On the morning of
July 7, 2005, four explosions rocked London’s transportation system. At around
8.50 am, three nearly simultaneous explosions hit the London Underground system
in a Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate
stations; in the Circle Line just outside Edgware
Road; and in a Piccadilly Line tunnel, between King’s Cross and Russell Square.
Less than an hour later, at 9.47am, a bomb carried in a backpack exploded on
the upper deck of a no. 30 bus in Tavistock Square.
The bombs, which vaporized the four suicide attackers, killed an additional 52
people and injured some 700 more.1 The four bombers were identified as Shehzad Tanweer, Mohammed Siddique Khan, Jermaine Lindsay, and
Hasib Mir Hussein.In the months leading up to the
attacks, Khan and Tanweer, the apparent ringleader
and right-hand man, respectively, of the London bombings, are believed to have
devoted themselves more or less full-time to the planning of the operation. In
May 2005, the group rented 18 Alexandra Grove, a modern ground floor apartment
in a two-storey block adjacent to the Leeds Grand
Mosque, where Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain prepared the
explosives.2 The bombs were homemade, peroxide-based devices, which were
commercially available and relatively cheap.3The bombers did not require great
experience to assemble the device, and may have gained the know-how to produce
the bombs from open sources, including possibly from the Internet.
The Official Account
of the attacks ordered by the House of Commons estimates that the overall cost
of the operation was less than 8,000. It believes that Khan has likely provided
most of the funding due to his “reasonable credit rating” and multiple bank
accounts, credit cards, and a 10,000 Pound personal loan.4 Nine days prior to
the bombings, the group made a reconnaissance visit to London, where they were
picked up on CCTV.5 This trial run suggested both a strong discipline of the
group and a strong awareness to its security, an awareness that was perhaps fed
by Khan’s apparent knowledge that he was under surveillance during that time.6
See our initial Dec. 2005 Case Study:
To many Britons, the
most surprising fact about the four suicide bombers was that they,the four suicide bombers were all British citizens,
and the Official Account of the bombings described the personal backgrounds of
the bombers as “largely unexceptional.”7
Tanweer, Khan, and Hussein were all second-generation British
citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin, whereas Lindsay was of
Jamaican descent. Shehzad Tanweer, the 22 year-old
bomber responsible for the blast between Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station, was from Leeds. His father Mumtaz, who is
considered a pillar of the Pakistani community in Beeston, the working class
suburb of Leeds where Shehzad grew up, immigrated to Britain in 1961 from the
eastern Pakistani city of Faisalabad. In the quarter century in which he lived
in the UK, he had slowly built a business for himself that eventually included
a slaughterhouse and a fish-and-chips shop.8 Mumtaz and his family, including
Shehzad, lived in a large house, and Shehzad led a seemingly ordinary live. He
wore brand-name clothes, worked out at a gym, took classes in martial arts, and
played for a local cricket team, where he excelled. He studied sports science
at Leeds Metropolitan University and occasionally helped out at his father’s
shop.9 Shehzad, grew up in a religious, although not radically religious
environment, praying five times a day and attending mosques regularly.10
Although Shehzad’s dream had been to become a professional cricketer, at around
age 18 he apparently underwent a political and religious transformation in the
course of which he began to feel distant from all things British.
Around the time of
the 9/11 attacks, he became more religious and began socializing with people
who were convinced that Islam was besieged.11 According to one friend, “Shehzad
definitely opened his eyes because of September 11. That’s when many young
people got back into Islam around here.”12 Beginning in around mid-2002,
religion became a major focus of his life, and he increasingly lost interest in
his studies. Nevertheless, nobody seemed to have observed that he became more
and more extreme.13 Together with Khan and Hussein, he began frequenting a
local Islamic bookstore, the Iqra Islamic Learning
Center. In December 2004, he went to Lahore, accompanied by Khan, where they
stayed for two months and may have received terrorist training at a madrassa
run by Lashkar-e-Taibeh, according to Pakistani
intelligence officers.14 He did not have paid employment at that point and was
financially supported by his father, who wanted him to work in his business.15
30 year-old Mohammed
Siddique Khan, who detonated his explosive device in the Circle Line outside Edgware Road, was the oldest member of the London suicide
cell. He was from the Leeds area, married with a pregnant wife, and the father
of an 18-month old daughter. Investigators of the London attacks regard him as
the senior and dominant figure, and the overall ringleader of the cell who was
responsible for identifying, cultivating, and supporting the other members.
Khan is also the person likely to have liaised with contacts outside Britain,
including in Pakistan. He was employed as a “learning mentor” at a local
primary school until December 2004, where many of his students perceived him as
a “father figure.”16 Friends remembered him as quiet and studious, and while
some have suggested that he consumed some alcohol and drugs in the 1990s, he
mostly stayed out of trouble. Khan studied at Leeds Metropolitan University,
where he met his wife. According to the House of Commons report, he “developed
a vocation for helping disadvantaged young people,” and he worked part time in
youth and community counseling while completing his degree.17 It is unclear
precisely when Khan developed more extreme views, but by 2001, Khan was clearly
very serious about Islam. He prayed regularly at work, attended mosque on
Fridays, but was not remembered being aggressive when he spoke to colleagues
about religion. He had spoken out against the 9/11 attacks in school. Some of
his friends, however, remembered that there had been “a subtle change in his
character” about a year after he begun studying, when
he became less talkative, more introverted, and slightly more intolerant about
dissenting views. Still, teachers and parents held him in high regard since he
had “a real empathy with difficult children,” helped calm down a number of
distressed children, and even managed to bring a few excluded students back
into school.18
Hasib Mir Hussein,
18, of Leeds, who bombed the no. 30 bus in Tavistock
Square, was a tall and shy youth described by his classmates as “docile, until
provoked,” at which point he had a tendency to become violent. 19 Hussein
attended college, where he studied for an Advanced Business Program, but his
academic achievements were poor, as was his attendance record.20 He is also
said to have smoked marijuana with friends.21 He turned very religious around
2003, and his extremism intensified when he returned from a visit with his
parents to Saudi Arabia, where he went on the hajj. He became more openly
supportive of Al Qaeda after the hajj, and was open about his belief that the
9/11 bombers were martyrs.22 Around 2004, Hussein began to wear Western clothes
again, and shortly before the attack he shaved off his beard, possibly to
attract less attention to himself.23
Germaine Lindsay, 19,
who detonated himself in the Piccadilly Line tunnel between King’s Cross and
Russell Squre, was the only one of the four bombers
who had no Pakistani origins. Born in Jamaica, Lindsay came to the UK as a
5-month old baby, together with his mother. He did not have an easy childhood.
His natural father had remained in Jamaica, and his stepfather reportedly had
treated him harshly. His relationship with his second stepfather was better,
but he left the family in 2000. Lindsay was described as a bright child, and he
did well both in school and in sports, and showed some artistic and musical
talent. 24 He spent his childhood in the outskirts of Leeds, and adopted Islam
“zealously” about four years before the London bombings.25 After his conversion,
he began referring to himself as Jamal. According to friends, he underwent a
personal transformation after adopting Islam. He turned away from some of his
old friends, quit smoking, and stopped listening to music and playing soccer,
while attempting to convert some of his friends to Islam. He began wearing the
traditional white thobe, learned Arabic quickly, and attended mosque frequently,
first the Omar Mosque, followed by the Leeds Grand Mosque, where worshipers
said “he was an enthusiast of Arabic recitation of the Koran and prayed loudly
and fervently.”26 Lindsay socialized with known troublemakers, and after his
conversion he was disciplined for distributing leaflets in support of Al Qaeda.
