By Eric Vandenbroeck and
co-workers
Dzokhar Dudayev Azerbaijani And Russian-Backed
Armenians
Since most terrorists
make very careful plans for their escape after an attack, suicide bombing cuts out
an entire layer of planning. The tactic enables the bomber to get close to his
or her target, giving rise to death tolls that are considerable - in fact four
to six times more lethal - compared with gun or grenade attacks below the level
of car bombs. Costing an average OfUS$150 to mount, suicide bombings are cheap.
If we take the Al-Aqsa Intifada,
between September 2000 and September 2005 there were 144 successful suicide
attacks in Israel among some 36,000 terrorist incidents. Although suicide
bombings accounted for a mere 0.5 per cent of all attacks, they caused 50 per
cent of deaths and casualties during this period. There is something else worth
noting about suicide bombing too. When successful, there is no one to capture
unless the mission fails - while the willingness to die indicates a fanatical
belief in a cause. The sheer ordinariness of the bomber indicates that there
must be a limitless supply of such people lurking in the hostile population. Denied
an obvious object of vengeance, much of the energy of the bewildered opponent
goes into working out the motives of why these men and women kill themselves.
Such bizarre phenomena as the small child who, in a 2007 Hamas TV advert,
swears she is going to follow her deceased mother by becoming a suicide bomber,
or the mothers who appear to welcome the deaths of their martyred sons,
encourage the view that this is all the fanatical face of a pathological
society. In fact, some of the mothers who do not grieve have been bribed,
drugged or otherwise intimidated by men, with an interest in ensuring that the
martyrs are celebrated.
Israel has around 250
unsuccessful suicide bombers in its prisons, who have been the subjects of
extensive investigation by expert psychologists. Some are alive because they
lost their nerve, others because their bombs malfunctioned. Their age range
begins at fourteen, a boy whom the Israelis captured trying to blow himself up.
Many of them were motivated to kill Jews (as they invariably put it) by the
loss of family or friends through Israeli military or police action. It is a
matter of revenge in a society where blood feuds last generations. This
multiplies the carnage. Others saw suicide bombing as a way out of a
dysfunctional family, dishonour - especially in the
case of women - or sheer boredom. Wafa Idris, a
Palestinian woman suicide bomber, had been divorced by her husband after it
became apparent she was infertile. Her husband remarried and moved his new wife
into a neighbouring house where he threw a party when
their first child was born. This sent Wafa Idris over
the edge. Several female suicide bombers seem to have disgraced themselves by
becoming pregnant with Fatah lovers, or had otherwise acquired a reputation for
looseness which shahid or martyrdom would expungeY In
2004, Hamas's first woman suicide, a woman with two children, was driven by her
husband to the checkpoint where she blew herself up after she confessed to
having had an extramarital liaison.
Ironically, some you,ng female would-be suicide bombers saw joining a
terrorist group as an opportunity to meet males without supervision. One of
them explained: 'We do not live in the West. When I went to training, I told my
father that I was going to a girlfriend ... I had freedom, even though our
family is religious. It is natural to go and see girlfriends.' She got cold
feet only when the males informed her that the object of these training trysts
was for the girls to blow themselves up. One shahida
explained that when her father refused to allow her to marry a (poor) disabled
man with whom she had fallen in love, she got her revenge by becoming a suicide
bomber. The vision of life in the Garden of Eden overcame her depression. For
women there would not be the seventy-two virgins, but an abundance of food and
a doting martyrwarrior. A male failed suicide bomber
explained his vision of heavenly delights, much of which was haram to Muslims:
'All that is forbidden in this world is permitted in the Garden of Eden. The
Garden of Eden has everything - God, freedom, the Prophet Mohammed and my
friends, the "shahids" ... There are seventy-two virgins. There are
lots of things I can't even describe ... I'll find everything in the Garden of
Eden, a river of honey, a river of beer and alcohol ... '44 Once dead, the
suicide bomber joins the rollcall of martyrs, his or her photo ringed with a
golden frame at home, and plastered everywhere on posters. Proud parents
announce the death in the weddings, rather than obituaries, columns of newspapers.
By 2001 Hamas was paying them between US$3,OOO and US$8,000 in death benefits.
Saddam Hussein raised this to US$28,000, with further perks such as clocks,
rugs and TV s. Expectations are so low in places like Gaza and Jenin, that
killing oneself can seem like an attractive career option, and a form of social
mobility for the entire family or clan. Social endorsement of martyrdom further
destroyed residual taboos about suicide, which in any case had been qualified
by many Islamist clerics.
Suicide attacks were
accompanied by vicious battles between armed elements of the Intifada and the
IDF. One of these raged for ten days in a refugee camp at Jenin, home to
fifteen thousand people. This was an Islamist stronghold variously described as
'the capital of martyrs' or 'a nest of cockroaches' depending on one's point of
view. Hamas and Islamic Jihad wanted to turn this into an Arab Stalingrad,
wiring it with booby-traps and sniping from amid the mounting rubble. As the
inhabitants were slow to abandon their homes, they also hoped that any Israeli
assault would deliver a propaganda victory, with talk of massacre finding its
way from journalists to human rights agencies. In fact, talk of 'hundreds' or
even 'thousands' of victims, relayed by Western media outlets, whose presenters
could hardly contain their own rage, was misplaced. The final agreed death toll
was thirty-two Palestinian armed militants, twenty-two Palestinian civilians,
and twenty-three Israeli soldiers. Instead of a non-existent massacre there was
steady physical erasure, as helicopters and tanks fired missiles and shells
into buildings, while sixty-ton armoured bulldozers
nudged down houses and ground down the rubble. If there were human rights
violations, these included the Palestinian and IDF decisions to fight a pitched
battle in a refugee camp, and Israel's denial of medical and humanitarian
relief to civilians caught in the fighting. Scenes like these, repeated
endlessly on the world's TV channels, further fuelled
the anger of the virtual ummah. They were not alone. In 2003 Asif Muhammed
Hanif and Omar Khan Sharif, Anglo- Pakistanis in their twenties, who had met
studying Islamism under Omar Bakri Mohammed at a college in Derby, volunteered
their services to Hamas. They met a Hamas instructor in Syria and then entered
Israel via Jordan, mingling with European left-wing activists arriving to
insert themselves into the Intifada as part of an Alternative Tourism Group.
They seem to have been ferried around various Palestinian towns by a left-wing
Italian woman journalist who did not realise they
were terrorists, having accepted their cover stories about being interested in
Palestinian medical centres. In Gaza they were kitted
out with suicide belts and the Italian woman drove them into Israel. Hanif blew
himself up outside Mike's Place, a popular Tel Aviv blues bar on the city's
waterfront, killing three people. Sharif fled, after a bomb concealed in a book
failed to detonate, and his body was washed up on the shore a few weeks later,
having drowned in mysterious circumstances.
The mother of a
professional Saudi soldier was watching the news with her son one evening in
the early 1990S: 'Look what they are doing, they are raping our sisters and
killing our brothers. My son, get up, and go, and I don't want to see you
again.' Abu Saif, the soldier, and a friend called
Abu Hamad al-Otaibi, were soon at the village of Bjala-Bucha in Bosnia. When the Serbs attacked, most of Abu
Hamad's head was blown off by a 120 mm shell. Abu Saif
was shot dead in the same battle. As they were lowered into one grave, their
fellow Arab jihadists said: 'They loved each other in this world and they shall
love each other in the next.' Over in east London at the some
time, Bangladeshi and Pakistani students at Tower Hamlets College
watched a short film, The Killing Fields of Bosnia, which made many of them
weep. At the London School of Economics, the 'Tottenham Ayatollah', sheikh Omar
Bakri, the Syrian-born spiritual head of the extremist Hizb
ut- Tahir, had Muslim students jumping to their feet
shouting 'Jihad for Bosnia!' after one of his rabble-rousing performances in
the main lecture theatre.45
Perceptions of
Muslims as victims were massively enhanced by the terrible wars that erupted
amid the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Balkans inspired anger, with tales
of Serbs using ropes attached to cars to drag the testicles off Muslim males.
In March 1992, the predominantly Muslim Bosnia-Herzogovina
declared its independence, thereby reminding Muslims elsewhere that they had two
million Serbo-Croatspeaking co-religionists
indigenous to this part of Europe, South Slavs who had been Islamised
under the Ottomans. However, after decades of Communism and secular education,
and rates of urban intermarriage of 30 per cent by the 1980s, the Bosnian
Muslims were largely Muslim by virtue of culture and tradition rather than
fervency. Certain distinct customs and habits marked them out - like drinking
coffee from cups with no handles, infant circumcision and distinctive names -
but they also drank alcohol and ate pork, and were heavily Europeanised
and scarcely hostile to a Western world they regarded as superior to
Communism.46
Bosnia has an
indigenous Islamist tradition, although this was confined to a tiny handful of
intellectuals. Alija Izetbegovic, the first Bosnian
president, was typical of most of these, however, in that he had matured from
the Muslim Brotherhood influences of his youth, which had repeatedly landed him
in the jails of the Communist dictator Tito, to an endorsement of democracy and
an openness towards Western culture. He bent over backwards to accommodate
Croat and Serb sensitivities as an independent Bosnia developed. This
relatively enlightened position was in marked contrast to the crudity with
which former Communists, like Slobodan Milosevic, espoused an extreme Serbian
Orthodox Christian national socialism which played upon the still visceral
mythology of the Second W orld War. In Serbian eyes,
the Croats were latterday Ustashe
- the Catholic Fascist party that Hitler and Mussolini had helped into power -
while the two million Bosnian Muslims were Islamist fundamentalists. Ethnically
speaking, they were nothing more than Romanised or Islamised Serbs. As had already happened when.. Croatia and
Slovenia declared their independence, Milosevic used the combined muscle of the
Serb-dominated Yugoslav federal army and sinister ethnic-Serb paramilitaries to
fuse the exclaves of territory which he sought to incorporate into a Greater
Serbia. This tactic was stymied by the Croats, leaving Milosevic to divert this
malign energy towards Bosnia, where the psychiatrist turned politician Radovan
Karadzic had already declared Serbian Autonomous Regions as a newly independent
Bosnia was recognised by the EEC in April 1992.
West European
politicians adopted the idiosyncratic strategy of extruding the US from what
they protectively claimed was a European problem, while evincing a patrician
disdain worthy of Bismarck for the warring savages in the Balkans. They
clutched at any historical cliche in their expensively educated imaginations to
justify a fateful inertia. By denying the Bosnian Muslims arms, they left them
at the mercy of Serb forces with huge stockpiled (and manufacturing) capacity
that was immune to an impartial UN arms embargo. British patricians used every
slippery evasion to do nothing while butchery, rape and ethnic cleansing took
place right under their noses, until the world's media - above all Penny
Marshall of ITN - made this impossible by publicising
scenes almost worthy of Bergen-Belsen. Western Christians and Jews were as
appalled by what they saw as anyone else, in many cases forcing their reluctant
governments to do something about it by comparing it with the Holocaust.
At first, the organised Muslim world did not know how to respond to the
plight of a Muslim community they knew next to nothing about. In 1992 the
subject was discussed at Islamic conferences in Istanbul and Jeddah. The
Iranians were the first to offer practical aid, shipping arms and training instructors
via Turkey and Croatia to Bosnia, a supply stream that the US tolerated to
redress the imbalance between Bosnia and Croatia and Serbia, for many of these
weapons fell out of their crates in Zagreb. Egypt and Saudi Arabia donated
respectively humanitarian aid and US$150 million, while discouraging a
repetition of the Afghan Arab jihad that was already blowing back streams of
militants into their countries. Inevitably, since the fall of Kabul in 1992,
the free electrons of the jihad were drawn to Bosnia as if by a powerful
magnet. Unless they went deeper into Afghanistan, they had nowhere to go, for
home was not an option. Pakistan had also blocked the passage of further Arabs
into that country. Men connected to Al Qaeda installed the personnel to receive
both Arab Afghan mujaheddin and local recruits from among Muslim European
immigrants as they made their way to Bosnia via Croatia.
