By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

By mid-2003, the center of gravity of global jihadist indoctrination shifted to Saudi Arabia, which became a new epicenter of Salafi-Jihadism. The radicalization of a group of younger Saudi Islamists, which challenged the older generations of Saudi Wahhabism, gave way to increasingly vocal condemnations of the United States, Western culture, and even the Saudi ruling family.107 The most striking figure in this process was Sheikh Yousef al-Ayeri, a Saudi scholar and commander of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia killed in June 2003. Al-Ayeri, who is among the leading architects of the notion of global jihad in Iraq, wrote an estimated 40 books and many more articles in the three years before his death. In his writings, all of which were unsigned and published on the Internet, al-Ayeri described the future strategy of global jihad, which in large part hinged on the jihadists’ success in Iraq. In one of his books, The Crusader War Against Iraq, for instance, al-Ayeri wrote that the Iraq war is not important because “a brother Arab country is attacked by the United States,” but because Iraq is the first link in a chain of attacks that are bound to follow. Therefore, he continued, “if the Mujahidin do not resist in Iraq, they are going to fail in the future aggressions.” Ayeri also stressed the importance of jihadist volunteers from outside of Iraq, who are a powerful source that will guarantee the success of the jihadist resistance. As the reality of the war in Iraq suggests, Ayeri’s recommendation has been implemented. Ayeri warned that the main threat to Muslims today was the spread of secular democracy, and cited this as the main reason why Muslims needed to resist the Americans in Iraq.(Amir Taheri, "The World Watches as Iraq Becomes a Litmus Test of Democratic Success," Times, London, 16 August 2005.) After 2005, and especially in the aftermath of the July 7 London bombings, some cracks appeared in the ideology of global jihad. Several ideologues of the older generation increasingly criticized younger generations of Salafi-Jihadists of abandoning the true jihad as envisioned by Abdullah Azzam for indiscriminate violence. Abu Basir al-Tartusi, for example, a Syrian Jihadi scholar residing in London and one of the key Salafi-Jihadist thinkers, published a fatwa on his website in which he protested the London bombings as a “disgraceful and shameful act, with no manhood, bravery, or morality.” Another highly publicized internal dispute was one involving Maqdisi and his former protégé, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. In 2005, Maqdisi criticized Zarqawi, saying that the latter’s “indiscriminate attacks might distort the true Jihad.” (Reuven Paz, "Islamic Legitimacy for the London Bombings," PRISM Occasional Papers 3, no. 4, July 2 005, 1-2.)

An important strategist of global jihad after 9/11, and the most important link between Al Qaeda and the global jihad movement it inspired and helped create is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al-Suri. Born in Aleppo in 1958, al-Suri’s political socialization occurred while he was a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Following President Hafiz Assad’s violent suppression of the Brotherhood in the town of Hama in 1982, al-Suri went first to Spain, and in 1987 to Afghanistan, where he met Abdullah Azzam and participated in the war against the Red Army. In 1992, al-Suri joined Al Qaeda, and he would spend much of the second half of the 1990s in London, running an institution called Conflicts of the Islamic World. While in the United Kingdom, he also served as the editor of an Arabic language newsletter, Al-Ansar. Throughout these years, he maintained ties to bin Laden and other senior figures in Al Qaeda. During al-Suri’s stay in London, he also helped found the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In 1998, he moved back to Afghanistan and pledged allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Although he rejoined Al Qaeda, however, he considered himself an independent operator. The U.S. State Department believed that while in Afghanistan, al-Suri was running two training camps, in Kabul and Jalalabad, where he allegedly trained the mujahideen in toxic materials and chemical substances. He made his views on unconventional weapon clear after the September 11 attacks, which he praised, adding that it would have been far more useful had the planes been loaded with weapons of mass destruction. He would later be linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and to the train attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004, although he denied charges of personal involvement. (Craig Whitlock, "Architect of NewWar on the West," Washington Post, 23 May 2006, A1.)

