The threat confronting the United States consists of both al Qaeda Central, the remnant of the organization that committed the 9/11 attack against the U.S., and the current al Qaeda social movement. And where members of al Qaeda Central should be eliminated or brought to justice. Currently it is the al Qaeda social movement, worldwide, that constitutes the real threat.

In devising a strategy, it is important to understand whether the danger the United States faces is in fact a threat to the existence of the nation. The Soviet Union had thousands of nuclear missiles poised at the United States, ready to destroy the entire country within a few hours. This is definitely not the case with global Islamist terrorism. September II, despite being an atrocity and the largest single terrorist event in world history, did not come close to wiping out the United States. Even the worst imaginable event, a biological or a nuclear strike by terrorists, will not destroy the nation. In fact, at this point in history, only the United States could obliterate the United States. If the United States transforms its fight against global Islamist terrorism into a war against Islam, which might mobilize all Muslims against the United States, then this expanded enemy could become an existential threat. However, only America has the power to transform this small threat into a much larger one. The key is to keep the threat contained in its present limit.

Will the threat grow or will it fade by itself? For all its emphasis on building a just world, based on the community of the Prophet, the projected utopia is not an appealing one. The few manifestations of this utopia, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and some parts of Algeria or the Philippines during the 1990s, were not inspiring for most young Muslim people. Indeed, a good countermeasure against this threat is to advertise what life was like under the Taliban.

The key to the social movement's continued existence will be its ability to attract young Muslims to its ranks. The sources of its appeal to young people are not universal, but are sustained by U.S. actions that are perceived to be a war on Islam. Without this fuel, young Muslims will no longer find the hopes and aspiration of their elders to be "cool" and will move on to new ones. The fact that rioting young French immigrants in the fall 2005 self-consciously rejected militant Islam as a frame for their action might be indicative that the message no longer appeals to French Muslim fifteen- or sixteen-year-olds, as it did with their older brothers. Elsewhere right now there is a "jihadi cool" talk on the Internet, but generations have a way of defining themselves anew, mainly in contrast to the older generation, which by nature is no longer considered "cool." Young Muslims are attracted to the goals of al Qaeda by dreams of glory and the thrill of clandestine activities. As al Qaeda and those acting on its behalf continue to commit even greater atrocities, this appeal will fade and be replaced with new ways of covering oneself with glory and new forms of "cool" thrills.

Thus far as one have seen, in the fight against global Islamist terrorism, the United States has committed grave strategic mistakes that fuel the ire of angry young Muslims. The correct strategy should be one of restraint with respect to the greater challenge: preventing young Muslims from joining the terrorist social movement (or what the NSCT calls the long-term approach).

At present the U.S. government has focused on a strategy of pursuing high-value targets in the hope of decapitating al Qaeda and allowing the movement to implode. As the NSCT states, "the loss of a leader can degrade a group's cohesiveness and in some cases may trigger its collapse."4This may be true in some cases, but in this instance, it is wishful thinking. The loss of Osama bin Laden or Ayman al Zawahiri will not have this predicted effect. The leaderless jihad will survive, for it is not especially cohesive and lacks central operational command and control. It is important to bring the principal leaders to justice for past atrocities, but their loss in terms of the future of the movement will be easily overcome.

Because the potential long-term threat-hostility against the United States growing beyond the few thousands in the al Qaeda social movement to encompass tens of millions of Muslims-is far more serious than any present threat, the approach to fighting global Islamist terrorism beyond the present situation is the real challenge. It is definitely a battle for the hearts and minds of Muslims, who might be tempted to join the ranks of the al Qaeda social movement. The U.S. program to fight this danger thus should be based on an accurate understanding of the internal dynamics and behavior of the enemy.

If national security is the true aim of the fight against this type of terrorism, and the threat is self-limiting, then the logical strategy is one of containment while waiting for the threath to disintegrate for internal reasons-just as it was, one strategy in dealing with the much greater and truly existential threat from the Soviet Union. The key is to accelerate and not slow down or stop this process of internal decay. Nothing should be done that will make the threat grow to include almost all Muslims; such an escalation may become an existential threat to the United States.

With the first two waves of global Islamist terrorism, the threat came from outside the West, from the radicalized expatriates, who trained in the camps of Afghanistan. It could have simply been countered by denying trained terrorists access to the West. This was not done before 9/11. Aggressive border protection, especially at airports worldwide, has effectively countered this threat. It should be continued, lest terrorists be tempted again to come and wreak havoc in (what is now generally called) “the West.”

The threat is now internal to ‘the West,’ and border security is no longer relevant. A successful strategy will disrupt the process of radicalization before it reaches its violent end.

Over the past century and a halve young people have joined terrorist movements for individual and collective glory, to build a better world on behalf of an imagined constituency.

Ones proposed strategy hence is to take the glory and thrill out of terrorism; based on how potential terrorists view themselves and the world.

Terrorists want to be elevated to the status of a person on an FBI wanted poster. In this sense, distributing the pictures of terrorists in areas such as Pakistan in a misguided attempt to get the population to denounce them has exactly the opposite effect: the Rewards for Justice Program, which posts and ranks terrorists according to the price that the U.S. government is willing to pay for information leading to their capture, has been a general failure and instead turns nobodies into heroes. Very few have turned in their now famous friends and acquaintances. This program is based on an American ethnocentric economic model, while terrorists and their friends reject materialism for status and respect.

In fact often terrorists see themselves as selfless heroes devoted to their less fortunate brethren. They are sacrificing their lives for a greater good, and therefore fed morally different from criminals who are out for material gain. Their fight is for justice and fairness, manifested in a desire to punish the perceived oppressors-usually the United States. Anything that elevates them to the status of  heroes in their friends' eyes encourages them. Their constituency consists of other like-minded groups that might join the al Qaeda social movement and now populate the Internet. They are heroes to this audience. Martyrdom lifts them from insignificance and paradoxically ensures their immortality. 'The prospect of such exaltation is intoxicating. A heroic literature with songs and poems glorifies their martyrdom on the Internet.

