In the following links we present our World Jihad concluding overview. Global Jihad P.1.

In 2005, 53% of all groups employing SAs were Salafi-Jihadist in nature.Global Jihad P.2.

Strategy and Goals of al Qaeda. Global Jihad P.3.

From Local to Global Jihad. Global Jihad P.4.

A Second Look at the Salafi Movement. Global Jihad P.5.

Al Qaeda’s Adaptive Strategy and Iraq. Global Jihad P.6.

Future World Jihad P.1

Future World Jihad P.2

Future World Jihad P.3: The Nazi Connection

On Dec. 22, 2005, the leader of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (no not Iran this time) stated that the Holocaust was a "myth" and denounced Western governments for criticizing those who say the Jewish genocide did not happen. Future World Jihad P.4:  Jerusalem’s Armageddon.

Future World Jihad P.5: What Now?

In spite of the rhetoric of bin-Laden supported by millions of Muslims worldwide-- of a Western religious crusade, the new conflict between the post-Christian West and Islam-- is more a clash between secular materialism and a revived religion. Here is the Evidence:

Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, plus more

Enter:

Global Jihad Case Study: Central Asia P.1.

Likely to become a new arena of international interest in the 21st century, not least because of its cocktail of abundant oil and gas, Islamic jihadist groups, dictatorial regimes, and rivalry between Russia, China, Pakistan, the US and Iran. Central Asia P.2.

Hydrocarbons and the Great Powers. Central Asia P.3.

As far a current information concerns Bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahri and others are operating out of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan.

Nowadays, jihadist insurgents are attacking Pakistani security and intelligence forces in the Pashtun areas in the Northwest.It must be remembered that prior to 9/11 the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence agency and military openly supported the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies. In addition to the relationships formed between bin Laden and the so-called "Afghan Arabs" (foreign jihadists) during the war against the Soviets, Pakistani troops also trained and fought alongside the Taliban and al Qaeda in their battles against the Northern Alliance and other foes. Because of these deep and historic ties, there are some in the Pakistani government (specifically within the security apparatus) who remain sympathetic, if not outright loyal, to their friends in the Taliban and al Qaeda. Additionally, and perhaps just as important, many in the Pakistani government and military do not want to kill their own people -- the Pashtuns, for example -- in order to destroy the much smaller subset of Pakistani and foreign militants. The challenge is to eliminate the militants while causing very little collateral damage to the rest of the population.

According to U.S. counterterrorism sources, U.S. intelligence had gathered some very good leads in the early days of the hunt for bin Laden and other high-value al Qaeda targets, and they shared this intelligence with their counterparts in the Pakistani security apparatus to try to organize operations to act on the intelligence. During this process, people within the intelligence apparatus passed information back to al Qaeda, thus compromising the sources and methods being used to collect the information. 

Al Qaeda has learned from the mistakes made by the men it has lost and has better secured the methods it uses to communicate with the outside world. This increased security, however, results in increased insulation, which has adversely affected not only communications but also financial transfers and recruiting. The tension between operations and security poses a significant problem for an organization that seeks to maintain and manage a global militant network. Should they attempt to become more operationally active and effective -- and decrease their security measures to do so -- they will provide more opportunities to get the one break it needs to find bin Laden.

Update  Dec. 4, 2009: A Taliban detainee in Pakistan, confirmed Osama Bin Laden early this year was in the province of Ghazni in eastern Afghanistan. Today however, nobody is reported to know where Bin Laden is.

The United States and now also Europe, are increasingly forced to confront the challenge it faces in its interaction with the Islamic world. Of course this is not, a "war on terrorism" because terrorism is merely a tool that certain, not all, Islamic groups use to achieve their end result. However sixty years ago the Military Intelligence Service of the U.S. War Department in an 11-page section titled “Islam: A Threat to World Stability,” already explained how the Muslim world (then making up one-seventh of the world’s population, now about one-sixth) could impede world stability. It further pointed out the frustration of Muslims, the sense of longing for an earlier era, the political volatility, the susceptibility to extremist ideologies. The Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad P.1: Egypt and the Sudan.

The Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad P.2: Somalia and Lebanon.

Today (Febr. 25, 2006) Al-Qaida vowed more attacks a day after an attempt to bomb the world's biggest oil processing complex, and added that it carried out the attack "based on the instructions of, Osama bin Laden. In this P.3 however, I will argue that Al-Qaeda does not want a popular revolution in Saudi Arabia, because this may lead to a U.S. invasion to ensure the continued flow of oil. The Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad P.3: Wahhabi's and Shi'ites.

The Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad P.4: Iraq.

The Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad P.5: Afghanistan.

In ”Devil’s Game” (Nov. 2005) Robert Dreyfuss, titles the spiritual father of the Muslim Brotherhood,  al-Afghani (born in Iran),--“ the great-great-grandfather of Osama Bin Laden.” (Dreyfuss, 2005, p. 20). Plus this week in “God's Terrorists” Charles Allen describes how during the 1850’s, Wilayat Ali, a Wahhabbi and student of Syed Ahmad of the Delhi Sultanate, developed a secret network trained  mujahidin, and became the true planner of the Sepoy Mutiny in India, 1857.*

The Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad P.6: Strategic Lessons.

In October 1940, representatives of the Free Arabs signed an Axis-Arab Manifesto of Liberation in Berlin. Both Hitler and Mussolini expressed strong support for an independent, united Arab nation. From Hitler to the "Arab Reich"P.1.

Not long after the war, many German military officers and Nazi party officials were granted sanctuary in Middle Eastern countries, most notably Egypt and Syria, where they helped develop the militaries and intelligences agencies of those countries. In 1953 rumors spread in the Middle East that Hitler might still be alive and living in Brazil. From Hitler to the "Arab Reich" P.2.

In 1996 "the Qods Force, the covert-action arm of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, arranged" the Khobar Towers bombing. In early June 2002 the leaders of four major terrorist organizations-Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine general command-met in Tehran, Iran. From Hitler to the "Arab Reich" P.3.

“The new alliance has come. The eleventh of September has brought together [the two sides] because the new right has reacted positively  They say, and I agree with them 100 percent, what happened on the eleventh of September, if it is the Muslims who did it, it is not an act of terrorism but an act of counterterrorism.”But what is the"new right"?

From Hitler to the "Arab Reich" P.4.

A Convergence of Militant Islam and the New Right?

KKK during a rally against ‘ZOG’ Oct. 26, 2005:

There was also the Aug. 2, 2006 slaying of Chauncey Bailey, editor-in-chief of the weekly African American newspaper the Oakland Post. Drawing once more the attention, and hence our review of fringe groups not yet mentioned.