After the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al-Suri went into hiding and did not surface until 2004, when he posted a massive, 1600-page book on the Internet titled The Call of the International Islamic Resistance, a treatise that outlines future strategies for the global jihad movement, placing terrorist attacks and decentralized urban warfare at the forefront of methods that will guarantee success to the global jihad movement.(Stephen Ulph, “Setmariam Nasar: Background on Al-Qaeda’s Arrested Strategist,” Terrorism Focus 3, no. 12, 28 March 2006). Al-Suri, who was captured in Quetta in October 2005, saw his role as that of educating the “third generation” of Muslim fighters, i.e., more dispersed mujahideen that did not receive systematic training in Afghan camps. Among his recommendations to the new generation of mujahideen was his call on Muslims to wage a decentralized global jihad against the United States and other infidel countries. Links to the organization’s leadership cadre should be kept at a minimum in order to evade enemy security advances. In August 2005, after the London bombings, he encouraged sleeper cells around the globe to launch a general front as part of a “global conflict” against the entire West and its allies. In this decentralized war, al-Suri believed that propaganda and jihadist indoctrination was of key importance. He recalled the failure of the jihadist experience in Syria, blaming the defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood on a lack of strategy and planning, a lack of ideological grounding, a dearth of jihadist theory and weaknesses in the foundations of propaganda. Al-Suri, whose writings are prominently featured on websites close to Al Qaeda such as the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), has become one of, and possibly the prime theoretician of Al Qaeda after 9/11 who acts in systematic and organized manner, and exhibits the patience of the first generation of Al Qaeda that is often lacking in younger jihadists such as Zarqawi. According to Paz, his 1600-page treatise is a “masterpiece of strategic thought.” (Reuven Paz, “Al-Qaeda’s Search for New Fronts: Instructions for Jihadi Activity in Egypt and Sinai,”PRISM Occasional Papers 3, no. 7, October 2005, 7.)

 

Al Qaeda’s Adaptive Strategy

In early 2006, Al Qaeda’s top operational priorities, according to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, were attacks on the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests overseas, as well as on U.S. allies, in that order. (Statement by the Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 February 2006.) The strategy to achieve these aims, however, was subject to a number of adaptations. For one, the preferred targets after 9/11, and especially after March 2003, tended to be ‘softer’ civilian targets that were not necessarily symbols of Western, especially American, economic and military powers as most targets up until that time had been. After 9/11, and especially after 2003, attacks against purely civilian targets such as dance clubs, restaurants, shopping malls, wedding ceremonies, and even funerals increased relative to attacks against more symbolic installations such as embassies, military bases, or financial centers. SAs planned and executed by jihadist groups in places like Bali, Riyadh, Morocco, and Iraq left no doubt that civilians now became fair game.

A second element of the new strategy was the deliberate attempt by Al Qaeda and the global jihad movement to erode popular support for the United States by targeting mostly Western countries in what, per Al Qaeda’s calculation, would result in a chasm between the United States and its traditional allies. Several books published in 2003 and early 2004 appealed to jihadist cells to adopt just such a strategy. One of these books was titled Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Risks, and was published on an Islamist website by The Information Institute in Support of the Iraqi People, The Center of Services for the Mujahideen. On 8 pages of the book, the author made a case that Spanish troops present in Iraq should be attacked because Spain was the “weakest link” of support for the United States. Attacking Spanish forces, the author/s argued, would be a useful starting point in a domino effect by which Al Qaeda would gradually erode Western support of the United States by undermining relationships between Western countries and the United States, thus isolating Washington. On December 8, 2003, the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) published a more explicit threat, hinting at the possibility of attacks against Spain outside of Iraq. Indeed, on March 11, 2004, three days before Spanish elections, Madrid was shaken by bombings on four commuter trains that killed 191 people. (Richard Bernstein, "Tape, Probably Bin Laden's, Offers 'Truce' to Europe," New York Times, 16 April 2004, 3.) The strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies was part of what appeared to be a growing political sophistication among the leadership of Al Qaeda. The SAs in Istanbul, which coincided with a Bush-Blair summit in London, and the Madrid attack’s timing, which coincided with the Spanish elections, led some analysts to believe that Al Qaeda, by exploiting the political calendar in the West for its own purposes, became a more pragmatic actor. Al Qaeda’s growing political activity was also apparent in April 2004, when bin Laden offered a ‘truce’ to European countries, albeit not to the United States, an offer widely regarded as an attempt to cause disagreements between the United States and its allies in the West. (Richard Bernstein, "Tape, Probably Bin Laden's, Offers 'Truce' to Europe," New York Times, 16 April 2004, 3.)