The terrorists ask for nothing more than to fight American soldiers. 'The courage to fight this apparently invincible enemy covers them with glory in the eyes of their sympathizers. The United States has thus committed a strategic mistake by relying on its unmatched military might to stop the threat by capturing and killing Islamist militants. The sight of U.S. soldiers fighting Muslims triggers moral outrage and inspires sympathizers to join the movement. The sight of Muslims fighting back provides a heroic model to emulate. The result is that military action, creates more terrorists than it eliminates. To young Muslims, the conflict is a modern version of Robin Hood fighting the evil sheriff's henchmen.

The pursuit of a military strategy was initially popular in the United States, but it is counterproductive and self-defeating because it determines the ultimate goal of protecting the U.S. homeland. This is emphatically the case with the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which quickly radicalized, a new wave of young jihadists who have been led to believe that America is establishing a base in the Middle East in order to exploit oil resources and dominate the region.

Use of the military should be a last resort. Indeed, the only military role in the overall strategy to fight global Islamist terrorism should be to deny terrorists sanctuary. For example it was aI Qaeda's creation of a sanctuary in Afghanistan that contributed to 9/11.

Thus sanctuary denial, especially in ungoverned regions like Afghanistan or the FATA, is an appropriate military strategy. However, American troops cannot linger on the ground after the operation is over, for their continued presence-labeled as occupation-will become a rallying cry for the enemy. Military operations must be conducted swiftly, precisely, with as much restraint as possible to minimize collateral civilian deaths and with as Iowa profile as possible in order to deny terrorists the argument that this campaign is a war against Islam. The American public must be educated about the need to resist the temptation to militarize the conflict.

One of the most effective way to remove the glory from terrorism is to reduce the terrorists to common criminals. There is no glory in being taken to prison in handcuffs. No jihadi website carries such pictures, as opposed to the thousands of video clips of American military vehicles blowing up, as well as martyrs blowing themselves up in the vicinity of uniformed American personnel. Arrested terrorists will fade into oblivion and no longer inspire young people to join the fight against the West.

This strategy of taking the glory out of terrorism also means putting a stop to press conferences at which representatives from the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of Homeland Security hold self-congratulatory celebrations of their newest victories in the "war on terror." The press conferences are good for electioneering, but they are  counterproductive. Homeland security will be better served through quiet arrests and prosecutions of potential terrorists. This apparent neglect of terrorists and their reduction to common criminals robs them of the stage they crave and undermines the effective promotion of their cause through propaganda by the deed. Reducing the terrorists' profiles deprives their potential followers of seeing them as feared major players.

If in a civilian jurisdiction, the ensuing trials should be low-key demonstrations of the poverty of their ideas and the vicious nature of their acts, with prominent testimony from victims and their families presented at the penalty phase of their trials. These trials must be above reproach, which means that the government must present a strong case before a jury, something it has so far failed to do in several instances, where overzealous federal attorneys overreached their limits. Such apparent lack of fairness may antagonize the domestic Muslim community and trigger a sense of moral outrage.

The U.S. government needs to keep its attention focused on protecting the public. It cannot allow individual civil servants to exploit the issue of terrorism for personal political gain. This is counterproductive against this form of terrorism.

Today’s new self-appointed members of the al Qaeda social movement explicitly refer to Iraq and the Palestinians in communiqués or videos released after their deaths. Pictures of dying Iraqi civilians inflame Muslim youths worldwide. It is irrelevant whether the killing is by American soldiers, although if it is, the outrage is multiplied, since the blame is placed on the U.S. presence in Iraq. It provides the terrorists with a ready excuse" partially exculpating them of the atrocities they are committing.

The presence of the U.S. military on the streets of Baghdad and in the other cities and towns of Iraq enables al Qaeda and its fellow travelers to portray the situation as one of American imperialism and provides a ready target for novice terrorists. The deployment of U.S. soldiers in civilian areas and the heavy-handed tactics that necessarily go along with that deployment garner popular support for al Qaeda in its role as the self-designated defender of Islam and adversary of the United States. Muslims find ridiculous the claims that the United States is occupying Iraq to defend New York and export democracy. Instead, they believe al Qaeda claims that the U.S. military is an army of occupation interested only in dominating the region, which is almost entirely inhabited by Muslims, and exploiting its oil wealth. The U.S. invasion has proved to be a rallying cry for a new generation of young Muslims, who are willing to sacrifice themselves on behalf of their Iraqi brothers (regardless whether these brothers welcome or reject such sacrifice). The presence of even one American soldier in uniform in Iraq will trump any goodwill policy the United States attempts to carry out in the Middle East. Withdrawal from Iraq is a necessary condition for diminishing the sense of moral outrage that Muslims feel.

Removal of American forces from Iraq and a good faith attempt to broker a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are absolutely essential if the United States wants to counter al Qaeda propaganda. Only deeds, not words, will count in this arena. Muslims realize that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is complicated. They also realize that a solution will be difficult. But the appearance of an honest broker is all that is required of the United States. Since the start of the second intifada, the U.S. government is seen as siding too closely with Israel, and as complicit in Israeli operations against the Palestinians. It is a sore that continues to fester and requires urgent and even-handed attention.

A sense of moral outrage is not the exclusive province of global politics.

Local events also fuel it. There is strong evidence that the Madrid bombers were upset at the arrest of close friends and relatives by both Moroccan and Spanish authorities for their alleged involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings. They believed that their friends were innocent, and so far the evidence supports this. The arrests were a major step in their radicalization, which eventually contributed to the horrors of the March 11, 2004, train bombings in Madrid. This illustrates the importance of appearing to apply the law fairly to all of society. No element can be singled out for special treatment.

