Where news media focused today on the announcement that Russia is resuming a Soviet-era practice, most missed to mention what is going on in the Ukraine today. Here, Russians have been pushing out in many of directions of late, sending long-range bombers out to poke at NATO states, starting riots in the Baltics, unnerving the Georgians at every opportunity, challenging Arctic boundaries and putting down flags in the Asian rim and Middle East. All of these things capture global attention, but most are really rather symbolic. A flag on the seafloor under the North Pole does not really make a claim, musing about a naval base in Syria is not the same as actually putting one there, and intimidating Georgia is about as hard as barking back at a Chihuahua. Part of determining the gravity of a resurgence is separating signal from noise. Russia is about to get serious about its efforts, and the inflection point will be Ukraine.
Ukraine is the most important piece of territory to long-term Russian strategy. It is the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, a 1,000-mile buffer between Russia and the West, and home to most of Russia's infrastructure connections to Europe and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's port. It is a chunk of territory that can compromise Russian influence in the Caucasus, and incidentally it is home to over 10 million Russians.
With Ukraine in its pocket, Russia would have a chance at re-achieving great power status. Without it, Russia's security would largely be determined by outside forces. With Ukraine, Russia's moves to date are the perfect introduction for a broad and aggressive policy to secure Russia's interests; without it, they are tantamount to breaking out the Christmas decorations without first purchasing a tree. After all, what would be the point of floating a fleet in the Far East if Moscow itself remains strategically vulnerable to western approach?
Right now Ukraine is in flux, with a government divided between pro-Russian and pro-Western forces and a critical election campaign under way that will culminate in a new parliament Sept. 30. The last time Ukraine was up for grabs was in 2004, when Russia and the West fought a bitter behind-the-scenes contest that culminated in the Orange Revolution, a victory for the pro-Western factions. That loss forced Russian President Vladimir Putin's government to reexamine Russia's situation, leading to a broad reconsolidation of power internally and preparations for pushing back against the perceived Western onslaught. Now, three years later, Putin and the Russians are ready to make their move and go beyond the world of smoke and mirrors.
On Monday, Aug. 20, Russia will give the world its first hint at what Moscow plans to do for real. On that day, the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine -- Russia's Mikhail Fradkov and Ukraine's pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich -- will meet in Sochi, ostensibly to discuss economic affairs. However, though Fradkov has a nice title, he is really more of a bureaucrat and not a true decision maker, and Sochi is Putin's favorite vacation spot. The Kremlin has hinted heavily that the president is likely to attend the prime ministers' meeting.
Putin's overt involvement in Ukraine's 2004 election is part of what led to the unification of pro-Western forces in Ukraine and the intervention of Western states on their behalf. Aug. 20, therefore, is far more likely to witness the discussion of a much subtler strategy. The specific tactical elements of that strategy are largely immaterial; what is nice about it is that it will be child's play to evaluate its tenor and success. The meeting is only 40 days before the Ukrainian vote. Russia and its Ukrainian allies will have to move quickly to implement whatever plan Putin presents.
In 2004, direct Russian campaigning for pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich united Ukraine's disparate pro-Western factions. The West added organizational and financial help, and the result was the Orange Revolution, which ejected pro-Russian forces from power and installed President Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko as Ukraine's political leadership. Since then, Timoshenko has flipped sides repeatedly, playing kingmaker. Right now she is both out of the government and in the anti-Russian camp, and the invalidation of her candidate list would have handed Ukraine to Yanukovich's party on a plate.
There are indications that the Aug. 11 commission decision was, at least in part, lubricated by Russian influence, if not outright cash. However, all of the members who voted against certifying Bloc Yulia Timoshenko candidates Aug. 11 voted to reinstate them Aug. 15. The West likely had its hand in the commission's reversal.
What is at stake is the future of two countries. Ukraine is perhaps the most strategically located country in the region. Most Russian transport links -- whether road, rail or petroleum pipe -- cross Ukraine en route to the West. When Russia has been invaded by Western states, the armies have typically crossed the territory that is now Ukraine en route to Moscow. The largest concentration of ethnic Russians outside Russia proper is in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine currently hosts Russia's Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol and will continue to do so until Russia can build a new port for itself at Novorossiysk. On the flip side, a pro-Western Ukraine gives the European Union and NATO tremendous strategic depth and places the West within a few hundred miles of critical locations such as the Caspian Sea and Moscow.
