On 6 November 1817, the 21-year-old
British Crown Princess Charlotte died in childbirth. If she had lived, the
course of history would have been different. Charlotte and her husband Leopold
of Saxe-Coburg, a shrewd and ambitious German prince, would have succeeded to
the British throne in 1830 and would have left their mark on a significant part
of 19th-century British history. What happened instead was that in 1831 the
International Powers installed Leopold L- on a throne in Brussels. He was
appointed King of Belgium, a newly created state one-and-a-half times the size
of Wales or New Jersey. Belgium - its name referred to Belgica,
the Latin word for the Netherlands - was an artificial state. It was inhabited
by two different peoples: Catholic Dutchmen, referred to as Flemings (after
Flanders, one of their historical regions) in the North, and
French-speaking Walloons in the South (Wallonia). What became Belgium, at
the time was the easiest path between France and Germany and the best avenue
for entry of British goods to the Continent.
Case Study: In search of a Kingdom
What became Belgium, at the time was the
easiest path between France and Germany and the best avenue for entry of
British goods to the Continent. Next to its central geographic location.
frequent invasions of what later became, Belgium territory were also a result
of its economic significance for the region.1 Thus, its French and Femish Provinces remained a persistent object of contention
between the French to the west and the Germans to the east, while both Spanish
and Austrian monarchs ruled the provinces from 1556 to 1792. The French however
remained the fiercest and most adamant claimants of Belgian’s Flemish
territories. They captured the Flemish Provinces in 1792, lost them the
following year, only to regain and annex them in 1794.2 In addition, the period
between 1776 and 1790 was characterized by instability and a series of
insurrections that broke out in different countries.3 This period of volatility
ended in 1814 with the disintegration of Napoleon's empire, which put the fate
of its Nordern French and Flemish provinces in the
hands of European diplomats. Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and the loss of the
‚Belgic‘ Provinces, even though it caused heartache for the French, did not
discourage them from pursuing their dream of re-annexation of Belgium.4 With
the fall of Napoleon, the Holy Alliance developed into a super-national league
for the suppression of revolutions and the upholding of the principle of
monarchical legitimism.5
The actions taken by the Holy Alliance
almost erased the dividing line between international affairs and the domestic
affairs of a state. It was more than a question of recognition or
non-recognition. Rather, it was an imposition of a regime by external force, an
intervention in the internal affairs of a state in the most flagrant manner.
Some authors have asserted that the conclusion of the pious terms of the Holy
Alliance 6 in 1815 between Tsar, the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia
as well as the righteous resolutions adopted three years later by the Congress
of Aix-Ia Chapelle of 1818,7 with regards to the the sanctity of international treaties were a mere staged
show. According to their opinion, the emphasis on law and religion served
only to mask the real intention of the Powers. Throughout the years, their main
goal was to maintain the territorial status quo and to prevent democratic
tendencies from threatening the privileges of the governing classes and the
absolute rule of the princes. The central goal of European powers remained
buttressing the well-established balance of power system determined at Vienna
regardless ofthe cost that effort entailed.8 The
peace settlements reached at the Peace of Paris in 1814 and the Treaty of
Vienna in 1815 clearly reflected the value of the state over the nation. During
this period territories were bartered among the sovereigns.10
When one sovereign lost a contested
territory, he was compensated with another. The use of the terms
"souls" rather than "citizens" to describe the populations
a sovereign would receive in compensation symbolized the view that states existed
apart ftom their people. This is also evident in the
fact that dynastic claims of territory were favored over national claims by
newly liberated peoples throughout Europe. Between 1815 and 1848 intervention
was a device used by great powers to control and assist the governments
of weaker states.11 They however wanted to differentiate between intervention
and war and even though they did intervene on a number of occasions, none of
those acts were preceded by a declaration of war. There was a manifest
determination amongst the great powers to establish the principle that
intervention by force in the internal affairs of another state was a legitimate
and legal act. Congresses, treaties and peace acts, which were quite frequent
during this period, were a way of establishing, formalizing and confirming that
legitimacy. The powers derived their legitimacy from the shared assumption that
they were guardians of the peace of Europe. Maintenance of peace and stability
was the moral obligation of the Great Powers and their right and duty to ensure
it was not disturbed by others. These rights and obligations were based on
accomplished facts and binding treaties. The legitimacy of intervention was
grounded in the rights, which belonged to the great powers and the assumption
that peace between states depended upon the maintenance of order within states.