Again, the NSCT is correct to point out that "terrorism is not simply a response to, ones efforts to prevent terror attacks." Counterterrorism measures need to be seen as fair. People who have committed criminal acts should of course be arrested and prosecuted. The population understands that, and puts the blame on the criminals. It is when Muslims are indiscriminately singled out that they become angry. Any campaign against terrorism must be focused specifically on the perpetrators, and not on a more general segment of the population. This was the lesson learned, after many years of failure, by the British in their attempt to contain Irish terrorism, and by the Egyptian authorities in the late 1990s against the Egyptian Islamic Group terrorist organizations. In the Egyptian case, some of the more militant elements of the Islamic Group tried to derail their leaders' peace initiative by killing sixty-two people in Luxor in the fall of 1997. The Egyptian government refrained from carrying out waves of mass arrests as it had previously done; it had learned that its previous strategy of sweeps had inspired many young people to join the terrorists out of anger. Since Luxor, there has not been any Egyptian Islamic Group attempt against the population.

If homeland security is the goal, this type of restraint is the only policy democracies can follow. They must ensure that legitimate police actions against the suspected perpetrators of violence do not harm or alienate the broader population from which the suspects come. A slip can negate years of careful, development of the relationship with the community. This is partially what happened in Britain after the 7/7 bombings, with unwise police actions such as killing a Brazilian expatriate on suspicion he was a Muslim terrorist or the shooting of two innocent pious Muslim Bangladeshi expatriates. Potential short-term gains cannot be allowed to interfere with this ultimate goal of homeland security. This means that in the pursuit of suspected terrorist-criminals, law enforcement agencies must follow the rules so as not to be perceived as prejudiced and singling out Muslims. If the threat can be contained without arrests of presumed perpetrators, it is best to keep them free until enough evidence is accumulated to convince the public of their guilt. This calls for restraint in ones law enforcement activities, because local action vividly brings home the idea that there is discrimination against Muslims, and polarizes the community to an unhealthy level.

Muslims join the al Qaeda social movement because they respond to its appeal. AI Qaeda Central has several ideologies, but its essence is that ‘the West’ is waging a war against Islam and all good Muslims must join the fight, lest they be destroyed. This is definitely a war for "hearts and minds." The United States has interpreted it as a "War of Ideas" and its strategy is, according to the N S CT, "to counter the lies behind the terrorists' ideology and deny them future recruits."Il The NSCT promotes "effective democracy" as the way to counter terrorist ideology: "terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. Islam has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused." (National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2006,p. 10).

The terrorists in Western Europe and North America were not intellectuals or ideologues, much less religious scholars. It is not about how they think, but how they feel. Let us not make the mistake of over-intellectualizing this fight. It is indeed a contest for the hearts and minds of potential terrorists, not an intellectual debate about the legitimacy of an extreme interpretation of a religious message.

The terrorists' lack of religious education is most striking for the third wave of global Islamist terrorists. Members of this wave are poorly educated (unlike those in the preceding waves) and do not even know the Qu’ran. Their relative ignorance of their religion contributes to their vulnerability to extreme interpretations of the Qu’ran. Religious education might have inoculated them against such interpretations since it would have given them a context with which to assess the legitimacy of terrorist messages. The entire effort to dissuade wannabes from joining the ranks of the al Qaeda social movement by debating them with religious arguments and selective quotes from the Qu’ran and hadiths is misguided. The defendants in terrorism trials around the world would not have been swayed by an exegesis of the Qu’ran. They would simply have been bored and would not have listened. Those potential terrorists visiting sites on the Internet would avoid those with overt religious content because they are not interested in religious disquisition. Radical Islamic theology is not the main source of appeal for the vast majority of arrested global Islamist terrorists. Theological debates may appeal to a few autodidactic scholars that populate some of the radical Internet sites, but they seem to only talk to each other and hold little appeal for the real terrorist rank and file, who join for other reasons.

A counterterrorist focus on Islamic ideology is dangerous. One cannot afford to allow the terrorists to control the debate by framing the context of this war to their advantage. It is not the role of the West to tell Muslims what is Islam and what is not Islam. Let them define it however they want, and focus ones efforts on undermining the appeal that global Islamist terrorism has for young Muslims.

At the same time, "effective democracy" as advocated in the NSCT is not going to appeal to potential terrorists either. The recent NSCT document provides a number of reasons as to why promotion of "effective democracy" is a strong counterstrategy to the terrorist ideology.

The terrorists' lack of religious education is most striking for the current wave of global Islamist terrorists. Members of this wave are poorly educated (unlike the in the preceding wave that involved 9/11).

Their relative ignorance of their religion contributes to their vulnerability to extreme interpretations of the Qu’ran. Religious education might have inoculated them against such interpretations since it would have given them a context with which to assess the legitimacy of terrorist messages. The entire effort to dissuade wannabes from joining the ranks of the al Qaeda social movement by debating them with religious arguments and selective quotes from the Qu’ran and hadiths is misguided. The defendants in terrorism trials around the world would not have been swayed by an exegesis of the Qu’ran. They would simply have been bored and would not have listened. Those potential terrorists visiting sites on the Internet would avoid those with overt religious content because they are not interested in religious disquisition. Radical Islamic theology is not the main source of appeal for the vast majority of arrested global Islamist terrorists. Theological debates may appeal to a few autodidactic scholars that populate some of the radical Internet sites, but they seem to only talk to each other and hold little appeal for the real terrorist rank and file, who join for other reasons.