He apparently suffered a crisis when in 2002, his mother left for the United
States, leaving Lindsay alone in his family home after that. He performed
occasional odd jobs since his mother’s departure. In October 2002, he married
Samantha Lewthwaite, another Muslim convert, and in April 2004, their child was
born. Lindsay worked as a carpet fitter at that point, although at the time of
the London bombings he was unemployed.
Although he had
previously avoided contact with other women, he began flirting with women
openly and soon had a girlfriend. He shaved his beard, began wearing western
clothes, and associated with petty criminals. After his wife realized that he
had cheated on her, Lindsay left the house. The social life of the four bombers
was rather similar. It revolved around mosques, youth clubs, gyms, and an Islamic
bookshop in Beeston. 28 Tanweer and Khan seemed to
have reconnected at the gym, after they had known each other as children. When
they became reacquainted, they grew increasingly close to each other. Hussein
joined Tanweer and Khan, and the three formed a
clique that spent much time in a local youth club, the bookshop. In the second
half of 2004, Khan and Lindsay became close associates of one another. The four
bombers had not been identified in advance as potential terrorist threats,
however, according to the report by the UK’s Intelligence and Security
Committee, Khan and Tanweer, appeared on the
peripheries of other investigations as they had been “among a group of men who
had held meetings with others under Security Service investigation in 2004.29
Motifs and Justifications.
The bombers were from
Beeston and the neighbouring district of Holbeck on
the outskirts of Leeds. Beeston, a densely-populated working-class neighbourhood in Leeds, is also one of the more culturally
diverse districts of the city. Described as a “deprived” area, Beeston has a
relatively high rate of unemployment, lying at 7,8 % (vis-à-vis 3.3 % in Leeds
at large). About a third of the population receives the British equivalent of
welfare.30 Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain, however, were
not poor by the standards of the area; Tanweer
certainly not. Tanweer, who received a red Mercedes
from his father as a present, was well-off by local standards. Indeed, the
personal background of the four London bombers, like that of most suicide bombers,
provides remarkably little clues about possible motivations to sacrifice their
lives while killing others. What is more likely at the root of the problem that
generated suicide bombers like Tanweer, Khan,
Hussein, and Lindsay is not necessarily unemployment or poverty, but rather a
crisis of identity. Young, second- or third-generation Muslims in England, as
well as in other European countries, report that they do not quite know where
they belong. The expectation that they should adapt to the Western lifestyle
clashes head on with the more traditional upbringing of their parents’
generation, which often leads to a clash with their parents’ generation. Many
have tried to adopt a British identity, but in many working-class
neighborhoods, this attempt has often been synonymous with sexual promiscuity,
drinking of alcohol and drug usage.31 Many have adopted martial arts and boxing
in these neighborhoods. Youth divide into gangs. One young Muslim from Beeston
said that unlike their parents, the youth today are not passive, but they will
fight for their rights.32 In the context of Beeston, youngsters told a New York
Times reporter, Islam saved them from Britain.33
A more interesting,
and perhaps revealing angle, is an examination of how the suicide bombers justified
their actions, and how the larger community of Salafi-Jihadists views the world
around them and its own place in it. Two of the bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan
and Shehzad Tanweer, recorded their wills on tapes,
which were published along with footage featuring Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s
deputy leader. Their words, and statements by other Salafi-Jihadists residing
in the UK, paint a picture of the mental universe of the bombers.
The London bombers
regard themselves first and foremost as Muslims, and they claim to act in the
name of, and in the interest of, their religion. In the words of Tanweer, in an audiotape released on the first anniversary
of the London bombings, “We are 100% committed to the cause of Islam.”34
However, a closer look at the statements of the bombers reveals that their
beliefs are more closely aligned to Salafi-Jihadist ideology than to Islam per
se. Khan and Tanweer, in their video statements,
reflect nearly all central tenets of Salafi-Jihadism. First and foremost, they
perceive Islam to be under attack from the West, and they believe that it is
their duty to defend their religion against this onslaught for the sake of
protecting the Muslim community, but also in order to avenge the perceived
atrocities by the West. According to Khan, “Your democratically elected
governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the
world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am
directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and
sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets.”35
The London bombers
accuse the West of a long list of atrocities against Muslims. Tanweer, for example, accuses non-Muslim UK citizens of
being those who have voted in your government, who in turn have, and still
continue to this day, continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and
sisters, from the east to the west, in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Chechnya. Your government has openly supported the genocide of over 150,000
innocent Muslims in Falluja … You have offered financial and military support
to the U.S. and Israel, in the massacre of our children in Palestine. You are
directly responsible for the problems in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq to
this day. You have openly declared war on Islam, and are the forerunners in the
crusade against the Muslims.36
The bombers want the
West, in this case UK citizens, to have a taste of its own medicine. Khan thus
warns that “until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my
people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you
too will taste the reality of this situation.”37
In a videotape message published on July 6, 2006 on Al Jazeera, Tanweer similarly justified his actions in part with the
ongoing British military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as
British support of the United States and Israel. He also warned that similar
attacks would follow: “What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a
string of attacks that will continue and become stronger until you pull your
forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq and until you stop your financial and
military support to America and Israel.”See our above
introductory case study plus,38.
Whether British
involvement in Iraq is a cause, a motivation, or an excuse for the London
bombings is difficult to establish. Certainly, however, Britain’s participation
has not reduced its risk of suffering terrorist attacks, and likely heightened
it, at least in the short term. Two key reports published in 2005 confirmed
that the war in Iraq helped radicalize British Muslims. In April 2005, a report
by the British Joint Intelligence Committee stated that “Iraq is likely to be
an important motivating factor for some time to come in the radicalization of
British Muslims and for those extremists who view attacks against the UK as
legitimate.” The report further warned that the Iraq war had “reinforced the
determination of terrorists who were already committed to attacking the West
and motivated others who were not.” The report, titled ‘International
Terrorism: Impact of Iraq’ further stated that “Iraq has re-energised
and refocused a wide range of networks in the UK.”39 In July 2005, the
influential Royal Institute of International Affairs (commonly known as Chatham
House) made a similar conclusion in its own report, namely that Britain’s
participation in the war in Iraq and its supporting stance of U.S. foreign
policy had increased the risk of falling victim to a terrorist attack.40
Hatred for the West’s
perceived atrocities is coupled with a complete rejection of all that is
Western, made possible by the Salafi-Jihadists’ tendency to view the West as a
conspiratorial super-entity which is decadent and threatens to defile Muslims.
The consequence is the framing of the struggle of Islam against the West as a
cosmic war between good and evil, whereby the evil of the West encompasses
every aspect, from the government to the economy to the military to the press.