Norwegian terrorism analysts Lia and Hegghammer showed that Al Qaeda’s growing political sophistication was reflected in the publication of a new genre of “jihadi strategic studies,” writings that draw on Western secular-rationalist sources, identify and analyze weaknesses of both parties, consider political, economic, and cultural factors in the conflict, and recommend realistic strategies. The writers of these tracts, which included such strategists as Yusuf al-Ayeri and Abu Musab al-Suri, oftentimes refrain from long religious justifications of the need to fight the West based on the Quran and the Sunna, and instead focus on practical strategies and tactics of how to wage that struggle. Lia and Hegghammer added that these strategic thinkers adopted an academic approach, constructing arguments in a rational and organized fashion, while extensively drawing fromWestern media and academic sources. (Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged Al Qaida Policy StudyPreceding the Madrid Bombings," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 5, September-October 2004).

The third adaptation of its strategy, and one that mushroomed after 9/11, was the jihad movement’s growing presence on and exploitation of the Internet, a phenomenon Peter Bergen called “Al Qaeda 2.0.” (Quoted in Anonymous, Imperial Hubris, 78.) For Al Qaeda, this medium was the perfect tool for what has been traditionally its most important priority, namely to spread the spirit of jihad in as many countries and to as many people as possible. On April 28, 2003, a forum of 225 Islamist clerics, scholars, and businessmen opened a web site at the URL www.maac.ws in both Arabic and English. The Secretary General of this virtual body was Dr. Safar al-Hawali, a man regarded as a key mentor of Osama bin Laden. (Reuven Paz, "The 'Global Campaign against Aggression': The Supreme Council of Global Jihad," PRISM Occasional Papers 1, no. 6, May 2003).October 2005 saw the inaugural broadcast of Sawt al-Khilafa (Voice of the Caliphate), a television program announced as the new weekly Al Qaeda news broadcast to appear on the Internet. A masked newsreader presented the week’s news from a Salafi-Jihadist standpoint, sitting next to a machine gun and a copy of the Quran. (Stephen Ulph, "Al-Qaeda Tv, Via the Web," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 18, 4 October 2005; and Yassin Musharbash, "Al-Qaida Startet Terror-Tv," Spiegel Online, 7 October 2005.) In September 2006, a group of Salafi-Jihadists launched a new website called Electronic Jihad (www.al-jinan.org). The purpose: to help organize electronic jihad against websites that insult Islam. Their move was sparked by comments uttered by Pope Benedict which the jihadist website developers had found offensive. (Abdul Hameed Bakier, "New Website Incites Electronic Jihad," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 38, 3 October 2006).

The above are just three examples of the role the Internet plays in the indoctrination and incitement of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism today. Writing in mid-2005, Scott Atran suggests that since 2000, the number of active jihadist websites rose from 14 to over 4000. (Atran, "The 'Virtual Hand' of Jihad," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 10.) The Internet provides a whole range of instructions for how jihadists and potential jihadists can wreak havoc on ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’ thanks to openly available online manuals and encyclopedias that provide information on a whole range of activities needed to stage successful attacks. In the Al Qaeda online periodical Muaskar al-Battar (‘The Al-Battar Training Camp’), for example, two senior Al Qaeda operatives describe how to pre-examine targets for attacks, remain vigilant during the planning phases, organize small, compartmentalized cells, mislead the enemy, and conduct surprise attacks. (Stephen Ulph, "Al-Qaeda's Online Publications," Terrorism Focus 1, no. 5, 1 October 2004). Technical aspects of training found on websites cover the range of instructions on artillery and range-finding, the production of poison and chemical and biological weapons, suicide explosive belts, anti-armor shells, and even rockets. In mid-2005, for example, Islamist websites featured a 26-minute long video containing detailed guides on how potential suicide bombers can produce suicide belts that are difficult to detect. (Hala Jaber, "Middle-Class Bombers Find Diy 'Martyr Belt' Online," Times Online, 17 July 2005.)