'.
A forty-two-year-old Saudi, sheikh Abu Abdel Aziz 'Barbaros'
- the latter word referring to his two-foot-Iong
henna-red beard - was a veteran Arab Afghan also known by the term 'Hown' after the Soviet Hound artillery shell he had used so
proficiently. He was one of the first recruits to Al Qaeda. Although he
initially thought Bosnia might be situated in the US, Aziz quickly pronounced
that the conflict was a legitimate holy war for his fellow jihadi-salafists. Another key participant was a radical cleric, an
Egyptian called sheikh Anwar Shaaban, imam of Milan's Islamic Cultural
Institute, a mosque installed in a former garage. There are ten mosques in
Milan, serving a Muslim population of about one hundred thousand. Most of them
are moderate, but the I CI was not, following its London equivalent in PillSbury Park in encouraging worshippers to occupy the
pavements in aggressive defiance of motorists and shopkeepers. The mosque was
also the hub of an extortion racket which monopolised
the supply of halal meat to butchers it terrified into being sole customersY The ICI performed an equivalent role to Abdullah
Azzam in Peshawar during the Afghan wars, and both the Jordanian cleric Abu
Qatada and Abu Hamza aI-Masri in London, in despatching fighters to Bosnia. The hook-handed Hamza went
to Bosnia in person, but soon fell out with Algerian Islamists he encountered.
Another Italian-based cleric, Mohamed Ben Brahim Saidani, head of a mosque in Bologna, was the direct link
between the Bosnian jihad and bin Laden. Beyond these two, a network of
Islamist clerics including sheikh Abu Talal al-Qasimy
in Cairo and sheikh Omar bin Ahmad in Yemen banged the drum to lure young men
to Bosnia. While these clerics provided the theologicallegitimisation,
and many recruits, for this new field of jihad, Algerian and Egyptian veterans
of Afghanistan, like Boudella aI-Hajj,
Moataz Billah and Wahiudeen al-Masri organised the military training at two camps which the
jihadists operated from Mehurici and Zenica.
A motley array of
volunteers descended on Bosnia. A Bahraini prince and one of the nation's
soccer stars, a Qatari handball player and young British Muslim medical
students rubbed shoulders with bulky ArabAmericans
from Detroit. The group's official cameraman was a young German Muslim who as a
teenager discovered that his German parents had adopted him from a Turkish couple,
whom he rejoined. At the age of twenty-one Abu Musa went to Bosnia to fight and
film for the mujaheddin, one of his key tasks being to capture the smile on the
faces of dying jihadi's. A shadowy network of Islamist charities, based in the
US, Europe, North Africa and the Middle East, many of which had proven links to
AI Qaeda terrorists and which would move its money around too, oiled the
assembly and supply of this army. The names, Human Concern International or
Third World Relief Agency, belied the evil intent.
The core fighters
were wild people, in their Afghan-style flat caps and long quilted jackets,
whose cries of'Allahu Akhbar!'
sent a shudder down the spines of UN peacekeepers, who were under orders not to
fire at them. They frightened their Bosnian allies, who generally wanted to
live, as well as villagers whose pigs they shot. The Arab jihadist presence in
Bosnia led to a new apocalyptic rhetoric, in which this complex struggle was
portrayed as 'a war between Islam and Christianity ... a war carried out by the
entire West against the Islamic world'. It also led to the introduction of Mghan mores, as when the heads of three captured Serbs were
displayed on poles, while others were crudely circumcised with a commando
knife. Another Serb prisoner described what happened to him in Arab jihadist
captivity: 'As soon as we arrived, the mujaheddins tied us with a hose, into
which they let air under pressure, to make it expand and press our legs. This
caused terrible pains and Gojko Vujeiae swore [to] God,
so one of the mujaheddin took him aside and cut his head off. I did not see
what he used to do the cutting, but I know that he brought the head into the
room and forced all of us to kiss it. Then the mujaheddin hung the head on a
nail in the wall.' Unsurprisingly, captured Serbs, like captured Soviets in
Afghanistan, began to accept offers to convert to Islam.
When in 1993 the Arab
mujaheddin and their Bosnian allies found themselves fighting the Croats as
well as the Serbs, similar atrocities occurred. On one occasion, the jihadists
had to be restrained by their Bosnian allies as they attempted to blow up an
ancient monastery after they had already scraped images of Jesus and the Virgin
Mary from the murals around the altar. Elsewhere they grabbed four young men in
a village, cut their throats, and collected the blood so as to tip it back over
the victims' heads.48 Western aid workers became targets too, notoriously when
three British men were kidnapped, which resulted in the execution-style killing
of Paul Goodhall, and the shooting of two of his
friends as they fled the same fate at the hands of the jihadists. Tensions
. between the Bosnian army and their indispensable foreign friends led to the
formation of a separate Battalion of Holy Warriors, whose semisuicidal
propensities w:re in evidence in several major battles. They were owed a debt
of blood by the Bosnian government. This explains why that government ignored
warnings that the networks that sustained these foreign fighters were
simultaneously engaged in acts of terrorism. In 1995, Algerian jihadists were
sent from Bosnia to blast with shotguns an imam of a Paris mosque who had
co-founded the Islamic Salvation Front, which by then had fallen foul of the
more extreme Armed Islamic Group or GIA. Others connected to the 'charity'
Human Concern International were responsible for two bomb attacks on the Paris
Metro - the first of which killed ten and injured 116 - as well as a failed
attempt to derail a high-speed TGV near Lyons, an early indication that the
jihadists were bent on indiscriminate mass casualties.
Warnings from Egypt
about this viper's nest in Europe's midst were also ignored by most European
governments. After an attempt was foiled to assassinate Hosni Mubarak, the
Egyptians decided to strike back. They had the Croatian police arrest Talal al-Qasimy, simultaneously the patron of the Bosnian jihadists
and the international spokesman of Al-Gama'at, the
terror organisation which had co-operated with Al
Qaeda in a bid to murder the Egyptian leader in Addis Ababa. In an early
example of CIA-supervised rendition under US president Bill Clinton (for George
W. Bush did not patent the policy), al-Qasimy was
'de-territorialised' by being moved to a US warship,
and then handed over to the Egyptians. After a spell in the so-called ghost
villas maintained by the Egyptian secret service, he was executed in accordance
with a death sentence passed in 1992.49 A decade before major terrorist
atrocities in Europe, the Egyptian government issued a clear warning in
Al-Ahram:
His [al-Qasimy's] arrest proves what we have always said, which is
that these terror groups are operating on a worldwide scale, using places like
Afghanistan and Bosnia to form their fighters who come back to the Middle East
... European countries like Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, England and others,
which give sanctuary to these terrorists, should now understand it will come
back to haunt them where they live.
Virtually every
European government, with the honourable exception of
the French, ignored a warning whose chill truth is evident a decade later. AB
sixty thousand NATO peacekeepers descended on Bosnia in the wake of the- Dayton
Agreements to halt the carnage, the Bosnian government enabled many of the Arab
jihadists, including those who had married locally, to become citizens by
issuing them with batches of blank passports. This got around the provision in
Dayton that the jihadists had thirty days to leave the country. The villages
where they settled acquired roadsigns warning 'FEAR ALLAH'.
Since the jihadists regarded the peace deal as a sell-out, and viewed Western
NATO troops as enemies of Islam, any number of ugly incidents occurred when the
two sides met, even as a Canadian suicide bomber attacked a Croatian police
station in revenge for the abduction of al-Qasimy. In
December, a nineteen-year-old British suicide bomber was killed when a car bomb
he was readying for use against Croat forces prematurely exploded. A spiral of
violence ensued, especially after Croat troops ambushed and assassinated sheikh
Anwar Shaaban, the key figure in the entire Bosnian jihad. As Christmas was
celebrated for the first time in four years in Bosnia, the mujaheddin shot up
Croat soldiers returning from mass.
What happened in
Bosnia is important for several reasons. The wars mobilised
Muslim opinion across the world, simplifying complex internecine conflicts into
a war between Christianity and Islam - a view somewhat undermined by the
enormous relief efforts made by Christians in the West who would have recoiled
from the nationalist Orthodox Christianity of the Serbs, whose only firm allies
were their Russian co-religionists. The foreign jihadists acquired further
combat experience and extended the organisational
sinews of terrorism into Europe, under the noses of security services that had
yet to learn that Human Concern International was not quite what the words
implied. Yet there was something else too. The war was resolved by another Pax
Americana and the presence of large numbers of NATO troops, including many from
Muslim countries like Turkey. The jihadists' attempt to plant Islamist palms in
the snows of the Bosnian hills had failed. The local Muslim population
resembled a body that rejects an organ transplant. Faced with what the
jihadists represented, the Bosnian Muslims opted for their local tradition of
confining their religion to the private sphere, laughing off radical calls to
ban Father Christmas. That this was all the local Islamist radicals called for
was a victory of a notable kind. The trouble was that this evolving reality did
not moderate the scenes of jihad that circulated on the internet or via DVDs,
for these had joined the timeless fairytale too.50
A third conflict enragea the jihadi-salafist
imagination by supplying lurid images of Muslim suffering and, one strongly
suspects, scenes of retaliatory savagery that often reflected a psychopathic
bloodlust. When would-be Anglo-Pakistani jihadists sit down of a night in some
dilapidated northern English suburb to watch their spiritual comrades in
action, the most gruesome scenes invariably stem from the Chechen wars, whose
agonies and complexities have been reduced to a jihadist splatter movie on a
DVD costing about US$20.
The implosion of the
Soviet Union in December 1991 brought not only the collapse of the Soviet outer
empire, but demands for greater autonomy within the newly minted Russian
federation, 30 per cent of whose citizens were not ethnic Russians. Only two
federal subjects refused to sign the 1992 Federation Treaty, and by 1994
Tatarstan had negotiated a special accord granting it enhanced autonomy. That
left Chechnya, the predominantly Muslim part of the former ChechenIngush
Soviet Republic, a million of whose people Stalin had deported in 1944 to
Kazakhstan, from which the remnants returned home in 1957. They found that
eight hundred mosques and four hundred religious colleges had been shut down,
while the mazars or shrines, essential to the Sufi
brotherhoods to which many Chechens belonged, had been closed or demolished.
Although the Muslim world is entirely unaware of this, it has largely been
conservative Western scholars like Robert Conquest and John Dunlop who have
spent decades investigating the crimes of the Soviet Union against the Chechen
people, studies partly informed by the spirit of the Cold War, but also honouring the struggle of a small nation against a
chauvinistic totalitarianism. Others have increased our understanding of
Islam's role in Chechen society. The vast majority of Chechens practise a popular Sufi strain of Islam that incorporates
local customs, drum and string music, and venerable paganisms; since the 1980s,
some 10 per cent have adopted the more bracing beliefs of the Wahhabis. On 6
September 1991, militant Chechen separatists led by former Soviet general Dzokhar Dudayev, a Chechen married to a Russian woman,
stormed the Chechen-Ingush Supreme Soviet, killing the Communist leader of the
capital Grozny and effectively dissolving the government. After having himself
elected president by a suspiciously large margin, Dudayev unilaterally declared
Chechen independence. When Russia's president Boris Yeltsin declared a state of
emergency and flew Interio~_ Ministry troops to
Grozny, Soviet president Mikhail, Gorbachev declared his action illegal. The
Chechens rounded up the Russian troops and bussed them home. Two months later,
Shamil Basayev, whose first name evoked the legendary
imam Shamil who had fought tsarist invaders in the mid-nineteenth century,
hijacked a Russian plane and 178 passengers en route
to Ankara in Turkey. He threatened to blow them up unless Yeltsin rescinded the
state of emergency. The incident was settled peacefully, but strikingly
president Dudayev made Basayev a colonel and gave him
a command in his Presidential Guard, a worrying response to an act of
terrorism.