Khan, for example, says that “I’m sure by now the media’s painted a suitable
picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a
spin on things to suit the government and to scare the masses into conforming
to their power and wealth-obsessed agendas.”41
Khan’s statements
also reflect his internalization of another central tenet of Salafi-Jihadism,
namely tawhid, the strict and absolute unity of God, which dictates the entire
life of the‘true’ Muslim. “Our religion is Islam,” he
says, “obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the
final prophet and messenger Muhammad, may peace be upon him. This is how our
ethical stances are dictated.” Adherence to the notion of tawhid requires that
Muslims reject all man-made laws, since only God’s laws are relevant. This,
too, is reflected in Khan’s statement, when he decries that “Our so called
scholars today are content with their Toyotas and semi-detached houses. They
seem to think their responsibilities lie in pleasing the kufar
[i.e., the heretic] instead of Allah so they tell us ludicrous things like you
must obey the law of the land… How on earth did we conquer land in the past if
we were to obey by this law? By Allah, these fellows will be brought to
account…”42 As a Salafi-Jihadist, Khan also accepts the centrality of jihad
within Islam, and asserts that if Muslims are deserting the holy jihad, which
he describes as “fighting in Allah’s cause,” then as a result “Allah will cover
you with humiliation, and it will not be removed until you turn back to your
religion.”43 Khan describes jihad as an individual duty for every Muslim, a key
factor distinguishing Salafi-Jihadists from non-violent mainstream Salafis. In
this regard, Khan says that “jihad is an obligation on every single one of us,
men and women…,” whereas “turning your backs on jihad … is a major sin…”44 Like
all Salafi-Jihadists, Khan then elevates the status of jihad to that of the
five core pillars of Islam. He also calls for the restoration of the caliphate,
a declared goal of Al Qaeda, warning that “You’re not safe, nor in the East or
the West and you’ll never have peace until Allah’s Sharia reigns supreme over
these lands…”45
Salafi-Jihadism
extols martyrdom as the most honorable way to fight jihad, and Khan’s and Tanweer’s statements are filled with calls upon their
Muslim brethren to emulate them and seek martyrdom, lest they will go to hell.
Khan, for example, urges his coreligionists, “Muslims all over the world I
strongly advise you to sacrifice this life for the hereafter. Save yourselves
from the fire and torment,”46 while Tanweer repeats
the Salafi-Jihadist mantra, “We love death the way you love life.”47 It is easy
to dismiss statements such as these as mere propaganda. However, a close
watching of the footage of the London bombers, who were caught on CCTV on the
day of the attacks, appears to strengthen Tanweer’s
insistence that indeed the suicide bombers were looking forward to their
deaths. When the four bombers arrived at King’s Cross station at around 8.30 am
on July 7, 2005, a camera captured them hugging each other. According to the
authors of the House of Commons report into the bombings, they appeared “happy,
even euphoric.”48
Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
Apart from the
statements and wills left behind by two of the London bombers, which, beyond a
shred of doubt, reveal an intense adherence to the central tenets of
Salafi-Jihadism, it is worthwhile to examine the factors that appear to have
helped the bombers to morally disengage from the act of dying and killing.49
These mechanism
include the building of in-groups and out-groups, such as between true Muslims
on the one hand, and heretics on the other hand. This mechanism is often
combined with the dehumanization of the out-group, another prominent means of
moral disengagement. Taped by an undercover reporter of the Sunday Times, for
instance, Omar Bakri Mohammed, the leader of the Al Muhajiroun,
said after the London bombings that “The toe of the Muslim brothers is better
than all the kuffar on the earth.”50 A member of the Savior Sect, an offshoot
of Al-Muhajiroun, who identified himself as Zachariah
said that “they’re kuffar. They’re not people who are innocent. The people who
are innocent are the people who are with us or those who are living under the
Islamic state.”51 Use of the terms kuffar, or “dirty kuffar,” are widely used
terms in Salafi-Jihadist popular culture, such as jihadist rap videos.The London bombers are known to have immersed
themselves in footage showing the killing of Muslims at the hands of Israelis
and Americans.52 Such viewing is likely to have enhanced a process known as
advantageous comparison, in which one’s own actions are seen as relatively
moderate when compared to the actions of the out-group, which are perceived as
far more vicious. This process of advantageous comparison seems to have set
root not only among the London bombers, but also among members of the larger
community condoning the activities of the bombers, or at least voicing
understanding for their deeds. Thus, one youngster in Beeston who sympathized
with the London bomber’s asked a reporter, “Why should we care about the London
bombings when thousands of innocent Muslims are being killed in Iraq?”53
Conspiracy theories,
which are widespread among Salafi-Jihadists, but also among many ordinary
Muslims, serve a similar purpose in that they further intensify anger and thus
radicalize potential jihadists. An undercover Sunday Times reporter spent six
weeks in Beeston and reported that conspiracy theories pervaded the local
Muslim community. Several people he met were convinced that the four London
bombers were not involved in the attack. Some family members too were in
denial. Hasib Hussein’s father Mahmoud, for instance, did not believe his son
was capable of blowing himself up, saying that “no-one has shown me any
evidence that he did it.”54
A few additional
elements must be added to the complex mix of motivations that may have led the
London attacks to perpetrate a suicide attack. The first is the promise of
benefits in paradise, which was mentioned by both bombers who left behind
wills. Tanweer, for example, recites a passage from
the Quran, from Surat Al-Touba: “Oh you who believe,
what is the matter with you, that when you are asked to march forth in His
cause, you cling heavily to the earth. Are you pleased with the life of this
world rather than the Hereafter? But little is the enjoyment of this world as
compared to the Hereafter.”55 Khan was even clearer, and in his statement to
the video camera, he invoked the promised benefits of paradise several times,
saying: “By preparing ourselves for this work [i.e., jihad and martyrdom], we
are guaranteeing ourselves paradise and gaining the good pleasure of Allah… and
by turning our backs on this work, we are guaranteeing ourselves humiliation
and anger of Allah…”56 He concluded his statement by saying that “With this I
leave you to make up your own minds and I ask you to make dawa
to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and enter us into
gardens of paradise.”57
Secondly, the obvious
element of vengeance that was a clear motive of the London bombers was
supplanted by the belief that becoming a martyr confirms and strengthens one’s
honor and manliness. This element is, again, evident from statements by both
Khan and Tanweer. Khan, for example, castigates “so
called scholars” of Islam who “fear the British government more than they fear
Allah.” He calls upon his brethren to oppose these fake Muslims from giving
lectures and issuing fatwas, and suggests that these so-called scholars “need
to stay at home…and leave the job to the real men, the true inheritors of the
Prophet’s…” Eventually, he calls upon them: “Come back to your religion and
bring back your honor.”58 This appeal to one’s honor appears to be widespread
among Salafi-Jihadists in London, and probably beyond. Omar Brooks more
commonly known as Abu Izzedine), a convert to Islam and member of the group Al-Ghurabaa, a successor organization to the Salafi-Jihadist
Al-Mujahiroun,59 said at a meeting of the group on July 3, 2005, that he
did not want die “like an old woman… I want to be blown into pieces with my
hands in one place and my feet in another.”60
Indoctrination and Radicalization.
