Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said Tuesday, "The equations of balance in the Middle East have changed ... These are such concepts as self-confidence and inclination towards Islam that define and determine such a balance." Hezbollah's representative to Tehran, Abdallah Safi al-Deen, said the same day that the new Middle East will be formed by the resistance of Lebanon and the solidarity of Muslims and Arabs.

Iran's goal is to have an increasing say in Middle Eastern affairs, and ultimately to become the main player in the region. Iran seeks to realize this aim by trying to create a new regional bloc, one in which Tehran holds the leadership.

Over the weekend, the Iranian news agency ISNA reported that Mohsen al-Hakim, the envoy to Iran of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Iraq's largest Shiite group -- called for a new security structure in the Middle East, one with the capacity to deal with changes at the regional and international level. Al-Hakim said organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have lost their ability to deal with issues threatening the region.

However, any new Iranian-led group is unlikely to be a security organization, Iran lacks the military capability to lead such a bloc. Moreover, Tehran does not want to trigger a backlash from the United States or Israel by announcing a new security grouping. At this point, the Iranians realistically can only hope to challenge the Arab states that currently are the main regional players.

Following the rise of the Iranian-leaning Shiite forces in Iraq, Tehran sought to enter into a power-sharing arrangement with the Arab states in the region by pursuing an observer status in the League of Arab States (LAS). It also tried to normalize ties with Egypt, which is the mover and shaker in the LAS. On both counts, the Arabs snubbed the Iranians; they realized that allowing Iran entry into the regional bloc would only help it realize its ambitions.

Meanwhile, Iran also sought to claim leadership in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Hamas's rise to power facilitated Iranian ambitions to a degree, but what really made the difference was Tehran's ability to encourage Hezbollah to provoke Israel into a conflict. It is too early to say with certainty, but it appears as though Hezbollah could emerge stronger, at least politically, from the current war with Israel. Hezbollah's enhanced stature within Lebanon (and hence in the region) obviously translates into greater political influence for its patron.

A new regional entity, even if it is only symbolic, will help Iran consolidate its gains in Iraq and Lebanon. Such a grouping would include Iran and Syria at least, and to varying degrees would seek to incorporate Iraq and Lebanon. It would look like a security alliance, but in reality would be an alternative political pole in the region, trying to compete with the LAS and GCC.

This prospect, of course, terrifies the Saudis. Saudi Arabia knows that its geostrategic location on the front lines of the Iranian-Arab divide makes it the Arab state most vulnerable to Iranian ambitions. The Saudis are well aware of Tehran's plans for a new regional order, which would explain the fact that King Abdullah, in what is being portrayed by the Saudis as a major visit to Turkey, is keen on engaging Ankara politically, militarily and economically. Riyadh, well aware of Iranian-Turkish cooperation over Iraq, is trying counter Iranian moves by not only steering Ankara away from any potential alignment with Tehran, but also having it play a major role in containing Iranian expansionism. The outcome of this regional struggle will depend to a great degree upon Iran's ability to exploit the fault lines among the Sunni Arabs in the region, not just in Turkey but in the Levant.

The story behind the story in the Middle East today is the proxy war, as Israel, on behalf of the US, takes on Hezbollah, which fights on behalf of Iran and Syria. But when it appeared that Israel was going to launch one its classic lightning campaigns in Lebanon, Tehran seemed to back away, calling for a cease-fire and indicating that it was prepared to negotiate on issues like uranium enrichment.
What seems to be less understood is that this is the first war between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel, via Iran's proxy Hezbollah, and that its overarching purpose is to advance Iran's ambitions to export the Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East.

Then international criticism shifted to Israel, and Israeli forces seemed bogged down. Iran's rhetoric shifted. Now, the Saudis are back to condemning Hezbollah, and the Iranians appear more confident than ever. From their point of view, they have achieved substantial psychological success based on real military achievements. They have the United States on the defensive in Iraq, and the Israelis are having to fight hard to make any headway in Lebanon.