In 1992 Dudayev sent Basayev to aid Muslim Azerbaijani national forces fighting
Russian-backed Christian Armenians in NagornoKarabakh,
and then to help Abkhazians fighting for freedom from Georgia. The rumours were ominous. One of the reasons why two hundred
thousand ethnic Georgians fled Abkhazia in terror was that, after decapitating
a hundred prisoners, Basayev had organised
soccer matches for his men playing with the heads of these captives. He
returned to Chechnya with a band of brutal 'wolves', although the human variety
were a great deal more sinister than the four-legged ones. In 1994 Basayev and twenty of his best men flew to Pakistan where
the ISI sent them for advanced training at a mujaheddin camp in Afghanistan. He
returned home to Chechnya after being taken ill handling chemical weapons, they
and nuclear explosives being a constant in the apocalyptic imprecations he
rained down upon Russia.
When a Moscow-backed
opposition emerged against President Dudayev's dictatorial rule, Basayev played a leading role in suppressing them,
defeating a squadron of Russian tanks operating as freelance mercenaries on the
rebel side. Not so covert Russian support for the rebels became an all-out
onslaught once the Chechen leader refused an ultimatum from Yeltsin for all
sides to disarm and desist. The Russian attack was a shambles, as officers and
men refused to participate in actions of dubious legality, while nervous
conscripts drafted in from neighbouring regions
trembled as they approached formidable Chechen fighters. Encountering
resistance in Grozny, most of whose citizens were ethnic Russians, the Russians
spent five weeks bombarding the city with heavy artillery and waves of bombers.
As the Chechen rebels had fallen back to wage a guerrilla campaign from the
mountains, most of the twenty-seven thousand dead in the ruined city were
innocent civilians, who unlike the Chechens had no village teips
or clans to seek sanctuary with.
The Chechen wars'
were fought with terrible brutality on both sides, even before the Chechens
resorted to spectacular terrorist violence. The Chechens used mines and
ambushes to disrupt Russian movement, while the Russians, many of whose
commanders were routinely drunk, pulverised towns and
villages with artillery fire that took no account of a civilian presence.
Torture of prisoners was similarly normal on both sides. After the Russians
killed eleven members of Basayev's family by dropping
two six-ton bombs on his uncle's house, fatalities which included the rebel
commander's wife and child, no captured Russian pilot would survive. Basayev made two fateful decisions.
First, he decided to
take the war to Russia, or, as he had it, to make the Russians see what blood
looks like, the second of many acts of terrorism he committed. These acts
played into Russian propaganda that built on the widespread reputation Chechens
had among ordinary Russians for Mafia-style activities. In the summer of 1995
he hid 145 of his men in trucks, while others, disguised as Russian policemen,
claimed that the vehicles contained the bodies of Russian troops killed in
Chechnya. Bribes ensured that the convoy swept through Russian checkpoints
until they were stopped in the southerly town of Budennovsk.
Escorted to the town police station, Basayev's men
leaped from the trucks and killed all the policemen, before initiating a
full-scale gun battle with police reinforcements in the town centre. Basayev initially secured
the town hospital, situated in a former monastery, so as to treat his wounded,
but then decided to use it as a last redoubt. He herded hundreds of civilian
hostages into the building, wiring explosives to the entrances and exits. As
there were a total of sixteen hundred hostages, this was the biggest incident
of its kind in modern history. To show his earnestness, and to settle an old
score, he personally shot dead six Russian pilots he unearthed among the
patients.
Refusing all offers
of compromise, and entreaties from general AsIan Maskhadov downwards, Basayev
warned that he would kill everyone in the building if the Russians did not
abandon their campaign in Chechnya. When he was told the Russians were planning
to round up and shoot two thousand Chechens, he effectively indicated that they
could kill every Chechen in Russia and he 'would not even flinch'. The Russian defence minister decided that four days of this were
enough. Russian troops were ordered to storm the building, which resulted in
the deaths of over a hundred hostages by the time they had fought their way to
the first floor. The following day, prime minister Viktor Chernomirdin
decided to negotiate with Basayev, live on TV. As a
result of these talks, Basayev and his men (shielded
by 139 volunteer hostages) set off back to Chechnya in six trucks, with a
refrigerated lorry bringing up the rear with their dead. A peace agreement was
signed that July.
Basayev's second stunt was to call upon the services of a Saudi
he had fought with in Abkhazia, Samir bin Salekh al-Suweilum, also known as al-Khattab, or as he was variously
called 'one-handed Akhmed', 'the Black Arab' or 'the
Lion of Chechnya'. Dark, flat-nosed, heavy-set and bearded in an ursine way,
al-Khattab's menacing face adorns thousands ofDVD
covers issued by Hamas and the like (one of his hands had been mangled by a
home-made grenade). He had turned down the chance to study in the US in favour of waging jihad in Afghanistan where he fought, for
six years, under the aegis of Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. Perhaps
because he claimed that his mother hailed from the Caucasus, or more simply
because he saw the fighting there on TV, he went to help the Muslim Azeris,
followed by a stint killing Russians in Tajikistan. Having already met Basayev, al- Khattab surfaced in Chechnya in early 1995,
bringing eight more Arabs who were contracted as 'consultants' to train Chechen
fighters. He brought in more Afghan Arabs, and men he had fought with in
Dagestan, to form his own Islamic Regiment. That autumn about forty of these
men decimated a hundred Russian troops in an ambush. In their next outing, in
April 1996, they attacked a convoy of fifty Russian trucks, killing two hundred
Russian soldiers in an action that was videotaped from beginning to end.
Al-Khattab is seen brandishing the severed heads of Russian officers, shouting
'Allahu Akhbar!' In August 1996 Basayev
and al-Khattab stormed the Russian garrison in Grozny; al-Khattab was given
Ichkeria's (Chechnya's) highest decorations and promoted to general. Four
months later he murdered six Red Cross relief workers in a hospital, after
warning them that he found the ubiquitous crosses offensive. That autumn he
also opened the first of four Wahhabist training
camps, to which international jihadists flocked for two- to six-month courses
in ambushing, hostage taking, armed and unarmed combat, and sabotage. Saudi
money paid for the Wahhabist religious
infrastructure, which was supposed to presage an Islamic Republic of the
Caucasus in embryo, for the plan was to link up Wahhabi enclaves in neighbouring Dagestan after a coup.
General AsIan Maskhadov, a former Red
Army artillery officer, was largely responsible for the Chechen separatists
getting the upper hand in the First Chechen '(Var. It was he who in December
1996 negotiated a ceasefire at Khasar~ Yurt with the
Afghanistan war hero general Alexander Lebed. The Russians undertook to
withdraw their troops, while agreeing to talks, scheduled for early 2001, to
determine Chechnya's future relations with the Russian Federation. Dudayev had
been killed in April 1996 by a Russian missile, and Maskhadov
succeeded him as president in early 1997. In Russian eyes he was the lesser
evil in relation to the other main candidate, Shamil Basayev.
A Second Chechen War
erupted in August 1999 as the Russians sought to reverse the de-facto independence
that Maskhadov had achieved in the first war against
Russia's conscript rabble. From a Russian perspective there were various
grounds to restart the war. General lawlessness and kidnappings for huge
ransoms were endemic in Chechnya, while the Chechen diaspora in Russia itself
was heavily involved in organised crime. Obviously
there were many gangsters from other nationalities, but the Chechens enjoyed a
reputation for blood feuds and savagery low even by local standards. Worse, if
Chechnya gained independence, other regions might make similar bids for
freedom, triggering a domino effect that might menace Russia's southern oil and
gas supply routes from the Caspian region. There was also a growing Islamic
dimension. In order to placate Basayev and the
jihadists, Maskhadov introduced sharia law, publicly
executing a few offenders at a time when Russia abolished the death penalty,
and turned to the Gulf and beyond for external support. He was unable to
correct the impression that he was not on top of gangsters and warlords or that
the jihadists were out of control. On Basayev's
command, al-Khattab and his Arab jihadists attacked Russian troops in neighbouring Dagestan. Suspecting that this was part of a
wider effort to Islamise the entire northern Caucasus,
the Russian air force was despatched, dropping
fuel-air explosive bombs on Chechen villages and killing hundreds of people.
Some people, most of
them nowadays dead, view the Second Chechen War as part of a dark conspiracy on
the part of the secret police/ industrial complex to terminate Russia's passing
fling with democracy and free markets. The former KGB lieutenant-colonel
Vladimir Putin has been the main beneficiary, and sundry oligarchs the chief
losers, as mysterious acts of terror were exploited to reverse the liberalising gains of the Yeltsin era. In September 1999
explosions demolished entire apartment blocks in Moscow and other Russian
cities. Hundreds of people were killed. These bombings were attributed to
Chechen separatist terrori~ts, meaning that hapless
Chechen emigrants were rounded up and framed by the FSB (the KGB's successor).
Discovery of FSB involvement in a bomb that failed to explode in Ryazan was
covered up with claims that the whole operation was an 'exercise' involving harmless
sugar rather than the explosive hexogen. People who argued otherwise
subsequently found that the brakes of their cars failed or, like journalist
Anna Politkovskaya, were shot dead or otherwise murdered (former agent
Alexander Litvinenko was very publicly poisoned by FSB-connected assassins in
the middle of London).
Putin progressed from
prime minister to president in a toxic atmosphere of chauvinism, fear and
resentment about loss of empire. Using air power and contract professional
soldiers rather than hapless conscripts, the Russians attacked Chechen
separatists that autumn. They dropped cluster bombs and hit villages with
artillery shells and rockets, without any regard for civilian casualties. The
Russians. dominated the northern Chechen plains and pulverised
the ruins of Chechnya's cities. In February 2000 they took Grozny after weeks
of fighting that had reduced it to the condition of Dresden in 1945. The
deployment of eighty thousand regular troops, and countless security agents,
forced the Chechen separatists into fighting a guerrilla war from the mountains
and to launch a full-scale terror campaign, whose international ramifications
meant that after 9/11 Chechen groups were put on various Western watch lists.
Both sides fought
viciously and without rules. As Putin once remarked: 'We'll get them anywhere.
If we find terrorists in the shithouse, then we'll waste them in the shithouse.
That's all there is to it.' The FSB reached out to 'touch' al-Khattab in 2002
after discovering that his mother in Saudi Arabia regularly sent mail to him
via Baku in Azerbaijan which was always picked up by the same courier. In March
the courier brought a package containing a Sony video-camera - to record him
cutting off heads - a watch and a letter. Al-Khattab retreated to open the
letter; he returned deathly pale fifteen minutes later and dropped dead. He had
been poisoned with botulism smeared on the letter. His patron Basayev shot dead the courier who he suspected was on the
FSB payroll.
