So why can’t Jews
(because that is where it’s all about) not resettle a land they see as ancestral, as far as the Islamic fundamentalists are concerned?
The answer of the Salafi and Islamist paradigm is enigmatic by historical
standards, but can be explained in terms of geopolitics. To Islamists, every
land that was conquered-or technically, opened-during the fatah
under a legitimate Islamic authority cannot revert back to the infidels. This
is the case of other nations and countries invaded by Muslim armies, including
Spain, most of France, and parts of India and Russia. Zionism is attempting to
take back a land that had been duly Islamized (by jihadic
standards). On that ground alone, Islamic fundamentalists reject the very
premise of Zionism. It is not about the size of the land or the regime
established or the type of economy, or even the demographic changes it causes.
Stretched to the limit, the Islamist approach would accept the relocation of
Arab Muslim populations back and forth, if it was in the interest of the umma,
but would not tolerate the relocation of an infidel population on a Muslim land
if it was not authorized by the caliphate-and more important, if it were to
develop into a sovereign infidel entity in the heart of Muslim territory.
The Salafi movement,
encompassing the Muslim Brotherhood, the Wahabis, and other pro-takfir
movements, saw the growth of the] ewish population
of Palestine with the same anger as did Pan Arabists and local Arab
populations. But the transnational Islamists calculated differently. While it
was an issue of daily struggle for local Arabs in Palestine, the Salafists looked
at the whole region. The tragedy was greater: France and Great Britain occupied
the whole region. A mostly Christian nation was emerging in Lebanon. A Coptic
prime minister was appointed in Egypt. The Shiites were empowering themselves
in Iran, and there were other issues as well. The Islamic fundamentalists had
a variety of "global matters" to deal with, such as the
reestablishment of the supreme world authority for Islam, the role of the
Wahabi state, and internal issues in each Arab country. Hence, some Arab
nationalists went so far as to accuse the Islamists, particularly the Muslim
Brotherhood, of not putting Palestine at the forefront of their struggle before
1948. In reality, until about 1947, not everyone in the movement assumed that a
Jewish state was imminent, especially during World War II. But events unfolded
quickly at the end of the war.
When the first
intifada exploded in 1987, a new offshoot of the Ikhwan spread throughout the
Palestinian communities: Hamas, an offshoot of the above mentioned Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt. The group, whose full name is Harakat al Muqawama al Islamiya (the
Movement of the Islamic Resistance), drew its ideology from the first
generation of Islamic fundamentalists but presented a platform for a local
Palestinian arena for jihad. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) erupted after
Hamas as a more reduced and less populist organization. Hamas's institutions
have received the financial support of the Saudi government and charities since
the early 1980s. But the new jihadist forces developed their own funding from
their networks of donors, including some in the United States.
As of the late 1980s
and particularly since the early 1990s, Hamas and PIJ opted for a relativist
doctrine regarding Israel and the United States. In what is most likely a
strategic choice made by their own leadership, and possibly following the
advice of the centraljihad mother ship in Saudi
Arabia and beyond, the jihadists of Palestine went into a full-fledged war
against Israel, sinking all attempts for a peace process. But these two groups
were extremely careful not to engage US. targets worldwide or within the US.
mainland. There are two reasons for this Palestine-centered battlefield
strategy. One was that both Hamas and Islamic Jihad had decided to build a
network of fundraisers within the West in general and the United States in
particular. It would have been difficult and counterproductive to attack
American targets under a "Palestine Jihad" label while sitting
comfortably on US. campuses and in American neighborhoods, collecting money
almost openly for the war against Zionism and America. Many in the United
States and the West could not understand why Hamas and PIO would not conduct
attacks or suicide killings in American cities and towns. The main reason is
that they have chosen to fight one infidel at a time and to concentrate their
resources on America's main ally in the region, Israel, hence ultimately
weakening the United States. The second reason, emerging after September 11, is
the distribution of roles. The main vehicle of jihad-at the moment, al
Qaeda-fights America head-on and everywhere. It will decide when and how to
handle jihad against the greatest infidel power. Meanwhile, Hamas and PIJ are
"regional" jihad forces whose battlefield is restricted to Palestine.
This is another example of the complexity of the international holy war against
the infidels in general and the United States in particular.