This principle was evident in the words of Austrian minister Klemens von Metternich who asserted: "when domestic
social unrest makes it impossible for a government to meet its treaty
obligations that bind it to other countries, the right to intervene belongs as
clearly and indisputably to every government which finds itself in danger of
being drawn into the revolutionary maelstrom, as it does to any individual who
must put out a fire in his neighbor's house if it is not to spread to its
own.“12
The right to intervention was presented
in a positive light, as Great Powers helping weaker states uphold their treaty
obligations, rather than Great Powers meddling into the affairs of other
states. This common policy and the way of thinking was undennined
in the 1820s and 1830s by disagreement amongst the great powers as to what
constituted disorder and whether turmoil in a particular country constituted a
threat to the peace of Europe. Fearing more revolutions and insurrections with
the exceptions of Great Britain and France, the Powers in November 1820 adhered
to the Troppau Protocol, which stated that: "States which have undergone a
change of Government due to revolution, the results of which threaten other
states, ipso facto cease to be members of the European Alliance, and remain
excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees for legal order and
stability. If owing to such alterations immediate danger threatens other
states, the powers bind themselves, by peaceful means, or if need be by army to
bring back the guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance."13
Intervention remained central to the 'Congress System' and rather controversial
as Great Britain strongly opposed the Powers intervening into the affairs of
other states.14
British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh
rejected the Protocol and the claim that intervention was the duty of the
Alliance and officially declared the text as a clear violation of international
law. 15 Castlereagh established the British position in a paper of May 5, 1820,
stating that the Quadruple Alliance was an alliance for the "liberation of
a great proportion of the Continent of Europe from the military dominion of
France...It never was, however intended as an Union for the Government of the
World or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other States.“16
Britain and France believed that the right to intervene rested solely on the
appeal of the government in distress for assistance. They adamantly rejected
the argument that a right of intervention belonged to the alliance of five
powers. Clearly they recognized two or more powers could legitimately act
together if they so wished, but they could not claim to act in the name of the
five. Howevert some believe that the disagreement
between the powers was more about the nature and the purpose of the five-power
alliance and the contest for its leadership rather than a debate about the
principle of intervention. 17
The great powers of Europe did not
consider the interests of smaller states, which increasingly rejected
absolutism and longed for constitutional guarantees. Establishment and
recognition of new states also fell into the realm of responsibility of the
Great Powers. The act of recognition was perceived as a stabilizer of security
and a tool for the maintenance of the equilibrium among states. New
entities were recognized as independent states in order to either support the
balance of power system. Therefore, the great powers restored old rulers only
where it suited them to do so, and their territorial arrangements were designed
primarily to satisfy strategic requirements, or to provide rough justice by
rewards, compensation or punishment. They were bound by no principle of the
self-determination of peoples or ethnic groupings. Although nationalism was
certainly used and discussed, its expression and practice was strongly
discouraged. For the people and for their governments, the determination to
return to peace was far more compelling than liberal and nationalist ideas.18
In as far as the peacemakers of 1814 had any ideological motive, it was a
desire to establish peace under the system of balance of power, which meant
different things to different states. 19
The Buffer State
A French ambassador at the time of Louis
XIV commented that "The English will give the shirts off their backs to
prevent the French from penetrating into the Low Countries.“20 Similarly to the
French, the British maintained a close interest in the fate of the French and
Flemish Provinces. The main reason behind this was Britain's strong belief that
their possession by France or any other country in Europe would upset the
balance of power and pose a threat to the British Isles. They were fully aware
of the danger implied by them shrewd comment made by Napoleon: "Antwerp in
the hands of a strong France was a pistol pointed at the heart of
England." 21 For military and economic reasons, the Northern Netherlands
also had a great stake in the fate of Belgium. These concerns were the capstone
governing the policies and conduct of foreign affairs of the great European
powers towards Belgium. Even though its size and military strength seemed
insignificant, due to its geographic location and strategic relevance for the
peace in Europe, Belgium's destiny was closely tied with the interests of Great
Britain, France and Germany. This country represented the focal point on which
the interests of the European powers converged. In turn due to the fact that
most of its history is characterized by foreign rule, Belgium depended on the
great powers both militarily and diplomatically.In
the 18th century, long fortresses stretched along the border between the
Habsburg-owned Austrian Netherlands (Belgium) and France. Interestingly, even
though the fortresses were on Austrian soil, they were manned by Dutch
garrisons in the interest of Europe. The Austrian presence significantly
impacted the balance of power calculation as Austria was one of the four
guarantors of the perpetual union of the Austrian Netherlands with the united
provinces to the north.22 It was soon realized that fortification did not
represent enough of a barrier to stop the northward expansion of the French
troops.23 Realizing this fact, during the height of the allied offensive
against Napoleon in the fall of 1813, the stadtholder-in-exile, later King
William I of the Netherlands, requested the cession of all Belgium to Holland
in order to build a new barrier against French aggression.24
In fact this is an example of the
previously mentioned tendency of powers to make territorial arrangements and
designs in order to suit their needs. The justification in granting William his
wish was found in their 'duty' to preserve peace in Europe and maintain the
current order especially in the realm of international security.The
Kingdom of the Netherlands which was created at the end of the Napoleonic Wars
25 was one of the most deliberate and carefully motivated decisions of the
Quadruple Alliance of 1814.26 The United Netherlands consisted of Belgium
Luxembourg and northern Netherlands. This unhappy union was guaranteed by
Austria, Prussia, Russia and Britain. The British especially pushed for the
rapid completion ofthe fortress building and made the
most significant investments in the project.27 The powers disposed of the
Southern Netherlands (meaning Flanders) first at the Peace of Paris on May 30,
1814, and by the Final Act of the Vienna Congress on June 9, 1815 which stated:
"In the interests of European peace, and of the balance of power, the
Southern provinces were joined to the Northern Netherlands under the
sovereignty of the House of Orange-Nassau, in order to form together an
indivisible state under the constitution already existing in the North, altered
to meet the circumstances." William I was appointed as the new
"legitimate" king and accepted this disposition on July 21, 1814 and
from March 16, 1815 commenced his rule of the amalgamated kingdom.28
The primary goal of the Congress of
Vienna was to establish a new balance of power in Europe, which would prevent
imperialism within Europe, and maintain the peace between the great powers.
Moreover, it hoped to prevent political revolutions such as French Revolution
and maintain status quo. The Treaty of Vienna never consulted the Belgians
about the decision to unite them with Holland in order to form a barrier
against any French expansion and to preserve peace in Europe.29 Belgians who had
a history of conquests of their territory and rule by other powers, perceived
themselves as voiceless and knowing the 'rules' of the balance of power system,
they acquiesced to the wishes of the powers. After all, the skills of diplomats
of the Belgic provinces in conducting foreign relations were rather limited as
they had no experience in conducting their own foreign affairs.On
the surface, Holland took an possible measures to guarantee that the
relationship between the south and north would be based on equality. Two
capitals were established in Brussels and at The Hague, and the Estates General
was appointed to sit in each alternately. No discrimination was allowed between
the two peoples, and there was to be an equal number of Belgian (but only
french-speaking) and Dutch deputies, which was to
ensure that no part of the country would have a chance of oppressing the other.