As if to signal that
al-Khattab's death changed nothing, that summer a massive mine blew up in the
midst of a Russian military parade commemorating the end of the Great Patriotic
War. On 22 October a large gang of Chechen terrorists- including several women,
some in their forties, whose husbands or relatives had died at the hands of the
Russians - seized a theatre in Moscow's Dubrovka
suburb during the second act of a musical. They took eight hundred people
hostage, wiring the auditorium with explosives and strutting about with
explosive belts wrapped with nails, nuts and bolts. They started to shoot
hostages so as to pressure Russia into withdrawing its forces from Chechnya. At
about 3 a.m. on 26 October, Russian commandos released an obscure gas into the
theatre, knocking out several hostages and a few terrorists in the front-row
seats near an orchestra pit that by this time was the communal lavatory. Two
hundred Russian commandos then stormed into the building, killing forty-one
terrorists, mostly with a single shot to the forehead. One hundred and thirty
hostages also died, since the authorities failed to inform the local hospitals
about the type of gas they had used in the assault.
Adopting tactics
pioneered by the Israelis, the Russians demolished the family homes of all
those terrorists killed in the Dubrovka theatre
siege. They dropped fuel-air explosives on the Vedeno
Gorge in an attempt to kill Basayev. By this time
sporting a wooden leg after stepping on a mine, Basayev
was publicly threatening to use Cruise missiles or nuclear bombs, in the
'Whirlwind of Terror' he wished to visit on Russian cities. On 13 February
2004, FSB assassins killed the former acting Chechen president Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev with a car
bomb at a villa in Doha, in Qatar, owned by a prominent Saudi arms dealer. The
Russians were caught, tried and imprisoned, although their local controller
evaded justice by claiming diplomatic immunity. Basayev
hit back when a bomb built into the VIP section of the Dynamo Stadium in Grozny
killed the pro-Russian Chechen president Akhmad
Kadyrov and several members of his government. This killing stopped Putin's
policy of Chechenising the conflict through local
clients, while triggering a blood feud between Basayev
and the dead president's son Ramzan Kadyrov.
Basayev mounted his most dastardly action that autumn,
managing to grab the world's attention even though the Russian authorities
disbarred and harassed foreign reporters and put psychotropic drugs in the tea
of the more venturesome local journalists who flew in to cover it. On 1
September 2004, the Day of Knowledge in the Russian school calendar, thirty-two
heavily armed Chechen terrorists took over School Number One at Beslan in Ossetia.
They held twelve
hundred schoolchildren, parents and teachers hostage in the gymnasium,
immediately killing anyone who spoke Ossetic rather than Russian and fifteen to
twenty men whose physique indicated that they might offer resistance.
Dehydrated and hungry children were forced to strip off in the terrible heat.
While negotiations to resolve the crisis dragged into a third day, explosions
inside the school led to an assault by hundreds of men from poorly co-ordinated secret service, military and police
formations. While army conscripts fled the scene, local civilians arrived armed
to the teeth, causing further chaos and confusion. The roof was set alight with
flame throwers while tanks fired anti-personnel shells into the school; the
exhausted and confused hostages were too weak to flee. An escaping terrorist
was lynched by crazed parents, while the school rapidly burned down in front of
one antiquated fire engine with no water. There were no ambulances either to
take casualties to hospital. Nearly four hundred hostages died in this chaos,
together with eleven Russian commandos and all but one of the thirty-two
terrorists. Two of the latter were British Algerians based in London with links
to Abu Hamza's PillSbury Park mosque. Before he
disappeared into the Russian prison system, the surviving terrorist, Nur-Pashi Kulayev, explained the
strategy behind murdering children, namely to trigger a religious war between
the Orthodox Christian Ossetians and the Muslim Chechens and Ingush that would
engulf the whole Caucasus. On 21 September 2005 Russian special forces tracked
down and killed AsIan Maskhadov,
by then designated a terrorist fugitive with a US$lO
million bounty on his head. A Russian soldier allegedly threw a grenade into
his hideout by mistake. On 10 July 2006, FSB agents used an improvised
explosive device to kill Shamil Basayev as he drove
in a car alongside a truck filled with explosives. The youthful Ramzan Kadyrov
still manages to act as Chechen president, with his menage of pet tigers and
hordes of heavily armed men.
Given this poisoned
atmosphere, it was inevitable that dark forces would gravitate to Chechnya. In
November 2006 Russian police stopped a minivan carrying three men, one of whom
identified himself as Abdullah Imam Mohammed Amin, as was confirmed by his
Sudanese passport. The photo of a middle-aged man in a suit and tie with neat
hair suggested nothing untoward. However, in the van there was US$6,400 in
seven currencies, a laptop, a satellite phone, a fax machine and piles of
medical textbooks. Closer inspection revealed a visa application for Taiwan,
bank statements from a bank in Guandong, China, a
receipt for a modem purchased in Dubai, a registration certificate for a
company in Malaysia, and details of a bank account in Missouri. The fake
Sudanese passport had multipl~- stamps from Taiwan,
Singapore and Yemen. The Russian police called in the FSB, who sent the laptop
to Moscow for analysis. Mr 'Amin' was detained for
five months, during which time letters flooded in from local Muslim clerics
protesting his innocence. At his trial, the judge decided to believe his claims
that he was a pious merchant - the accused repeatedly dropped to his knees to
pray in the dock - come to scout the prices of leather. He received a six-month
sentence for illegal entry, most of which he had already served. In his diary,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, for it was he, wrote that 'God blinded them to our
identities.' After spending ten days free in Dagestan nursing an ulcer, he left
to join bin Laden in Afghanistan.52
There was one other
conflict in the 1990S whose complexities did not impinge on any Muslim with a
crassly polarised view of the world. After the
Algerian military had 'interrupted' the January 1992 elections, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) was banned and some forty thousand Islamist militants
were despatched to camps in the Sahara. The problem
with FIS was that although many of its supporters called themselves democrats,
others believed in 'one man, one vote, one time'. Armed Islarnism
predated this coup, since the Algerian Islamic Movement (MIA) was formed in the
early 1980s, evolving into the AIS or Islamic Salvation Army a little later,
while the rival GIA emerged in 1991. The two organisations
fought different types of campaign. Sometimes they briefly merged, more often
they attempted to kill each other. Both organisations
had a heavy representation of Algerian veterans of Afghanistan, who basked in
the glory of successful jihad, members of the FIS who had gone underground, as
well as criminals and unemployed street toughs who, combining Levi 501S, the
Kalashnikov and the Koran, imposed totalitarian Islamism on their neighbourhoods. Ideologically, the groups encompassed
people who still wished to pursue a democratic course from a position of armed
might, and jihadi-salafists who regarded democracy as
un-Islamic and the entire Algerian population as kuffar apostates. This
unstable composition led to deadly faction fights within these groups, which
were subject to the murderous attentions of the Algerian military and murky
intelligence agencies that regard torture as routine. Islamist prisoners
arriving at a prison at Blida, where use of a blow torch was normal, were told:
'There is no God or Amnesty International here: you talk or you die.'
In the early 1990sJhe
G IA murdered about ninety Western employees in the oil and gas industry,
forcing a mass exodus of six thousand Europeans from Algeria. Twelve Croat
technicians were abducted and, their hands bound with wire, had their throats
cut in an empty swimming pool. The French interior minister, Charles Pasqua, deported seventeen Islamist clerics to Burkina
Faso. The GIA also murdered forty francophone Algerian journalists, writers and
doctors, including the Kabylia magazine editor and
novelist Taher Djaout, whose Last Summer of Reason
describes Islamist destruction of the dying remnants of Algeria's cosmopolitan
culture. This great left-wing writer was shot dead outside his home in an
Algiers suburb. His film-maker friend Merzak Allouache caught the hypocrisy and paranoia of the
Islamists in his Bab el-Oued City, filmed in an
atmosphere so dangerous that he could not return to do second takes in that
quarter of the capital. The G IA also abducted and executed an Islamist cleric
who refused to issue a fatwa licensing their activities, and in 1998 murdered Lounes Matoub, one of Kabylia's leading rat singers. Some six hundred schools
were burned down in an effort to eradicate secular education, while
sociologists and psychiatrists found themselves token victims of disciplines
that the jihadists did not like. Women who did not conform to Islamist notions
of decorum were threatened, raped and murdered; people who persisted in
accessing 'pornographic' French satellite TV were warned before their severed
heads ended up in disconnected dishes.
Late in 1994, four
GIA hijackers took over an Air France jet at Boumedienne
airport with a view to smashing it into the streets of central Paris. French
commandos stormed the plane when it refuelled at
Marseilles, freeing 171 passengers and killing the four hijackers. The aim of
this attack was to force France to abandon ties with Algeria, thereby weakening
the Algerian government to the point of collapse. All it achieved was for the
French to stop issuing visas in Algeria, using a central service in Nantes
instead, and for Air France to cease flights to Algeria. Although many French
people thought that Algeria could 'go hang itself', the French government came
under intense US pressure to encourage the military regime to extend its
political base. In Algeria itself, the government began arming village patriots
to fend off the jihadists who came to commit murder in the dead of night.
The GIA was run by a
swift succession of violent emirs, as most met grisly ends. The then emir,
Djamel Zitouni, the son of a poultry merchant with a
sec~!!dary education, alienated many Islamists when
he had two leading Islamist ideologues murdered. He exceeded himself when in
May 1996 seven French Trappist monks from the desert monastery of Tibhirine were kidnapped and beheaded. That brought to
nineteen the number of Christian clergy killed by Algerian Islamists,
culminating in the murder of Pierre Claverie, bishop
of Gran. The murder of these monks, whose security the GIA had guaranteed, was
too much even for Abu Qatada, the GIA mouthpiece in London, who suspended
publication of the GIA's AI-Ansar bulletin. Zitouni
was shot dead, by GIA members fed up with him, a while later. His twentysix-year-old successor, Antar
Zouabri, found a new spiritual guide to replace
Qatada in the shape of Londonistan's hook-handed Abu Hamza. They satisfied
themselves that the main problem in Algeria was that the majority of the
population had become apostates because they were not pursuing their duty of
jihad. In the autumn of 1997 several hundred Algerian villagers had their
throats cut, including women, who had first been raped, as well as children
whose heads were smashed against walls. Attempts to blame this on the Algerian
security services, one of whose members claimed that his former colleagues were
really behind the G lA, were confounded when Zouabri acknowledged his own authorship of a vulgarly
phrased communique that called all Algerians 'kuffar, apostates and
hypocrites'. As the US journalist Robert Kaplan reported, relatives of the
people massacred by Islamists knew that they rather than the secret police were
responsible, although shady army and police units undoubtedly killed many
people, sometimes with a view to discrediting the Islamists in the eyes of Western
opinion.53
In 1998, and with
encouragement on a satellite phone from Gsama bin
Laden, the Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat emerged out of the wreckage ofthe GIA. The GSPC took several steps back from the GIA's
universal war on Algerian society, while simultaneously subscribing to the
international jihad. It sought to destroy the Algerian military regime,
replacing it with a sharia-based Islamist state, while pursuing the cause of
the 'rightly guided caliphate' against Jews and Christians. Even as the GSPC
evolved into one of the world's most deadly terrorist organisa
tions, with a network of supporters throughout
Europe, the AIS caffil in from the cold, accepting an
Algerian government amnesty an< the introduction of the presidential
elections that put veteran foreigI minister Abdelaziz
Bouteflika in power. It is widely believed that abou
two hundred thousand Muslim Algerians were killed in the struggl<
between Islamists.~nd the government during the
1990S. The head of th Algerian secret police, General
Smai"n Lamari, was
fully prepared to kiJ up to three million people in
order to wipe Islamism out. No longe willing to treat
Algeria as France's backyard, the US has built up a larg
CIA presence in Algiers, spreading its eagle wings over the Bouteflik
regime, which has become an eager partner in the 'war on terror'. 54
Seeming
inevitabilities unravel if one goes back a generation or tw<
In 1957, a year after US president Eisenhower brutally brought th Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Suez to a halt, he inaugurated
a ne' building on Washington's Embassy Row. This was
a mosque. It WE built after a Palestinian tycoon had attended the funeral of a Turkis diplomat. He had said to the Egyptian ambassador,
'Isn't it a shame th, the prayer for such a great
Muslim is not held in a mosque?' An Italia architect designed the building,
incorporating details recommende by the court
architect in Egypt. Eisenhower dedicated the buildin:
'America would fight with her whole strength for your right to hm here your own
church and worship according to your own conscienc
This concept is indeed a part of America, and without that concept '"
would be something else than what we are.' Today, three thousan
people attend the Friday prayers in a building that is the equivalent c the Episcopalian
National Cathedral.