The suicide attacks
in London, like those elsewhere, have been used first and foremost for their
tactical value as a cheap, effective, highly lethal, and extremely shocking
modus operandi that leaves a long-lasting psychological impact on the target
audience.61 The very nature of the attacks would add an additional element of
surprise, given the relative dearth of suicide attacks in Europe.Responsibility
for the attacks was initially claimed by two groups, the first by the hitherto
unknown Secret Group of Al-Qaeda of Jihad Organization in Europe, and the
second by the Abu Hafs al-Masri
Brigades. Experts deemed the claim of the former more credible.62 In a video
statement released by Al Qaeda after the bombings, Ayman al-Zawahiri took
credit for the operation, saying that “London’s blessed raid is one of the
raids which Jama’at Qa’idat
al-Jihad was honored to launch… In the Wills of the hero brothers, the knights
of monotheism—may God have mercy on them, make paradise their final abode and
accept their good deeds.”63 Investigators were also aware that Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan between November 19, 2004, and
until February 8, 2005. Who the would-be-bombers have met in Pakistan was
unknown a year after the bombing, but the authors of the Official Report into
the bombings ordered by the House of Commons thought it “likely that they had
some contact with Al Qaida figures,” and that Khan had recorded his farewell
video during that visit. Khan was also believed to have had “some relevant
training” on the Pakistani side of the Pakistani-Afghan border during a brief
visit in the summer of 2003. The report’s authors were unable to determine
whether Khan had met significant Al Qaida figures during this or other visits
to Pakistan, but assumed that the visit had “at least a motivational impact.”64
They concluded that as of May 2006, there was “no firm evidence to corroborate
this claim [Al Qaeda’s involvement] or the nature of Al Qaida support, if there
was any. But, the target and mode of attack of the 7 July bombings are typical
of Al Qaida and those inspired by its ideologies.”65
About a year after
the bombings, however, additional signs emerged suggesting closer links between
Al Qaeda and the bombings than had initially been assumed. Already in September
2005, a video that featured Khan had lent strong support to the claim that at a
minimum, the London bombers were inspired to great extent by Al Qaeda’s
ideology. In his statements, Khan declared his gratitude to Allah for having
been raised “amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the
martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman
al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and all the other brothers and sisters
that are fighting in Allah’s … cause.66 Peter Bergen noted that one of the key
pieces of evidence overlooked in the British government report was that Khan’s
statements, which had been interspersed with statements by Al Qaeda’s alleged
no. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were made on a videotape that bore the distinctive
logo of Al-Sahab (lit., ‘The Clouds’), Al Qaeda’s television production arm.
Bergen also argued that Khan’s appearance on the videotape strongly suggested
that he met up with members of Al Qaeda’s media team based on the
Afghan-Pakistan border.67
This led Bergen to
conclude that “the more you delve into the London bombings, the more they look
like a classic al-Qaeda plot.”68 In early July, the BBC reported that Pakistani
intelligence suggested that Khan and Tanweer met with
Zawahiri in Pakistan’s tribal areas in January 2005. In the three months that
led up to the bombing, the bombers were in contact with one or several
individuals in Pakistan and may have obtained advice from them. The methods
used in the communication, according to the BBC, were designed to make it
difficult to identify the individuals.69 Bergen’s assertion and the alleged
Pakistani intelligence report were further corroborated when on the first
anniversary of the London attacks, another videotape of a second London bomber
appeared. This tape featured Shehzad Tanweer
alongside segments showing Ayman al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, an American
member of Al Qaeda known by his nom de guerre, Azzam al-Am’riki,
or Azzam the American. While the three were not shown together on the tape, the
tape made evident that Al Qaeda invested much into the sophisticated production
of the tape. While Tanweer’s appearance on an Al
Qaeda videotape does not by itself prove that the London attacks were organized
by Al Qaeda, other aspects of the attacks seem to suggest at least some
professional involvement by Al Qaeda in the bombings. For instance, the attacks
were financed by methods that would arouse little suspicion and, as the
Official Account into the attacks concluded, “the group showed good security
awareness and planning discipline…”70 This, in itself, again does not prove an
Al Qaeda involvement, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the clique had
some professional guidance in the planning process of the attacks. Furthermore,
Tanweer’s statements were closely aligned to some of
the goals Al Qaeda had long claimed to pursue. Moreover, Tanweer’s
statements have, probably intentionally, helped advance some of Al Qaeda’s
tactical goals, namely to instill fear among a large audience, while attempting
to rally Muslims to Jihad by presenting Al Qaeda as the vanguard of a global
Islamic insurrection that aims to liberate all Muslims from the perceived yoke
of the Crusader-Zionist alliance. Tanweer warned that
what you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks,
which, inshallah, will intensify and continue, until you pull all your troops
out of Afghanistan and Iraq, until you stop all financial and military support
to the U.S. and Israel, and until you release all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh, and your other concentration camps. And know that
if you fail to comply with this, then know that this war will never stop and
that we are ready to give our lives, one hundred times over, for the cause of
Islam. You will never experience peace, until our children in Palestine, our
mothers and sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel
peace.71 Whether or not Al Qaeda is responsible for the London attacks, it is
in its interest to claim direct or indirect responsibility for the London
bombings. Successful attacks such as the London bombings are likely to generate
pride among many young Muslims who accept Al Qaeda’s narrative that Islam is
under siege, and hence required to defend itself. By using suicide bombings,
the most shocking and awe-inspiring tactic available in its arsenal, Al Qaeda
is able to present itself as fearless, determined, and omnipotent. These
characteristics help Al Qaeda fortify its role as the vanguard of a resurrected
and self-confident Islamist movement that strikes back at its attackers with
the only means left at its disposal—its willingness to sacrifice its own
members’ bodies in an act that, they argue, pleases God and helps redeem
Muslims at large. Al Qaeda firmly counts on the attraction that this act, which
is portrayed as an act of heroism, bestows upon the Muslim who has no other
means to establish his honor other than by creating a balance of terror. This
explains why bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other members of Al Qaeda keep repeating
the perceived grievances and sufferings of Muslims, and the need to avenge
these injustices through the total devotion to jihad, manifested in its
ultimate form, through martyrdom operations.
Target Selection
In the mindset of
Salafi-Jihadists, Britain is part and parcel of the Crusader-Zionist entity
that has subjugated Islam. In the case of Britain, the perceived sins it
committed against Muslims reach even farther back into history than the sins
committed by Americans and ‘Zionists,’ and they include Britain’s alleged
responsibility for the demise of the Mughal empire in India in the early 18th
century. Britain is also blamed for colonizing large swaths of the Middle East
after World War I, including Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine, and of exploiting
their natural riches. Britain is held responsible for cheating the Arabs of
their chance to create a single Arab homeland. These accusations and others,
some of which contain elements of truth, and others that seem grossly
exaggerated, are constantly referred to in the statements of bin Laden,
Zawahiri, and other key members of Al Qaeda. In 2000, bin Laden accused the
British of being responsible for destroying the caliphate system in 1924, and
for creating the problems in Kashmir and Palestine, as a result of which many
Muslims died. He blamed Britain for establishing an arms embargo on the Muslims
of Bosnia, and which led to the alleged killing of 2 million Muslims. Britain
is also
blamed for “starving the Iraqi children” when it embargoed Iraq under Saddam
Hussein, and for its continuous bombings and killings of innocent children in
Iraq as the primary ally of the United States in the war in Iraq. The London
bombings were likely carried out as part of a string of campaigns announced
by Ayman al-Zawahiri in September 2002. At the time, Al Qaeda’s deputy leader
warned that countries that would assist the United States in a future attack in
Iraq would suffer the consequences. “The Mujahed
youth had already sent messages to Germany and France,” he warned then.