The Internet is also used for the recruitment of jihadis, including suicide bombers. Gabriel Weimann observed, for instance, that “Iraqi insurgents and their sympathizers are monitoring users of their sites, then contacting those who seem the most sympathetic to killing American soldiers, Iraqi military and others.” (Jonathan Curiel, “Terror.Com,” San Francisco Chronicle, 10 July 2005, A1.) In other cases, small cells have formed among strangers who met on the Internet, or where personal connections made in real life have been nurtured in cyberspace. (Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “Terrorists Turn to the Web as Base of Operations,” Washington Post, 7 August 2005, A1.) The Internet has also become a popular fundraising tool for terrorist organizations. Given its global use, the Internet provides a sheer unlimited pool of potential recruits and financiers. Organizations openly raise funds on their websites, sometimes even using the popular online payment service Paypal. (Eben Kaplan, "Terrorists and the Internet," Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, 12 May 2006.)  Next we will proceed by conduct an in-depth examination of the environmental context of Salafi-Jihadism in Jordan and Iraq, before we proceed to intermediate conclusions and policy recommendations.The November 2005 bombings in Amman were hardly the first time that Salafi-Jihadists had planned to attack the Hashemite Kingdom with self-described ‘martyrs.’ In 2004, Fahd Nouman Suweilem al-Faqihi, a Saudi national, attempted to blow himself up on the Saudi-Jordanian border.1 In July 2005, a cell of five Iraqis, a Libyan, and a Saudi were involved in a plot to conduct SAs against Jordan’s Queen Aliya International Airport, as well as hotels in the Dead Sea and the Red Sea resort of Aqaba. Four of them were arrested in February 2006. According to the charge sheet, some of the suspects rented apartments in Zarqa and Jabal Hussein, and they said they chose the hotels because they were frequented by Americans and Israelis. They said they acted on behalf of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Authorities had also seized roughly 7 pounds of PE-4A heavy explosives, which one of the suspects had concealed in a children’s game in a rented Amman apartment.2

Mainstream Salafism has existed in Jordan at least since the 1960s, when young students who studied in neighboring Arab countries introduced the stream to the Hashemite Kingdom.Their chief exponent in the 1970s was a Syrian scholar named Nasr al-Din al-Albani, who moved to Jordan in 1979 and helped create an informal network that continued to exist.3 Albani’s branch of Salafism, sometimes referred to as traditionalist Salafism, rejected violence and political activism alike. Many jihadists from Jordan, like those from other Arab countries, were radicalized during the 1980s, when a few hundred of them joined the mujahideen in Afghanistan in their war to oust the Soviet Army from their lands. One of the key figures who helped organize the arrival of foreign Arab fighters, the so-called Afghan Arabs, was Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden’s mentor and the founder of Makhtab al-Khidamat, the precursor of Al Qaeda. Azzam himself was a Jordanian of Palestinian origin. The Jordanians who went to Afghanistan to participate in the jihad against the ‘godless Soviets’ were poorly educated. Eager to rid itself from problematic elements within its territory, the Jordanian regime encouraged the Jordanian contingent of the Afghan Arabs to leave for Afghanistan. One of them was a young man by the name of Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaileh, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. When these Jihadists returned to Jordan from Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the GID kept a close watch over them, knowing that they had received ideological indoctrination that could eventually help turn the returnees against their home state.4 The return of the Jordanian ‘Afghans’ came shortly after the influx of some 250,000 Palestinians who had arrived from Kuwait, which had expelled them for their support of Saddam Hussein during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Of the quarter million immigrants from Kuwait, an estimated two thirds settled in Zarqa,a poor town east of Amman that in subsequent years became a breeding ground for Salafists, including many individuals that would later affiliate themselves with Zarqawi.5 Others settled in the city of Salt (and fewer in Irbid). Originally a place ravaged by problems of alcoholism and drug abuse, after the 1990s Salt witnessed a religious resurgence and subsequently produced many Jordanian suicide bombers and insurgents in Iraq.6 It was in this city where in March 2005, the family of a suicide bomber reportedly celebrated the ‘martyrdom’ of their son in Iraq in a SA in Hilla, in which 125 Shii civilians died, thus temporarily causing a rift in Jordanian-Iraqi relations.

When the Kuwaiti immigrants first arrived, however, their relative prosperity exacerbated existing social cleavages between the rich and poor in Jordan. The returning ‘Afghans’ weredisillusioned at the sight of these Palestinians, and wondered whether this is why they had been fighting a holy war.7. They also faced a generally high rate of unemployment in Jordan, and were disappointed by the result of the 1991 Gulf War and the normalization of ties between Jordan and Israel. Many faced problems integrating into Jordanian society, went to Europe and became part of the European Muslim diaspora. Others went underground to organize themselves for the struggle against the ‘apostate’ Hashemite regime.The immigrants from Kuwait also included Salafi-Jihadist preachers such as Issam Muhammad Taher al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a key Salafi figure who would later become the religious mentor of Zarqawi. Maqdisi was primarily responsible for spawning the violent, Salafi-Jihadist stream which grew out of a rejection of the traditional, nonviolent Salafism associated with al-Albani.8 Once Maqdisi settled in Jordan in 1992, he travelled around the country to preach. Together with his protégé Zarqawi, he formed a group called Al Tawhid (Unity of God) in 1993, which later became Bayat al-Imam. The group’s aim was to mobilize the Jordanian returnees from Afghanistan.9 After forming Bayat al-Imam and as a response to it, Maqdisi and Zarqawi were arrested and moved around a number of prisons, eventually ending up at Suwaqa prison south of Amman. Maqdisi became the emir of the imprisoned jihadists and published a number of books while behind bars. Zarqawi, meanwhile, deepened his religious education and increased the number of his followers. Many would die years later under his command in Fallujah and other places in Iraq.10