Nineteen fifty-seven
is ancient history to most Muslims today, tl majority
of whom are so young that they come up to the averal
Westerner's waist. The jihadi-salafist imagination
deals in racial esseno and ahistorical archetypes, to
which history is a necessary correctiv In their view,
the Jews are inherently malevolent, using the USA, tl
IMF, the World Bank and the UN for their nefarious purposes. Th explains the
bizarre concept of 'Crusader-Zionists'. Anyone with even sketchy recollection
of medieval history knows that nothing links medieval Christian crusaders, who
on occasion massacred Rhenish Jews prefatory to slaughtering Arabs, with a
political movement born in the nineteenth century, primarily as an antidote to
European anti-Semitism. But facts do not seem to inhibit emotion and prejudice.
Even in countries where there are few Jews, like Indonesia, the local jihadi-salafists find them by imagini~.g
mercantile 'Chinese-Zionists'. In a sense this proves that anti-Semitism links
all jihadists. They are like the man looking at an empty salt cellar who is
compelled to talk about Jewish domination of the medieval salt trade or a
monopoly 'they' have recently acquired in the Camargue. Although Israel is home
to large numbers of conservative Orthodox Jews, it is also an outpost of
Western secular modernity. That last part is what Islamists hate, especially
when it is combined with the manifest superiority of the high-tech Israeli
economy in the region. Instead of allowing this to fructify the neighbourhood commercially, the jihadists are bent on
enveloping it in the chaos and violence they create everywhere.
In their view, Israel
is the modern incarnation of the Latin Kingdom ofJerusalem,
a crusader outpost planted among Muslims by an imperialist West which the Jews
control, a claim that passes over the halfmillennium
that separates the crusades from the age of European imperialism, and accords
'the Jews' more power than they could conceivably possess. Intervening events,
like the Protestant revolt against the medieval papacy, and the multiplication
of hundreds of Protestant denominations, figure not at all in Islamist
understanding of the West, which is routinely chastised for not comprehending
the division between Sunni and Shia. This is because Islam, at least in Arabia,
has overwritten societies where kin or clan are paramount, resulting in
indifference or hostility to what lies beyond. In the very few instances where
Christians have attacked Muslims (and vice versa), such as Serbia or Indonesia,
these attacks have not been endorsed by any Christian religious authorities of
any standing. There have been no Christian calls for an anti-Muslim crusade,
unlike the many voices demanding warlike jihad. 55
There is something
narcissistic about this assumption that the West is obsessed with Islam and
seeks to destroy it. It is not. It is obsessed with itself, followed by China,
India and Russia which jostle for Westerners' short attention span. It is
drawn, wearily, into so many Middle Eastern crises because this region, with a
manufacturing capacity only equal to US civilians were fair game as they paid
taxes which indirectly propped up the Zionist regime. Besides, from firebombing
Tokyo, via Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam, the
US itself rained death on civilians. Noam Chomsky, John Pilger or Harold Pinter
might have written his script. In fact, Y ousef was
not especially motivated by religious zeal; he was driven more by a sort of
criminal fertility that opeI:ated under cover of
Islam. 57
Still posing as an
Iraqi, Yousef quickly got his bearings in Brooklyn's Arab community,
establishing contacts with the Alkifah Refugee
Center, a 'charity' established by Abdullah Azzam to funnel money to the jihad
in Afghanistan. He frequented mosques in Jersey City, where the blind sheikh
Omar Rahman - unconscionably having been given a visa by the US embassy in
Sudan - preached. Egyptian requests for his extradition had been refused. Y ousef and the sheikh spoke several times on the phone.
Yousef recruited a small team of migrant ne'er-do-wells and set about
manufacturing sixteen hundred pounds of explosives from commercially purchased
chemicals, designed to blow up the W orId Trade
Center. It took three weeks of mixing, spreading and drying, to assemble enough
explosives for a gigantic bomb which was kept in rental storage. The detonation
system was trickier, so much so that Yousef actually phoned Ajaj
in prison to see if he could help. Other comical moments occurred when three of
the bombers were almost killed after their car careered out of control late one
night, hospitalising Y ousef,
who nonetheless ordered more chemicals from his hospital bed. The driver,
Mohammed Salameh, even though he had failed his test four times, and even
though his visa had expired, successfully rented a Ryder van for which he put
down a US$400 deposit. In one of his few sentient acts, he even remembered to
rent one that would clear the height barriers. Hell bent on collapsing both
towers so as to kill a quarter of a million people, Yousef added one last
refinement to his ammonium-nitrate and fuel-oil bomb. These were four cylinders
of hydrogen gas, intended to propel the initial blast further forwards.
On 26 October 1993,
Yousef and a Jordanian, Eyad Ismoil,
parked the truck in the basement of the World Trade Center, where it detonated
shortly after noon. The blast went through three floors down and two floors up,
killing six people, building workers having lunch, and injuring more than a
thousand. Y ousef flew to Karachi that night while Ismoil took a flight to Jordan. Salameh hung around,
brooding about his US$400 deposit. By the time he went to claim it, haggling
the sum up from zero to US$200 with an undercover FBI agent, FBI forensic experts
had identified the truck used to house the bomb. He was arrested after he left
the rental office. Although the attack had killed six and caused half a billion
dollars' worth of structural damage, the jihadists around the blind sheikh were
not satisfied. Urging them on to greater depravities was the imprisoned
Egyptian EI-Sayyid Nosair, serving seven years for
assassinating the fanat~c rabbi Meir Kahane in 1990. Osama bin Laden had paid his legal bills.-
A motley group, eventually numbering eleven, resolved to blow up the Lincoln
and Holland Tunnels into Manhattan. Cars, bomb-making materials and timers were
acquired. Justification was sought from sheikh Omar, unaware that one of the
key conspirators worked for the FBI and that all of the group were under electronic
surveillance. A long series of trials put several of these men, including the
sheikh, in jail for the rest of their lives. One of the sheikh's defence lawyers would more recently follow him behind bars
for colluding in passing messages from his prison.
These events had no
direct connection with bin Laden save that the master bomber had been through
his training programme, and he has vowed to wreak
havoc if and when the elderly sheikh finally expires from the multiple
illnesses he is afflicted by. Refusing medication, the sheikh scoffs immense
quantities of fast food from prison canteens so that his diabetes and high
blood pressure may expedite this murderous outcome. In 1995 al-Zawahiri's
expatriate campaign of terror in Egypt led to the ejection of the entire aI-Jihad group from Sudan. Aided by Sudanese intelligence
officers, al-Zawahiri conspired to assassinate Hosni Mubarak as he attended an
African Unity conference in Addis Ababa. The plan - referred to above in the
context of Bosnia - was to kill him as his motorcade drove from the airport
into the capital, using teams of shooters equipped with RPGs and automatic
rifles. The plot failed, although not before two Egyptian bodyguards had been
killed, as Mubarak sped by.
The Egyptian
government lashed out at Islamist sympathisers,
commissioning five new prisons to house them. Its intelligence agencies decided
to strike directly at al-Zawahiri. They kidnapped the young sons of two leading
fundamentalists connected to aI-Jihad and Al Qaeda,
who were drugged and then photographed being sodomised.
These compromising photographs were enough to turn them into spies, and to
agree to plant a bomb outside al-Zawahiri's Khartoum home. The first bomb was
discovered by al-Zawahiri's Sudanese protectors before it went off. Meanwhile
one of the boys was being treated for malaria, ironically by al-Zawahiri. The
Egyptians tried again, equipping the first boy with a suitcase bomb to kill
al-Zawahiri as he attended a meeting. The boy bomber was caught by the Sudanese,
who also picked up his ailing companion. Both boys were tried by a sharia court
presided over by al-Zawahiri who had them both shot. Their confessions and
execution were filmed to discourage others.
This evidence of a
state operating within a state angered the Sudanese so much that they ordered
al-Zawahiri to leave immediately together with his al-Jihad followers. He fled
to Yemen. But he had not finished with the Egyptians. On 19 November 1995, two
men fired on the guards outside the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, scattering
them so that two suicide bombers could drive a pick-up truck inside, which
exploded killing both drivers and sixteen other people. The Pakistani
authorities rounded up two hundred Arab Afghan jihadists; bin Laden appeared
offering air tickets to take them to the Sudan. But relations were cooling
there too. The Americans had joined the Egyptians and the Saudis in putting
pressure on Turabi to expel bin Laden. This was an irresistible combination.
Bin Laden might have slept more soundly had he known that White House lawyers,
the US military and the CIA were simultaneously frustrating suggestions from
counter-terrorism officials that the US simply snatch him in Sudan. Faced with
the choice of either staying put, in closely monitored inactivity, or leaving
for Afghanistan, bin Laden chose to revisit the scene of his early glories. The
crooked Sudanese stripped him of his considerable assets before he flew to
Jalalabad. Their claims that they offered up bin Laden to the uninterested
Americans are probably lies, even if it is true that at this time the CIA
regarded him merely as a 'financier of terrorism'. That year, however, it did
set up a special office, code-named 'Alec', the first time it had concentrated
such resources on an individual terrorist,58
Bin Laden sought
refuge among the Taliban, the Pashtu word for students, an Islamist movement
supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which built and financed the madrassas
from which the Taliban came. In the eyes of Pakistan prime minister Benazir
Bhutto, the Taliban would restore order after four years of civil war, a
necessary precondition for Pakistan to tranship oil
and gas from Turkmenistan to its burgeoning industries. This was the line she
sold to the Clinton administration, for whom the Taliban were like some
orientalist fable come alive. Bhutto's armed forces also calculated that a
Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan would enable Pakistani forces to regroup there if
the east of the country ever fell to Indian arms. Saudi Arabia's motives were
more straightforward: the Taliban would be a useful Sunni bulwark against Iran.
The Saudis dictated the terms of settlement for the wandering prodigal, since
they insisted that the Taliban keep bin Laden quiet on the farm he purchased
near Jalalabad with a view to going into the production of honey. His men were
~oused in the expanded facilities ofTora
Bora near by. They were not happy, because compared
to that oasis of 'progress and civilisation' in
Yemen, Mghanistan was a desolate place, 'worse than a
tomb' as one Yemeni put it. Nothing worked, with every journey spent perched on
an eighth of a car seat, over rutted tracks. The Afghans were child-like,
barbaric and venal with an unhealthy interest in boys. There were also clashes
of personality, which probably explains why bin Laden initially based himself
in Jalalabad rather than Taliban-dominated Kandahar.