Put another way, despite Russia's failings in the past 16 years, with Ukraine in its orbit, Russia stands a chance of rising again to the status of a great power. Conversely, Russia fears -- with a considerable degree of realism -- that should Ukraine instead integrate with the West, any dreams of Russia charting an independent course of any sort would vanish.
In this fight, Russia enjoys a clear advantage. In addition to ethnic, linguistic, economic, energy and historical links, the Kremlin can count on powerful allies up to and including the Ukrainian prime minister -- the aforementioned Yanukovich -- as well as Russia's own hardly inconsequential intelligence services to manipulate Ukrainian events in Russia's favor.
Russia also enjoys one major advantage in 2007 that it did not have in 2004.
In 2004, the United States had just come off a victory in Iraq and it was hardly clear that it was about to be locked down in a quagmire. The United States seemed a boldly ascendant power, and it was U.S. leadership that empowered the leaders of Ukraine's Orange Revolution to push so far so fast. In 2007, the tables are flipped. The Bush administration is damaged goods and the United States is perceived as distracted and weak due to Iraq -- as well as desperate to regain its attention span through a deal with the Iranians. Meanwhile, the Russian government -- fresh from three years of intense power consolidation at home -- is now pushing out along its entire periphery. The Orange Revolution was successful in part because Russia feared a direct conflict with the United States. This time around, the United States does not want any Russian complications as it seeks to find a resolution for all things Iraqi. True, the European Union is more in step on Russian issues than it has been at any time since the Cold War, but without leadership from Washington it would take a minor miracle for the Europeans to face down a determined Moscow.
Yet it is not a risk-free game for the Russians. In 2004, Russia faced a similar well-stacked deck, influencing not only the prime minister (then, as now, Yanukovich) but also the president, the intelligence services and the army (all entities that now are the purview of pro-Western Orange Revolution leader Yushchenko). But as the 2004 presidential election drama unfolded, Russia attempted to turn a sure victory into a crushing victory. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself began actively campaigning for Russia's preferred candidate -- a move that led to the Orange Revolution. In 2007, the two requirements for an Orange redux are not yet present: a united pro-Western front and a coalition of Western states confident enough to challenge Russia.
The Russians have been pushing out in many of directions of late, sending long-range bombers out to poke at NATO states, starting riots in the Baltics, unnerving the Georgians at every opportunity, challenging Arctic boundaries and putting down flags in the Asian rim and Middle East. All of these things capture global attention, but most are really rather symbolic. A flag on the seafloor under the North Pole does not really make a claim, musing about a naval base in Syria is not the same as actually putting one there, and intimidating Georgia is about as hard as barking back at a Chihuahua. Part of determining the gravity of a resurgence is separating signal from noise. Russia is about to get serious about its efforts, and the inflection point will be Ukraine.Ukraine is the most important piece of territory to long-term Russian strategy. It is the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, a 1,000-mile buffer between Russia and the West, and home to most of Russia's infrastructure connections to Europe and the Russian Black Sea Fleet's port. It is a chunk of territory that can compromise Russian influence in the Caucasus, and incidentally it is home to over 10 million Russians.
With Ukraine in its pocket, Russia would have a chance at re-achieving great power status. Without it, Russia's security would largely be determined by outside forces. With Ukraine, Russia's moves to date are the perfect introduction for a broad and aggressive policy to secure Russia's interests; without it, they are tantamount to breaking out the Christmas decorations without first purchasing a tree. After all, what would be the point of floating a fleet in the Far East if Moscow itself remains strategically vulnerable to western approach?
Right now Ukraine is in flux, with a government divided between pro-Russian and pro-Western forces and a critical election campaign under way that will culminate in a new parliament Sept. 30. The last time Ukraine was up for grabs was in 2004, when Russia and the West fought a bitter behind-the-scenes contest that culminated in the Orange Revolution, a victory for the pro-Western factions. That loss forced Russian President Vladimir Putin's government to reexamine Russia's situation, leading to a broad reconsolidation of power internally and preparations for pushing back against the perceived Western onslaught. Now, three years later, Putin and the Russians are ready to make their move and go beyond the world of smoke and mirrors.