The Islamist Salafis
of Palestine are engaged in their local battlefield in Israel and will continue
to focus there until another equation presents itself. Individual jihadists
among the Palestinians are engaged against the United States either overseas
or inside America, and also against European targets. The "organized"
entities, such as Hamas and PIJ, have developed networks in the continental
U.S. mainland and internationally but have not attempted to engage directly in
the war against America. But, as they are connected to the interna tional mother ship on a multitude oflevels,
they provide information, technical assistance, and financial contributions,
and would send militants to battlefields if the international command so
decided. But the most dangerous war effort provided by Hamas and PI] membership
and supporters within the United States, and around the world, to al Qaeda and
future globaljihadists is related to political and
national intelligence. PI] members have built or integrated political
organizations under American and European laws. These lobbies, operating
within the system, can and have been able to serve the interests of global
jihad inside the American institutional establishment-legally. This activity
ranges from building networks on campuses all the way up to lobbies that have
been received at the highest echelons of government, including the White House.
Although al Qaeda would find it very difficult to penetrate the U.S. system
directly, its allies who operate through American-based organizations can
provide assistance. Hence, the structure of Palestinian Salafis' jihad against
the United States is complex and multidimensional.
In Palestine, Hamas
and Islamic ]ihad wage their most relentless war
against their direct enemy, the state and the people of Israel. In the United
States, these networks are (or were, at least until September 11) protected by
or hidden inside American-based pro-jihad organizations. The latter join forces
with other jihadi political networks in the United States to provide al Qaeda
and the international jihadist web with a valuable assessment of American national
security. Such networks exist in Europe and other regions, to varying degrees.
The Hamas and PI] networks in America and Europe are "reserve forces"
for the next wave of global jihad attacks against the West. This distribution
of roles allows the "reserve" to grow, while supplying the mother
ship with assistance. The next greatest danger to America's security, in the
context of the war between Palestinian jihadists and Israel, is when the
"global jihadists" unleash all their forces and allies-including
Hamas and PIO-simultaneously within the United States and against worldwide
targets in a planetary assault.
Islamists and
jihadists see Israel and the United States as one bloc, but have designed a
complex strategy to confront them. This strategy can be found at all levels of
international jihad. It has been applied to all other enemies of the fundamentalists-across
the Atlantic and around the world.
Back to the Future
In a very complex
analysis, the Islamic fundamentalists chose jihad over national secular
resistance and opted for strengthening the higher cause of the caliphate over
the lower nationalist causes. They obviously stood against Israel-not to build
a Palestinian secular state, however, but to reestablish an "Islamic"
Palestine. This worldview of jihad was not well understood during the cold
war, or even now, by most western academics and politicians. For example, after
September 11, 2001, many rushed to conclude that bin Laden was attacking
because he wanted a Palestinian state. In fact, the leader of al Qaeda never
uttered the word "state" in connection with the Palestinians. He
wanted Israel eliminated (just like recently the President of Iran expressed
himself), but never pledged a state for the Palestinians, for in his mind
"Palestine" was to become simply a province within the caliphate, not
a country in itself.
During the cold war,
the Wahabis adopted a peculiar strategy from their fortress in Saudi Arabia.
Inside the kingdom and throughout the clerical networks, an ongoing debate
examined the concept of using the resources of the infidels to achieve the
goals of jihad.
It followed two
tracks. The long-term one was a sustained policy of financial and diplomatic
support to Islamist networks around the world, within the framework
of charities, mosques, hospitals, orphanages, and of course religious schools.
No wonder that al
Qaeda sister organizations around the world have enjoyed an endless
strategic source of manpower. They recruit not just from their own
schools of cadres, but also from what oil resources have allowed the
Wahabi realm to foster worldwide for many years, and which is currently only
increasing with oil prices at a high level today.
The second track of
Wahabi international strategy was to use its own natural and financial
resources to influence the West, build alliances and diplomatic support, and
shield Islamic fundamentalism under the protection of the “infidels.”
The political economy
of oil, as it is today, added huge power to the Wahabi thrust worldwide. The
"economic partners" of the Saudis in the West-the multinational
energy corporations-became the first extensions of its influence on all levels.
If the Saudi regime planned on weapon acquisitions, its friends would cut the
deals. If the Saudis wished to introduce their views-or to impose them on-the
U.S. educational system, their "American" partners did the groundwork.
With with the 1973 boycott crisis by the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a new factor added itself to the
"respect" created by the Saudis' : the looming threat of an
interruption in the supply of oil. With a global show of force, Riyadh's establishment
and its Arab partners sent one striking message to the West: You will do as we
say in international politics, you will not undermine our Wahabi doctrine, and
you will abide by our policies within the Arab Muslim world-otherwise, you
will find yourselves biking to work ‘like the Dutch.’ As a result of the 1973
oil boycott, many European countries, such as the Netherlands, had to face
draconian measures, including gas rationing. The response in the Lowlands was
to use their bicycles for months.