The Israelis have few options. They can continue to fight until they break Hezbollah -- a process that will be long and costly, but can be achieved. But they then risk Hezbollah shifting to guerrilla war unless their forces immediately withdraw from Lebanon. Alternatively, they can negotiate a cease-fire that inevitably would leave at least part of Hezbollah's forces intact, its prestige and power in Lebanon enhanced and Iran elevated as a power within the region and the Muslim world. Because the Israelis are not going anywhere, they have to choose from a limited menu.

The United States, on the other hand, is facing a situation in Iraq that has broken decisively against it. However hopeful the situation might have been the night al-Zarqawi died, the decision by Iran's allies in Iraq to pursue civil war rather than a coalition government has put the United States into a militarily untenable position. It does not have sufficient forces to prevent a civil war. It can undertake the defense of the Sunnis, but only at the cost of further polarization with the Shia. The United States' military options are severely limited, and therefore, withdrawal becomes even more difficult. The only possibility is a negotiated settlement -- and at this point, Iran doesn't need to negotiate. Unless Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, firmly demands a truce, the sectarian fighting will continue, and at the moment, it is not even clear that al-Sistani could get a truce if he wanted one.

While the United States was focused on the chimera of an Iranian nuclear bomb - a possibility that, assuming everything we have heard is true, remains years away from becoming reality -- Iran has moved to redefine the region. At the very least, civil war in Lebanon (where Christians and Sunnis might resist Hezbollah) could match civil war in Iraq, with the Israelis and Americans trapped in undesirable roles.

The United States also, must make a difficult decision in Iraq now. If it simply withdraws forces, it leaves the Arabian Peninsula open to Iran and loses all psychological advantage it gained with the invasion of Iraq. If American forces stay in Iraq, it will be as a purely symbolic gesture, without any hope for imposing a solution. The United States now has no good choices; its best bet was blown up by Iran. Going to war with Iran is not an option. In Lebanon, we have just seen the value of air campaigns pursued in isolation, and the United States does not have a force capable of occupying and pacifying Iran.

It never happened. The Shia, instead of reciprocating the Sunni and American gestures, went into a deep internal crisis. Shiite groups in Basra battled over oil fields. They fought in Baghdad. We expected that the mainstream militias under the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) would gain control of the dissidents and then turn to political deal-making. Instead, the internal Shiite struggle resolved itself in a way we did not expect: Rather than reciprocating with a meaningful political gesture, the Shia intensified their attacks on the Sunnis. The Sunnis, clearly expecting this phase to end, held back -- and then cut loose with their own retaliations. The result was, rather than a political settlement, civil war. The break point had broken away from a resolution.

Part of the explanation is undoubtedly to be found in Iraq itself. The prospect of a centralized government, even if dominated by the majority Shia, does not seem to have been as attractive to Iraqi Shia as absolute regional control, which would guarantee them all of the revenues from the southern oil fields, rather than just most. That is why SCIRI leader Abdel Aziz al-Hakim has been pushing for the creation of a federal zone in the south, similar to that established for the Kurdistan region in the north. The growing closeness between the United States and some Sunnis undoubtedly left the Shia feeling uneasy. The Sunnis may have made a down payment by delivering up al-Zarqawi, but it was far from clear that they would be in a position to make further payments. The Shia reciprocated partially by offering an amnesty for militants, but they also linked the dissolution of sectarian militias to the future role of Baathists in the government, which they seek to prevent. Clearly, there were factions within the Shiite community that were pulling in different directions.

But there was also another factor that appears to have been more decisive: Iran. It is apparent that Iran not only made a decision not to support a political settlement in Iraq, but a broader decision to support Hezbollah in its war with Israel. In a larger sense, Iran decided to simultaneously confront the United States and its ally Israel on multiple fronts -- and to use that as a means of challenging Sunnis and, particularly, Sunni Arab states.