In 1997, Zarqawi and Maqdisi were transferred to a prison in Salt and established an informal recruitment network using mostly petty criminals who went in and out of prison. Zarqawi and Maqdisi were eventually moved to another prison, and released in 1999 as part of a general amnesty declared by the newly crowned King Abdullah. Zarqawi left Jordan, first to Pakistan and later to Afghanistan. After his departure, and especially after 2004, Maqdisi began to criticize Zarqawi, warning him not to use violence as an end in itself.11 As in other parts of the world, religion is resurgent in Jordan. Fuad Husayn points out that whereas 30 years ago, people in mosques were mostly in their 50s, today’s mosque-goers are very young. “Religion resonates with young people these days,” the Zarqawi biographer adds.12  Many have turned to violence. There are an estimated 180 Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan, most of them in Jwaideh prison. The prisons have proven to be a hotbed of Islamist extremism, and in the last year have witnessed a number of riots that have revealed the remarkable organizational power of the Salafi-Jihadist movement in Jordan. In April 2006, rioting broke out in Qafqafa prison, about an hour north of Amman. A month earlier, a riot erupted first at Jweideh prison and spread to Swaqa and Qafqafa prisons in what was a well organized mutiny in which inmates in the three prisons coordinated their actions through a sophisticated system that included cell phones, internet communications, and messages passed along to visiting relatives.13 The prison riots, which Jordanian analysts say have been staged by Jayousi, coincided with a mutiny in an Afghan prison, suggesting transnational links among the Salafi-Jihadists. Prisons used to be a main recruiting ground, but now Jordanians keep the prisoners in one larger cell, as a result of which recruiting and inspiring others has become more difficult.14

Which factors led to the Amman bombings and what motivated the bombers and other Jordanians who have opted to martyr themselves for the sake of Islam? Concerning the suicide attackers of Amman, little information is available. From what is known, it appears that Sajida al-Rishawi, the failed woman bomber, acted out of revenge, given that four of her family members of her have died fighting U.S. troops in Iraq. The reciting of Quranic verses before her failed bombing does not necessarily prove that she was very religious. The citing of farewell videos, including the reading of Quaranic verses, is a common procedure for suicide attackers used for propaganda purposes, and to psychologically commit the bomber to carrying out his act. From this point, the martyr reaches what Ariel Merari has called a “point of no return,” when the volunteer for martyrdom becomes a “living martyr.”15 Given the dearth of biographical information about the Amman bombers, we can learn more about individual motivations of Jordanian suicide bombers from the biographies of six Jordanian jihadists who travelled to Iraq mentioned above. The backgrounds of these martyrs should disabuse us from the commonly held belief that suicide bombers have a single profile, that of a young, single, unemployed, and religious individual. Abu Hammam, the first martyr, was married with a daughter and had a job at a factory. Anas Jamal al-Ashkar was an electronics student, and Safwan al-Abadi a lawyer. The martyrs did not necessarily come from a religious background. Safwan was not religious, but turned increasingly so following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, while Abu al-Waleed was a Christian convert. Another striking characteristic is that several of the six Jordanians described in the document were trying to join the Jihad elsewhere, before ending up in Iraq. Abu Yihye tried to join jihadist groups in Chechnya, and Safwan al-Abadi desperately tried to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but failed to reach these countries. Hence, we can assume that although Iraq is likely to have intensified Muslim notions of victimization and the subsequent decision to join the jihad, jihadists regard their program as a global initiative. As the biographies suggest, many young Muslims are not only enticed to join the jihad when they perceive an aggression to Muslims, but also when they sense success. Raed Mansoor al-Bana, for example, is said to have been influenced to join the jihad after the 9/11 bombings, which he may have sensed as a moment of empowerment for Muslims. Five of the six martyrs mentioned expressed an interest in volunteering for suicide operations when they reached Iraq which, together with the desperate attempt of some of them to fight the jihad wherever they could, suggests that these Jordanian martyrs, and possibly a large part of today’s globalized jihadists, are intensely committed to sacrificing their own lives for their cause. At the group level, the reason for the Salafi-Jihadists’ attacks against Jordan, the particular target selection, and the choice of modus operandi can be more easily grasped. The Salafi-Jihadist movement has long focused on Jordan, and some of the leading contemporary exponents of Salafi-Jihadism were Jordanians, including Abdullah Azzam, Maqdisi, and Zarqawi. Stephen Ulph suggests that another reason for Al Qaeda in Iraq’s selection of Jordan as a target can be found in part in the rising pressure of U.S. forces on insurgents active in Iraq’s Anbar province.16 From a practical point of view, Zarqawi openly admits to employ suicide operations for their obvious tactical benefits, “in order to hit the targets with accuracy and cause the maximal number of deaths.”17 Clearly, suicide attacks are also used for their ability to cause economic harm to Jordan, and indeed many Jordanians believe that one or two additional attacks like the November 2005 bombings will cause economic harm on a catastrophic scale to Jordan.18  Fuad Husayn believes that SAs may also be a way for Zarqawi to examine the extent of commitment of a volunteer for jihad, and identify possible infiltrators into his organization. Those who come to Zarqawi and ask to contribute to jihad may be asked to give their life in a martyrdom operation.Those who do not agree may be regarded as spies.19