In the midst of a
raging cold war, with the Vietnam crisis lurching toward its torturous end and
a boiling Arab- Israeli conflict, the West submitted to the god of oil and
opened its gates even wider to the flow of Wahabi influence. But were the
Saudis using this influence to feed terrorism directly, as some have concluded
after September 11? The situation was never that simple. The long term
objectives of the Wahabi strategic planners were to achieve gradual technological
superiority, use the power of the West to reach foreign policy goals such as
facilitating Wahabi influence in the region, and ultimately spread the ideology
worldwide, all at an acceptable pace.
Muslim Brother Strategy: Using the Power of Muslims
For their part,
during the cold war the Muslim Brotherhood followed the general guidelines of
the Wahabis, but since it was not in control of a government (like it is now to
some degree in Egypt), it developed a different strategy. While the Saudis had
the luxury to use the powers of others, mainly the United States, the Ikhwan
preferred to use the powers of the community they wanted to mobilize. The
group’s dense and complex writings over half a century focused on infiltrating
the group’s home countries, starting with the Arab and Muslim societies, so
that they could be in full control of their destinies. The Brotherhood was
extremely careful so as not to engage the regimes before reaching full
capability. Their military and subversive doctrine was amazingly fluid and
adaptable to circumstances. Their ideal shortcut was to infiltrate the ranks of
the military and proceed with a coup d’etat against
the government. Their next choice was to “advise” the ruler and influence him
instead. This approach would start from the bottom-up and then reverse into a
top-down mechanism. Hence, the Brotherhood would be interested in spreading
through the elites, converting them patiently into the Salafi doctrine, and
only then enlisting them in the organization. The Muslim Brotherhood often
created front groups, both inside the Arab world and within I communities.
Known to be very patient, the members distinguished themselves in smart
deception.
In contrast to recent
more radical organizations such as al Qaeda and its allies, the Brotherhood
has made sure to camouflage its literature.7 As I noted in many of the
documents I reviewed for US. And European courts dealing with terrorism cases,
a significant segment of the “intellectual material” was marked by Ikhwan’s
influence: The group seldom called for a direct confrontation with the ruler
(al haakem), which was a recourse of last resort if
he stopped abiding by the rule of Sharia or if he became obstructionist. The
Brotherhood wanted full legitimacy on its side and projected an image of being
the “aggressed,” not the aggressors. Members acted as hardworking militants
transforming the society in which they live into a gruyere (a Frech/Swiss cheese, full of holes ). Their ideal plan is to
make ideological reversal impossible. Educational and media institutions are
the ideal tools for their campaigns. Their impact will be felt across the
school system and in many cases within the media web. This trait was
omnipresent in the audiotapes I examined as the government’s expert in one particular
terror case. The speaker, a Salafi cleric from Egypt whose words reached as far
as Detroit, said clearly: “We need to preachjihad in
schools; the culture of jihad must become the first nature of our youth.”s
Indeed, the
Brotherhood’s ideology is clear and self-explanatory. The path to power
resembles a pyramid, from the community up to the governing bodies. The Ikhwan’s
jihad is more flexible politically than that of the Wahabis, although they are
equivalent ideologically. The Brotherhood has accepted, for example, the need
to participate in the political process, including legislative elections.
Although inconsistent with their Islamic fundamentalist vision, which does not
accept the concepts of republic, democracy, secularism, nonreligious courts,
and so on, the Brotherhood and related organizations practiced the “political
path.” In Jordan, the group has an official presence in parliament. It has
accommodated to the political structure in the hope of achieving further
inroads. Will elections eliminate the struggle for the caliphate? Many westerners
thought they would, but they have not understood the very long-term strategy
of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1991 the Front de Salut Islamique
(FSI), an offshoot of the Ikhwan, ran for election in Algeria and won more than
51 percent of the seats. Many citizens frustrated with the previous
totalitarian government voted for the FSI, despite the fact that it signaled
openly that it would transform the republic into an “Islamist state” with all
that entails: elimination of political parties that disagree with a new
constitution and ultimately elimination of pluralism and the basic
institutions of the republic.9 The Muslim Brotherhood invented “political
jihad,” which means using democracy to come to power so that one can destroy
democracy. Most western analyses, particularly academic research, overlooked
this dimension of jihadism. American and European scholars imagined that any
step toward some democratic practices was a slow concession toward
liberalization. The western apologists could not comprehend the overarching
global goals of the modern jihadists; and they made the same analytical mistake
with regard to jihadi violence.