The Constitution guaranteed freedom of worship for both groups.30 Based on the
above, the creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands should have been welcomed
in Belgium. On the contrary, it was a source of disappointment for the Belgians
whose dissatisfaction and grievances only increased exponentially over time.The worsening situation only exacerbated the
differences between two peoples. The antipathy between the Belgian representativs and the Dutch is founded on the diversity of
commercial and agricultural interests between the two parts of the kingdom as
well as on the opposition between the religious principles.31 With respect to
economy the Dutch had the traditional economy of trade and very open while
Belgians had less developed local industries. Hence, while the Dutch wanted
free trade, the Belgians called for the protection of tariffs. Religion and
language also pointed towards significant differences between the French
speaking Roman Catholic south and the Dutch speaking Protestant north. These
differences were probably not sufficient to cause a riot however the worsening
situation within the Kingdom and the oppression of the Belgian population in
Brussel awakened nationalistic feelings helping the them to develop a
sense of national identity. Between 1818 and 1830, the system was anything but
relaxed. The Allies tried to establish a series of military and strategic
servitudes for the Kingdom of Netherlands. claiming the right to occupy the
country and use it as a base of operations. The Duke of Wellington was
appointed the commander in chief of the quadruple Alliance, in charge of
supervising the fortress system while seeing to it that the King of the
Netherlands carried out his duties. In addition to the funds made available by
the French indemnity, each of the allied powers regularly contributed funds to
finance the construction and maintenance of the barrier. The military planners
of the German Bund considered the Netherlands defense system almost an integral
part of the Bund' s own lines, centering on Luxembourg.32
On the surface, it appeared that the
necessary strategic and political steps have been taken to ensure the success
and realization of the Congress of Vienna.However,
the powers were soon to be faced with an irreversible crisis that threatened to
shake up the established balance. History has shown that even an unlikely union
between different groups can survive the test of time provided it has strong
leadership able to afford the necessary balance and accommodate diverse needs.
King William's rule provided no such leadership and proved to be a bitter
disappointment to the Belgian people. Many foreign diplomatic observers noted
that King William I did not have the capacity and leadership skills necessary
to keep the union together. He failed to understand the religious and cultural
sensitivities of the Belgians.33 In response to the threat posed by Napoleon's
return from Elba, William I appointed a select commission of Belgians and
Hollanders to consider codifying the Fundamental Law of the Kingdom. The
commissioners agreed on a government which placed all authority in the hands of
the king. Ministers were responsible only to William, the King appointed over
half of the Senate, and the Second Chamber could only reject or approve but not
amend legislative proposals. An obstacle was encountered regarding
representation in the Chamber. The Belgians whose region possessed 3,400,000
inhabitants compared with Holland's 2,000,000 insisted that representation be
proportionate to the size of the population. 34
The Dutch, on the contrary, were adamant
about the idea of equal representation.36 Another point of contention and
Belgian frustration was the fact that they bore greater responsibility in
paying taxes. These disagreements led the Belgian notables to reject the
modified Fundamental Law. As the French bourgeoisie (the Flemish although
making up a majority of 60% didn’t count) of Belgium increased in economic
power, they demanded a greater role in solving political and social questions
related to their interests. William's failure to uphold the sections of the
Fundamental Law regarding the independence of judges and the freedom of the
press was a grave aggravation for the Belgians. Instead of trying to
accommodate the Belgian demand, William I disregarded their claim and
proclaimed the law as accepted. This incident was an indicator of not only the
nature of the relationship between the French language Belgium people of
Brussels and the King but also of the status of Belgium and apparent lack of
its power in decision-making regarding the future of the country. Despite
disagreement with William's ruling, the Catholic party defended the position
and authority of the Roman Catholic clergy while the Liberals, under the
influence of the principles of the French Revolution, demanded more toleration
and less clerical influence. Yet both Catholic and Liberals were Roman
Catholics, and in their Catholicism shared a dislike for living under
Protestant rule.37
By his poor judgment and bad policies,
William managed to unite Liberals and Catholics into a united opposition. On
November 8, 1828 a National Coalition of Catholics and Liberals was fonned under the fitting name of the Union of Opposites. It
endured for 14 years.The conflict and the gap between
the King and the Belgians which began at the birth of the united
state only continued to grow and deepen. Moreover, the fact that the
Dutch always thought of Belgium as a territory annexed to Holland rather than
as equal part of the state did nothing to alleviate grievances of the
Belgians.38 Even as early as 1819, the animosity between the Belgium and the
Dutchman was difficult to ignore. A large number of French songs appeared in
Belgium attesting to this: 'I'm not a Dutchman, And I don't want to be one.Yes, I am a Belgian, And that's what I think is grand.
And I am proud, upon my word, Of the name of my Fatherland.'39
Failing to recognize the signs of
growing displeasure, King William made an attempt to promote national feeling
of unity by urging the acceptance of Dutch as the national and official
language. This caused not only an outrage but a problem for Belgians who spoke
French or Walloon, which included nearly all the leaders of society who had
been placed there by the Napoleonic regime before. Even though some concessions
were made in 1829, by then a majority of the leading figures of the south,
receiving considerable support both in Flanders and in Wallonia, were calling
for autonomy from Dutch rule.40 Deep dissatisfaction of Belgian people, which
has been growing over the years, has reached its culminating point. The
situation in the country was ripe for action and it was only a matter of time
when Belgian grievances led by former bureacrats
under Napoleon, would turn into violent protest. While King William wrongly
assumed that the patriotic lyrics of an opera could not cause a disturbance, he
saw no apparent reason to ban the performance of the French Opera, La Muette de Partici in Brussels on
August 25, 1830, even though it had previously been prohibited.41However, it
was precisely these lines of sacrifice, bravery and righteousness that moved
the audience at the Brussels Opera house that evening and emboldened their
feelings. The news of the Paris July Revolution echoed and provided a further
source of encouragement for the Belgian bourgosie. At
the beginning it was not clear whether the revolt was aimed at the Great
Netherlands state, Protestantism, and constitution, the system of government,
the government itself, or the Dutch dynasty. One thing was indisputable; this
was an attack on Holland.42 Grievance and dissatisfaction under Dutch rule of
the French speaking bureaucrats were revived in an instant.Even
though William's overconfident temperament and political ideology played an
important part in the causes of the revolution, they provide insufficient
explanation of the events which unfolded.What became
a minor Revolution, occurred for more profound reasons.Frequently,
language, religion, and economics have been viewed as the underlying causes of
the revolt. Interestingly enough, British diplomats, pointed to these factors
as potential problem areas as early as 1814.43 The basic causes of the eruption
of 1830 were the deep beliefs of each people that they were different, and that
their uniqueness would be violated by the other half.44
The Bruxellois
did not at first think about demanding a complete separation from Holland.198
An assembly of notables met three days after the outbreak and sent a delegation
to ask the King to consider their grievances and to discuss them with the
States General. A Committee of Public Safety was formed of which the majority
were moderates. Revolutionary groupings did call for a provisional government
but until September 20, it was all in vain. On the day the by now both French
and Flemish speaking masses in the city, stormed the Brussels Hotel de
Ville, the Committee of Public Safety was disbanded as was the citizens' guard
that had policed the city. This clearly signified that the hold of the
moderates was shattered.45 Thus, Berlin, London, Vienna and St. Petersburg now,
were confronted with the decision of whether to lead armed aid to Holland in
maintaining the status quo or whether a different course was to be followed.46
Each of them individually considered what was in the best interest for their
countries. Tsar Nicholas I of Russia was interested in the success of the
Netherlands for military, dynastic, and economic reasons and he
profoundly feared French expansion.47
The foreign minister of the new French
government, Count Mole, faced a dilemma regarding the issue of whether France
should allow the dispatch of British and Prussian troops to Belgium to restore
order or whether the proper policy should be to give aid to the insurrection.