Most recently then, Iranian Guardian Council Secretary Ayatollah Jannati In Tehran Friday said: Islamic History is Repeating Itself Today "With the Battle Between the Descendents of Ali and the Jews"

This opinion is  echoed by Iranian Ambassadors all over the world , for example here EC- Ambassador to Spain, Mahmoud Salehi on Saturday; Iranian government support for Islamic resistance in Lebanon and Palestine is based on Islamic teachings. The Iranian Ambassador appears to be quoting Ali's last testament, in which he said: Persist in jihad in the cause of Allah, with your money, your souls, and your tongue. It is apparent that Iran not only made a decision not to support a political settlement in Iraq, but a broader decision to support Hezbollah in its war with Israel. In a larger sense, Iran decided to simultaneously confront the United States and its ally Israel on multiple fronts.

But while Hezbollah, fights on behalf of Iran and Syria, one can widen it further and describe the participants as proxies for the West versus militant Islam.
For decades China has been building up influence in the Middle East. It suits China’s strategy well that coverage has been almost non-existent. As Deng Xiaoping once put it, China must “hide brightness and nourish obscurity . . . to bide our time and build up our capabilities”. As China develops into the role of global power, its influence on the region is no longer obscure; it cannot now be ignored.

The original postwar Middle East proxies were the US and the Soviet Union. Washington supporting Israel and the Kremlin sponsoring enemy regimes and their terrorist offshoots. But the Sino-Soviet split, which began in the 1960s, meant a lifting of the constraint on China getting involved, and it soon began to develop ties to countries that were not under Soviet influence, such as Egypt under Sadat.

A brilliant analysis of China’s role by Barry Rubin, in the Middle East Review of International Affairs, describes China’s first steps thus: “As hope for global revolution faded and Beijing switched its partners from tiny opposition groups to governments, China now projected itself as leader of the Third World, struggling against the hegemony of the two superpowers, the USSR and the United States. Lacking the strength and level of development of other great powers, China would try to make itself the head of a massive coalition of the weaker states.” That meant, in the Middle East, Israel’s enemies.
Today countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan — all key states in the region — have strong ties to China, which they are all likely to see as a counterbalance to American power in the Middle East and beyond.

As President Jiang Zemin put it in 1994, US “hegemony” should be opposed, in part by helping countries such as Iran, which were already fighting that battle. But China’s strategy dovetailed geopolitics with economic necessity. Without access to oil markets, China had to fuel economic expansion by turning to more neglected suppliers, such as Iran, Iraq and Sudan. And with a growing consumption of Gulf oil, so China has had to direct its security policy towards ensuring that the US will not be able to interfere with the flow of oil. This means developing ever stronger political and strategic relationships with oil exporters.
Jiang’s state visit in 1999 to Saudi Arabia cemented what he termed a “strategic oil partnership”. In 1996 Saudi exported 60,000 barrels per day to China. By 2000 exports stood 350,000 bpd (17 per cent of Beijing’s oil imports). Iranian oil exports rose even faster, from 20,000 bpd in 1995 to 200,000 bpd in 2000.
The Middle East is now China’s fourth largest trading partner. But its trade is hardly traditional. As Rubin puts it: “Being so late in entering the region — and having less to offer in economic or technology terms than the United States, Russia, Japan, and Europe — China must go after marginal or risky markets . . . supplying customers no one else will service with goods no one else will sell them.” What that means, of course, is arms.

In the war-by-proxy analysis, Iran is rightly said to be the power and arms supplier behind Hezbollah. But the issue of where Iran’s arms come from has been ignored. China has sold Iran tanks, planes, artillery, cruise, anti-tank, surface-to-surface and anti-aircraft missiles as well as ships and mines. It is also Iran’s main supplier of unconventional arms and is thought by almost all monitors to be illicitly involved in supplying key elements in Iran’s chemical and nuclear weapons programme. This is despite China being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

China has sold nuclear reactors to Algeria, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and Chinese nuclear weapons designs were found in Libya. It has also negotiated with Syria on the sale of M11 ballistic missiles. China is one of the few global suppliers of ballistic missiles. and can charge a heavy price. It demanded of the Saudis, for instance, to whom it sold CSS2 missiles, payment in cash, ensuring both the cementing of a key strategic relationship and total deniability of the sale.