A general tactic in
their speeches are to make a distinction between the violent and the
nonviolent Islamists. But the ten years in Algeria were a hell waged by the
Muslim Brotherhood Salafis against seculars; more than 150,000 were killed for
example. Many scholars in the United States and western Europe seriously
misunderstood the Muslim Brotherhood jihadists. In fact there were and are
distinctions, but these are drawn by the fundamentalists themselves. They can
chose to be violent or nonviolent at their discretion-not at the discretion of
western experts. During the cold war era for example, the Muslim Brotherhood
got bigger and more complex and gave birth to offshoots, as noted earlier.
Iran’s Strategy: Becoming a Superpower
In Iran they chose a
third path: no alliance with the infidels against other infidels, no dependence
on the superpower's power, and direct jihad when circumstances allow. The
Iranian Islamic Revolution opted for the concept of "superpower
now." From the beginning the Khumeinist
revolution described the United States as the "big devil" (al shaytan al akbar), the Soviets as
the "red devils," and Israel as the "little devil." It
projected itself as the leader of the Muslim world, brushing aside the Sunni-Shiia divide and going so far as to attempt to assign
itself the mission of defense of all underdogs in the world. The Khumeinist revolution wanted to emulate the communists by
declaring itself the leader of the "weak" (mustadafeen)
and struggling against what it called the "condescending" (al isti'laa'). Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran was large and
technologically advanced enough to claim grandeur. And unlike the Muslim
Brotherhood, it was backed by the resources of a powerful state. But unlike
both, the Iranian jihadists were fewer in numbers. There are ten times more
Sunnis than Shiia worldwide, and thus Salafis are ten
times greater in numbers internationally. This matter may have convinced the
Iranian Khumeinists to follow a state-jihadism line
instead of the patient Muslim Brotherhood longterm strategy.ll
Tehran's mullahs
developed a form of Shiia Wahahism.
Today embodied by Ayatollah Sistani of Iraq, the new "spiritual
capital" of Shiism was moved to Qum in Iran. Ayatollah Khumeini's
circles argued that as long as Iraq was under the Baathist secular apostate
regime, the world center of Shiism must be under the protection of Iranian
power. The "revolution" developed an old-new institution called
"the mandate of the wise" (vilayet e fakih),
the highest institution of militant Shiism. It was the parallel of the Sunni
caliphate. In short, it proclaimed the institution as the heir of Ali, in the
same way as the Salafis viewed the caliphate as a continuation of past caliphs.
But on geopolitical grounds, the Khumeinist strategy
was twofold: Develop a high military power in Iran, and organize a
regional-international terror network outside the country. Using Iranian oil
resources, Tehran's regime aimed at developing strategic arms, including a vast
conventional military and weapons of mass destruction. Obtaining chemical and
biological systems was a first stage before developing nuclear weapons. The
logic behind such a trend was to create an umbrella under which the regime
could conduct its activities and "protect" its regional allies, such
as the Hafez Assad regime in Syria.12 By obtaining the doomsday device, Tehran
would gain a status similar to that of all other owners of atomic military
capability. It wanted to become a sort of Islamist Soviet Union with weapons
of mass destruction to balance U.S. power, while creating international
networks to use in low intensity conflicts.
State jihad was the
choice of Iran in its challenge to the kufr powers (the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Israel). But it also challenged the Sunni countries in the
neighborhood: Arab Gulf, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq. By adopting radical policies
in all directions, the Islamic republic thought it would reduce the criticism
by the Sunni Salafis against its Shiite identity. Furthermore, and through its
followers in Lebanon's Shiite community, Tehran was able to help create a long
tentacle of jihadism: Hezbollah. During the cold war, Iran's jihadism was
centered on the growth of its own power as a state and on the development of
its terror network. And in order to aggrandize itself in competition with the Sunnijihadists, the Iranian Khumeinists
clashed with the United States head on. With the U.S. embassy hostage crisis,
Iran's jihadists showed no fear to take on the "greatest devil." And
after blowing up the Marine barracks and the U.S. embassy in Beirut and taking
hostages and executing them in Lebanon during the 1980s, Hezbollah'sjihadists
were viewed by Islamists as ahead of the Salafi jihadists in the region.