Another option for the French was to stay neutral in this matter and leave
things up to the other European powers. During the rebellion, the British
seemed to support the Belgian efforts to challenge the existing order and break
into the European system. At first, London's reaction to the riots was
nonchalant. The British Foreign office was convinced that the Brussels affair
centered on local grievances. The Tory Prime Minister at the time of the
revolt, the Duke of Wellington, regretted the disruption of the Vienna system,
however at the time he did not want to pledge British military aid to King
William I, partly because he regarded him as a weak ruler and partly because
Britain was rather militarily weak. England's interests necessitated stable
relations with France, and when Mole indicated that France wished arrangement
of the Belgian matter, the Duke was willing to cooperate. Mole took initiative
by telling the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Werther, that France would retrain from any intervention in any country on her
borders, as long as no other major European state intervened first. By
announcing this, France proclaimed that any entry of Prussian troops into
Belgium would be followed immediately by the involvement of the French anny as well.204 This decision was rejected by the European
powers and only the British cabinet expressed conditional agreement. Other
powers were more willing to get involved. The Prussians had mobilized at once
and were prepared to march into Belgium.
In October, 1830 King William I
finally made an appeal for help to end the insurrection although by then
it was to late becouse
Belgium already declared itself as independent. The Dutch monarch based his
appeal on the Treaty of the Eight Articles, which has made the victorious
powers guarantors of his dominions. The French government was the first to take
the initiative. It appointed an experienced diplomat Talleyrand as the new
ambassador to the Court ofSt. James. His task was to
persuade the British government to call a conference of all the interested
powers to resolve the issue. William's ability to end the revolt was
questionable. However even attempting to do so might have caused the French to
move in and aid the Belgians. The Orange monarch certainly could not risk a war
against France without European support. In the meantime the fighting continued
and a large volunteer force arrived ftom Wallonia to
defend Brussels against the Dutch anny. Belgians
fought fiercely and defeated the Dutch in a battle that lasted for three days
outside the Brussels palace. On September 27 the Dutch withdrew. The Belgians
rather quickly formed a provisional government, which declared independence on
October 4, 1830. On November 3, a National Congress was fonned
by an electorate of 30,000 men. The same month, the issue of declaration of
independence was debated. On November 18, the following resolution was passed
unanimously: "The National Congress of Belgium proclaims the Independence
of the Belgian People on November 18, 1830, respecting at the same time the
relations of Luxembourg with the Germanic Confederation.“
Shortly thereafter the Conference of
London opened on November 4 1830 and was crucial in determining the future of
Belgium. The Great Powers, rather than Belgium and Holland, occupied themselves
with establishing the arrangements to "combine the future independence of
Belgium with the stipulations of the Treaties with the interests and security
of other Powers, and with the preservation of European equilibrium.“ These
phrases were the key to the final resolution pertaining to the faith of
Belgium, for they acknowledged that Europe would recognize Belgium as an
independent state. The Powers believed that they possessed the authority, based
upon the treaties and protocols of 1815 and 1818, to resolve Belgian affairs.
The plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France
declared at its first session that it had been the intent of the great powers
in 1815 to reestablish the peace of Europe and create ajust
equilibrium. The Conference of London made an official declaration that in its
judgment, it would not even be possible to reunite the two countries without
war.
In evaluating the conference, the
English historian Boulger~ who is considered anauthority on Belgian history, commented:"The
London Conference has been cited as a proof of the concord of Europe; no one
who reads its sixty-three Protocols from end to end will find in its record
proof of anything but discord, -- the latent strife, the keen rivalry, of the
five Powers which then constituted Europe. The Conference that nominally dealt
with the fate of Belgium was concerned least of all with its interests. It
wanted to avert a general war, to maintain the balance of powers, to prevent Belpum falling to France, and to save Holland from being
too much weakened.“The rivalry was mainly between
England and France and both took the initiative in determining the future of
Belgium. It was Lord Palmerston, one of the ablest Foreign Secretaries England
ever had and the French Ambassador Prince Talleyrand, the most prominent figure
in European diplomacy of that time, who gave Belgium her status among the
European nations, naturally to suit their own countries' purposes.On
its first day, the Conference issued the first of its seventy protocols. It
ordered the establishment of an armistice and the evacuation by both parties of
all areas, which had not formed a part of their respective territories prior to
May 30, 1814.213 The first protocol declared:
"The troops of both parties shall
withdraw behind the line which before the treaty of May 30, 1814 separated the
territory of the Sovereign Ruler of the United Netherlands from the provinces
added to his dominions to form the Kingdom of the Netherlands."