On Monday, Aug. 20, Russia will give the world its first hint at what Moscow plans to do for real. On that day, the prime ministers of Russia and Ukraine -- Russia's Mikhail Fradkov and Ukraine's pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich -- will meet in Sochi, ostensibly to discuss economic affairs. However, though Fradkov has a nice title, he is really more of a bureaucrat and not a true decision maker, and Sochi is Putin's favorite vacation spot. The Kremlin has hinted heavily that the president is likely to attend the prime ministers' meeting.
Putin's overt involvement in Ukraine's 2004 election is part of what led to the unification of pro-Western forces in Ukraine and the intervention of Western states on their behalf. Aug. 20, therefore, is far more likely to witness the discussion of a much subtler strategy. The specific tactical elements of that strategy are largely immaterial; what is nice about it is that it will be child's play to evaluate its tenor and success. The meeting is only 40 days before the Ukrainian vote. Russia and its Ukrainian allies will have to move quickly to implement whatever plan Putin presents.
In 2004, direct Russian campaigning for pro-Russian presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovich united Ukraine's disparate pro-Western factions. The West added organizational and financial help, and the result was the Orange Revolution, which ejected pro-Russian forces from power and installed President Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko as Ukraine's political leadership. Since then, Timoshenko has flipped sides repeatedly, playing kingmaker. Right now she is both out of the government and in the anti-Russian camp, and the invalidation of her candidate list would have handed Ukraine to Yanukovich's party on a plate.
There are indications that the Aug. 11 commission decision was, at least in part, lubricated by Russian influence, if not outright cash. However, all of the members who voted against certifying Bloc Yulia Timoshenko candidates Aug. 11 voted to reinstate them Aug. 15. The West likely had its hand in the commission's reversal.
What is at stake is the future of two countries. Ukraine is perhaps the most strategically located country in the region. Most Russian transport links -- whether road, rail or petroleum pipe -- cross Ukraine en route to the West. When Russia has been invaded by Western states, the armies have typically crossed the territory that is now Ukraine en route to Moscow. The largest concentration of ethnic Russians outside Russia proper is in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine currently hosts Russia's Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol and will continue to do so until Russia can build a new port for itself at Novorossiysk. On the flip side, a pro-Western Ukraine gives the European Union and NATO tremendous strategic depth and places the West within a few hundred miles of critical locations such as the Caspian Sea and Moscow.
Put another way, despite Russia's failings in the past 16 years, with Ukraine in its orbit, Russia stands a chance of rising again to the status of a great power. Conversely, Russia fears -- with a considerable degree of realism -- that should Ukraine instead integrate with the West, any dreams of Russia charting an independent course of any sort would vanish.
In this fight, Russia enjoys a clear advantage. In addition to ethnic, linguistic, economic, energy and historical links, the Kremlin can count on powerful allies up to and including the Ukrainian prime minister -- the aforementioned Yanukovich -- as well as Russia's own hardly inconsequential intelligence services to manipulate Ukrainian events in Russia's favor.
Russia also enjoys one major advantage in 2007 that it did not have in 2004.
In 2004, the United States had just come off a victory in Iraq and it was hardly clear that it was about to be locked down in a quagmire. The United States seemed a boldly ascendant power, and it was U.S. leadership that empowered the leaders of Ukraine's Orange Revolution to push so far so fast. In 2007, the tables are flipped. The Bush administration is damaged goods and the United States is perceived as distracted and weak due to Iraq -- as well as desperate to regain its attention span through a deal with the Iranians. Meanwhile, the Russian government -- fresh from three years of intense power consolidation at home -- is now pushing out along its entire periphery. The Orange Revolution was successful in part because Russia feared a direct conflict with the United States. This time around, the United States does not want any Russian complications as it seeks to find a resolution for all things Iraqi. True, the European Union is more in step on Russian issues than it has been at any time since the Cold War, but without leadership from Washington it would take a minor miracle for the Europeans to face down a determined Moscow.