Bin Laden's host,
mullah Omar, was a tall, forbidding figure with a dark beard, whose sinister
air was intensified by his having lost an eye as fragments of Russian shrapnel
excavated the upper half of his face. His voice was an almost inaudible
whisper. Mullah Omar and his Taliban had their own foundational myth. After
experiencing a vision of the Prophet, mullah Omar believed that he had been
chosen to deliver Afghanistan from chaos. He gathered together a small group of
madrassa students who initially went around like Robin Hoods, rescuing boys and
girls from warlord sodomites and rapists. Within a year his band had multiplied
into an army of twenty-four thousand that took over most of southern
Afghanistan, with Pakistani volunteers arriving at critical moments in the
fighting against the Iranian- and Russian-backed Northern Alliance. On 4 April
1996 this obscure village mullah literally wrapped himself in the mantle of the
Prophet when he removed a robe from a shrine in Kandahar that was said to be
Mohammed's. Ecstatic crowds cheered as he paraded on a roof, clutching this
garment, the event that gave rise to the only known photograph of him. From that
moment he was unstoppable, going on to take Kabul itself that September. One of
the Taliban's first acts was to enter a UN compound from which they dragged out
the Communist-era president Najibullah and his brother. Both men were castrated
and tortured, shot, dragged behind a car and then hanged from a concrete pillar
with cigarettes in the fingers and money spilling from their pockets.
As Pashtun peasant
boys who had been through refugee camps and make their point. They rounded up
Shia Hazara, a Turko-Mongol mountain people, raping
the women and killing the men by shutting them in giant metal containers which
were then dumped in the surrounding desert. Taliban clerics gave the surviving
Shia three choices: convert to Sunni Islam, leave or die. Between six and eight
thousand Shia died. The dead included eleven Iranian consular officials and
secret agents, who were taken.~o a basement and
shot.60
Bin Laden had various
residences in Afghanistan, including a hundred-acre complex at Tarnak Farm outside Kandahar. This consisted of about
eighty buildings surrounded by a ten-foot-high mud wall, separating it from the
surrounding scrub. Bin Laden also used various villas in Kandahar itself,
shifting his location frequently in dim awareness of the US satellites miles
above his head. Relations with the Taliban leader were not smooth. The
ultra-shy mullah Omar resented bin Laden's obsessions with the modern media,
or, as two AI Qaeda men reported it to al-Zawahiri, 'the disease of screens,
flashes, fans and applause'. Bin Laden was obliged to acknowledge the supremacy
of his host, which may have rankled as he was forever bailing out the feckless
Taliban with prodigious amounts of money when they ran through the US$40
million they had received in aid from the Pakistanis. Using onetype
code systems, AI Qaeda tried to conceal itself within the language of
international business. The mullah might have been surprised by coded
references to himself and the Taliban as the 'Omar Brothers Company', business
partners of the 'Abdullah Contracting Company', meaning bin Laden and comrades,
traders (jihadis) in competition with 'foreign competitors', that is the CIA
and MI6.61 Despite these frictions, the Taliban became major state sponsors of
terrorism, adopting many aspects of the jihadi-salafist
platform. They enabled bin Laden to set up a network of training camps, from
which he despatched guerrilla fighters (the majority
of those trained) and terrorists to attack in dozens of places, coming and
going without visas, while bin Laden himself sped about freely in a heavily
armed convoy.
The training camps
were multi-purpose, designed to build bodies, minds and skills. They were where
the Taliban themselves learned how to calculate artillery ranges, to use high
explosives like C-4, and other guerrilla tactics. A special Arab unit called
Brigade 005 was deployed to help the Taliban at crucial times in its struggle
with the Northern Alliance. The training camps were also useful to the
Pakistanis for they were where men destined for Kashmir learned to use M -16s,
more suited to Kashmir than the shorter-range AK-47. All Al Qaeda recruits
began with a fifteen-day session of physical preparation, involving leaping
over gaps or through fiery hoops. Each day began with dawn prayers and ended at
about eight at night. This was followed by a forty-five-day period of learning
the art of war, from map reading to handling various weapons. A more select
band went on to another forty-five-day course in counter-surveillance,
counter-interrogation, agent recruitment, forgery, hijacking, assassination and
bomb making. Much of this knowledge was codified in a training manual,
discovered by British police in Manchester, that eventually reached twelve
volumes before being put on a CD-Rom; if one wanted
to brew up ricin poisons this was where to look before the internet offered
many .alternatives. With the help of Pakistani scientists, there were attempts
to use such biological and chemical agents as anthrax and cyanide, experiments
confined to dogs in glass cages. Indoctrination sessions forged a group
mindset, while films starring Arnold Schwarzenegger and other US action movies
were shown for relaxation and to pick up useful tips.62
It was from amid this
charming world that in August 1996 bin Laden issued his 'Declaration of War
against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places'. This
so-called occupation had gone on for seven years rather than the few months
promised by Saudi's rulers. The declaration ingratiated itself with the Saudi
in the street by describing the corruption and economic downturn afflicting the
kingdom, blaming this on the US military presence in remote desert provinces.
In a long literal passage about the joys of martyrdom, bin Laden announced:
'Men of the radiant future of our ummah of Mohammed, raise the banner of jihad
up high against the Judaeo-American alliance that has
occupied the holy places of Islam.' He quoted poetry to describe his type of
holy warrior:
I am willing to
sacrifice self and wealth for knights who never disappointed me. Knights who
are never fed up or deterred by death, even if the mill wheel of war turns. In
the heat of battle they do not care, and cure the insanity of the enemy by
their 'insane' courage. 63
In an interview that November
with Australian Muslim activists, bin Laden praised the bombing of the World
Trade Center, and more recent attacks on Americans in Riyadh and at the Khobar
Towers apartment complex which killed respectively seven and nineteen people,
the majority US servicemen, even though these were Iranian- rather than AI
Qaeda-sponsored operations. That operations of an almost fantastic ambition
were then entertained was due to a visit by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, with a
story that stretched all the way to Kuala Lumpur and Manila as he searched for
a way of hitting the USA.
Khalid Sheikh had
.come from Karachi where he notionally worked as a public works engineer. He
travelled extensively posing as a Saudi businessman. One of his supposed
business ventures was in Kuala Lumpur, where his partner was the Indonesian Encep Nurjaman who went by the
name of Hambali in honour
of an eighth-century Muslim saint. Born in West Java, Hambali
had gone to Malaysia in 1985 to deepen his acquaintance with Islam. After a
period fighting in Afghanistan, he returned to Malaysia in 1989, settling in
Sungai Manngis, a hamlet about sixty kilometres west of Kuala Lumpur, where Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar,
the exiled founders of Jemaah Islamiyah, also lived. This was Terror Central
for South Asia. The schemes hatched here were oddly at variance with the
ambient squalor. These men hated cosmopolitan and prosperous Singapore, finding
local cell members who felt that its materialism and order were spiritually
vacuous or who were unnerved by the rational choices a modern society involves.
They wanted more certain rules than even this most law-abiding society
involved. Perhaps they could stoke enough strife between Chinese and Malays to
trigger a war from which the Islamist vanguard would emerge victorious? Hambali lived with his wife in a hut with a zinc roof, one
light fitting and a lavatory that was a hole in the ground. He eked out a
living selling kebabs and slaughtering poultry. But most of his time was spent
preaching and leading discussion groups called usrah.
These enabled him to identify potential jihadists, whom he sent for military
training either with AI Qaeda in Afghanistan or with the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) which operated in Mindanao in the southern Philippines.
The MILF was not the only sympathetic group in the Philippines. The port city
of Zamboanga was a hotbed of jihadist militancy. Bin Laden's brother-in-law,
Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, had a branch of his International Islamic Relief Organisation there, which had close links with a breakaway
MILF faction, of bandits, kidnappers and pirates, called Abu Sayyaf or Bearers
of the Sword, named in honour of a giant Afghan
jihadist. In March 2000 Abu Sayyaf is said to have received US$25 million from
Libya's Colonel Ghaddafi.
Khalid Sheikh and
Yousef plus one Wali Shah arrived in Manila, where
the two younger men had already acquired girlfriends in the Philippine
capital's many go-go bars. Khalid Sheikh, by now using the name Abdul Majid,
and Shah rented apartments there while Yousef took up residence in the
Manor hotel. They held meetings in the city's karaoke and go-go bars, plotting
holy murder in places filled with mirrors, flashing lights.and
half-naked dancers. They hired a helicopter to survey the city. Khalid Sheikh
took up with a Filipina dentist, sometimes phoning her from the helicopters so
she could look up and wave at her paramour. They purchased priests' robes and
Bibles, for the reason they were in Manila was to assassinate pope John Paul
II, having given up on the heavily protected US president. To that end they
rented an apartment along the route his holiness was most likely to take. This
was not the only plot under way because, since his discussions with Murad, Y ousef had become obsessed with downing large planes. He
developed a new bomb, involving nitroglycerine disguised in containers for contactlens solution, and a timer made from a Casio
Databank watch which had the advantage of an alarm that could be set for up to
twelve months ahead. The batteries used to power the lightbulbs which (their
glass having been deliberately weakened) would set the thing off could be
hidden in the heels of shoes, as they did not come within the range of airport
X-ray machinery. He tried out a mini-version of this device in a Manila cinema.
Then he summoned the pilot Murad. On 8 December, Yousef took a flight from
Manila to Tokyo. He assembled his little bomb in the lavatory, and then
attached it below his seat, leaving the plane when it refuelled
at Cebu. An hour into its second leg, the bomb killed a young Japanese
engineer, Haruki Ikegami, who happened to sit where Y ousef
had placed the device. It ripped the lower half of his body to pieces and
almost sent the plane out of control when it burned through the aileron cables
controlling the flaps. The pilot managed to force the plane into a turn before
landing it on Okinawa, saving the lives of 272 passengers and twenty crew.
Returned to Manila, Y
ousef moved into the apartment block where the pope
would pass by, joining Wali Shah who lived below. Neighbours began to gossip when they noticed the rare
spectacle of these Arab men struggling upstairs with boxes and bottles in the
torpid heat. They might have found it even odder that on 21 December Yousef
threw Manila's only party to celebrate the sixteenth anniversary of the
Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am 103. Just after Christmas Khalid Sheikh and Murad
arrived, for it was all gloved hands to the pump as two plots got under way, to
kill the pope, and something called Boijinka, a
made-up word Khalid Sheikh had picked up from Afghanistan or Bosnia. Y ousef told Murad to be ready to fly to Singapore on 14
January 1995, one of five men who were going to explode ten Boeing 747 aircraft
over the Pacific, by changing planes after the initial legs of their journeys.
Yousef reserved for himself the tri.<:ky exercise
of boarding and leaving three different flights. About three thousand people
would have died had this plot been a success.
The 6th of January
was intended to be clean-up day in Manila. Yousef was burning off superfluous
chemicals on the stove when the flat filled with a cloud of dark smoke too
thick to disperse through the windows. It billowed into the hall too,
discommoding the neighbours. The fire brigade were
called, who arrived with a policeman. Seeing that there was no fire, they
accepted Yousef's claim, delivered in the hall where he was frantically
dispersing smoke, that he was making fireworks for a belated New Year's party.
Firemen and police returned when a fire alarm finally detected the fumes.
Police thought they had wandered into the lab of a mad scientist, with
nitroglycerine in grape-juice containers, switches, timers, wires, soldering
irons, cassocks and maps of the pope's visit. After the two men had fled, Yousef
told Murad to retrieve his laptop from the flat. He did. The police arrested
him, along with Shah the following day.