A change of British governments did not
work in favor of the Dutch as even before Palmerston replaced Wellington, the
Belgians made a gain when the conference proposed an armistice based on the
borders given Holland by the Treaty of Paris of 1814. The protocol further
benefited the Belgians by referring to them not as rebels but as recognized
belligerents which significantly promoted their cause in further
negotiations. Some of the main problems that arose at the conference were
related to the questions of boundaries, the division of the national debt, the
navigation of the rivers and canals. The international aspects included a
buffer between France and state to the northeast and the problem of the balance
of power and general security. There was a uniform belief among the European
Powers that a monarchy rather than a republic would be a preferred form of
government for Belgium. A republic could not have been acceptable to Palmerston
and would never have been tolerated by the Conservative Powers. Some
politicians went as far as claiming that if Belgium proclaimed itself a
republic, it would start a new revolution. Russia, Austria and Prussia were
opposed to Belgian independence. The simultaneous outbreak of revolution in
Poland prevented a Russian-Austrian-Prussian military intervention in support
of William I against the rebellious Provinces. However, Lord Palmerston's new
government wholeheartedly supported recognition. It was precisely the
Franco-British coalition that imposed a reversal on the London Conference
affording Belgium its official independence in January 1831.218 The initiative
and formal motion which initiated the process of recognition was introduced by
Lord Palmerston and seconded by Prince Talleyrand on December 18, 1830. The
text of the proposal indicated the following: "In having provided by the
treaties of 1814 and 1815, for the union of Belgium and Holland, the
powers...intended to create ajust balance of power in
Europe and to assure the maintenance of general peace. The events of the last
four months have unfortunately demonstrated that 'this perfect amalgamation'
had not been obtained and will be impossible of attainment, so that very
objective of the unionof Belgium and Holland is
destroyed and therefore it is now indispensable that other arrangements be
found to accomplish these intentions...United to Holland, and being an integral
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Belgium fulfilled its role in the
European duties of the Kingdom and the obligations laid upon it by the
treaties. Its separation ftom Holland must not ftee it ftom this portion of its
duties and obligations. The Conference will occupy itself subsequently with
discussing and agreeing on new and proper arrangements to combine the future
independence of Belgium with the stipulations of the treaties, with the
security interests of the other powers and with the preservation of the balance
of powers."
William protested also against a new
disposal by the Powers of Belgian provinces by claiming the following:
"Having once for all determined the fate ofthe
Belgian provinces, you have not according to intemationallaw,
the right to rescind your decision: to sever the ties binding Holland and
Belgium, is outside the sphere of your competency, the more so as this increase
of Dutch territory was granted on certain burdensome conditions.. .At the
expense of several colonies and considerable financial sacrifices. The
Conference of London, it is true, met at my request, but this circumstance does
not give it the right to give to its intervention an effect, diametrically
opposed to the purpose for this it was requested.“ The conditions, limitations
and qualifications to full national sovereignty, which the Conference pointed
to in its seventh protocol, were the main subject of deliberations during the
month of January 1831. In two key protocols, the so-called "Bases of
Separation" of Belgium from Holland or the Eighteen Articles are defined,
and the main points of contention between the two entities were addressed, not
to everyone's satisfaction. First, the Conference prefaced the fixing of the
borders and the division of the public debt with another declaration concerning
the European obligations of the two nations. It further pointed out to Brussels
that any future arrangements would be subordinated to the rights of the
Conference members. Finally, the plenipotentiaries made it clear to the Belgian
authorities that no new Belgian conquests or territorial aggrandizements were
to be made at the expense of Holland. The plenipotentiaries also added a
condition that was to be achieved with Belgian independence: "Belgium,
within the limits described above. . . will be constituted into a perpetually
neutral state. The five powers will guarantee it this perpetual neutrality, as
well as the integrity and inviolability of its territory, within the limits mentioned.
By a just reciprocity, Belgium will be constrained to observe the same
neutrality toward all other states, and not to disturb in any way their
internal or external tranquility.“ One week later, the conference issued anther protocol which stated that:"Belgium
assumes 16/31 of the total public debt of the former Kingdom of the
Netherlands; that while the final debt settlement was worked out by bilateral
negotiations, Belgium pay its share of the service charges; that Belgium should
enjoy free and unhampered trading privileges with the Dutch colonies."
(Protocol No. 22 Annex B. January 18, 1831 (BFSP, XVIII)
The provisional Belgian government
rejected the territorial and the financial "Bases of Separation" and
refused to ratify these proposals. Rather than showing itself more
conciliatory, it seemed that Belgians gained new confidence and started
increasing their demands. London warned that in the event of Belgian failure to
accept the separation plan the powers would break off relations with Belgium
and refuse to recognize her independence. The choice of the new King was also a
subject of great debate. From the outset the Belgians decided that a prince of
the House of Orange-Nassau would under no circumstances be acceptable to them.
By the same token it was clear that if the French prince took the new Belgian
throne, French influence would have been so dominant in the new kingdom that
its annexation by France would only be a question of time. Lord Palmerston took
measures to prevent such a possibility by introducing a proposal according to
which no prince of the ruling houses represented at the conference would be
eligible for the Belgian throne. After a couple of eliminations, the British
Cabinet obtained on June 4, 1831 the election of its own protege, Prince
Leopold of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, who had been married to the late Princess
Charlotte of Great Britain and Ireland and was known to contemplate a second
marriage with Louise of Orleans, daughter of the King of the French.
