Though there were signs of some thawing during the summer of 2003, South Asia still remained one of the most militarized and restless regions in the world. In terms of its regional politics, South Asia, even after the end of the global Cold War, remained a hotbed of bilateral rivalries, triggering an arms race and almost uncontrollable population transfers. While India retains 76 per cent of the entire regional territory with a corresponding proportion of population and resources, its relationship with the six other regional neighbours has usually been less than cordial. The image of a grand and united India has been propounded, both by the Congress and its rival Hindu parties such as the outlawed Mahasabha, RSS, Jan Sangh, Shiv Sena or the ruling BJP, for their own respective reasons. However, this ironical convergence, shared both by the secularists and ultranationalists, assumed a pronounced hegemonic dimension under Hindutva, spawning centrist policies within the country, parallel with an attitude towards neighbours characterized by indifference, ambiguity or occasional hostility. It is not just the size of the country itself, but also the advocacy of Akhand Bharat and such other unilateral formulae, varying from regional preeminence to a kind of Monroe Doctrine, that has inculcated fear among its neighbours. Though some Indian nationalists frequently counseled accommodation with the Muslim League, the bitterness over Partition has never allowed any meaningful dialogue.

After Independence, the mass migrations, disputes over princely states, natural resources and assets bedeviled Indo-Pakistan relations ever since. A common slogan applied by the BJP and Shiv Sena-`Pakistan Ya Qabristan!' (Pakistan or graveyard!)-aims at pressurizing Indian Muslims to accept Hindu civilization as the mother civilization and denounce their own religion as Muslims.

Except for the varying degree of sophistication, the Taliban-style Islamic fundamentalism, Jihadi groups and Hindutva are similar to one another in their inception, ideological mindset, scapegoating minorities and a high level of obduracy, though some may appear more modern than the rest. Where the Arabic sponsored Wahhabi doctrine of the Taliban called for demolishing a famous Buddha statue in Afghanistan, came as a ‘tit for tat’ after the demolishing of the famous Ayodhya mosque by the Hindutva /BJP –party in India.

The specific articulation of Jihad merely as a militarist concept joined with Sunni statism, and full-fledged projects like Hindutva, Khas Hindu movement and Islamic Bangladesh are similar manifestations of a majoritarian fascism. Such an ethos is invariably shared all over the region, whereby exclusionary forms of nationalism and identity are increasingly being ordained in the name of history, religion, demography and such other denominators. These irredentist ideologies offer reductionist, dangerous and simplified solutions to immense human problems. Their simple formula is through a constant 'Othering', whereby, an `enemy within' is shown conspiring in league with the enemies from outside. The Muslim and such other religious communities in India, religious minorities in Pakistan, and the ethno-religious sections in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan, suffer from various forms of discrimination, displaying a growing convergence between official policies and societal clusters, all justified in the name of an imagined national identity. In the process, pluralism remains the main casualty, and despite a wider politicisation, comparatively freer press and vocal civil societies, the ethnic, gender and religion-based othering has been on the increase.

These dissensions exacerbate inter-state conflicts over several unresolved issues and at populist levels, mundane problems are juxtaposed as irresolvable conflicts between Islam and Hinduism, Buddhism and Hinduism, Christianity and Hinduism, Hinduism and Sikhism, and Islam and Christianity. The Bihari issue is, of course, an exception, where an undefined citizenship has led to the statelessness of a quarter of a million people, while religion-unlike in the cases of Bangladeshi Hindus and Christians-is not a contention at all. However, in every other case, the discretionary interpretation of religion and a so-called majoritarianism appear to be feeding into each other to deny human rights to smaller communities, which in most cases, are already disadvantaged.

Even after witnessing the world's largest migration in 1947, South Asia continues to experience an unprecedented number of population movements in recent years owing largely to geo-political, economic or religious factors. Such movements have been taking place both within the respective countries and between them. Never in the history of the subcontinent have so many huddled masses been on the move. The developments in Afghanistan in 1978-79 pushed more than three million Afghan refugees into Pakistan with serious human and politico-economic repercussions, whereas revolution in Iran caused the exodus of a number of Iranian nationals to Pakistan. Many of them continue to stay on. During the 1970s, while Pakistan agreed to accept a number of Biharis-generally known as stranded Pakistanis-from Bangladesh, the repatriation of many more remained a major emotive issue in both the countries. While about 250,000 Biharis have continued to live in designated camps in their former homeland, in Sindh, local, parallel ethnic movements have made their repatriation a contentious issue. As the Urdu-speaking community in Sindh led by the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) demanded their immediate repatriation, the native Sindhis agitated against `becoming American Indians on their own soil'. (Feroz Ahmed, `Pakistan's Problem of National Integration', in Asghar Khan, (ed.) Islam, Politics and the State. The Pakistan Experience, London, 1985, pp. 229-230.)

Due to inter-ethnic tensions in Nepal and Bhutan, one noticed growing population movement and the resultant inter-state tensions. Nepal seemed to have lost its erstwhile political stability in 2001, when the crown prince, in a furious bout, killed the king and other members of the royal family. The instability only increased the violent unrest in the rural areas, largely sponsored by the communists since 1996. It was being feared that if the insurgency went out of hand, it might trigger Indian intervention, which could escalate Sino-Indian rivalry in the Himalayan regions.

