men was retaliatory rape of Muslim women by Hindu men. Echoes of this stance indeed seem to resonate in modem Hindu nationalist actions, in the recent (2002) violence in Gujarat.

In Savarkar's mind, Muslim machinations coupled with the Gandhian doctrine of nonviolence (presumably a legacy of Buddhist influence) conspired to make Hindus vulnerable. His advocacy of this belief became most in doing so I made it my duty to give a fillip to military awakening amongst the Hindus by addressing thousands and thousands of Hindu youths. (p. 204; italics added)

Savarkar stressed that it was the duty of young Hindu men to join the Indian army to fight for their country and to resist Islamic conta­mination of the Hindu army. He ended his address to the twenty-fourth session of the Mahasabha by exclaiming: "Hinduise all politics and Militarise Hinduism!" (p. 302)

The members of the Bajrang Dal, a youth group affiliated with the VHP,  declares it is the "security ring of Hindu Society" and whenever "there is an attack on Hindu Society, Faith, and Religion, the workers of the Bajrang Dal come forward for their rescue." Such defense is necessary because "Hindu Society and its faith are being kicked and insulted by various forces for the last fourteen hundred years" (VHP, Dimensions of VHP).

The youthful members of the Bajrang Dal have taken on the role of soldiers protecting the motherland. Although, officially they reject violence and declare they only resist insults to Hinduism through democratic means (VHP, Dimensions of VHP), this support for democracy seems weakened in face of their avowed intention to not appear submissive to their foes. As Dr. Surendra Jain, a Dal leader claims, "The Bajrang Dal is assertive not militant ... missionaries consider Hindus a soft target. Even words `soft target' were used in the missionary literature. However, now the Hindus have woken up. We are no more a soft target for their unholy activities" (Diwanji, Hindus are a Soft Target). Although it is possible to demonstrate invincible strength and resistance through democratic means, reality challenges this professed sup­port for democracy claimed by the Dal. The most recent challenge derives from the Dal's implication in the Ahmedabad riots of 2002. A dramatic portrait of a Dal activist on the cover of the news magazine Outlook (March 11, 2002) captures the mode of participation undertaken by this group: a young bearded man whose very being radiates fury with a steel rod upheld in one hand and a saffron bandana tied around his forehead.

On February 27, 2002, coach S-6 of the Sabarmati Express on its way to New Delhi pulled out of Godhra-a small station just outside the city of Baroda in Gujarat-and stopped a little less than a mile outside the station. VHP activists who occupied S-6 were suddenly attacked with acid-filled containers, stones, and burning rags. The railway carriages caught on fire and fifty-eight people, including twenty-six women and sixteen children burned to death. There was no question that this was a well-orchestrated attack undertaken by Islamic militants. Such aggressive behavior was seen by the Bajrang Dal as a call to battle for the protection of the Hindu homeland. Cities in Gujarat erupted into violence as Hindu activists targeted Muslim homes and businesses to exact retribution for the horrific attack on the Sabarmati Express.

But aggression and violence of this sort is one possible outcome of a cultural nationalism articulated with images of warriors and the vocabulary of martial prowess. Further, such language within the VHP narrates a monolithic nation devoid of diversity and nuance: "In place of `India that is Bharat,' we should have said 'Bharat that is Hindustan.' Official documents refer to the `composite culture,' but ours is certainly not a composite culture.... In a very fundamental sense, this country has a unique cultural oneness [italics added]. No country if it has to survive can have compartments" (VHP, Unifying Heritage).

 The VHP rejection of "composite culture" or diversity is tied to its fear that an acceptance of "compartments" will usher in chaos and seemingly obstruct the unity required for a disciplined, masculine nation. It follows a chain of reasoning similar to that of the RSS to configure a homogenous, monolithic India: caste hierarchies as well as diverse interpretations and manners of Hindu worship are erased, Sikhs, Jains, and Buddhists are included into the Hindu fold, while Christians and Muslims are constructed as "original" Hindus converted to an alien religion. Finally, like the RSS, the VHP objects to the notion of Adivasis or indigenous peoples of India, preferring the term "vanavasis."

Thus the VHP, through devotional meetings, texts, electronic media, and schools, disseminates the notion of a united, homogenous Hindu nation embodying martial prowess and invincible strength. Put another way, masculine Hinduism-interpreted as Hindu soldier-represents the ideal citizen of a strong Indian nation. In the VHP's vision manhood becomes quite unidimensional as ideas of spiritual vigor, moral fortitude, and asceticism popularized by Vivekananda retreat to the background and Savarkar's view of Hindu manhood as an expression of raw military power moves to the fore.

The VHP as well as the RSS are not political parties; rather, they define themselves as social organizations aiming to build a strong and proud Hindu India. In contrast, the Bharatiya Janata Party is political, it contests elections, and until recently (2004) Atul Behari Vajpayee of the BJP was the Prime Minister of India. However, for many Indian social observers the BJP's status as a participant in electoral democracy does not mute this party's affiliation with strident cultural nationalism, and they argue that the BJP as a member of the "Sangh Parivar" (or the Sangh family) comprising the VHP and RSS together with all their affiliated groups is implicated in the spread of xenophobic conflict in India.' There is no doubt that BJP politicians have strong ties to the RSS. For example, Vajpayee himself was a RSS pracharak as was Narendra Modi, the BJP Chief Minister of Gujarat.' Therefore, it is reason­able to expect that a variation of the masculinized interpretation of nation emerges in its ideology.

PS. Already Paul R. Brass in The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, Oxford University Press, 2003 asked;1) Why do Hindu-Muslim communal riots persist in India? (2) Why do they wax and wane, bursting out here and there at various places differentially and at different times? (3) How does it happens that massive episodes of violence--in which particular religious groups are targeted--get classified in the public domain as riots rather than pogroms? (4) What interests are served and what power relations are maintained as a consequence of communal antagonisms and violence?

Brass ventures an explanation, bolstered by the fieldwork in Aligarh: that were riots are endemic, what he calls "institutionalized riot systems" exist in which "known persons and groups occupy specific roles in the rehearsal for and the production of communal riots. Even more explicitly, he states that the production of communal riots is very often a political one, being associated with intense inter-party competition and mass mobilization.


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