“However, if these doses are not enough, we are prepared with the help of Allah
to inject further doses.”72 As Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s Bin
Laden Unit put it after the London bombings, “as always for Al Qaeda, a threat
made yields an attack executed.”73
On September 1, 2005,
in his first statements after the London bombings, which also featured, for the
first time in Al Qaeda’s history, English subtitles, Zawahiri again stated that
Islam is under attack by the West. He said that the attacks in London were
designed as vengeance for Western occupation, and aimed at carrying the battle
onto the enemy’s turf. He called the attacks a “slap in the face to the
conceited crusader British arrogance,” which made Britain “drink from the same
cup from which it had long made the Muslims drink. This blessed raid, like its
glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid, brought the battle
to the enemy's soil…” Zawahiri also blamed Britain for not only ignoring Al
Qaeda’s previous offer of a truce, but rejecting Al Qaeda’s offer with
contempt, thus laying the blame for the London attacks on the British
government: Didn't the Lion of Islam, the mujaheed
Sheikh Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect him, offer you a truce, so you would
leave the lands of Islam? But you were obstinate and your arrogance has led you
to crime, and your Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that these proposals
should be treated ‘with the contempt which they deserve.’ So taste the
consequence of your governments' arrogance. Blair brought calamities upon his
people in the heart of their capital, and he will bring more, Allah willing,
because he continues to exploit his people's heedlessness, and stubbornly
insists on treating them like uncomprehending idiots. He keeps reiterating to
them that what happened in London has nothing to do with the crimes he
perpetrated in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq.74 Zawahiri also justified the
targeting of all Britons, including specifically civilians, arguing that
whoever elects and pays taxes to his government cannot be absolved from
responsibility of that government’s actions. Indeed, Zawahiri argues that even
those who did not elect the government, yet who abide by the man-made laws that
punishes those who disobey the authorities are fair game.We
say to them that these civilians are the ones who pay taxes to Bush and Blair,
so they can equip their armies and give aid to Israel, and they are the ones
who serve in their armies and security services. They are the ones who elected
them, and even those who did not vote for them consider them legitimate rulers
who have the right to give them orders and must be obeyed, and who also have
the right to order strikes against us, killing our sons and daughters, and to
wage war in their name, and to kill Muslims on their behalf. Moreover, they
consider disobeying their orders a crime punishable by law.75 Finally, Zawahiri
warns of future attacks should the West not cease its aggression against
innocent Muslims. He warns that anybody who participates in any kind of
aggression against Muslims, be it in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Palestine, will be
repaid in kind.76
Given Al Qaeda’s
portrayal of Muslim’s struggle against the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’as a cosmic war of epic proportions, a war of good
against evil, it cannot be ruled out that the London bombers, who at the very
least were profoundly inspired by Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology, chose
the particular targets in London also for their symbolic significance. Thus, it
may not be a coincidence that it was King’s Cross station which served as the
epicenter of the attacks on London’s transportation system. In a video released
in July 2006 by Al Sahab, the narrator said that “The knights of London
continued to train and plan for the operation, and the targets were identified
with precision, so much so that even the names of the targeted stations held
symbolic meaning and spiritual significance for the Crusader West. And after
completing their training and preparation, the knights departed for the field
of operation.”77
The Importance of Friendship Ties
Zawahiri’s words
leave little doubt that for Al Qaeda, taking responsibility through a video
statement is a great opportunity to recruit additional jihadis by portraying
shaheeds such as Tanweer as modern day Robin Hoods
who are redeeming the Muslim nation through their selfless acts of devotion to
God and the entire Muslim umma. Thus, Zawahiri says, What made Shehzad join the
camps of Qaeda Al-Jihad was the oppression carried out by the British in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Palestine. He would often talk about Palestine, about the
British support of the Jews, and about their clear injustice against the
Muslims… That is why Shehzad joined the camps of Qaeda Al-Jihad, where he spent
some time, along with Muhammad Al-Siddiq [i.e., Khan]. Both of them were
striving for martyrdom, and were hoping to carry out a martyrdom operation.
Both of them were very resolute in this. If the brothers discussed some other
issue, they would not pay any attention, because their goal, for which they
came to the camps of Qaeda Al-Jihad, was to carry out a martyrdom operation.
They were bonded by a great love, for the sake of Allah. Together, they formed
a great team, even though each excelled at different things. The love of
martyrdom for the sake of Allah was not motivated by poverty, unemployment, and
emptiness, as some mercenary media outlets try to portray to us. It was
motivated by the love of Allah and His messenger. A person who is about to
carry out this act has complete conviction that this act of his is one of the
best acts in the eyes of Allah. Whoever looks at the life of the martyr Shehzad
can see this with absolute clarity. Shehzad Tanweer,
Allah’s mercy upon him, was well read, loved sports, and kept physically fit,
and that is why he studied physical education at university. He had a passion
for boxing. Even though his family was well off, his clothes and look did not
disclose this. Allah’s mercy upon him, he used to pray all night long, and
loved reading the Koran. While his brothers spent their time reading the
Hadith, he would spend his time reading the Koran. He would contemplate what he
read in the Koran, and often he would stop at a specific verse and say to his
brothers: “Look, this is exactly what is happening today.” 78
Al Qaeda’s ‘strategic
indoctrination’ through such statements increases the possible pool of young Muslims
who are attracted to Al Qaeda’s ideology and motivates some to seek ways in
which they can link up to the Jihad. Friendship, and at times kinship ties,
play an important role in the radicalization process of the group and its
efforts to link up to global jihad. In his seminal book Understanding Terror
Networks, Marc Sageman discusses the importance of friendship and kinship bonds
for the radicalization of today’s jihadis at length. Sageman collected
biographical detail of nearly 200 members of what he terms the “global Salafi
jihad” for his book, and found that unlike in hierarchically structured
terrorist organizations, where recruitment tends to be top-down, the global
Salafi jihad is characterized by bottom-up recruitment. In the recruitment to the
global jihad movement, friendship among individuals is formed prior to the
joining of the movement. Once that friendship is forged, rhetorical extremism
escalates, and the condemnation of the West readies the small circle of friends
to join the jihad. Sageman believes that in this process, a strong desire for
adventure combines with religious and political motives. 79 “Formal affiliation
with the jihad … seems to have been a group phenomenon. Friends decided to join
the jihad as a group rather than as isolated individuals.”80 Hence, rather than
being recruited by Al Qaeda, many of the young men in Sageman’s sample are
volunteering to join the organization themselves, given the absence of
traditional recruiters. The encounter with a link to jihad is necessary to join
the movement lest the small group will remain isolated. Persons with which the
small group has ‘weak ties,’ and who are sometimes highly visible and have
prestige, can be of crucial importance.81 Sometimes, the encounter with the
link to the jihad happened by pure chance.
Based on Sageman’s
sample of members of the ‘global Salafi jihad,’ pre-existing friendship bonds
“played an important role in the formal affiliation of 68 percent of mujahideen
on whom there was adequate information. Most of them joined the jihad in small
clusters of friends.” In 14 % of the cases, kinship played a strong role.
Several examples of the importance of friendship ties are cited in the
radicalization of suicide bombers, including the 9/11 attacks, the foiled Paris
embassy plot,82 and the Casablanca bombers.83 At times, the bonds are even
tighter because the suicide bombers are linked through kinship. This was the
case in the 2002 Bali attacks, where four of the plot participants belonged to
the same family and another was a next door neighbour
from childhood.84 Combining kinship and social ties and eliminating the
overlap, Sageman finds that about 75% of the mujahideen had preexisting social
bonds to members who were already involved in the global jihad or decided to join
the jihad as a group with friends or relatives.85
Sageman summarizes
the process of joining the jihad in three steps. First, social affiliation with
the jihad is accomplished through friendship and kinship ties; second, a
progressive intensification of beliefs and faith, leading to acceptance of the
global Salafi jihad ideology; and third, the formal acceptance to the jihad
through the encounter of a link to jihad. Nowhere is this phenomenon of
friendship and kinship ties preceding a formal joining of the jihad more
evident than in the case of the four London bombers. As described at length in
the House of Commons report into the London bombings, the mutual friendship and
bonds among the London bombers, which grew over time, seems to have generated
an internal dynamic of intense self-radicalization. From the report, it appears
that Khan, the probable ringleader of the clique, used places such as gyms,
youth clubs, and an Islamic bookshop to identify suitable candidates for future
terrorist attacks. Subsequent indoctrination of the group, which may have been
a group process rather than a one-way process, took place in less public
spaces, such as private apartments, in order to avoid detection.86 In the
months before the bombings, Khan, Tanweer, and
Hussain spent a large amount of time together, and some of their activities
included camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and similar
outdoor activities that help create strong personal bonds among a group of
individuals. The activities were oftentimes arranged by Khan and other young
Muslims who frequented the youth centre and bookshop.