Sponsored by the Conference, Leopold had
been engaged in weeks of negotiations with a Belgian deputation in London, the
essence of which was to negotiate the acquisition of Luxembourg for the choice
of Leopold as king and the acceptance of the remaining articles of the Basis of
Separation. Leopold's intimate adviser, Baron Stockmar,
confirmed that the powers were willing to accept this deal since they were
desperate by June for some sort of Belgian settlement, After the Treaty of
Eighteen Articles was announced on June 26, 1831, the Belgian National Congress
not only speedily elected Leopold King, but on July 12, 1831 accepted the
Eighteen Articles.229 It seemed that the armistice was finally achieved and
that the Europe was on its way to a solution to the Belgium problem. However,
King William flatly refused to even consider these terms. On August 2, 1831
Dutch troops invaded Belgium. As soon as Paris learned of the events,
especially of King Williams' refusal of the agreement, the Army of the North
comprised of 50,000 soldiers, under the command of Marshal Gerard, marched into
Belgium. The French decision was taken unilaterally, without consultation with
the Conference, in response to an urgent appeal from King Leopold, whose army
was loosing the battle. At that point, rather than
risking an engagement with the French troops, the Dutch commander rapidly
withdrew his forces. By August 14, 1831, Belgium had been completely evacuated
by the Dutch. As soon as the armistice had been reestablished the
plenipotentiaries returned to finding a final settlement acceptable to both
parties. It was becoming apparent that there was no hope that Holland would
accept the Eighteen Articles, nor could the status quo be permitted to last
indefinitely, as Belgium or Holland would recommence hostilities, particularly
over the bitter Luxembourg question. Threatening Holland with a naval blockade
to prevent further hostilities, the powers extended the treaty draft on
November 14, 1831 to a definite and in-evocable instrument, to be adhered to
not only by the two main parties, but also by the conference powers themselves.
Through this means, the final and definite separation of the two countries was
to be made binding on all the major powers, who became the guarantors of the
an-angement.
This was the famous Treaty ofthe Twenty.Four Articles, which
despite a seven year.delay was destined to be the
final arrangement establishing the independence of Belgium, defining the
borders and regulating the relations between not only Belgium and Holland but
also of Belgium and the rest of Europe. The territorial extent of Belgium was
fixed as in the two previous proposals, with some exceptions. The second major
provision dealt with mutual transit, navigation rights and the partition of
debt. In contrast to their earlier position, the plenipotentiaries now ruled
that the Belgian share of the joint debt would amount to 8,400,000 florins of
total annual charges, with Belgium being freed from any payments pending the
creation of the machinery for transferring the money. The remaining fund of the
Kingdom of Netherlands was to be divided equitably through a bilateral
agreement. In addition, not only was the territory and the neutrality of
Belgium guaranteed, but the financial, transit and miscellaneous articles were
placed under the protection of the conference as well. While the Belgian
government declared its readiness to ratify almost immediately, The Hague
refused. Berlin, Vienna or St.Petersburg seemed just
as disinterested and London and Paris did not exchange ratifications with Belgium
either.The Article of Separation of Holland and
Belgium (article VII) read: "Belgium.. .shall form an independent and
perpetually neutral state. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality toward
all other states.“Neutrality as an institution of
international law was then not without a precedent as in 1815 the Swiss
confederation had been declared a perpetually neutral state. Neutrality implied
two types of obligations. Firstly, the Powers were not to interfere in
Belgium's internal affairs or to pursue against her any annexationist policy.
Secondly, Belgium was not to depart iTom a strict
impartiality in her relations with other countries. By extending to Belgium the
regime granted to Switzerland in 1815, the Conference confirmed Belgian
position as the "keystone of Europe" and in the eyes of the Powers
the Conference created a solid guarantee for the maintenance of peace.
The fruitless and tiresome negotiations
continued during the summer of 1832. Both the Belgian and Dutch governments
agreed to further talks, even though they both doubted their outcome. Both
parties continued to express their readiness to make concessions. However,
Belgium specified that before any agreement could be reached,the
Dutch would have to evacuate the citadel of Antwerp, which they had continued
to occupy since the revolution. The Dutch adamantly refused to do this until
after agreement on the reserved articles had been reached. Meanwhile Dutch
warships and the batteries of the citadel continued to obstruct the fteedom of navigation on the river. Immediately after the
French troops were safely pulled out of Belgium, Britain and France reopened
negotiations with the Dutch government. Their ultimate aim was the full
acceptance of the Twenty-Four Articles by the Hague, but having as a minimum
objective the conclusion of some sort of a provisional arrangement, pending the
conclusion of a mutually acceptable final treaty. On December 31, 1832,
Palmerston and Talleyrand proposed to the Dutch an interim agreement which
provided for: "evacuation of all territory still occupied by each party in
defiance of the borders drawn by the treaty, opening of navigation on the Meuse
and the Schedlt, the granting of amnesties and the
exchange of prisoners, the opening of the Sittard
trade route to Germany, mutual anns reductions, to be
followed by raising the blockade and embargo still in effect against Dutch trade.“Britain and France demanded an unlimited armistice
and full Dutch recognition of Belgian neutrality. On March 9, 1833, a treaty
was concluded at Berlin in which it was provided: ''that the London Conference
should be reconstituted after the cessation of all coercion measures; that the
Twenty-Four Articles should be the basis of an entirely new negotiations, in
which the Belgian and Dutch governments should participate as equals; that the
consent of the German Bund to the Luxembourg-Limburg arrangements of the treaty
of November 15, 1831 was an essential condition; and the three monarchs agreed
that any new arrangement could not put more onerous conditions on Holland than
those already agreed to" The new negotiations would be broken off if a new
attempt at coercing Holland was to be made. Finally, the three rulers pledged
to assist Holland if her territory were attacked or if Britain and France were
to act contrary to these stipulations.
