By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
Two theories
highlight the limitations of existing research on the causes of suicide terrorism
to provide plausible explanations for the genesis of the predominant
contemporary manifestation of this phenomenon. The occupation theory, which
holds that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation, fails
to explain a growing number of SA campaigns in which foreign occupation plays
either a less prominent, or no role at all. (See Robert Pape, "The
Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science Review
97, no. 3, August 2003) The other, is the “market share” theory, which
holds that suicide terrorism may be employed when groups are competing with
other groups for the support of a domestic population, appears of decreasing
relevance in an age where the domestic population of a given country is
frequently the prime target of suicide bombers living in its midst. (See Mia M.
Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror, Columbia University
Press, 2005, 85.)
We in instead have
explained that the global rise of SAs and its unprecedented lethality is
connected in large part to the mutually related rise of Al Qaeda and its
guiding ideology, Salafi-Jihadism. With regard to Al Qaeda, the group’s
statements and actions to date have left no doubt that suicide operations are
its preferred terrorist tactic. In this dissertation, I demonstrate this
primacy of suicide attacks within Al Qaeda’s doctrine using statements by
senior Al Qaeda leaders as evidence. I also offer three explanations for why Al
Qaeda has made a decision to globalize its terrorist activities: First, Al
Qaeda’s original doctrine which, from the outset, called for the establishment
of the Islamic equivalent of an international rapid reaction force that would
fight to protect Muslims whenever and wherever they are in need; second, the
physical spread of the ‘Afghan Arabs’ after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan in the late 1980s, which has globalized Al Qaeda’s membership; and
third, the strategic decision taken by Al Qaeda’s core leadership to effect a
strategic shift from targeting so-called apostate Arab regimes in the Middle
East, the ‘near enemy,’ to targeting the ‘far enemy,’ i.e. the Western infidel
regimes, led by the United States.As far as
Salafi-Jihadism is concerned, several factors point at a close relationship
between this ideology and the globalization of SAs. First, as will be seen, of
those groups that have employed SAs since 1981, Salafi-Jihadist groups have
become the dominant category after 2003, suggesting a strong link between this
ideology and this tactic. Second, Salafi-Jihadist ideology claims to represent
a global, virtual, community of Muslims, the umma, while rejecting territorial
borders between nation states. This universalistic view of the world enables
groups adhering to this ideology to attract recruits from geographically
distant places, highlighting the transnational character of Salafi-Jihadist
SAs. Third, Salafi-Jihadist groups perceive their confrontation with infidels
and apostates as a struggle between good and evil. Because the maximization of
deaths on the enemy side is crucial in this epic battle, SAs, which are known
both for their high lethality and their cost-effectiveness, are the favored
tactic by Salafi-Jihadist groups in the absence of even more lethal weapons. In
this war of cosmic proportions, in which the enemy is defined in the broadest
terms, the ideology also provides the justification for transnational attacks
outside of conventional combat zones. Finally, Salafi-Jihadism also accounts
for the element of self-sacrifice that is part and parcel of any SA.
Salafi-Jihadists argue that Islam is under attack, and waging jihad in the
defense of Islam, including sacrificing one’s life in the course of this
struggle, is an individual duty (fard ayn) for each and every Muslim.
We next, not only
identified the rise of Al Qaeda and Salafi-Jihadist ideology as the main reason
for the globalization of SAs, but also conducted a ‘root cause analysis’ into
the reasons that enabled the rise of Al Qaeda and Salafi-Jihadism in the first
place. Here we identifies five major factors: the crisis of Islam;
globalization; Western dominance in the Arab and Muslim world; the physical
diffusion of Salafi-Jihadist actors and institutions; and the element of
opportunity that was provided by the Afghan-Soviet war. The discussion of the
link between Al Qaeda, Salafi-Jihadism, and SAs, and the subsequent discussion
of the factors that enabled the rise of Al Qaeda and Salafi-Jihadism in the
first place, where then placed into a larger theoretical context. To that end,
we distinguished between two general patterns of SAs, namely a localized and a
globalized pattern, with the globalized pattern dominating the picture in
recent years in terms of the number of attacks and their lethality.