Some of these trips are likely to have served as opportunities to identify
candidates for indoctrination, and perhaps for operational training and
planning. Although other people took part in these trips, there is no evidence
that other individuals in Britain were involved in the plot, although the group
had some contact with other extremists in the UK.87
The Official Account
into the bombings concludes that “the process of indoctrinating these men
appears principally to have been through personal contact and group bonding,”
and further, that “their indoctrination appears to have taken place away from
places with known links to extremism.”88 Hence, the most frightening aspects of
the London attacks was the relative lack of outward signs that the clique was
highly radicalized. Apart from Lindsay, none of the London bombers came from
problematic backgrounds that would seem to render them particularly vulnerable
to radicalization. The speed with which the clique radicalized is additional
cause for concern. Although the precise date at which the plans of the attacks
were originally concocted remains unknown, the period of radicalization seems
to have occurred in the year prior to the attack.
Salafi-Jihadism in Britian.
Since the 19th
century, Britain has served as a refuge and centre
for dissidents from the Middle East. The connection between the United Kingdom
and Al Qaeda dates back to the 1980s. During the Afghan war against the Soviet
Union, between 300 and 600 British Muslims are believed to have trained in
Afghan training camps,89 and a sizable share of them are likely to have
returned to the United Kingdom after the Soviet Army’s retreat from
Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden first established a foothold in London around the
mid-1990s. Shortly before, the Saudi government clamped down on a number of
Saudi dissidents whose criticism of Riyadh was deemed a threat to the Saudi
regime. When a number of these Saudis moved to London to continue their verbal
attacks against the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, bin Laden did not want to be
left out and opened an office in the North London suburb of Dollis Hill. The
office bore the name ‘Advice and Reform Committee’ and was led by Khalid Fawwaz, who became bin Laden’s first local lieutenant.
Years later, Fawwaz was arrested in connection with
the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.90 Other members of Al
Qaeda also lived in the UK during the 1990s, including Anas al-Liby, an Al Qaeda computer expert who was also implicated
in the embassy bombings, who resided in Manchester. Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist
ideology has further been propagated in the United Kingdom through a number of
radical clerics who have openly called upon their listeners to adopt the
doctrine of jihad. Among these radical preachers, who can be thought of as the
strategic indoctrinators of jihad, are men like Abdullah al-Faisal, a
Jamaican-born cleric who called upon his followers to kill infidels using guns
and chemical weapons. He is said to have had a strong influence on Jermaine
Lindsay, the Jamaican-born member of the London bombing cell. Another radical
cleric is Omar Mahmoud Uthman abu Omar, better known
as Abu Qatada, who has been described in court documents as the spiritual
leader of Al Qaeda in Europe, and whose sermons have inspired, inter alia, lead
September 11 hijacker Muhammad Atta.
Among the most
venomous Islamic preachers residing in London is Omar Bakri Mohammed, founder
of the radical Salafi-Jihadist group Al-Muhajiroun
which, in late October 2004, split into two groups, the Savior Sect and Al-Ghuraaba. Bakri’s admiration for bin Laden dates back at
least to 1999, the year that Bakri published an open letter to bin Laden on his
group’s website, offering his service to the Al Qaeda leader. A year earlier,
bin Laden sent a fax to Bakri in which he guided the preacher on how to conduct
a jihad against the United States.91 Since 2003, the Syrian-born preacher
regularly urged young British Muslims to volunteer to fight the jihad in Iraq.
His lectures in Islamic law were reportedly attended by two young Britons who
in April 2003 went to Israel to conduct a suicide attack at Tel Aviv’s Mike’s
Place pub, which will be described in more detail below.92 In December 2004,
Omar Bakri Mohammed warned in a sermon in central London attended by over 500
people that if the West failed to change its policies in the Middle East,
Muslims would give them “a 9/11, day after day after day.”93 The most prominent
among the London-based Salafi-Jihadist clerics is Abu Hamza al- Masri, an Egyptian veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war who
preached at London’s notorious Finsbury Park mosque,
which was frequented by London bombers Khan, Tanweer,
and Lindsay. Known for his incitement to violence, Al-Masri
has frequently called for violence against ‘infidels.’ He urged his listeners
to get an infidel and “crush his head in your arms, so you can wring his
throat. Forget wasting a bullet, cut him in half!”94 Among the individuals he
helped radicalize during his tenure as the mosque’s imam are Zacarias
Moussaoui, who was convicted of conspiring to kill Americans as part of the
September 11 attacks, as well as convicted ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid, who
attempted to ignite an explosive device hidden in his shoe during an American
Airlines flight from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001.95 Saajid
Badat, another attempted shoe bomber who was supposed
to detonate an explosive device on board an airliner from Amsterdam to the
United States but who had apparently changed his mind and was subsequently
arrested, also worshipped at the Finsbury Park
mosque.96 Under al-Mazri’s tenure, the North London
Central Mosque, as the Finsbury Park mosque is
officially called, also stocked an arsenal for deadly weapons. In 2003, a raid
on the mosque discovered a cache of equipment for chemical warfare, chemical
warfare protection suits, three pistols, a stun gun, CS spray, gas masks,
handcuffs, and hunting knives.97
Radical Muslim
clerics have substantially contributed to a radical Islamist atmosphere that
produced a growing number of terrorists and insurgents with links to the United
Kingdom. In no small part, they have helped turn ‘Londonistan’ into a
destination and crossroads for potential terrorists who used the city as a base
from which to conduct fundraising and recruitment of terrorists.98
These include Omar
Saeed Sheikh, a British citizen educated at the London School of Economics who
was arrested in 2002 in connection with the murder of Wall Street Journal
reporter Daniel Pearl. London was also the target of several high-profile
terrorist plots. In January 2003, Scotland Yard arrested 12 men and charged
them with making traces of ricin in North London apparently planned for use in
an attack on the Heathrow Express train. All but one of them, however, were
released due to lack of evidence.
This atmosphere gave
rise to several British individuals linked to suicide attacks long before the
7/7 bombings. Several individuals involved in the planning and execution of the
U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, as well as the
bombings in Casablanca in 2003, had links to the United Kingdom. A plot to
conduct a suicide attack against the U.S. Embassy in Paris was carried out by a
group with ties to Al Qaeda, two members of which lived in Britain.99
The July 2005
bombings in London were not the first attacks on British targets. On November
20, 2003, a dual suicide truck bombing targeted the HSBC Bank and the British
Consulate in Istanbul, killing thirty people and wounding 400 others. Most of
the victims were Turks, but the attacks also killed several Britons, including
among them Roger Short, the consul general of Britain in Turkey. British
citizens were also among the victims of the attacks of September 11, the Bali
attacks of October 2002, and the Madrid attacks of March 2004. Two young
British Muslims made history as the first British citizens who intended to
conduct a SA. On April 30, 2003, 21 year-old Asif Muhammad Hanif and 27 year-old
Omar Khan Sharif approached the Mike’s Place pub in Tel Aviv, a popular bar on
the beach front adjacent to the U.S. embassy. After being denied entry into the
pub, Hanif blew himself up at the entrance to Mike’s Place, killing three
civilians and wounding 50. Sharif, a married resident of Derby, however, failed
to detonate his device, fled the scene, and later drowned in the Mediterranean.