The attacks in Jordan are also consistent with the ideology of Al Qaeda, including that of its Iraq branch, and with Salafi-Jihadism in general. In statements attributed to Zarqawi and Al Qaeda in Iraq, there are a number of recurrent themes. First and foremost is the notion that Islam is under attack by a Crusader Zionist coalition that enjoys support from Jordan and other ‘apostate regimes.’ Real Muslims, the ‘defenders of the faith’ must act in defence of Islam, and help reverse the ongoing humiliation of its men, the pillaging of its cities, and the raping of its women. Indeed, communiqués issued by Al Qaeda in Iraq are replete with calls to uphold the honour of Muslim men and women. The overthrow of Jordan and other ‘apostate regimes’ is at the top of the Salafi-Jihadists’ agenda because the ongoing control of Muslims by Western countries and Western institutions such as the UN, the World Bank, and NATO is perceived to be possible only thanks to the collaboration of these ‘treacherous’ regimes who have sold out to the United States and Israel. In light of the above, Al Qaeda in Iraq staged the SAs in Amman in part for the purpose of strategic signalling to a number of audiences. Terrorist groups intend to create a state of extreme fear in the larger population, which is intended to signal to the various audiences of terrorism that the group’s threats are credible and that it is determined to use any means to achieve its goal. By creating fear and horror among its target audience, terrorist groups also display the potential for future violence. By raising the spectre of additional attacks, terrorist groups hope to intimidate the targeted state to cave in to the terrorists’ demands and to influence the larger population to exert additional pressure on its government to seek ways to address the terrorist group’s grievances. In the case of the Amman bombings, the attacks had multiple audiences. To its own audience, fellow Salafi-Jihadists and Muslims that it hopes to recruit to the cause, the attacks were meant to signal the empowerment of the group and help convince Muslims who are indifferent about the group to join the battle on the winning side, so to speak.

To the West, the attacks were intended to send the message that ‘true Muslims’ cannot be placated and will fight to the death to achieve their notion of justice. The attacks also sent a message to Jordanians and other Arab countries, namely to refrain from any collaboration with the United States and Israel, lest they will pay a high price. Finally, the attacks were meant as a warning to Israel that the circle around it is closing, and that soon the ‘Zionist entity’ itself will be targeted.From an environmental-level point of view, the attacks, and the emergence of Jordanian martyrs in general, must also be seen in the context of the socio-economic hardships in Jordan and Iraq. In interviews this author conducted in Jordan in June 2006, every interviewee cited the socio-economic difficulties as a factor, though not necessarily the dominant one, in the pull of Salafi-Jihadism. Of perhaps even greater importance is the frontal clash between tradition on the one hand, and modernity on the other. Zarqawi’s denouncement of “fornication and debauchery” in Jordan is reflective of this tension, and embodies a call to adhere to more traditional values such as modesty and submission to God, as well as a patriarchal social and family structure in which the roles of man and woman, husband and wife, and father and children are clearly defined. The suicide attacks in Jordan of November 2005, which were carried out by Iraqis, and the Jordanian martyrs who volunteered for Jihad in Iraq exemplify the transnational movement so typical of today’s globalization of martyrdom. In the past, the Hashemite Kingdom’s internal stability was challenged mostly by domestic elements. The “Iraqi nightmare,” however, as one Jordanian official termed it,20  led to a change in the constitution of the threat to Jordan, and non-Jordanians are just as likely to strike the regime of King Abdullah, and perhaps more so, than Jordanians themselves. It is true that part of the reason why Jordanians are not believed to be involved in the Amman attacks is due to the tight grip that Jordan’s feared General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has on home-grown Jordanian Islamists and Salafi-Jihadists. Yet, the export of the jihad from Iraq to Jordan embodies more than merely operational expediency. Global jihad is by definition transnational, and the movement of jihadists goes in both directions. Fuad Husayn, for example, believes that as of June 2006, some 300 Jordanian fighters cross the border to Iraq each month.21 It appears that the bulk of the Jordanian jihadis would be willing to sacrifice themselves for what they call a martyrdom operation. In fact, it increasingly appears that the distinction between a suicide bomber and a jihadist has become blurred. Martyrdom operations appear to be the preferred tactic today for most individuals seeking to join the jihad.