Existing explanations
into suicide terrorism where thus plausible only for those SAs that I would
describe as falling into the category of the traditional, localized pattern of
SAs. This pattern of SAs tends to have five characteristics: It traditionally
occurs in the context of a localized conflict; it is planned and executed by
both religious and ethno nationalist groups; the
organizing entity is a sub-national terrorist or insurgent actor; it mostly
targets people in or near the conflict region; and the groups employing
localized SAs tend to have well-defined and limited goals. The more recent
pattern of globalized SAs, on the other hand, which remained largely
unexplained in existing research (per September 2007), tends to bear several
rather different characteristics: It occurs in the context of either localized
or globalized conflicts; it is planned and executed by Salafi-Jihadist groups;
the organizing entity as we have seen tends to be a transnational cell or
group; attacks may be executed beyond a particular conflict region; and the
groups employing globalized SAs tend to have elusive and unlimited goals. This
new, globalized pattern of suicide operations as we have shown, further
distinguishes itself from its more traditional counterpart in the motivations
of the suicide attackers. The vast majority of traditional suicide attackers,
acting on behalf of such groups as Hizballah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE), the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), or one of the various
Palestinian organizations, have spent their adulthood in an atmosphere of conflict.
As a result, many traditional suicide attackers have been directly subjected to
the difficult consequences of war and occupation. A substantial number of them
may have lost friends or relatives in their respective struggles against
Israelis, Sinhalese, or Turks. Many of today’s Salafi-Jihadist suicide bombers,
on the other hand, appear not to have experienced violent conflict themselves,
but seem to be affected by the conflicts of their coreligionists indirectly and
viscerally.
As we have then, seen
in the Jordan case before, the ruling Hashemite regime is nominally Muslim, and
even boasts a direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. Nevertheless, many
religious Jordanians consider the regime to be an apostate government and a
puppet of the West. Based on interviews, it also appears that the deep
alienation that many ordinary Jordanians sense, and that may help explain in
part the successful pull of radical Islamism in general, and Salafi-Jihadism in
particular, is linked to what is perceived as a system that perpetuates social
injustice and an uneven distribution of wealth. Most Jordanian observers stress
the lack of democracy as a key problem, in addition to an inability to cope
with modernization. One could argue that many other regimes in the Middle East
and elsewhere suffer from similar problems, yet have not suffered from suicide
attacks. Apparently chance and opportunity factors, Jordan’s proximity to Iraq,
and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s personal grudge against the Hashemite Kingdom, thus
may have just as much, to do with why Jordan has been targeted as have
socio-economic reasons.
In Iraq in turn,
Salafi-Jihadist networks have been present since the 1990s, but it is not until
the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the insurgency that followed that Salafi-Jihadism
has taken a stronghold in that country. It is undeniable that suicide attacks
in Iraq are linked to the presence of coalition troops in Iraq.
Salafi-Jihadists claim that the coalition presence in Iraq constitutes a
deliberate attack on Islam, and hence must be responded with a jihad in defense
of the umma.Yet again, occupation alone is not a
satisfying answer to the genesis of suicide attacks. The background of the vast
majority of suicide bombers, which is non-Iraqi, requests a more nuanced explanation,
one that includes the attraction of many young Muslims to Salafi-Jihadism, an
ideology that, much like fascism and Marxism, can help provide the
justification for the use of violence, is global in nature and aspirations, and
is inclusive enough to accept within it a range of individuals who are looking
for the proper system of ideas to help frame their thoughts and translate these
into action.
Thus we have argued
that recently there emerged a new pattern of globalized suicide attacks, where
groups are heavily influenced by Al Qaeda and its guiding Salafi-Jihadist
ideology. In this context we have seen how suicide attacks have diffused in two
major respects: they occur in a growing number of countries in nearly every
corner of the globe, and they are carried out by an increasing number of
groups. Whereby the link between Al Qaeda and Salafi-Jihadism on the one hand,
and the global spread of suicide attacks on the other, has a larger implication
for suicide attacks.
Conclusion and Implications.
Given that the new
pattern of globalized suicide attacks are overwhelmingly planned and executed
by Salafi-Jihadist groups, the United States and its allies are facing, first
and foremost an ideological enemy. Challenging that ideology must be a key
component of an overall counterterrorism strategy.This
follows to challenge Salafi-Jihadist ideology, and the United States for
example, could hence see to it that the internal inconsistencies and negative
effects of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism are highlighted and exposed.