His body washed ashore on the Tel Aviv beach front two weeks later. Hanif and
his family were from the suburb of Hounslow in West London, where they lived in
a modest row house in a mostly Asian neighborhood. Hanif’s brother, Taz Hanif,
said that his brother, whom he described as “a big teddy bear,” had traveled to
Syria to study Arabic. He studied business at college, worked part-time at
Heathrow Airport, and grew increasingly religious. 100 Sharif’s background was
somewhat different. His family was relatively affluent and came from the
English Midlands town of Derby. According to neighbors, he came from a
Westernized family, was educated in a private school, and enjoyed playing
football and skateboarding. 101 After spending a few years in university in
London, Sharif became more religious, and his wife dressed in a burka.102
British jihadists
also went to Iraq, where a British brigade of an estimated 150 radicals is
believed to have joined the insurgency against coalition forces in Iraq. 103
According to a Whitehall document, Al Qaeda had plans to recruit many more of
the estimated 1.8 million Muslims to its cause. A joint Home Office and Foreign
Office dossier titled ‘Young Muslims and Extremism’ prepared for Prime Minister
Tony Blair in 2004 said that Britain may be harbouring
thousands of Al Qaeda sympathizers, and that Al Qaeda was secretly recruiting
affluent, middleclass Muslims in British universities and colleges to carry out
terrorist attacks in the UK.104 By 2006, the search for British recruits for
suicide operations had reportedly also reached foreign countries. In April
2006, an Iranian-based group, the Committee for the Commemoration of Martyrs of
the Global Islamic Campaign, said it was targeting potential recruits in
Britain because they faced fewer restrictions in entering Israel.105
In the year after the
July 7 bombings, the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom remained high. On
August 12, 2006, John Reid, Britain's highest-ranking law enforcement official,
disclosed that some 24 terrorist conspiracies were still under surveillance in
the United Kingdom.He added that since the 7/7
attacks, British security services had foiled what he described as four other
major conspiracies.106
Among the major plots
foiled was an alleged conspiracy to detonate a number of airliners in mid-air,
in a plan strikingly similar to the 1994/1995 Bojinka
plot concocted by Ramzi Youssef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.107 On August 10,
2006, over twenty people, most of them British citizens of Pakistani
extraction, but also including at least two converts, were arrested. They were
suspected of playing a role in the SA plot that, had it been successfully
executed, could have rivaled the 9/11 attacks in its fatality and destruction.
The plot reportedly involved the attempted detonation of at least a dozen
American and British aircraft flying from the United Kingdom to various
destinations in the United States. The would-be-hijackers allegedly intended to
use sophisticated and highly effective liquid explosives, to be carried in the
conspirators’ hand luggage, possibly disguised in soda bottles. They also
planned to use electronic equipment as detonators.108
Thus we can say that
the bombings of London were the first successful Islamist terrorist
attacks in the UK and were all the more shocking to Britons because for the
first time, it was British citizens who perpetrated SAs on British soil. The
London attacks also shocked the entire European continent.
“Nobody had
anticipated perpetrators such as these,” German journalist Yassin Musharbash wrote in Der Spiegel. “They did not exist as a
profile. Terrorists of the previous generations had joined jihad mostly in
countries in which they were neither born, nor had lived over a longer period
of time. Now, a “third generation” had struck in Europe, its
supposed home: young Islamists whose radicalization had been completely
underestimated.”109
As with other suicide
attackers, motivations of the suicide bombers remain unclear, although several
elements seem to come together to produce a deadly mix. The bombers seem to
have suffered from a crisis of identity that appears to befall many children or
grandchildren of immigrants to Europe, namely how to define themselves. Neither
able to identify with their parents or grandparents’ home country, nor fully
accepted in the UK, where nationalism is strong, xenophobia rampant, and
opportunities for professional advancement scarce, it is possible that the
bombers were searching for a new identity in a virtual community of Muslim
believers. They chose to adopt Salafi-Jihadist ideology, which offers a
simplistic worldview and offers solace and sense of belonging to the
globalized umma. They adopted this ideology together, as a group, while
undergoing a process of intensive radicalization led by a highly charismatic
leader, Mohammed Siddique Khan. These bonds provided emotional support to all
members of the group, and encouraged the adoption of Salafi-Jihadism. Their
bonds were strengthened by the secret pact that they held, which they had to
keep until their death. As Sageman puts it, “it may be more accurate to blame
global Salafi terrorist activity on in-group love than out-group hate.”110
Their social lives revolved mostly around a few select places, Islamic
institutions, gyms, and outdoor activities.
The adoption of
Salafi-Jihadist ideology also opened the gates for a gradual readying for the
act of killing and dying, aided by various mechanisms of moral disengagement
offered by the ideology. Perceiving Britain and the United States as the
absolute evil on earth, and their citizens as kuffars
[i.e., kufr, or heretics], the enemy was dehumanized in the bombers’ eyes,
which arguably made it easier to mistreat them. They were also convinced them
that what would await them after their act of martyrdom would be the pleasures
of paradise. Whether this post-hummus benefit acted as a motivator in itself,
as an added benefit, or as a mechanism to overcome the fear of death is
impossible to know. What is likely, however, is that the bombers really
believed that they would attain these benefits. The statements by Khan and Tanweer, and findings by the Home Office and the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, strongly suggest that the Iraq war has
itself served as a motivator. Once the bombers have accepted that they are
acting on behalf of, and for the sake of, a globalized community of brethren,
then the attacks against their brethren in Iraq, Chechnya, and Palestine became
highly personalized. Attacks against their brethren were likely perceived as
attacks against their most immediate family, and certainly as attacks against
Islam, adding to an overwhelming sense of humiliation and frustration.
Apart from a new
meaning of life, the expectation of posthumous benefits, and the desire for
revenge for the perceived attacks against their fellow Muslim brothers and
sisters, the bombers also appear to be driven by a desire to fulfill the role
of men, as they see it. Both Khan and Tanweer
stressed the heroism of their deeds, and labeled those who are ‘appeasing’ the
West and fail to join the battle on the side of true Islam as people who are
acting in an unmanly fashion. The London bombings also highlighted the inherent
danger emanating from policies that are highly tolerant of indoctrination by
preachers of hate.111
It is in large part
due to Britain’s relative tolerant policies vis-à-vis these minorities that
radical networks were allowed to flourish in Britain for years, leaving radical
Islamist imams like Abu Hamza al-Masri and Omar Bakri
Muhammad free reign to spread their radical propaganda.
1 On July 21, 2005, a
set of four bombers, Muktar Said Ibrahim, Yasin
Hassan Omar, Ramsi Mohammed, and Hussein Osman,
apparently emulating the July 7 bombers, attempted to detonate bombs in the
London transportation system. Their attempts failed. The focus of this chapter
is exclusively on the July 5, 2005 bombers. In May 2006, the intelligence
agencies of the United Kingdom reported that they currently had “no evidence of
direct links between the 7 July attacks and those involved and the incidents on
21 July,” however, as of August 2006, investigations into possible connections
between these two events continued.
See "Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005,"
(Intelligence and Security Committee, May 2006), 13.