 

Iraq

Most suicide attacks in Iraq are perpetrated by groups that adhere to a strict Salafi-Jihadist doctrine of Islam. These include Ansar al-Islam, Ansar al-Sunnah Army, the Victorious Sect, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jamaah Army, and the Conquest Army, among others. The quintessential Salafi-Jihadist group active in Iraq is Al Qaeda in Iraq, which is part of a larger Salafi-Jihadist umbrella organization, the Mujahideen Shura Council. The goals of Al Qaeda in Iraq, which are paradigmatic for those of other Salafi-Jihadist organizations, were summarized in an online magazine in March 2005 by a commander of the group, Abu Maysara. Al Qaeda in Iraq’s goals include the renewal of pure monotheism; waging jihad for the sake of Allah; coming to the aid of the Muslims wherever they are; reclaiming Muslim dignity; and finally, “to re-establish the Rightly-Guided Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet’s example, because ‘whoever dies without having sworn allegiance to a Muslim ruler dies as an unbeliever.’22 While the war in Iraq has done much to intensify Salafi-Jihadism in Iraq, Salafi-Jihadist networks in Iraq had existed prior to the 2003 invasion of the country. In the course of the 1990s, these networks came to existence partially in response to the military and economic crisis brought by the first Gulf War. In the aftermath of 9/11 and Operation Enduring Freedom, when Salafi-Jihadists lost Afghanistan as a safe haven, additional Salafi-Jihadists entered Iraq, where they were joined by members of Salafi-Jihadist networks from places like Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon,North Africa, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, and Europe.23

In the course of the insurgency, the rhetoric especially of groups that perpetrate SAs, but also of those that do not, gradually adopted elements of Salafism. According to a 2006 report by the International Crisis Group (ICG), the insurgency has “converged around more unified practices and discourse, and predominantly Sunni Arab identity… For now, virtually all adhere publicly to a blend of Salafism and patriotism.”24 While many websites depicted the insurgency as patriotic and nationalistic, for example, “the rhetoric from the groups most visibly active on the ground was of an increasingly religious and, more precisely, salafist bent.”25 More insurgent groups, for example, began referring to their struggle as one against Crusaders, and an increasing number began making an explicit link between the war in Iraq and a broader struggle on behalf of Muslims.26This convergence around Salafi-Jihadist themes came in spite of the internecine fighting that plagued the insurgency in the first half of 2005. Rather than leading to a permanent fragmentation of the insurgency, the infighting helped create a more unified discourse centered around Salafist themes. Thus, for instance, insurgent groups turned to Salafist ulama in increasing numbers for moral and juridical justification for jihad and for specific forms of violence. The strengthening of Salafi-Jihadism has also become evident in the growing support that an increasing number of Islamist clerics have voiced for tactics favored by Salafi-Jihadists such as SAs and beheadings. Reuven Paz points out that prior to the war in Iraq, for example, Islamic clerics debated the legitimacy of SAs. In the course of the Iraq war, however, many Islamist clerics condoned suicide operations. To the extent that there has been a debate over what constitutes legitimate tactics, it was largely over other issues, such as the legality of beheadings, kidnapping, the killing of Muslims, or the question of whether terrorist acts can be perpetrated outside of Iraq.28