Given the rather low
levels of esteem that the United States (as we have elsewhere shown) seems to
enjoy at present, it may not want to be identified as the source of these
verbal challenges. It could hence use moderate Muslim proxies to spread these ideas
or, alternatively, use the anonymity of the Internet to spread challenges to
Salafi-Jihadist ideology without identifying itself as the originator. Among
the hypocrisies and inconsistencies that should be exposed are the following:-
More Muslims than non-Muslims have died and been maimed by Salafi-Jihadist
terror.- Salafi-Jihadists openly justify the killing of Muslims under a logic
of “the ends justifying the means.” As Zarqawi, for example, has noted:
“Admittedly, the killing of a number of Muslims whom it is forbidden to kill is
undoubtedly a grave evil; however, it is permissible to commit this evil –
indeed, it is even required – in order to ward off a greater evil, namely, the
evil of suspending jihad.” (Quoted in "Jihad and Terrorism Studies,"
MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 917, 7 June 2005). -Suicide is forbidden in
Islam.- Wrongly accusing another Muslim of being an infidel is a major sin in
Islam.- Leaders of the groups employing suicide attacks rarely, if ever,
perpetrate suicide attacks themselves. - Salafi-Jihadist leaders issuing
religious decrees (fatwas) oftentimes have no religious authority to do so. -
Salafi-Jihadists accuse the West of hedonism (“We love death, while the West
loves life”), but offer hedonistic pleasures to potential martyrs. - Life under
Salafi-Jihadists would resemble Afghanistan under the Taliban.-
Salafi-Jihadists offer no concrete political program other than fighting
‘infidels.’
B) As we have seen,
the global geographic scope of the groups and individuals that perpetrate
suicide attacks implies that threats of suicide attackers to a state may not
emanate predominantly from individuals who are living within the territorial
boundaries of that state. On the contrary, states like the United States may be
more threatened by conspirators who are attempting to infiltrate the United
States in order to execute an attack. In addition, given that suicide attacks
may be planned by groups outside of the target country, states ignore terrorist
groups outside of their territorial borders at great peril. This is especially
important as a growing number of terrorist groups, as we have shown, have
adopted a ‘global’ perspective of their enemy and are hence likely to be active
beyond the traditional geographic confines of a particular state or region. The
following policy recommendations are offered: - Establish and maintain close
international coordination in intelligence-sharing in order to track the
movements of terrorists who are increasingly mobile and ‘globalized.’- Establish
and maintain close international coordination in intelligence-sharing in order
to track the shifting motivations, compositions, strategies, and goals of
terrorist groups that are increasingly ‘globalized.’- The mobility of the
globalized suicide bombers and other terrorists suggests that governments
should step up those efforts designed to disable the free movement of suspected
terrorists. Governments must ensure, for example, that travel documents are
difficult to forge, and that individuals involved in the forging of travel
documents are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.
C) Given that the
goals of the groups carrying out globalized suicide attacks are elusive,
countries that have traditionally been targets of terrorism, but increasingly
also those that have not, must watch out for subtle threats by Salafi-Jihadist
groups. An understanding of the ideological and theological underpinnings of
Salafi-Jihadism becomes increasingly crucial for the growing list of countries
that are probable targets of attacks. Countries affected by terrorism should
hence invest not only in understanding the motivations of terrorists, but also
in understanding the theological and ideological underpinnings of today’s
terrorist groups. Tapping into a pool of non-governmental specialists at public
policy think tanks and academic institutions will help broaden the range of
expertise required for a fuller understanding of the threat.
D) The findings that
suicide bombers are not mentally ill, that there is no general profile of
suicide bombers, and that there are no easy explanations as to the motives of
suicide attackers has important implications. First, screening of possible
suspects for suicide attacks is more challenging as a result. There are more
instances of suicide attackers today who are older, female, married, and
employed, and thus do not fit the traditional profile of suicide attackers
anymore. The rising number of converts, including Western European individuals,
adds to the complexity involved in profiling based on appearance, a problematic
endeavour in any case, given the issues such
profiling raises with regard to civil liberties. True, the majority of suicide
attackers are young and male, but it is probable that terrorist groups will
increasingly rely on non-traditional profiles of attackers to carry out the
most spectacular attacks, because women, for example,create
less suspicion among security officials. A practical recommendation that would
follow is that security and border personnel should receive enhanced training
in behavioural profiling. Another implication of
these findings is that if the profile of the suicide bomber is expanding and
the motivations multiple and complex, the search for the root causes of
terrorism is becoming increasingly complex too. Thus, had all suicide bombers
grown up in poverty, we could infer that poverty is linked to terrorism, and
look for relatively straightforward remedies, alleviating poverty. Given that
an increasing percentage of terrorists have not suffered from poverty and
education, however, the search for ‘root causes’ must be extended to other
areas. This implies that the best attempts to understand suicide attackers, and
terrorists in general, are multi-disciplinary in nature.
E) The finding that
suicide attackers are not necessarily religious, but rather undergo a
born-again conversion, has implications with regard to early indicators of
radicalization. Several examples suggest that individuals undergo a profound personal
transformation that is visible to their friends and families. See Case Study London 7/7.
In fact several
suicide bombers who have adopted Salafi-Jihadist ideology have changed their
outward appearance as well as their behaviour.