Both nations have kept the relationship as secret as possible, but one expert, Robert Mullins, estimates that at least 1,000 Chinese military advisers have been based at Saudi missile installations since the mid-1990s. Such secret deals are handled by Polytechnologies Incorporated, a defence firm controlled by the People’s Liberation Army, which both installs weapons and trains handlers.

But like all the most successful illicit traders, China is ideologically profligate in its relations. Keen to supply weapons to Israel’s enemies in return for oil, it is equally happy to trade with Israel in return for its technology. As Benjamin Netanyahu put it to the Chinese when, as Prime Minister, he championed an Israeli investment in China: “Israeli knowhow is more valuable than Arab oil.” The estimates are that there has been between $1 billion and $3 billion of arms trade between China and Israel. But in this case the flow of arms and weapons technology has been from Israel to China.

1) In the Wall Street Journal , world-renowned Middle East scholar Bernard Lewis writes, August 22 "might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world"

What is the significance of Aug. 22? This year, Aug. 22 corresponds, in the Islamic calendar, to the 27th day of the month of Rajab of the year 1427. This, by tradition, is the night when many Muslims commemorate the night flight of the prophet Muhammad on the winged horse Buraq, first to "the farthest mosque," usually identified with Jerusalem, and then to heaven and back (c.f., Koran XVII.1). This might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and if necessary of the world. It is far from certain that Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events precisely for Aug. 22. But it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.

A passage from the Ayatollah Khomeini, quoted in an 11th-grade Iranian schoolbook, is revealing. "I am decisively announcing to the whole world that if the world-devourers [i.e., the infidel powers] wish to stand against our religion, we will stand against their whole world and will not cease until the annihilation of all them. Either we all become free, or we will go to the greater freedom which is martyrdom. Either we shake one another's hands in joy at the victory of Islam in the world, or all of us will turn to eternal life and martyrdom. In both cases, victory and success are ours." See also:

But it is the theological aspect of this conflict that makes it so explosive and could lead to its expansion. Both  Ahmadinejad in Iran and the Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq are  devout believers in the "Imam" of Shia Islam. Also known as "Imam Mehdi" - hence the name of Sadr's militia, the Mehdi Army - he was the 12th grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. According to certain branches of Shia Islam, the return of the "hidden Imam" must be prepared by his followers, in a particular sequence of events. Chaos and rampant violence in the region are supposed to be among signs leading to the main battle in which the Imam will return to lead Shiites to victory.

Whether Ahmadinejad and Sadr personally believe that it is their duty to prepare the ground for the rise of the Imam, or whether they are merely exploiting religious mythology for their own political purposes, Iran and its agents in Iraq are starting to make the connection between the current conflict and the return of Imam Mehdi.

In eastern Baghdad, where Sadr's militias are based, there has been a sudden appearance of banners and writings on the walls carrying religious messages that refer specifically to Imam Mehdi. A large number can be seen near the Interior Ministry complex, home to police forces loyal to Sadr. And reports are surfacing that Sadr's militia is recruiting fighters to travel to Lebanon.

It is not coincidental that these banners appeared within 24 hours of Hezbollah's kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers. The messages on these banners, with their unstable mixture of religion and policy, are ominous, written in a tone that invokes the rise of the Imam. One reads: "By renouncing sin and by integration for the sake of afterlife, we become the best soldiers to our leader and savior, the Mehdi." Integration is one of those words Sadr often uses in reference to preparations for the afterlife.

Throughout Islamic history, rulers have used divine texts to consolidate their power. They did this either by twisting the meaning of the written texts, or by inventing thousands of alleged sayings of the prophet. In this case, it looks like the way is being paved for the "imminent" arrival of the Imam to be announced through the Mumahidoon (those who pave the way for the Imam), which is how Sadr and his followers describe themselves.