While undergoing
interrogation by senior superintendent Rodolfo 'Boogie' Mendoza, with the aid
of a rubber hose occasionally debouching water into the suspect's lungs, Murad
fell for the classic gambit of being told 'You're a shit, a nothing to me' by
boasting that he was one of the Wodd Trade Center
bombers and an associate of the fabled Ramzi Y ousef.
Assaults on human vanity usually work for the skilled interrogator. Yousef was
holed up in an Islamabad hotel, whose location was betrayed by a potential
recruit who had turned him down before deciding to collect the US$2 million
reward money. Pakistani and US diplomatic security agents burst in upon him in
February 1995, dragging him out blindfolded as he demanded to see the necessary
paperwork. On the long flight to New York he bragged about his own atrocities
to agents who went to the lavatory to jot down his words. At his trial, in between
trying to chat up the pretty blonde court sketch artist, Yousef volunteered
that he was a terrorist. On his computer the FBI discovered a business card
with 'international terrorist' given as his profession. Yousef is currently
imprisoned for life, in solitary confinement and without possibility of parole,
in a federal Supermax facility in Colorado.
Khalid Sheikh, who
had been staying on the ground floor of the same hotel, used one of his twenty
passports to slip away to Doha in Qatar where he had many friends and sympathisers. US pressure on the Qatari government to
arrest him, after senior US officials had talked themselves out of a snatch operatiC?n, led to Khalid Sheikh's visit to bin Laden, with
a portfolio of plans that had been hatched by his ever fertile nephew. Khalid
Sheikh mentioned Murad's idea of crashing a plane into Langley or the Pentagon,
to which bin Laden responded: 'Why use an axe when you can use a bulldozer?'
The plan to crash ten aircraft simultaneously seemed over-ambitious and dependent
upon too many changes of planes. Of course, one could combine the two projects,
by smashing fewer aircraft into prominent symbolic targets in the US itself,
which would be unmistakable from the air. Bin Laden authorised
Khalid Sheikh to commence planning such an operation; the Saudi would finance
it, and provide the manpower from AI Qaeda training. camps. This would not come
to fruition untiln September 2001-.
In the course of
1998, the CIA's bin Laden unit studied satellite imagery of the Tarnak Farm. US agents based in Islamabad recruited about
thirty Afghan tribesmen for an armed raid to snatch bin Laden. This operation
was vetoed at an advanced stage by the CIA itself, because of worries about the
legality of assassination, if bin Laden refused to come quietly, and about
collateral casualties, because bin Laden and his associates had many women and
children around them. Attempts to use newly developed armed Predator drones to
kill the AI Qaeda leadership were frustrated by the military's concern that the
CIA should pay for them.
Unaware of these
deliberations, bin Laden activated an AI Qaeda operation whose feasibility had
been established in 1995 when he sent AIi Mohammed to
Nairobi. The latter spent four or five days scouting and photographing targets
until he had recorded on his Apple PowerBook that the US embassy fronted the
street and was lightly protected by Kenyan policemen. No lessons had been
learned from the 1983 Beirut bombings about strengthening embassy security,
despite a report on this subject by admiral Bobby Inman. A Kenyan AI Qaeda cell
had been established in 1994. A Palestinian, Mohamed Sadeek
Odeh, opened a fishing business in Mombasa, while Wadi el-Hage
opened an NGO called Help Africa People in Nairobi, where he lived with his
wife and five children. Other recruits included Fazul
Abdullah Mohammed, a native of the Comoros, and Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-Owhali. They rented a single-storey
house where an Egyptian bomb maker arrived to assemble a device consisting of
2,000 pounds of TNT concealed in a brown Toyota truck. On 7 August 1998, the
eighth anniversary of the arrival of US forces in Saudi Arabia, al-Owhali and a man known only as Azzam drove this tru\:!<- towards the embassy's small underground garage,
after a Kenyan guard had waved them away from the public car park. Al-Owhali dismounted to open the barred gate, dispersing the
guards by throwing a grenade, after which he fled.
This bang made many
people in surrounding offices rush to the windows. Azzam detonated the truck bomb.
The concrete face of the embassy was ripped off, killing twelve Americans, and
injuring ambassador Prudence Bushnell, but most of the blast struck a neighbouring secretarial college, while also hitting a bus
and passers-by in this busy commercial district. Two hundred and one Africans
were killed, with a further 4,500 injured, the majority blinded or cut by
shards of flying glass when they had gone to their windows after the grenade
had exploded, only to be caught in the second huge blast. Nine minutes later,
an Egyptian called Ahmed Abdullah, known as Ahmed the German because of his
fair hair, drove a petrol truck laden with gas canisters packed around a
similar bomb into the US embassy in Dar-es-Salaam. Luckily, a water tanker
absorbed most of the blast, although not enough to save eleven Tanzanian visa
applicants who were killed or the eightyfive wounded.
The upper half of Ahmed Abdullah hit the embassy roof, still clutching the
steering whee1.65
In the White House
the first priority had been to provide rescue experts while arranging to fly
the most serious African casualties to hospitals in Europe. Israel flew in
specialist sniffer-dog units which played a major role in rescuing victims
buried under tons of rubble. Kenya's emergency services, geared up for a mass
catastrophe involving at most sixty people, were overwhelmed. There was no
heavy lifting gear, insufficient reserves of blood, and not enough room in the
mortuaries. The US offered US$2 billion by way of compensation and
reconstruction, although individuals would receive only US$500 for injury and
relatives only US$l1,OOO for a death. The hunt for the perpetrators was
relentless, with five hundred FBI agents and hardened CIA counterterrorism
operatives like Gary Berntsen descending on Nairobi in C-130s. Odeh was
arrested using a false passport when he flew into Pakistan.
nuclear submarines
armed with Cruise missiles off the coast of Pakistan, to decrease the response
time between actionable intelligence and any attack, while secretly authorising the CIA to use lethal force to deal with bin
Laden, thereby breaking with US policy since the Ford era.
These missile attacks led to expressions of anger, easily incited on the
streets of Pakistan, while boosting bin Laden's prestige in the Muslim world as
his voic~ ,announced on radio, 'By the grace of God,
I am alive.' Weighing up whether he wanted the US as an enemy, mullah Omar
moved closer to bin Laden, who prudently took an oath to Omar as 'the emir of
the faithful'. Omar himself vowed in return: 'Even if all the countries of the
world unite, we would defend Osama with our blood.'66 By this time, bin Laden
was ensuring his personal primacy over the various separate terrorist 'nations'
that had washed up in Afghanistan with a view to waging jihad by making them
swear an oath he had devised himself: 'I recall the commitment to God, in order
to listen to and obey my superiors, who are accomplishing this task with
energy, difficulty and giving of self, and in order that God may protect us so
God's words are the highest and his religion victorious.'
One of those to swear
this was a young Jordanian, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Bayt aI-Imam terrorist group who in 1999 had been freed from a
fifteen-year jail sentence as part of a broader amnesty of three thousand
prisoners. Al-Zarqawi was a reformed juvenile delinquent from the rough town of
Zarqa from which he took his name. Embarrassingly for a jihadist he was covered
in tattoos, including a nautical anchor, although he later tried to remove these
with hydrochloric acid. People called him 'the green man' because of his body
art. He had drifted from crime to radical jihadism, spending time in
Afghanistan from 1989. His three years in Jordan's tough Suwaqah
prison had been spent body-building and extending his gang of forty Islamist
inmates by recruiting imprisoned drug addicts and felons. His prison charisma
was cemented by beating people up and washing the bodies of the sick. People
obeyed when he blinked his eyes. On returning to Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi and
forty of his Jordanian comrades were recruited into Al Qaeda by their
high-ranking fellow countryman Abu Zubaydah.
Something of a maverick, al-Zarqawi was allowed to establish a training complex
near the Iranian border at Herat, whose primary function was to infiltrate
Iraqi Kurdistan via a jihadist group called Ansar aI-Islam,
whose leader mullah Krekar lives in Norway. This
would not only help establish an Al Qaeda sanctuary, if they were ever driven
Abu Qatada, the Palestinian Omar Mahmoud Othman, who issued the GIA's
newsletter Al-Ansar from London. One result of this was the formation of the
GSPC, which while refraining from the GIA's mindless violence inside Algeria
made up for it by swimming into the wake of Al Qaeda. Abu Doha met bin Laden in
Afghanistan and agreed to put his European network at his disposal like a
temporary franchising operation. That was how Ahmad Ressam ended up crossing
the Canadian-US border to blow up LAX. The call from Frankfurt to London forced
the German police to act. They raided the Frankfurt flat, arresting four of the
five-man cell. Two of them were failed asylum seekers living in Britain who,
despite committing crimes like drug dealing, had not been deported by the
British. Another was a convicted GIA terrorist with French citizenship, which
did not stop him moving freely between Britain, France and Germany. A fourth
was an Algerian who had been refused leave to stay by the Germans when he
admitted having procured arms and ammunition for the PIS, but who then disappeared
anyway, except when he was repeatedly arrested for theft.
In an apartment used
by this cell, German police found thirty kilograms of potassium permanganate, a
chemical usually sold in quantities of five to ten grams to treat children with
eczema. It is also suitable for making bombs. The men had disguised themselves
as respectable doctors embarking on an aid mission to Africa, who visited
forty-eight pharmacies near Frankfurt airport claiming they had forgotten they
needed prescriptions for the chemical in their haste to reach the paediatric clinics where they intended to do good. This
hard-luck story worked on most pharmacists. In another apartment rented by the
group, the German police found a twenty-minute videotape recording a journey
from Baden-Baden to Strasbourg. In Strasbourg the camera focused on the
cathedral fa<rade, and especially on shoppers in
the Christmas market. There was a soundtrack in Arabic: 'These are the enemies
of God taking a stroll ... These are the enemies of God. You will go to hell.
God willing.' The plan seems to have been to put bombs inside pressure cookers,
but there is no certainty, for at their trial the defendants maintained
silence, only to shriek, 'You are all Jews. I don't need the court. Allah is my
defender. Our only judge is Allah,' as they were sentenced. The entire plot had
been organised from London, where many members of the
cell lived. The British arrested Abu Qatada, and then Abu Doha as he tried to
flee from Heathrow. Italian police rolled up a Milan-based cell after their
extensive electronic eavesdropping revealed that a Munich-based Libyan was
trying to replay the Strasbourg attack with the aid of a toxic-gas attack.68
The continent's lax
asylum laws meant that, whereas in 1983 there were eighty thousand asylum
seekers, by 1992 the figure was seven hundred thousand, with highly organised smuggling rings bringing in many more illegally,
often in deplorable circumstances. This laxity enabled several serious Islamist
playe~s to gain a foothold, despite the fact that
they routinely told multiple lIes to gain the
requisite permissions, as when Abu Hamza contracted a bigamous marriage with an
Englishwoman in order to gain leave to stay. Even when they broke the terms of
their asylum or committed crimes, as in the case of the entire Strasbourg
group, it was the exception rather than the rule that any European government
would deport those concerned. The Yemeni Ramzi bin al-Shibh
claimed to German authorities that he was tOmar'
fleeing persecution in his native Sudan. Even before they rejected his claim,
Ramzi bin al-Shibh had acquired the correct
registration papers, in his real name, for a German university which he used to
obtain a student visa from the embassy in Yemen.69 There was virtually no
co-ordination between courts, interior ministry, immigration authorities,
prisons and police, in contrast to the teams oflegal
activists such men could mobilise if ever they were
arrested. At a rarefied level police and intelligence services co-operated, but
lower down national jurisdictions ensured no co-ordination of policy in any
depth. A conversation recorded by Italian intelligence agents reveals how such
men regarded Europe as a soft touch, even without the aid of sympathetic
immigration and human rights lawyers, professions that have successfully
insulated themselves from all criticism. The named speaker was Mahmoud
Abdelkader Es Sayed, a high ranking Egyptian AI Qaeda member, who had
anticipated the Italians' curiosity by admitting connections with Islamic Jihad:
Unknown man: Did you
get political asylum?