Muhammad Atta and Mohammed Siddique Khan, for example, have become increasingly
intolerant of dissenting views. Individuals who adopt Salafi-Jihadism tend to
become more introspective, end existing relationships with some of their
friends and at times family members, and lead a more rigid lifestyle.
Certainly, few individuals adopting Salafism become terrorists. Nevertheless,
if such a transformative lifestyle is accompanied by an expressed sympathy for
Al Qaeda, such behavior should ring alarm bells.
F) The finding that
social bonds crystallize as a crucial form of radicalization implies that close
friends and family members of suicide bombers may be involved in, or
knowledgeable about, a particular terrorist plot. As a result, friends and
family members of both actual and apprehended suicide bombers should be closely
examined as part of the larger investigation into terrorist plots.
G) As has been
argued, ideology serves as an enabler of suicide attacks, but not necessarily
as a cause of suicide attacks per se. The implication is that rather than
providing a counter-ideology as a remedy—for instance, to argue that democracy
or freedom offers a better alternative than radical Islam—counterterrorism
efforts should aim at undermining and exposing the inconsistencies and
hypocrisies offered by Salafi-Jihadists to draw impressionable individuals to
its side. Practical recommendations to challenge Salafi-Jihadist ideology have
been outlined in point A) above.
H) The fact that
groups discussed here have been shown to possess varying degrees of ties to Al
Qaeda means that Western counter-terrorism officials must jettison traditional,
static frameworks of understanding the contemporary threat of terrorism in
general, and Al Qaeda in particular. The threat of Al Qaeda and global jihad is
unlike any other threat that has preceded it. Unlike previous threats, this
entity is extremely dynamic, constantly shifting in composition and structure.
In fact, the threat consists of a number of different, overlapping structures
at once, including a core group, affiliated groups, and cells that form part of
a larger network that are influenced by Al Qaeda’s strategic message. Clearly,
traditional, hierarchically structured groups continue to exist, but the most
challenging threat today emanates from non-traditional terrorist entities.
I) The change in the
nature of recruitment from top-down to bottom up may suggest that some
counter-terrorism efforts against Al Qaeda and global jihad have been
successful, and that as a result, Al Qaeda is unable to actively recruit
individuals for suicide and other attacks, requiring individuals to seek ways
to join jihad on their own. While this may be true, it is more likely that the
actual, and more frightening, reason for the prevalence of today’s bottom-up
recruitment, is that more individuals are motivated today than during the
1980s, and that the magnitude of the desire to become a suicide bomber far
exceeds that of the traditional suicide attackers. Another implication with
regard to counter-terrorism is that more resources must be diverted to
countering terrorism on the Internet, the platform through which most
individuals become acquainted with the Salafi-Jihadist message, recruitment
videos, and other means of incitement. In addition, there is an urgent need to
study the in-group dynamics of small groups, cells, and cliques.
The actual defense
against suicide attacks, a subset of terrorism, is part of a broader strategy
to counter terrorism in general. The purpose of such a counter-terrorism
strategy is to save lives and property, while ensuring that national security
interests are upheld.A comprehensive strategy to
counter suicide attacks, and terrorism in general however, is composed of a
number of different elements. None of these elements in itself is sufficient;
some of these are critical (e.g., preventive and pre-emptive measures); others
are desirable, but their overall effect unclear (e.g., disruptive measures);
while still others must be carefully evaluated and executed, as their
employment may turn out to be counterproductive (e.g., offensive measures). The
components of an overall strategy to counter terrorism include the following
measures:
1) Analytical
measures (addressing the root causes)
2) Preventive and
preemptive measures (intelligence)
3) Bureaucratic measures
(institutional coordination within a state)
4) Diplomatic
measures (international cooperation between states)
5) Offensive measures
(military options, covert action)
6) Defensive measures
(hardening of physical infrastructure, public information)
7) Disruptive
measures (disrupting terrorist financing; exploiting organizational quarrels;
misinformation campaigns)
8)
Counter-ideological measures (war of ideas)
9) Investigative
measures (law enforcement, justice)
10) Consequence
management (training of security, evacuation, and medical personnel)
Finally, suicide
attacks, just like terrorism at large, is a tactic, and hence cannot be
‘defeated.’ Like the genesis of war, there are countless reasons why terrorism
exists, and like war, it is unlikely that terrorism and suicide attacks will
ever cease to exist. Governments, therefore, must be committed to a long-term
effort to manage this problem. Where we have shown, that suicide terrorism is
highly context-dependent. The strategy to counter suicide attacks must
therefore be carefully evaluated on a case-by-case basis. While the goals of
the strategy to counter terrorism should be clearly formulated, the strategy
must be sufficiently adaptable to different, and constantly changing,
circumstances.
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