A counterterrorist focus on Islamic ideology is dangerous. One cannot afford to allow the terrorists to control the debate by framing the context of this war to their advantage. It is not the role of the West to tell Muslims what is Islam and what is not Islam. Let them define it however they want, and focus ones efforts on undermining the appeal that global Islamist terrorism has for young Muslims.

At the same time, "effective democracy" as advocated in the NSCT is not going to appeal to potential terrorists either. The recent NSCT document provides a number of reasons as to why promotion of "effective democracy" is a strong counterstrategy to the terrorist ideology. Advancement of "effective democracy" is a worthwhile goal by itself, which I strongly endorse, but it will not affect terrorism. In fact, the unrest that might accompany the transition to "effective democracy" might promote terrorism, as it did in Indonesia in its transition to democracy. There, the unrest was so widespread that a wave of bombings that damaged about forty churches on Christmas Eve 2000 went unnoticed at the time. The NSCT even admits that its strategy might not work.

Democracies are not immune to terrorism. In some democracies, some ethnic or religious groups are unable or unwilling to grasp the benefits of freedom otherwise available in the society. Such a group can evidence the same alienation and despair that the transnational terrorists exploit in undemocratic states. This accounts for the emergence in democratic societies of homegrown terrorists-even among second- and third-generation citizens. Even in these cases, the long-term solution remains deepening the reach of democracy so that all citizens enjoy its benefits. In other words, young Muslims in the democratic West who chose to join global Islamist terrorism were "unable or unwilling to grasp" the gift of democracy. This is not a convincing explanation of the "homegrown terrorist" phenomenon.

Thus promoting "effective democracy" as a strategy in the war for "hearts and minds" falls flat. Muslims know all about democracy: they have it in Egypt, in Morocco, in Algeria, and now in Iraq. They do not want this type of democracy. Muslims around the world also do not believe that the United States is trying to promote "effective democracy" when they see that it seems to backtrack on its commitment to democracy each time parties hostile to the United States win elections in the Middle East (the case of Ham as in the Palestinian Authority being one the more recent examples). And in Europe, Muslims realize that although they do have a voice in the government, the numbers are against them and they do not have any effective influence over their government. They then reject democracy as an effective tool and turn to violence instead to influence their government. Indeed, they celebrate their alleged victory in Spain in the election of March 14, 2004, where Prime Minister Aznar's government, which sent troops to Iraq, was defeated by Prime Minister Zapatero's government, which promptly brought the troops home. Although this is not my reading of why this sequence of events took place, this use of violence three days before elections has been celebrated in jihadi chat rooms (and ironically also denounced in right-wing U.S. chat rooms) as a major victory for al Qaeda.

A focus on "effective democracy" in the context of an occupation of Iraq and support for some of the greatest violators of democratic principles strains the credibility of the United States. Credibility is a key issue in a battle for hearts and minds. At present, the U.S. government has no credibility in most of the world, and this has been a self-inf4cted wound. On the other hand, the willingness of an extremely wealthy civil engineer and a promising physician to sacrifice all for the sake of their beliefs makes it credible that they preach what they actually believe.

Earlier on Soc.World-Journal.Net, one argued that Muslims join this terrorist social movement because they want to be viewed as heroes. The desire to escape insignificance and become famous seems to be a powerful motivator for joining the terrorist social movement. Young Muslims need alternative local heroes with whom they can identify and who can be role models for them.

In the Middle East, the region of hereditary democracies, leaders do not allow anyone to become so famous as to potentially challenge their legitimacy. After a certain threshold of fame, they are systemically cut down. Instead, Osama bin Laden is a hero to many Muslims for his willingness to sacrifice his riches for the cause of the Muslims. This does not mean that they like his policies or his goals, but they admire him and many want to become like him.

In the United States there are Muslim local heroes who have become successful in the community. They can be a source of inspiration for local ambitious young Muslims. In Europe, local heroes to the younger generation are rare, and in the Middle East, they are even rarer. Now, the local heroes to imitate are terrorists. There is a "jihadi cool" and "jihadi talk" in Europe, where it is fashionable to emulate terrorists. This makes jihad fun and interesting to young Muslims, who join global Islamist terrorism because it's cool and thrilling to be part of a clandestine undertaking. It is imperative that the Muslim community create new models of success for their youth to emulate.

At present, non-Muslim populations give an inadvertent advertisement to bin Laden and al Qaeda by their obsession with them. This is the wrong message to send. The key is to diminish the fame and therefore the appeal of these violent models. Much of the discussion about "jihadi cool" takes place informally in Muslim enclaves in Europe and in Internet chat rooms. The chat rooms have become the arena where the war for the "hearts and minds" takes place. This battle is completely one-sided. The true believers, who populate the radical forums, are working themselves into a frenzy with no moderate voice present to calm them down. This leads to ever greater radicalization on the part of the participants, who slowly take on the views of their friends. The greater Muslim community cannot allow this to happen. This is a fight for the soul of the Muslim community. Muslims who reject violence need to enter this arena and participate in the discussions to influence and stop this slide toward ever greater radicalization. This is an internal Muslim debate about the nature of their community in the West. Non-Muslims have no role to play in this debate, for any intervention on the side of those rejecting violence might simply discredit them and leave them open to accusation of having sold out. The Internet should become the battleground of this war of interpretations, hopes, dreams, and aspirations.

In this online battle for hearts and minds, it is important to identify the influential opinion leaders in the various forums frequented by Muslim youths. These leaders should be the focus of a subtle campaign to influence them to embrace nonviolence as a way to fulfill Muslim aspirations. This campaign should be conducted by other Muslims, who can benefit from advice on the process of political and cultural influence. Of course, conflicts between Muslims and non-Muslims are bound to arise in any complex society. The point is to informally persuade influential Muslims-those whom young Muslims look up to-to advocate the resolution of such conflicts in a law-abiding and peaceful manner.