Es Sayed: Yes, when I
got here I went to Rome. I came to Milan only after obtaining the asylum.
Anyway, when I came here, I shaved my beard and I 'shaped up'.
Man: Yes [laughing]
of course they never got to know anything about your extremism ...
Es Sayed: I filed my
claim in Rome ... [laughing] naturally
I told them I have
three brothers in jail ... I also told them I had been in jail.
network. To put this
in perspective, French security authorities calculate that of France's 1,685
mosques, which are regularly attended by only 10 per cent of five million
French Muslims, eighty or 4.7 per cent gave cause for concern, with 1.1 per
cent actually controlled, rather than contested, by radical salafists.
Most imams were actually rather meek people, avoiding controversy so as not to
offend their congregations or the presbyterian-like mosque committees that
controlled the money from collections. The' committees often preferred to hire
these foreign village preachers because they were cheaper than employing
someone with a Western education ranging beyond mastery of the Koran. Control
of such committees was one way for radicals to hot up the temperature in the
mosque. Radical Islamists were recipients of centralised
funding, whether from a local organisation in the
host country or from an external source like Wahhabist
Saudi Arabia. Unlike some aged peasant cleric preaching in an Urdu that young
second-generation Muslims found difficult to comprehend, the radicals frequently
operated in the national vernacular, or in authentic Arabic, and were the first
to utilise the most modern technologies,?
They also knew just
which aspects of the local culture to adopt, so that, for example, sheikh Omar
Bakri managed to combine the belligerence of his native Syria with a comedic
touch worthy of Bernard Manning, an unlamented British racist comedian of a
vulgar disposition. Any attempt by moderates to say 'yes, but' could be slammed
down with citations from the holy book by 'sheikhs' and 'imams' with no
theological grounding whatsoever, but with a feel for life as young Muslims
live it. Masters of vituperation, these figures had angry young men eating out
of their hands, especially if they bore the physical stigmata of some foreign
jihad. Battles for control were fought over moderate mosques, sometimes leading
to the bizarre spectacle of a moderate preaching upstairs and a maniac in the
basement, or, as in the case of Abu Hamza, out in a London street under the
gaze of bored policemen. As in Milan, radicals set up ad-hoc mosques in a
former garage or similar premises, or, as in the case of Stepney's
East London mosque, gravitated to an alternative venue that they totally
controlled. This is what the French call 'Islam des caves', of the basements
and cellars in huge public housing projects. Muslim student societies, for this
was the generation that enjoyed mass tertiary education, were quickly dominated
by bodies like the Young Muslim Organisation, one of
the routes into more radically subversive groups such as Hizb
ut - Tahir. British academics refused to 'spy' on
their students, although they still monitor signs of drug abuse or mental
instability. At enormous cost, some European governments, notably the
Netherlands, have belatedly commissioned university-based licensing programmes for imams, the goal being to combine Islamic
learning with a plural, rationalistic Western education. That 70 per cent of
the students are female is not encouraging for the scheme seems doomed to
failure in such a male-dominated culture.72
The ayatollah
Khomeini's parting gift to the world before his death in June 1989 was the
issuance of a fatwa calling upon the world's Muslims to murder the novelist
Salman Rushdie for insulting the Prophet. This outrage was a bid to reassert
Iran's hegemony in the Muslim world now defined to mean everywhere Muslims
lived - after the conclusion of the Saudi-sponsored victory over the Soviets in
Afghanistan. It also stymied the efforts of Iranian moderates to reopen doors
to the West. After a significant lapse of time, Muslims in India and Pakistan
succeeded in whipping up a fury among their co-religionists in Britain. A
country that had blithely ignored the religious implications of mass migration,
assuming that all immigrants would happily melt into the prevailing secular
hedonism, was shocked by scenes of angry people burning books and effigies in
northern British cities. This anger has not gone away; it has been regularly
re-incited over the last twenty years, to the decreasing amusement of natives
who are wearying of the fist -waving and finger-jabbing, the flames and the
insatiable anger.
For many European
Muslims, their last vision of a functioning multicultural society ends when
they leave the false dawn of multi-ethnic, multi-faith primary schools for an
increasingly segregated secondary school system. There is something deeply
tragic about the way this has happened, and it is difficult to see how things
can be rectified. These divisions are an inevitable consequence of the
formation of de-facto ghettos, the 'dish cities' where the TV satellite
receiver is tuned to other shores. Five per cent of British citizens are
Muslims, but in some towns they constitute 15 per cent of the population. In a
town like Blackburn in Lancashire, people in the Muslim south live separate
lives from white people in the north. School children are bussed back and
forth, as if visiting a church or mosque in the other part of town was like a
trip abroad. According to a recent BBe television programme in May 2007, 'white flight' will result in
entirely South Asian or entirely white cities. Politicians express grave
concern about such ghettos, but have no idea how to break them up since each
fresh initiative seems to fail. In Britain they have to bear in mind that some
fifty or so Labour Party MPs are heavily dependent on
the Muslim vote, which can be influenced this way or that by telephone calls
from a religious or political leader in Pakistan or by fraudulent manipulation
of postal voting systems. Politicians of all stripes, except Labour MPs with constituencies containing large numbers of
poor whites, ignore polls in which 70 per cent of Britons express their wish to
tighten immigration criteria, preferring to side with bien-pen~ant
opinion rather than with what their fellow countrymen - including many Asians
and Afro-Caribbeans - actually think. Even to raise these issues was once to be
dismissed as a Fascist, a racist or, bizarrely, a eugenicist, a creed that had
some purchase on the left too.73
One of the major
problems is that something for which we already had the neutral term
cosmopolitanism, that is all the everyday things about mixed ethnic communities
we historically liked, was elided with the activist ideology of
multiculturalism, which means far more than buying coffee from a purportedly
Algerian store on a gay street in London's Soho run by Italians and Poles, or
the fact of (highly ordered) multi-ethnic city states like Hong Kong or
Singapore. Some Jews do not like the word cosmopolitan, seeing it as a coded
synonym for nineteenthcentury Berlin or Vienna, but
that is insufficient reason to avoid it.
Multiculturalism
means that each diverse group adopted a story of victimhood so as to put itself
beyond close scrutiny, enveloping itself in the myth of moral purity that comes
with being the historically oppressed. These diverse communities spoke to
government through their so-called community leaders, a liberal version of an
imperial power dealing through nabobs and tribes with the natives. In fact, the
self-appointed leaders of victim minorities can be oppressors too, as anyone
familiar with the Bogside, Falls Road or Short Strand will know. There are
bullies aplenty in Muslim communities too, in societies like Hizb ut - Tahir that function like
gangs. Wild charges of institutionalised or systemic
racism shut down discussion of Muslim subordination of women or the hatred they
expressed towards gays and Jews, just as some Jews have for decades inhibited
criticism of Israel, or of dubious acts involving individual Jews, by
automatically insinuating charges of anti-Semitism.74
Continued
in Part 3....
43 See especially Ami
Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism (Cambridge 2005) pp. 134ff.
and the less interesting Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win. Why Suicide Terrorists
Do It (London 2006) and Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense of Suicide Missions
(Oxford 2005)
44 Anat Berko and Edna Erez, , "Ordinary People" and "Death
Work": Palestinian Suicide Bombers as Victimizers and Victims' Violence
and Victims (2006) 20, pp. 603-23
45 Ed Husain, The
Islamist (London 2007) pp.74-81
46 Noel Malcolm,
Bosnia. A Short History (London 1994) pp. 220-22 is characteristically humane
and intelligent
47 Lorenzo Vidonio, Al Qaeda in Europe. The
New Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, New York 2006) pp.215-31
48 Evan Kohlmann, Al-Qaeda's Jihad in
Europe. The Afghan-Bosnian Network (Oxford 2004)
pp. 85-6
49 'The 1995 and 1998
Renditions' Human Rights Watch at http://dRl/hrw.org/ reports/ 2005/ egypto 505h 5.htm
50 Kepel, Jihad pp. 251-3
51 Paul Murphy, The
Wolves of Islam. Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terror (Washington DC 2006)
pp. 20-24
52 Andrew Higgins and
Alan Cullison, 'Saga of Dr Zawahiri Sheds Light on
the Roots of Al Qaeda Terror' Wall Street Journal 3 July 2002
53 Evan Kohlmann,
'Two Decades ofJihad in Algeria: The GIA, the GSPC,
and Al-Qaida' www.nefafoundation.org (2007) pp. 1-28. Mohammed Samraoui, Chronique des annees de sang (Paris 2003) should be used with caution as
it has been the object of libel actions in French courts. See especially Martin
Evans and John Phillips, Algeria. Anger of the Dispossessed (New Haven 2007)
pp.235ff.
54 Stora, Algeria 1830-2000 pp. 213ff. is good on politics in
the 1990S
55 For the first
point see Mark Allen, Arabs (London 2006) p. 30
56 Habeck, Knowing the Enemy pp. 83ff. 57 Simon Reeve, The New
Jackals. Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden and the Future of Terrorism (London
1999) pp. 125-32 is a persuasive account of Yousef's mind
58 Richard A. Clarke,
Against All Enemies. Inside America's War on Terror (New York 2004) pp. 140-47
59 Burke, AI-Qaeda p.
127
60 See mainly Ahmed
Rashid, Taliban. The Story of the Afghan Warlords (London 2001) pp. 72-5
61 See Alan Cullison, 'Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive' Atlantic Monthy (September 2004) pp. 1-16. Cullison's
brilliant reporting from Afghanistan for the Wall Street Journal includes
details from abandoned Al Qaeda computers he purchased in Kabul
62 Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections. States that Sponsor Terrorism
(Cambridge 2005) pp. 205-9
63 McDermott, Perfect
Soldiers Appendix C p. 264 for most of this text
64 Baradan Kuppusamy, 'Hambali: The Driven Man' Asia Times 19 August 2003
65 Lucien Vandenbroucke, 'Eyewitness to Terror: Nairobi's Day of
Infamy' and Patience Bushnell, 'After Nairobi: Recovering from Terror' American
Foreign Service Bulletin (2000) June, July issues
66 Michael Griffin,
Reaping the Whirlwind. Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and the Holy War (Sterling,
Virginia 2003) p. 174
67 Jean-Charles Brisard
and Damien Martinez, Zarqawi. The New
Face of AI-Qaeda (Cambridge 2005) is essential on Zarqawi as it is based on
extensive Jordanian documentation
68 Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe pp. 147ff.
69 McDermott, Perfect
Soldiers pp. 37-46
70 DIGOS (Italian
secret service) report 'AI Muhajroun 3' dated 21
November 2001
71 Shiv Malik, 'My
Brother the Bomber' Prospect (June 2007) p. 34
72 Gerald Robbins, 'Dutch
Treat: The Netherlands Tries to Assimilate its Muslim Immigrants' Weekly
Standard 13 July 2007 pp. 1-2
73 George Walden,
Time to Emigrate? (London 2006)
74 Paul M. Sniderman and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide (Princeton 2007) pp.
27ff.
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