The Conference reopened in London and
during the summer and fall of 1833 attempted to work out a new treaty that
would satisfy the wishes of the Dutch in the disputed transit and navigation
clauses ofthe Twenty-Four Articles. The demands of
Holland clearly indicated that they had no wish for a final treaty and the
negotiations made no progress. Finally, in November of 1833, Palmerston
demanded from the new Dutch plenipotentiary, whether the King had taken any
measures to obtain the consent of the German Bund to the proposed division of
Luxembourg and Limburg. Upon learning that William had not done so, Palmerston
declared the conference suspended until The Hague would give evidence of being
ready to accept the Twenty-Four Articles, or show some positive desire to
negotiate. Amazingly, no such signals were given for the next five years which
ensured suspension of the conference over those years. After reaffirming their
opposition to compelling any settlement from the Dutch and any changes in
European public law due to revolutionary activity, the three eastern absolute
monarchs on September 20, 1833 began a long period of regarding Belgium as a
public outcast. Britain and France, on the other hand, immediately established
full diplomatic relations with Brussels and continued to conduct friendly
diplomatic relations over the course of the following five years. Eastern
Europe opted for a different course of action. Russia refused to recognize
Leopold I and had no diplomatic relations with Brussels. Berlin and VielUla showed their displeasure with the new state by
merely accrediting charges to Leopold. In addition constant friction existed
between Belgium and Prussia over border issues, over the uneasy state of affairs
in Luxembourg, and over alleged Belgian's involvement in the early Kulturkampfin the Prussian Rhineland, which reached serious
proportions in 1838.
The Final Settlement
In the period between 1833 and 1838
Belgium enjoyed the advantage of the interim arrangements. Those included full
control of all Luxembourg and Limburg, and furthermore no required payments on
the Belgian share of the debt. This state of affairs became increasingly
bothersome to unyielding William I who in March 1838, suddenly declared his
readiness to accept the Twenty-Four Articles, and demanded immediate Belgian
evacuation of the teritories to be given to Holland.
Now it was time for the Belgians, to protest against the Twenty-Four Articles
and to demand their alteration, especially the financial and teritorial clauses. The terititorial
exchanges were mostly to be made based on languages spoken in the teITitories. The London Conference found itself in full
session again. By summer of 1838 the Conference had come to a general agreement
that while the Belgian share of the debt with total annual charges of 8,400,000
florins, should be reduced in favor of Belgium, the territorial division must
be left unchanged. Naturally, Belgium was outraged. It immediately reverted to
the one technique that had worked in the past. Volunteers gathered around the
flags, ministries fell, Belgians armed themselves and the demand for war echoed
throughout the country. Leopold I openly declared that Belgium would never
acquiesce to such an agreement. This opposition to the decisions of London
continued during the most of 1838. Finally, on December 6, 1838, the Conference
presented Brussels with an ultimatum in which the final terms were stipulated.
Belgium was to evacuate the disputed areas and in turn her share of the debt
would be reduced to 5,200,000 florins, and she would be freed from having to
pay any of the arrears, which had been accumulating since 1831.
Initially, France refused to accept and abide by the
ultimatum, which encouraged the Belgians to hold out for two more months.
However, after the unconditional Frence agreement
reached London, late in January 1839, the government of Leopold I was left with
no alternative. Confronted by unanimous determination of the Conference to
impose the final settlement on Brussels, the government indicated its
willingness to abide by the December 6, 1838 protocol. The revised Twenty-Four
Articles were signed by Belgium in May and ratified early in June, 1839. The
concert of Europe was satisfied as it yet again managed to solve a crisis and
preserve the balance of power. It further assured the security of the powers
and the new state through unconditional Belgian independence and perpetual
neutrality. Belgium paid the price for its independence, for after all, it had been
created to serve a clear purpose. Europe had invested considerable money in
building fortifications designed for containing France. At the time it was
unquestionable that Belgium's independence heavily depended on the approval of
Europe. Independence was not something that Belgium could proclaim on its own
and expect Europe to easily grant it.
Leopold furthermore stated his view
that: "without comparative security by means of well
regulated measures of defense, at the least, no country, be it great or
small, can be considered as possessing national independence" The defense
measures were taken by the Belgians both to prepare for an attack and to gain
recognition from the powers. In the minds of the Brussels statesmen, the
stronger the state became, the more likely it was that the powers would show
increased consideration for the Belgian point of view. The small country seemed
to want to make clear to the rest of Europe that it had the courage to go
against he wishes of a larger power. Military
development was undertaken not only for defense, but also as a method of
gaining the respect of other powers. Since such activities would be expected of
a great power, it seemed remarkable that a newborn state would have the
audacity and boldness to undertake such course of action. Belgium, due to
Holland's attitude, had reasons to act as it did. However, without Leopold's
insistence on military strength, the fortifications would likely never have
been considered.
There are a number of reasons that
explain Belgium's success. Palmerston' s willingness to come to aid of the
Belgian diplomats was essential. Coupled with this approach was a tactic of
claiming far more than Belgium could expect to get in hopes that more might be
won in the final settlement than if she only made modest demands. It might be
argued that this tactic reflected unrealistic hopes and even though at times
this was so, frequently it evidenced shrewd bargaining. Like the diplomats of
many new nations, the Belgians showed audacity, sometimes in their
bluff-calling tactics, at times in persistence and finally in their willingness
to include military action as their negotiations tool. The stubbornness of her
diplomacy reflected not only the diplomatic style of a small state working for
recognition but also that of a new revolutionary state determined to make a
mark on the world. Belgium's birth by violence in a time when order and
stability were watchwords created one of her greatest obstacles, however it
seemed that this approach worked in her favor in obtaining independence and
recognition. Having already gained independence by use of arms, Belgians were
too eager to resort to them as a solution to the negotiation stalemates. Their
strategy was to demonstrate their feelings and desires clearly and violently
with a threat of the use of force in hope that the powers would give way. Such
tactics may have been the mark of independence, but they of course aggravated
the powers that were trying to protect their established system. To a new state
in the 1830s as in the 1950s and 1960s, power seemed equated with military
force and independence with the fteedom to act as
one's wishes dictated. It was only in time that the Belgians became aware that
power possessed more than military attributes and that their own interests were
ftequently best served if they did not push their
rights as an independent nation to the extreme.Moreover,
it cannot be said that the recognition of Belgium's independence was the result
of the political sense and diplomatic skill of the Brussels leaders. How did
Belgium gain recognition? It was the consequence of an extremely simple
situation that had nothing to do with the Belgians, but that had an
irresistible influence on the powers meeting in London. Nobody, as things
stood, wanted another war. France did not want one because Louis Philippe knew
he would be risking his throne. Prussia did not want a war because she would be
beaten if she were not supported by England and Russia, and would probably lose
the Rhineland. Austria was against war because it was at peace and knew that a
war would be a jump into the unknown. The English particularly feared ageneral war, because they knew it would be detrimental for
their interests. Even though they would have preferred to see the restoration ofthe Kingdom of the Netherlands they had created in 1815,
the British knew that in a general conflict, whoever won whether France or
Russia, would gain the leadership of Europe. The British were satisfied with
the status they had in Europe and feared that a war would weaken their power.