Terrorist groups often do make mistakes and go too far-even for their own supporters. Most commonly, this happens when they start killing women and children. The bombing of a wedding in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005 dramatically turned the Jordanian population from one that generally supported terrorism (especially directed against Israel) to one that rejected it. Such mistakes offer a hugely important opportunity for those who want to mobilize public, opinion against the terrorists. This calls for restraint and nimble exploitation of the opportunity offered by the overreach of the terrorists when even many Muslims reject violence and terrorism.

The same bias also operates the other way, when the most outrageous statements from Sunday morning evangelists in the United States are posted on Saudi websites within a day or so, and people in Saudi Arabia believe that these statements represent majority belief in the United States. Sensationalism sells. Editors and producers need to provide more balanced reporting on this issue.

Perhaps a more active engagement between non-Muslims and Muslims in the West would give more visibility to mainstream Muslims through this relationship. Both sides can issue joint statements condemning moral violations against Muslims and non-Muslims alike, advocate universal civil rights for all and condemn discrimination against Muslims in the West, and promote the idea of a partnership for justice and fairness for everyone around the world, including Muslims. This will require the West, and especially the United States, to distance themselves from local violations of civil rights, often perpetrated by putative allies in the name of the "war against terror" -the Russian intervention in Chechnya, the Uzbek crackdown against dissidents, the Egyptian government's campaigns against dissidents, for example. These violations must be condemned no matter what their origin. There can be little doubt that many U.S. allies in the Middle East and the Muslim world do not share a Western commitment to civil rights, let alone "effective democracy."

National security thus is not just a matter for government officials. In the battle for hearts and minds, the American public must also be educated about the real nature of the threat facing the United States. The fear of terrorism has reached the bogeyman threshold. Terrorists are not as well organized as the Communist Party that the United States faced just two decades ago. The real threat to the United States comes from two sources: spontaneously self-organized groups of homegrown wannabes, who are still undetected by local law enforcement authorities and who join the terrorist social movement in the act of committing their first (and last if it is a suicide mission) terrorist attack; and outside terrorists, especially from Europe, who succeed in sneaking into the country to carry out their attacks. With the possible exception of AIi al-Marri, there has not been any infiltrated trained long -term sleeper cell in this country. AI Qaeda is not an insidious, silent presence. Since 9/11, most successful terrorist networks actually had been detected by local law enforcements agencies, but the seriousness of the threats was not recognized.

It is time that one begin an honest conversation about ones core values and see where security fits in ones priorities, particularly when it may involve compromises in privacy or personal rights. This debate should also encompass new technologies, such as computer-mediated communications, that are transforming how people relate to one another. This nationwide conversation must take place in public, in the various media, including the Internet; it is a conversation that will touch on the essence of what one want ones nation to be. This conversation may allow radicals of all kinds to join in a peaceful debate about ones respective visions of what, one would like ones society to be, and perhaps help defuse some of the violent "propaganda by the deed."

Although the United States, Asia, and the Middle East have been the focus of the "war on terror:' the real battleground for "hearts and minds" is Europe. European governments should begin a campaign to educate their population about the benefits of new immigrants. Once immigrants are accepted as full citizens of their countries, the friction between Muslims and non-Muslims will begin to fade away.

The duration of the threat is determined by the influx of newcomers into the global Islamist terrorist social movement. As long as young Muslims sign up, the threat will persist. As the flow into the movement dries up, so will the danger. In essence, any threat requires some form of periodic successes to inspire new young people to join the movement. As the successes vanish, so will the movement's appeal to the young, who will look elsewhere for inspiration.

The global Islamist terrorist interpretation appeals to Muslims because it resonates with their personal experiences of discrimination and economic exclusion. This is mostly a West European problem, for the "melting pot" mentality and American dream (whether myth or reality) partially protects the United States. European countries must provide their Muslim immigrant populations with equal opportunity in the labor market that refutes the claim that the West is at war with Islam. They must strive to eliminate any bias against Muslims and treat them on an equal footing with other members of their societies. Of course, Muslims should have legal remedy against such discrimination and I am sure that each Western society has the equivalent of the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. This ecumenical program would convince the Muslim community that it is an integral part of the nation, isolate the rejectionists from which potential terrorists emerge, check the spread of their appeal and inoculate potential recruits against terrorism.

In order to actively engage the Muslim community to fight violence, the rest of the population must not provide potential terrorists with any support for their claim that there is strong discrimination against Muslims, part of a War against Islam. Any slander or- discrimination against Muslims should be vigorously exposed and protested not only by government officials, but also representatives of society and nongovernmental watchdog groups, such as the Anti-Defamation League, the American Civil Liberties Union, or the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. Non-Muslim organizations should have a prominent role in extending protection of civil rights to Muslims, denounce discrimination and defamation against them and put such action on the more universal footing of the protection of civil rights. These organizations should encourage private initiatives by Muslims to denounce the more discriminatory and defamatory practices they see. Of course, such initiatives must be endorsed by the political leadership of each country and the population in general. This general condemnation of civil rights violations will in turn give Muslim leaders legitimacy and a platform to criticize violations within their midst, such as those of terrorists who happen to be Muslim. This will encourage Muslims to feel part of the larger community and distance them from the extreme elements within.

The everyday discrimination against Muslims in Europe in the labor market must be fought with the same vigor as the more blatant social discrimination. The French government's attempt to liberalize the labor market in the spring of 2006 was a good first step. However, this law was shelved after huge demonstrations of host students were joined by labor unions. The Council of State later declared the law unconstitutional. This is a bad precedent, which sends a very negative message to the children of immigrants, who are in a majority Muslim. The liberalization of the labor markets in Europe should be on a universal footing, and not appear to include measures specifically aimed at Muslims. This appearance might trigger a major blowback from the host population and  needlessly polarize society between mostly Muslim immigrants and the rest of the general population. For instance, liberalization of labor markets should be presented as a necessary measure for competition in a global economy.