In Punjab, Maharashtra, Bihar, Assam and Jharkhand, the nativist movements became more vocal in demanding the expulsion of the non-natives who had come there seeking jobs and seasonal employment. In a cosmopolitan and otherwise forward-looking Bombay, Shiv Sena triumphantly articulated its anti-alien campaign, demanding Maharashtra for the Maharashtrans and organized itself into a. formidable parallel administration. By adding a very communal ingredient to its ethnocentricity, Shiv Sena became a vanguard in the anti-Muslim campaign and has since broadened its following. Bal Thackeray has virtually controlled the politics of the state and has established his countrywide leadership on sheer communal animosity. His audacity would not allow even a cricket match between India and Pakistan. It appeared as if the South Asian urban centres, instead of developing an overarching composite ethos, had fallen prey to criminalized ethnicization and dangerous atomization.

Ethno-regional heterogeneity, like religious diversity, may prove a bane for any plural, representative system, and if not handled judiciously, can be an immensely implosive factor for any multiple society like India or Pakistan. Due to the Indian polity gradually becoming dependent on a centralist and elitist state structure, ethnic, communal and regional identities have become extremely politicized. Primordial factors such as language, religion and region have been operative in identity-formation activated through an ambiguous or hostile interaction with the state itself. All the way from Kashmir and Punjab to the North-east, ethno-regional movements embody defiance against the official authority by falling back upon primordial loyalties to varying degrees. In all such cases of ethnic and cultural nationalism in India, one notices an indigenous revulsion against a perceived majority-led irredentism. Where such a scenario reflects basic impediments to the evolution of a pluralist Indian nationalism, one detects a permeating uneasy relationship between the majorities and minorities and between the centre and the constituent units. If the Hindu majority, on the basis of its numerical strength, was ever able to consolidate a vetoing power within a centralist structure through electoral or other means, the separatist aspirations of various cultural and ethnic nationalists, especially on the peripheries, could gain further momentum, ushering South Asia into a conundrum of convulsions. Both ethno-nationalism and majoritarian irredentism are capable of changing the contours of South Asian politics either through massive population transfers with accompanying `ethnic cleansing', or by simply triggering inter-state hostilities.

In a way, South Asia may not be such a unique case, as one finds the rise of Ultra Right and discretionary nationalist ethos overriding pluralist prerogatives even in the developed democracies, such as in the North Atlantic region or the former Eastern bloc. The insecurity of the majorities, though ostensibly incomprehensible, especially after 9/11 and in the wake of vengeful attacks on Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq, has unleashed a plethora of tensions on the existing pluralism. The saga of `fortress Europe', the harassment of non-whites, specially the Muslim elements, and a growing accent against political exiles, despite a hyped globalisation, have increased amidst the rolling back of civil liberties. The subtle forms of institutional racism and sheer physical and verbal violence against non-whites, in several cases, have increased, and the pervasive fear is of a sudden rise in the graph in case of any new terrorist attacks in these regions. The spotlight on Islam and rather irresponsible use of disputatious terms like `Islamic Fundamentalism', `Islamic Terror', `Muslim Militancy', and the 'Crusades'-not always used innocuously and value free-reverberates in the rising popularity and electoral performance of racist outfits. Like their Hindutva and such other so-called majoritarian proponents in South Asia, specific pressure groups and powerful media trajectories egg on these racist parties in the West. The dividends of a global peace movement, with its massive and immensely plural participation, may still offer hope for an alert global civil society, away from the scavenging forces of abrasive power and profit, yet its incapacitation in the United States, Britain and Australia, in the face of official regimentation, highlights the enormous problems ahead. The disregard for the massive loss of human lives in Afghanistan, Iraq, Chechnya, or of innocent civilians in Palestine or Gujarat, abysmally reveals the limitations of the local and global civil societies while confronted with statist and societal unilateralisms. The states, in all these cases, have utilised national, cultural and even religious symbols to justify their brutalisation, or have simply sat back to let the perpetrators take their toll from disempowered minority groups.

While religions are social and historical realities in South Asia as elsewhere, their expropriation for narrow nationalist or such other temporary benefits needs to be seen as a region-wide malady. The tolerant and plural traditions of all these religions have been forsaken to suit specific interests, with the result that the Jihadi outfits, Sunni activists, Kar Sevaks, Sinhala nationalists, Tamil separatists, or Khas Hindus now find it expedient to deny civil rights to other fellow citizens besides aggravating inter-state conflicts. The politics of competition as well as cooption to seek a greater legitimacy through religious symbols, both by the political and societal elements, have only allowed the extremist and exclusionary policies to prevail. The dependence of an entire national identity on such exclusive religious infra structure, or the other way around may yield some temporary gains for a particular ruling or aspiring elite, but its cost for the societies at large is too horrendous, as has been seen time and again across the region. Of course, Jinnahist and Nehruvian postulations on secularism have been misunderstood-sometimes not without logical reasons-yet a greater debate on their merits within the context of South Asian pluralism, equal citizenship and a due respect for all beliefs and a `hands-off policy on such matters are worth investigating. The de-Indianisation of Pakistan and Bangladesh is as dangerous, as is the de-Islamisation of India. Their security and identity-related concerns will be better met through a greater awareness of their historical pluralism and shared contributions towards a larger human harmony. This has to come about by withholding the transformation of textbooks to suit discretionary needs, a responsible use of media and a greater debate on collective advantages to be had from a vigorous and fresher regionalisation, without of course, surrendering sovereignty. Regional co-operation will not only preclude any more possibility of `balkanisation' of this immensely plural and populous region, it will also usher South Asia into a long-cherished era of peace and stability.