The race to escalate
jihad against the infidels was on between the Sunni Salafis and the Shiite Khumeinists, particularly in the 1980s. The cold war continued
between the two great "infidel" superpowers, but the jihadists were
fighting both empires on different battlefields.
Enter Saddam
Before the Iraqi
invasion of its neighbor, the United States had almost no presence in the
region. The last military expedition of the United States was to Beirut in
1982. It ended in a bloodbath at the hands of Hezbollah's Shiite jihadists in
1983. My question was simple but warranted: What would the (Sunni) Islamic
fundamentalists do at the sight of U.S. and other "infidel" divisions
deploying in these Arabian deserts? True, the "infidel" CIA had
helped them during the cold war against their first enemies, the communists;
but now the Salafi militants had gone into the twilight zone. They had finished
with one great enemy, the Soviets, but had not started with the other. Here was
the perfect opportunity. Unfortunately, I was right; the Iraq invasion of
Kuwait and the subsequent liberation unleashed the long-awaited reaction by the
Salafists. It gave them the opportunity to move from the eastern front to the
western front. Now that Persia had been taken, it was time to move against
Byzantium. But the Islamic fundamentalists, united against the communists, were
divided on the policy toward America.
Evidently, the Saudi
government was not going to wage a jihad against the United States after
American-led forces saved the dynasty and the country from an impending Iraqi
invasion. Riyadh's long-term policy, well implemented for decades, was to
acquire influence in Washington and make inroads from the inside. Get the best
arms and technologies, and protect the spread ofWahabism
inside the United States until it becomes a second nature to the country of
George Washington (meaning until average Americans will accept it as a cultural
tradition among one of its communities). The Wahabi strategy toward the United
States and the West was a very long-term one. But the jihadists of Abdallah
Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al Thawahiri (the
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood's offshoot, Islamic Jihad) did not see eye to
eye with the "masters" in the kingdom. The clerics were split as
well. The official religious spokesmen of the regime tried to argue with the
hot-headed Afghan veterans. The officials said America helped liberate Muslims
from the Soviets and now they would help defeat Baghdad's socialists, who
after all were Moscow's former allies. The Saudis used arguments from the cold
war. But in the eyes of the Salafi jihadists, that war was over, and they felt
they were the ones who won it on the ground.
The men of the
"international brigades" had a different plan in mind. In audiences
with the monarchy's top leaders, Osama bin Laden pleaded with them to organize
the Islamic resistance against the Baathist occupation of Kuwait. He begged
them not to allow the infidels to deploy on Muslim lands, especially in Arabia,
the land of the Prophet, which had been purged of Jews and Christians thirteen
centuries ago. He asked the regime to authorize him to lead the Islamist jihad
against the Baathists. In reality, he wanted to kill two birds with one stone.
By pounding Saddam's forces in Kuwait and possibly inside Iraq, he wanted to
return as a leader in the Wahabi country. His real strategic aim was to be
received as a commander of the jihadists and eventually, in a historic fantasy,
as a newly anointed caliph. By way of comparison, he would be an Islamist
Trotsky who would become an Emir Stalin, and perhaps even aji~ hadic Hitler. His dreams shattered when his own Wahabi
rulers dismissed his plans, ignored his jihadist achievements in Afghanistan,
and in the worst insult of all, extended their invitation to the very
archenemies he wanted to fight next: the infidel Americans.
As soon as the
operations ended in Kuwait and the Iraqi regime signed a cease-fire agreement,
the Salafists were at work to regroup and ready themselves for the new war: the
march toward the rest of the world.
The action undertaken
by the United States and the coalition had changed the geopolitics of the
region. Unlike Beirut in 1983, the "strong Americans" had re emerged internationally. Eastern Europe was free, Kuwait
was freed, Saddam was boxed in, Iran was unable to play the East-West
contradictions, Syria had been given Lebanon and was therefore holding back
Hezbollah from attacking the United States, and most Arab regimes looked
forward to American protection. The United States had become the sole
superpower in the region, and in the world for that matter.
In the eyes of the
Islamists, America's influence and the dar el harb became almost
overlapping. The jihadists were not happy with Washington's popularity for
winning the cold war and beating Saddam; they wanted the Arab world to praise
them for their deeds in Afghanistan. Hence their fatwas fused at the end of the
Iraq war: America is the greatest infidel power. It must be pulled out of the
region, its allies defeated, and eventually its power at home challenged.
Future World Jihad P.3: The Nazi Connection
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