To provide Muslims options other than joining terrorism out of boredom and idleness; welfare policy better be modified. It should provide some relief for the unfortunate out of work, but it should not allow them to spend their free time surfing the Internet and becoming full-time terrorist wannabes. State-sponsored work programs should keep them busy on tasks useful for society, a little like the various work programs under the New Deal. Such programs would not have to be so extensive since the national unemployment rate is not as dramatic as the one during the Great Depression. The point is that young people of working age should not be idle and thereby seek to escape boredom in the thrill of joining a forbidden movement.

Any governmental singling out of the Muslim community will be viewed with suspicion in these extremely tense times because of the global Islamist terrorist threat. Muslims resent being viewed as terrorists by the rest of the population and reject this label. Even measures to protect some segments of the Muslim population will be viewed as discriminatory. Because of the German government's desire to prevent forced marriages, common in the Turkish immigrant community, which imports very young brides from Anatolian villages, it enacted a law that grants a residency permit to spouses of immigrants only if they are at least eighteen years of age and have a basic knowledge of German. This law does not pertain to spouses of nonimmigrant Germans and does not apply to Americans, Japanese, or European Union citizens. Groups representing Germany's Turkish population claimed discrimination and refused to participate in the German chancellor's integration summit in mid-July 2007. They claimed that if the law was intended to protect women, it should be adopted to make it easier for women to flee violent husbands. According to current regulations, a spouse who joins a partner in Germany could get his or her independent residence permit only after two years.

While the fight against this new infectious form of terrorism is a battle for hearts and minds, there are physical terrorists who are plotting to kill people. These terrorists must be eliminated before they can indiscriminately harm innocent victims. This is a local law enforcement task, which must be carried out with restraint and in accordance with the law to maintain the trust and confidence of society.

The recommendation for police restraint was already articulated in the section on diminishing moral outrage. The local police force must never be seen as the enemy by the Muslim community. An effort must be made to change that perspective, so that local law enforcement is viewed as part of the community. This means that local law enforcement should be recruited from the neighborhood itself so that its composition reflects the local population.

Police departments in European cities for example draw heavily on the host population, which treats the immigrant populations and their progeny with some condescension. There is a palpable hostility between the police departments and the newcomers' neighborhoods when the officers assigned there are not from those communities. This is ripe for incidents that might spark riots, such as those in France in the fall of 2005.

The fight against terrorism is a community affair. The community must become responsible for its protection. Its vigilance against violent threats should alert local law enforcement authorities about them. British authorities complain that they do not get tips about potential terrorist threats from their local Muslim communities, which view the police with suspicion. This contrasts sharply with law enforcement authorities, who get so many tips that they must deal with the opposite problem: How to recognize real threats from the fears of the citizenry? A local police force that is seen as an integral part of the community will increase trust in local enforcement authorities and encourage Muslims to become the eyes and ears of the police. It is not sufficient for a police department to meet with Muslim leaders on a weekly basis. This might  be a good first step, but it is essential that the police force to be viewed as an organic part of the community.

Trust in the local police, a crucial ingredient of the fight against terrorists, is undermined by excessive secrecy imposed by trial judges attempting to shield potential jurors from news reports that might prejudice them at trial. In the United States, law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities are allowed to present the case in an unsealed indictment, laying out the accusation. Likewise, the principle of freedom of the press is interpreted as allowing investigative reporting on government allegations. In many Commonwealth countries, however, such as Britain, Canada, and Australia, this kind of reporting is banned because of its potential prejudicial effects on juries. The gag orders imposed on the media and authorities by the judiciary in these countries prevent the authorities from informing the Muslim community about the scope of the terrorist threat because the evidence against the suspects cannot be disclosed until the trials are over. Nor can newspapers publish what their investigative reporters have found out on their own until the trials are over.

These gag orders have contributed to broad public and especially Muslim skepticism and suspicion about the scale of the Islamist terrorist threat. The breakdown in the public's trust of the police and the public's unwillingness to accept the government's explanations of the threat of terrorism has severely affected the ability to collect important information from the public that could help tip them off to potential plots. The idea that the public can suspend judgment about such dramatic events as arrests and wait for three or four years to discover the evidence runs against human nature. The public will fill in the gaps in its knowledge and this can potentially turn against the authorities. Compelling evidence of crimes or intended crimes must be shared with the public, and especially the Muslim community, lest it become suspicious that such arrests are unwarranted and discriminative, target Muslims and therefore are part of a more general war on Islam. The U.S. legal system demonstrates that one can conduct a fair trial while still allowing the authorities to release enough evidence before the trial to convince the public that a threat exists and permitting the press to conduct and publish its own independent investigation. Defendants are entitled to a fair trial, but this does not require jurors to know nothing about a case. I see no evidence that investigative reporting prejudices juries. Jurors may know something about the events under litigation, but not so much as to prevent them from deciding fairly about the responsibility
of the defendants. The law should aim for a fair trial as opposed to an ideal one. British appellate courts must ease up on the gag orders that feed the skepticism of its Muslim community.