2 "Report of the
Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," (House of
Commons, 11 May 2006), 22.
3 The bomb-making
process had a bleaching effect, and in fact, Tanweer
and Hussein’s families noticed that Tanweer’s and
Hussein’s hair was getting lighter in the weeks that led to the bombings.
4 "Report of the
Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 23.
5 "London
Bombers Staged 'Dummy Run'," BBC News, 20 September 2006.
6 "Report of the
Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 24.
7 Ibid. 24.
8 Sudarsan
Raghavan, "Friends Describe Bomber’s Political, Religious Evolution,"
Washington Post, 29 July 2005, A16.
9 Lizette Alvarez,
"Lives of Three Men Offer Little to Explain Attacks," New York Times,
14 July 2005, 13.
10 Ibid.
11 Raghavan,
"Friends Describe Bomber’s Political, Religious Evolution," A16.
12 Ibid.
13 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 15.
14 Gethin
Chamberlain, "Attacker ‘Was Recruited’ at Terror Group’s Religious
School," Scotsman, 14 July 2005, 2.
15 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 14.
16 Paul Tumelty, "An in-Depth Look at the London
Bombers," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 15 (28 July 2005).
17 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 13.
18 Ibid., 14.
19 Alvarez,
"Lives of Three Men Offer Little to Explain Attacks," 13.
20 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 14.
21 Tumelty, "An in-Depth Look at the London
Bombers,"
22 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 15. 27
23 Ibid. , 24.
24 Ibid. , 17.
25 Lizette Alvarez,
"New Muslim at 15, Terror Suspect at 19," New York Times, 18 July
2005, 8.
26 Ibid.
27 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 18.
28 Ibid., 16.
29 "Report into
the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005," 13-14.
30 Amy Waldman,
"Seething Unease Shaped British Bombers' Newfound Zeal," New York
Times, 31 July 2005, 1.
31 Ibid., 1.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings,"
35 "The Complete
Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," . Transcript of Mohammed
Siddique Khan’s statements by the author.
36 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.
37 "The Complete
Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast,"
38 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.
39 Richard
Norton-Taylor, "Iraq War 'Motivated London Bombers'," Guardian, 3
April 2006.
40 "Security,
Terrorism, and the Uk," in ISP/NSC Briefing
Paper 05/01 (London: Economic & Social Research Council, Chatham House,
July 2005).
41 "The Complete
Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," SITE Institute.
42 Ibid.SITE Institute.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.
48 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 4.
49 On mechanisms of
moral disengagement, see the discussion in chapter 3. The theory was formulated
in Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," 161-91.
50 "Focus:
Undercover in the Academy of Hatred," Sunday Times (UK), 7 August
2005Sunday Times, 7 August 2005.
51 Ibid.
52 Raghavan,
"Friends Describe Bomber’s Political, Religious Evolution," A16.
53 Ibid.
54 Ali Hussain,
"Focus: Undercover on Planet Beeston," Sunday Times, 2 July 2006.
55 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.
56 "The Complete
Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," SITE Institute.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Additional information
on Al-Muhajiroun appears later in this chapter.
60 "Focus:
Undercover in the Academy of Hatred," Sunday Times.
61 On the
psychological effects of the London bombings, see especially "Report of
the 7 July Review Committee," London: London Assembly, June 2006).
62 Tumelty, "An in-Depth Look at the London
Bombers," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 15.
63 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 21.
64 Ibid. , 20.
65 Ibid. , 21.
66 "The Complete
Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," SITE Institute.
67 Peter Bergen,
"Al-Qaeda, Still in Business," Washington Post, 2 July 2006, B1.
68 Ibid., B1.
69 Gordon Corera, "Were Bombers Linked to Al-Qaeda?," BBC
News, 6 July 2006.
70 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 27.
71 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.
72 Quoted in Michael
Scheuer, "The London Bombings: For Al-Qaeda, Steady as She Goes,"
Terrorism Focus 2, no. 14 (22 July 2005).
73 Ibid.
74 "New
Al-Jazeera Videos: London Suicide Bomber before 'Entering Gardens of Paradise,'
and Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Threats of More Bombings in the West," MEMRI
Special Dispatch Series No. 979 (3 September 2005).
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 "The First
Anniversary of the Bombings in London - a Video Presentation by as-Sahab
Featuring Speeches from Shehzad Tanweer, Azzam the
American, and Al-Qaeda Leadership," SITE Institute, 7 July 2006.
78 "Al-Qaeda
Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.
79 Sageman,
Understanding Terror Networks , 109.
80 Ibid., 110.
81 Ibid. , 169.
82 For details of the
plot, see the Appendix underneath.
83 Sageman,
Understanding Terror Networks, 111.
84 Ibid., 167.
85 Ibid., 113.
86 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 16.
87 "Report into
the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005," 12.
88 "Report of
the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 26.
89 Steve Coll and
Susan B. Glasser, "In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Heaven,"
Washington Post, 10 July 2005, A1.
90 Ibid., A1.
91 Rita Katz and
Michael Kern, "Center of the Jihadist World; They Call It Londonistan for
a Reason," National Review Online, 11 July 2005.
92 Helen Gibson,
"New Recruits; Why Did Quiet, Well-Liked British Men Travel to Israel to
Become Suicide Bombers?," TIME Europe, 12 May 2003.
93 Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta Jr., "For a Decade, London
Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of Terror," New York Times, 10 July 2005, A1.
94 Coll and Glasser,
"In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Heaven," A1.
95 Sean O'Neill and
Daniel McGrory, "Abu Hamza and the 7/7 Bombers," Times (London), 8
February 2006, A1.
96 Coll and Glasser,
"In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Heaven," A1.
97 "Police Found
Weapons at Finsbury Park Mosque," Times Online
(UK), 7 February 2006.
98 The term
‘Londonistan’ was first coined by French officials dissatisfied with the
British government’s inability to extradite an Algerian who had been charged in
France with financing a series of attacks on the public transportation system
in Paris in 1995. See Christopher Caldwell, "After Londonistan," New
York
Times Magazine, 25 June 2006, 42.
99 Radu, "London
7/7 and Its Impact," FPRI E-Notes, July 2005.
100 Gibson, "New
Recruits; Why Did Quiet, Well-Liked British Men Travel to Israel to Become
Suicide Bombers?,"
101 Ibid.
102 Alan Cowell,
"Zeal for Suicide Bombing Reaches British Midlands," New York Times,
2 May 2003, 6.
103 Caldwell,
"After Londonistan," 42.
104 Robert Winnett and David Leppard, "Leaked No. 10 Dossier
Reveals Al-Qaeda's British Recruits," Times (London), 10 July 2005.
105 Robert Tait and
Ewen MacAskill, "Iranian Group Seeks British Suicide Bombers," Guardian,
19 April 2006, 1.
106 Alan Cowell,
"Britain Says Two Dozen Major Terrorist Conspiracies Are under
Investigation," New York Times, 14 August 2006, 8.
107 For more on the Bojinka plot, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report; and Brzezinski, "Bust
and Boom," W9.
108 "Q&A: Uk Aircraft Bombplot," BBC
News, 12 August 2006. Available online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778889.stm, last accessed 13 August 2006.
109 Yassin Musharbash, "Menetekel
7/7: Jahrestag Des London-Anschlags," Spiegel Online 2006.
110 Sageman,
Understanding Terror Networks, 135.
111 Prior to the
attack of September 11, 2001, Britain arrested or extradited relatively few
radical Islamists, although it monitored many of them.
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