Yet it is not a risk-free game for the Russians. In 2004, Russia faced a similar well-stacked deck, influencing not only the prime minister (then, as now, Yanukovich) but also the president, the intelligence services and the army (all entities that now are the purview of pro-Western Orange Revolution leader Yushchenko). But as the 2004 presidential election drama unfolded, Russia attempted to turn a sure victory into a crushing victory. Russian President Vladimir Putin himself began actively campaigning for Russia's preferred candidate -- a move that led to the Orange Revolution. In 2007, the two requirements for an Orange redux are not yet present: a united pro-Western front and a coalition of Western states confident enough to challenge Russia.
Pro-Russian Regions Party's supporters shout in front of the presidential offices in Kiev on August 16, 2007; in support of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich. While Ukraines feuding president and prime minister were holding crisis talks in the capital as troops loyal to the president were said to be moving towards Kiev:
Then on Aug. 27 , 2007, Russian Ambassador to Belarus Aleksandr Surikov said that Russia might consider basing nuclear weapons in Belarus if the United States deployed its missile defense system in Poland. A day later, Surikov backed away from the statement and Konstantin Kosachyov, the head of the Russian Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, said Surikov's comment was purely "theoretical." He went on to say that, from a legal standpoint, there is nothing to prevent the deployment of nuclear weapons in any country that agrees to have them.
Thus it is clear now that Russia is engaged in a systematic campaign to both reassert its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union and take advantage of U.S. preoccupation in the Middle East in order to redefine regional relationships. The Russians have objected to the U.S. anti-missile shield and are demonstrating that they have options in response to the missiles. These statements were designed to rattle Washington's nerves without actually committing Russia to any course.
As a practical matter, the Russians don't really care about the anti-missile system the United States is building; Moscow retains more than enough nuclear-armed missiles to saturate the missile shield. Nor is the transfer of nuclear weapons to Belarus a particularly frightening idea to Washington; whether these missiles are in Russia proper or in Belarus really makes very little difference. This conversation is not about missile defense or nuclear missiles.
It is, rather, about the status of Poland and the Baltic countries -- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia -- which are all part of NATO. The Russians see the extension of NATO to within 80 miles of St. Petersburg as a direct threat to their national interest and security. They see the placement of an anti-missile system in Poland as important because it is a military commitment by Washington to Poland that goes beyond mere formal membership in NATO. If there is a missile defense system there, it must be defended. The more confident Poland is about Washington's commitment to its security against the Russians, the more confident the Baltic countries will be. Russia does not see a confident Poland as in its national interest.
The threat to place missiles in Belarus is of little consequence. However, if missiles are placed in Belarus, then other military force can be based there as well. Where missiles go, so do troops. It is the same principle as is at work in Poland. The return of Russian troops to Belarus and the integration of the Belarusian military with that of Russia in some alliance framework is of very great importance. Belarus is a buffer between Russian forces and NATO. If Belarus were prepared to accept Russian troops, then the balance of power in northern Europe would shift a bit. Poland doesn't have to worry about the Russian army right now, and Poland is fairly assertive about its interests. With Russian troops on the Belarusian-Polish border and all along the Baltic frontiers, the real and psychological dynamics would start to shift.
There is little doubt that Belarus would accept the troops. In spite of recent friction over trade and other issues, Belarus is the least reformed country in the former Soviet Union, and it is probably most in favor of recreating some sort of alliance system -- or even something closer. If Russia wanted to position troops there, Belarus would allow it.
In our view, Russia intends to do precisely that. Given President Vladimir Putin's unfolding strategy, the forward deployment of the Russian army in western Belarus makes a great deal of sense. But the Russians want to be very careful about how those forces are deployed. By warning the United States and Poland that there will be consequences for constructing a missile defense system, the Russians can portray their re-entry into Belarus as a response to Polish recklessness.
The Russians are not planning to invade anyone. But they want to make the region very nervous and aware that Russian power is near, while American power is far away and busy with other things. By configuring this move as a response to missile defense systems, they want to create movements in Poland and in the Baltic states that will constrain some of the more self-confident and assertive leaders in the region. In other words, they want to scare the dickens out of the Poles and the Balts, hoping they will become much less confident in the United States and less likely to give Washington a meaningful foothold -- and undermine the national leaders who got these countries into such a mess. The strategy makes sense, and it might even work. In any event, all this talk about nuclear weapons and missile defenses has much more conventional geopolitical meanings.