With the help of the community, local police forces would be the first ones to detect any potential terrorist threats. However, they must understand the nature of threat reported to them. Given the differences between local criminals and terrorists, the local police might not appreciate the warning signs. Federal authorities, because they have become the repository of information about other terrorist groups, are more likely to understand the process of radicalization and acts in furtherance of homegrown terrorist wannabes. Therefore, greater collaboration and even integration between local and federal law enforcement agencies must be set up in Western countries to detect and perhaps dissuade these groups from the path of violence. The creation of regional fusion centers under the Department of Homeland Security providing this link between local police departments and federal agencies is a step in this direction.
It is possible that the appeal of global Islamist terrorism might be a temporary romantic rebellious urge in Muslims transitioning to adulthood. They might not be hardened terrorists, and may grow out of it and settle into a more peaceful and responsible life. The law should also allow for leniency for minor infractions in exchange for important information and cooperation with authorities. Grants of leniency have proved successful against terrorist organizations, especially those past their peak appeal for potential new members. Such partial leniency, which may give the appearance of not fully punishing criminals, does carry political costs, especially from families of victims. These two imperatives, elimination of a threat and fair punishment, must be weighed by prosecutorial authorities on a case-by-case basis. However, if the ultimate goal is to reduce the actual threat to homeland security, and the arrested perpetrator has valuable information to bargain, the resulting apprehension of further perpetrators will diminish the likelihood that the public would view such bargaining as rewarding terrorism.

If the law does not allow for the fair prosecution of some suspects, then the law must be changed to reflect current realities. This is especially true when dealing with potential plots involving weapons of mass destruction. For Western jurisprudence, the problem of terrorism offers a major challenge. Because of the extent of potential atrocities committed in the name of terrorism, no government can afford to sit back and wait for these events to occur. The goal
for governments is to prevent them and disrupt or arrest terrorists before they have the opportunity to act.

And what can one do about people who talk about doing things, but have not yet  committed any acts? This is exactly the situation of potential terrorists, who are arrested before they get a chance to tarry out their intent. It is hard for the prosecutor to prove that such a person really intended to do a criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendants always have an easy defense: "One were just talking, this was not serious." Juries tend to be skeptical when finding guilt means serious prison time.

Many jurisdictions are thus trying to criminalize the status of being a terrorist. The problem, is that there is no commonly agreed upon definition of terrorism or formal status of being a terrorist. The law can provide a definition, but the defense attorney can undermine it with the common argument that a terrorist for some is a freedom fighter for others. The official definition of a terrorist also glosses over the difficulty that juries face when confronted with real cases of prosecution, namely to what extent is the indicted person guilty. Not all terrorists make and explode bombs that kill innocent bystanders. In fact, most are supporters who make terrorism possible through the dissemination of literature or Internet postings, raising money for activities that include terrorism. Or they may be people who might know about future operations but choose not to become involved and instead tell authorities about them. So, the law tries to provide more concrete criteria by making criminal the simple act of belonging to a terrorist organization. The French have had some measure of success with this approach, which assumes that formal terrorist organizations exist. This misunderstands the true nature of modern terrorism, which is carried out by informal groups of people who do not call themselves anything but "brothers." These groups are given names in the media and sometimes within law enforcement authorities as a form of shorthand. These labels over time acquire a reality of their own, leading people to make the mistaken assumption that these groups formally exist, when in fact they are usually informal and fluid in composition according to the situation, which depends on many chance events.

This obsession with legal minutiae can result in absurd decisions. On December 2, 2006, a court in Amsterdam found that three defendants were individually engaged in preparing terrorist attacks, but were acquitted of belonging to a terrorist organization. In reading out his judgment, the presiding judge contrasted the group that they belonged to-which the prosecution labeled the Lions of Taw heed (tawheed means monotheism)-with the Hofstad Group (also previously labeled by the prosecution), which had been found in  another trial to be a terrorist organization. In the Lions case, the judge argued that the Hofstad Group was a terrorist organization for three reasons: its members met regularly, these meetings were presided over by a spiritual leader, and the members devoted themselves to disseminating their ideology in writing.(See Benjamin and Simon, 2.005: 88-95; Benschop, 2.005; Buruma, 2.006; Vidino, 2.006,
337-364).

Although the Lions of Tawheed were much further along than the Hofstad Group in making preparations for one or more attacks, they did not seem to form a terrorist group because the suspects rarely met face to face. When they met each other on the street, no structure was involved. The Lions had never met in plenary session, and some members had never met each other during the period in question.( Reported in Olgun, 2.006).Under this reasoning, if the Madrid or London bombers who carried out the atrocities on March II, 2004, and July 7, 2005, respectively, had been caught, they would also have been exonerated on charges of being terrorists because they did not belong to a formal terrorist organization. I suspect that no terrorist in the third wave of Islamist terrorism could be proven to belong to a "formal" terrorist organization.

The legal consequences of this fiction of membership in a formal terrorist organization cannot be underestimated. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) prescribes procedures regarding requests for judicial authorization for electronic surveillance of those engaged in international terrorism against the United States on behalf of a foreign power. FISA includes in its definition of "foreign power" a "group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation thereof" This is construed as meaning a formal group." Unfortunately, most suspected terrorists threatening the United States are not part of a formal group, which means that law enforcement officials cannot go to a FISA court to request authorization for electronic surveillance of suspects. Since such surveillance has not been formally authorized, the results cannot be used in court, for it is not admissible evidence. This prevents the prosecution of some suspects for whom the government has amassed considerable evidence. The assumption that terrorists are organized in formal groups is an obstacle to the rightful prosecution of terrorists. This assumption needs to be rethought in light of the present evidence, and the laws altered to reflect the reality on the ground, of the defendants are necessary. One of the ways is to divert them into joining pro-social groups such as the Boy Scouts. During the early 20th century such a movement was able to captor a large portion of young people and keep them out of trouble through, outdoor activities, and good deeds. A similar large and formal network of young Muslims, based on peaceful Muslim traditions, might provide a set of belonging and self-help to deal with some of the problems that children immigrants invariably face.

As for social science often the subject of this website, a problem is that it best is done in protected areas of free inquiry, where mutual challenges and disputes lead to new insights as for example in ones own case study below. The atmosphere in government agencies however, is not conducive to such leaps of creativity because inquiry into areas of disagreement is prematurely cut off, especially when scientists' evaluations, which form the basis for promotion, are written by their superiors.