In the last quarter of a century, Iran's dreams of exporting the Islamic revolution were stopped by the once strong pan-Arab nationalism in the region. No more. Once the mullahs consolidated their power in Iran through their recent "electoral coup," in which they prohibited close to a thousand candidates from running in the last parliamentary elections and thus eliminated the reformist movement from the political scene, they were able to look outward. Now they are positioning themselves to fill the ideological vacuum left by the demise of pan-Arabist socialist ideologies with Islamic fundamentalism.

Iran's ambitions present a danger not only to Israel, but also to the free world, whose values are fundamentally opposed to those of radical Islamic fundamentalism. It is therefore critical that the West unite behind a clear strategy to thwart Iran's ambitions.

A first step is to recognize that Iran's calculations, which may seem irrational, factor in its potential to exploit deep religious feelings and mobilize Shiite followers to fight in Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere in preparation for the return of the Savior Imam. It is a wily strategy that must be recognized and addressed by the West, lest Iran's Armageddon Day become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Also last Thursday, the Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, Lebanon’s leading Shi’ite cleric, praised Hizballah for waging a “new battle of Khaibar.”
Reporting Fadlallah’s remarks, AP blandly noted that “at Khaibar, the name of an oasis in what is now Saudi Arabia, Islam’s prophet Muhammad won a battle against Jews in the year 629.” Reality was somewhat different. In fact, Muhammad was not responding to any provocation when he led a Muslim force against the Khaybar oasis, which was inhabited by Jews – many of whom he had previously exiled from Medina. One of the Muslims later remembered: “When the apostle raided a people he waited until the morning. If he heard a call to prayer he held back; if he did not hear it he attacked. We came to Khaybar by night, and the apostle passed the night there; and when morning came he did not hear the call to prayer, so he rode and we rode with him….We met the workers of Khaybar coming out in the morning with their spades and baskets. When they saw the apostle and the army they cried, ‘Muhammad with his force,’ and turned tail and fled. The apostle said, ‘Allah Akbar! Khaybar is destroyed. When we arrive in a people’s square it is a bad morning for those who have been warned.’” [1]

A Jewish leader of Khaybar, Kinana bin al-Rabi, was brought before Muhammad; Kinana was supposed to have been entrusted with the treasure of on of the Jewish tribes of Arabia, the Banu Nadir. Kinana denied knowing where this treasure was, but Muhammad pressed him: “Do you know that if we find you have it I shall kill you?” Kinana said yes, that he did know that.
Some of the treasure was found. To find the rest, Muhammad gave orders concerning Kinana: “Torture him until you extract what he has.” One of the Muslims built a fire on Kinana’s chest, but Kinana would not give up his secret. When he was at the point of death, one of the Muslims beheaded him. [2]

During the caliphate of Umar (634-644), the Jews who remained at Khaybar were banished to Syria, and the rest of their land seized. [3]

Thus when modern-day jihadists invoke Khaybar, they are doing much more than just recalling the glory days of Islam and its prophet. They are recalling an aggressive, surprise raid by Muhammad which resulted in the final eradication of the once considerable Jewish presence in Arabia. To the jihadists, Khaybar means the destruction of the Jews and the seizure of their property by the Muslims.

That Khaybar is repeatedly invoked today as a historical model for Hizballah should be a matter of grave concern for Western analysts and policymakers. It should play a significant role in discussions of whether and how a ceasefire should be pursued, and how much of a Hizballah presence can be tolerated indefinitely in Lebanon. But because most Western analysts are still dogmatically committed to the proposition that Islam has nothing, or nothing important, to do with the present global unrest, they recuse themselves from considering such data.

 [1] Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Ibn Ishaq’s Sirat Rasul Allah, A. Guillaume, translator, Oxford University Press, 1955. P. 511.

 [2] Ibn Ishaq, p. 515.

 [3] Ibn Sa‘d, Kitab Al-Tabaqat Al-Kabir, S. Moinul Haq and H K. Ghazanfar, translators, Kitab Bhavan, n.d., vol. II, p. 142.