The Partition of India was a traumatic event, but it was an Indian tragedy not a solely Hindu one despite efforts on the part of RSS and others to claim so. However more recent efforts by the Sangh Parivar to foment communal polarization for example through an agitation over a place of worship in Bangalore/ Chikmagalur District failed to gain the BJP advantage at the 2004 election. However it was the neglect of the poor, lower castes and women by the NDA Government that has cost them their power. Most telling has been their policy on education, deserving a first time ever, analysis:

One of the key characteristics of Hindu nationalist militancy in India is the presence of overlapping, but highly disciplined, organisations that promote different facets of a unique interpretation of Hindu nationalism called Hindutva (Hinduness).

 

Note:  Savarkar one of It's Early Key Ideologists

Savarkar was an Anti-British revolutionary, till his imprisonment, who had talked about Hindu Muslim unity and had praised Bahadur Shah Zafar for leading Hindu Muslim kings in the anti British war of 1857; shortly after being imprisoned, he started seeking mercy from the British authorities with knees bent.
But there are various myths which have by now become a matter of folklore in general and more so in Maharashtra, the place where the politics of Hindutva took an aggressive stance after the publication of his book 'Hindutva or who is a Hindu' by Savarkar and later by the formation of RSS, which took this book's formulation about Hindutva as the base of its divisive politics. The myth that he spent most of his life in cellular jail has no basis at all as factually he was there for around ten years after which he was transferred to Ratnagiri jail, from where he was released in 1924. It is noteworthy that while he is being praised for his bravery and suffering, many revolutionaries suffered longer but unlike him did not buckle under the pressure of suffering. They are going unsung while Savarkar is adorning the hall of Parliament. Savarkarites have manufactured the answer to it that he wanted to participate in the freedom struggle so he apologized to the British as a matter of 'clever' tactic. Islam shows through Savarkar's writings that he did not participate in the freedom struggle after getting released and was critical of the national movement all through, to the extent of helping the British war efforts.

It is here that the myth was created that he advised Subhash Chandra Bose to go to Japan to seek Japanese assistance to get freedom from British. This claim gets exposed when we realize that it is during this time that Bose is forming Azad Hind Fauj and fighting the British, while Savarkar is assisting the British in their war effort. Now a time has come for them to manufacture a new argument to 'praise' his greatness in simultaneously doing two contradictory things, if at all he was the advisor of Subhash Bose. He was a firm ally of British when they were repressing the National movement by brutal methods. The argument that he stood firmly against the Muslim league politics is again far from true. As a matter of fact Hindu Mahasabha collaborated with Muslim League in formation of coalition ministries in Sind and Bengal, and Savarkar supported and appreciated this move of Hindu Mahasabha.

As such collaboration with Muslim League is so 'logical' for Hindu Mahasbaha as both of these parties are on the same wavelength of political ideology. Both of them hold on to religion based nationalism, that religion can be the base of nationalism, was inherent in their politics, both of them did not participate in the freedom movement and both these formations were derivatives of the political formations founded by landlords and kings of princely states. So the Muslim League-Hindu Mahasabha alliance is logical and not an aberration.

An interesting part of Savarkar's writings is about the King of Nepal. This monarch of Hindu Rashtra of Nepal is perceived by Savarkar as the one who is the logical ruler of Hindus all over the world. So had Savarkar's politics succeeded, today India would have the 'proud privilege' of being ruled by a king who has killed his brother's entire family for power and has muzzled the democracy.

Also, his efforts to eradicate untouchability many a times are projected as being equal to those of Ambedkar. The contrast can never be worse. While Ambedkar burns Manusmriti Savarkar upholds this as the core rule book for Hindus. At one point he assures the sanatani Hindus that they should not worry about temple entry of Shudras as Hindu Mahasabha will not let the untouchables enter the temples and will not let them come in beyond a point at which non Hindus are shown the 'No Entry' board. The 'brilliance' of this strategy is beyond words. Dalits are Hindus but like the non-Hindus they will not be permitted to enter the "Laxman Rekha" drawn by Holy Scripture called Manu Smriti. So much for his rationalism.

The role of Savarkar in Gandhi murder has been a matter of creation of another myth. Taking advantage of the fact that the court acquitted him in this case, it is being said that he was not a part of the conspiracy. As a matter of fact, he was let off only because the charges were not corroborated. Kapoor commission pointed out that Savarkar was a part of the conspiracy while Sardar Patel also said similar things, including in a letter.

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