And the politics of government funding favors contracts for concrete products. In other words, at the end of the contract, there must be an unambiguous tool or "deliverable." Enter the software developers and modelers, who have been tasked to model terrorism in order to anticipate and predict the threat facing the United States. These projects, unfortunately, have no relevance to reality because they draw on inaccurate or poorly developed concepts regarding terrorism and terrorists. Models based on preconceived and false notions of how terrorist networks behave are worthless.

Although a model is a "deliverable;' it is just a tool to help manipulate concepts. It is only as useful as the purpose to which it is put. Generating data for these models is a very difficult process. Indeed, in the creation of software programs to analyze real social trends, such as forecasting the stock market, for instance, the generation of data itself that is the most difficult, complicated, and expensive step. And yet, this is exactly what is not funded because the government does not like to support the collection of information from open sources.

Tools can advance the study of terrorism, but they are just tools. The person in charge of these projects should understand terrorism and be able to gauge the usefulness of a tool for the study at hand. Federal contracting officers need to change their policy for funding terrorism research, so that many important basic projects such as "How does one become a terrorist?" or "How is a terrorist different from people who had a chance to become one but did not?" or "How do new technologies of communication transform the terrorist threat?" will be funded. Some visionary federal contracting officers are beginning to understand the problem and provide seed money for such projects.

Another  obstacle in this context is obtaining accurate data. This is made nearly impossible however, because of the widespread secrecy surrounding government acquisition of information about terrorism. Some of this governmental concern with secrecy is legitimate. However, such tactical information is not eternally sensitive and should not be maintained as secret only because of bureaucratic inertia. Homeland security was not compromised by the declassification of large parts of the interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and others for the publication of the 9/11 Commission report. This worthwhile initiative should be followed up for less important terrorist suspects currently in custody. This would make available the data necessary to pursue terrorism research on a sound empirical footing, rather than to generate opinions based on speculation.

Most government data need not be secret. There is some information that does require classification, but this should not apply to every snippet gathered about terrorists. The situation now is such that scholars dealing with terrorism know less about the new developments in the field than at any previous time. As a result, they continue to base their analysis on outdated concepts rather than evolving facts on the ground. This is especially true with the evolution of global Islamist terrorism, partly driven by the greater use of the Internet. Once, governments implicitly asked the help of the academy in the attempt to understand terrorism, as illustrated by the publications of the German Interior Ministry's findings about the psychology and sociology of the Red Army Faction wave of terrorism in the 1970s.( See Schmidtchen, 1981; Baeyer-Katte, 1983). This kind of initiative should be emulated since it provides the raw material that anchors a major program of true evidence-based terrorist research.

The NSCT correctly singles out the possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism for special consideration. The NSCT however, does not analyze the possibility that terrorists, whether Muslim or not, could acquire WMD without relying on a state sponsor. The recommendations are based on hypothetical worst-case scenarios and surprisingly ignore the empirical data on terrorists using WMD.

The difficulties of generating a nuclear device have so far prevented terrorists from seriously embarking on this path. Several terrorist groups such as al Qaeda have shown great interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, but they have not gone beyond that point. The far more serious threat in terms of both feasibility and destructive potential is from live biological agents (as opposed to biologically derived poisons) used as terrorist tools.

The odds are that a WMD attack on the United States might come, not from any of the well-known terrorist groups, which are already monitored by law enforcement authorities, but from an informal group that is not yet the focus of such scrutiny. This group might very well fly under the radar of authorities, and the strategy contained in the NSCT may prove ineffective against such an informal group. Detection will instead come from local law enforcement, which might not have the expertise-present in federal agencies-to recognize and correctly interpret what they see on the ground.

As suggested above, even if a-terrorist group where able to obtain a nuclear device and explode it, the attack would not threaten the existence of the United States. However this one should now ad, the reaction to such an attack could. This was the purpose for example of the Aum Shinrikyo attacks in the 1990s: to trigger a global war, which the cult believed it would survive. After a WMD attack, the pressure in a democracy to "do something" immediately would be overwhelming. The outraged public would demand instant retaliation against any enemy, even if it turned out to be the wrong one-as was the case with the false accusation against Iraq of involvement in the 9/11 plot. This reaction, especially if it is a nuclear strike against a traditional enemy of the United States, might escalate into a global nuclear exchange, which would be much worse than the original attack and potentially threaten the existence of the human race.

To avert such a nightmare scenario, new mechanisms must be immediately put in place. The nuclear powers need to revisit the question of nuclear war. The cold war doctrine of mutually assured destruction as the deterrent against retaliatory nuclear attacks may prove obsolete in the event of a terrorist nuclear detonation. A different strategy must be put in place that will satisfy the demands of rightfully outraged crowds in the victim state and bring the perpetrators to justice in a fair and just way. There must be immediate and transparent international cooperation to avert an even greater tragedy.

Although I focus on the WMD threats from terrorists who happen to be Muslim, one need to consider that an even greater threat may be awaiting us. Global Islamist terrorists have argued that their beliefs can legitimate the use of WMD in certain circumstances. So, too, have radical environmentalist extremists, who make the case that humans are destroying the world through pollution, global warming, and overuse of national resources and that the only way to preserve the earth and the human race is to eradicate a large portion of the world population. Such logic practically invites the use of biological agents, for no other weapon has the potential to kill so efficiently. One must not allow ones obsessive focus on the horrors caused by a wave of terrorism perpetrated by a small group of radical Muslims to blind us against the potentially far more cataclysmic devastation engineered by a completely different type of terrorism that could threaten the existence of the human race.

 

 

Global Jihad P.7.

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