If the coalition were victorious, Russia would be powerful enough to seize
Constantinople and the eastern Mediterranean and thus to threaten English
hegemony in India. By the same token, if France won, she would annex the left bank
of the Rhine and would then be in a position to resume her struggle against
England. Therefore the British diplomats realized from the beginning that the
Belgian incident must be taken seriously and that it could only be brought to
an end by a compromise, and they perceived only two possible solutions to
ensure peace. The first option was the status quo, consisting of the
recognition of Belgian independence, and turning over Limbourg and Luxemburg to
Holland as compensation. This was the easier solution, since everybody would
keep what he had, and it would give some measure of satisfaction to Prussia,
while Belgian independence was in itself a victory, or at least an advantage
for France and England.
The second option was partition, which
would be inevitable if no compromise could be reached, and would be the only
way of avoiding war. This option would have involved giving Brussels and Ghent
to the Dutch, Liege and Luxemburg to the Prussians, and the rest of Wallonia to
France. Everybody would thus get something and there would no longer be any
point in fighting a war as the balance of Europe would be maintained. All
statesmen present in London were in reality only seeking a means of keeping the
balance and power in Europe to preserve the peace. As Belgian barrister, Pierre
Graux, remarked: "the five great powers were to
use their right of recognition only with the utmost rigor. The Belgian
revolution threatened to ruin the edifice so painfully established by the
diplomacy of 1814 and 1815 for the maintenance of European peace". The
Kingdom of the Netherlands, on which so many hopes had been placed, was no
longer in existence, and Belgium brought back some concerns which were thought
resolved. Thus, the five Powers at London in their desire to assign to Belgium
an inoffensive and peaceful place in European politics, in their own interest
and not in order to grant a favor to the new state, established the perpetual
neutrality as a condition of their recognition. Belgian opinion was but
scantily informed of the realities of diplomacy.
The easy victory of September 1830 had
gone to the country's head and there was opposition to the idea of giving up
Maastricht and Luxemburg. Many of the insurgents would have preferred a general
war and they even believed they would be able to take France into it with them.
European powers knew better.Lauterpacht justified the
Belgian case on grounds of "collective intervention,“ but the parties
themselves seemed to have acted as much upon the assumption of a continuing
right to enforce and regulate terms of the Congress of Vienna. Lauterpacht explained that the European powers acted
together in order to preserve the balance of power on the continent. In this
case it is obvious that political interests and balance of power had great
impact on the progress and decision-making behind recognition of Belgium. The
country gained independence and resigned itself to accepting neutrality as a
condition to be achieved by that independence against her will; it was for her
the price of independence, the ransom of her liberty. Hedley Bull argues that
"after the American and French revolutions the prevailing principle of
international legitimacy ceased to be dynastic and became national or popular.
It came to be generally held that questions of this sort should be settled not
by reference to the rights of rulers, but by reference to the rights of the
nation or the people. The dynastic marriage, as the means whereby acquisition
of territory was made internationally respectable, gave place to the plebiscite;
the patrimonial principle to the principle of national self-determination. In
the case of Belgium, this claim applied only to a limited extent. National
self-determination and international legitimacy were factors in the recognition
of Belgium, but only as long as those principles did not stand in the way of
the goals and ambitions ofthe Great Powers. Having
provided a detailed analysis of the Belgian secession from the Kingdom of
Netherlands and the actions taken by the Great Powers, it is questionable
whether this study is about state recognition or if it is a case of
intervention. Even though the Kingdom was created to serve the interests of the
powers, it was still an independent, sovereign and legitimate entity operating
independently of other powers. There was never a contract that was signed in
which the Kingdom acquiesced to the power to handle its internal or foreign
affairs. The Great Powers did more than merely recognize Belgium as an
independent state. They intervened into the affairs of The Netherlands, ensured
cessation of fighting and determined the future of Belgium. The great powers
however followed the activities inside the Kingdom rather closely and commenced
to meddle into its affairs at the first sign of problems. Immediately after the
Belgians declared their independence, the powers intervened by organizing the
London conference to 'diagnose' the situation and provide clear solutions that
would be strictly in their interest. The legitimacy or the right of such
intervention on the part of the great powers was never questioned. The great
powers appointed themselves as the guarantors of the peace in Europe, a title
which seemed to have afforded them unlimited powers making them the final
arbiter of the fate of all other countries. Recognition was extended to Belgium
after the realization that it would be impossible to unite the divided Kingdom.
The deliberation at the conference was not about whether the recognition should
be extended, about its timing, appropriateness nor regarding any type of
statehood criteria which may have been required for Belgium to satisfy prior to
being recognized into the community of nations. Rather, it was strictly about
ensuring the preservation of the balance of power system and about the future
of Belgium as a buffer state serving the interests of the great powers and
maintaining the peace in Europe. Belgium gained recognition based on the
general criteria of statehood which included having its own government,
territory, permanent population and ability to conduct foreign relations.
However this criterion was combined with specific interests of the great
powers, most of which were strategic in nature, which also played a significant
role in Belgium's recognition.
Thus where Belgium was a clear
example of collective intervention, this was also the case with former
Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Kosovo, where the powers intervened and recognized the
nascent republics against the wishes of the mother state. However, even with
the consent of the mother country, the recognition of Belgium was a case of
intervention. The great powers decided that the crisis could not be resolved
and that they needed to decide the fate of Belgium.Therefore
intervention through recognition was a self-imposed right and prerogative of
great powers that were only acting in their self-interest which coincided with
the goal of preserving peace.
Case Study: Conquering the Kingdom
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