One of the reasons why Salafi rhetoric has been able to dominate the discourse is likely due to the strong Internet presence and more effective use of Internet resources by Salafi-Jihadist groups. Online researchers at ICG reported that the groups most closely affiliated with transnational, Salafi-Jihadist networks were the first to implement a “genuine internet-based communication strategy.” To that end, Salafi-Jihadist groups established links between Salafi Iraqi preachers (especially from Fallujah) and like-minded Salafi ulama abroad. These contacts are likely to have facilitated subsequent contacts among jihadist groups.29 Salafi-Jihadist groups in Iraq are not merely interested in ending the occupation and are unlikely to rest their activities if and when the occupation will eventually end. As Zarqawi has made clear before his death, his group was “not fighting to chase the occupier out or preserve national unity or keep borders delineated by the infidel intact. We are fighting because it is a religious duty, just as it is a duty to take Shariah law to the government and create an Islamic state.”30 Everyone who stands in the way of the establishment of the future Caliphate is a heretic, a kaffir, and must be fought. Hence, Salafi-Jihadists target not only the occupiers, but all those who resist the attempt to create an Islamist super-state ruled in accordance with the strictest Salafi-Jihadist tenets. To quote Zarqawi again, We do not fight for a fistful of dust or illusory boundaries drawn by ‘Sykes-Pikot.’ We are not fighting so that a Western evil would replace an Arab evil. Ours is a higher and more sublime fight. We are fighting so that Allah’s word becomes supreme and religion is all for Allah. Anyone who opposes this goal or stands in the way of this aim is our enemy and will be a target for our swords, regardless of their name or lineage.31

Since 2003, Iraq has increasingly assumed a central place in the strategy of Al Qaeda. One key Salafi-Jihadist scholar, Yussuf al-Ayeri, argued in several influential writings posted on the Internet that Muslims have much at stake in Iraq. Muslims were required to resist the occupation in Iraq not only because of the need to defend an Arab country, but because Iraq was one link in the chain of attacks by the infidel West that would follow. Thus, if mujahideen failed to achieve victory in Iraq, they would also fail in future aggressions.32 Iraq also began to be mentioned as the ideal birthplace for the longed-for caliphate. In a letter written by Al Qaeda deputy leader Zawahiri to Zarqawi intercepted in July 2005, Zawahiri laid out the strategy clearly. Following the expulsion of the American forces from Iraq, in the second stage the mujahideen should “establish an Islamic authority or amirate, then develop it and support it until it achieves the level of a caliphate- over as much territory as you can to spread its power in Iraq…” In the following stages, the caliphate should be extended to “secular countries neighboring Iraq,” followed by the fourth stage, namely “the clash with Israel.”33

This transnational goal that supersedes limited, local objectives such as to oust an occupation force, is reflected in the rhetoric of all Salafi-Jihadist groups. As a commander of the Salafi-Jihadist Ansar al-Sunna army, for example, said, “the task [of jihad] is great and the issue momentous and concerns the fate of a nation and the aim does not end with the expulsion of the occupier and weakening him with inflicted wounds, but with the establishment of Allah’s religion and the imposition of Muslim law to govern this Muslim land.”34 Salafi-Jihadist groups thus entertain absolutist goals that are immensely difficult to realize. The uncompromising nature of these goals also affects these groups’ choices of tactics, including SAs. In the case of Iraq, the adoption of this modus operandi seems more of an imported than a ‘homegrown’ problem. Hence, the most plausible ‘structural’ explanations are not conditions that are endemic to Iraqi society, but are rather found in the radical Salafi-Jihadist ideology that has developed in Iraq in the mid-1990s, and especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq.As argued before, Salafi-Jihadist ideology is particularly prone to violence, and in its most extreme form even legitimizes the killing of Muslims if it serves a larger goal. In May 2005, an audiotape believed to be from Zarqawi appeared in which the terrorist mastermind defended the killing of Muslims. “The shedding of Muslim blood… is allowed in order to avoid the greater evil of disrupting jihad,” the voice said. In the tape, the speaker also defended the use of SAs, saying that “killing of infidels by any method including martyrdom operations has been sanctified by many scholars even if it meant killing innocent Muslims.”35

Salafi-Jihadist ideology also has an endemic religious quarrel with Shiites, most strikingly expressed by members of Al Qaeda in Iraq, especially when it was led by Zarqawi. In mid-January 2004, American officials obtained a detailed proposal believed to be from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, directed at senior leaders of Al Qaeda. In the 17-page letter, found on a CD seized in a Baghdad safehouse, Zarqawi asked the Al Qaeda leadership for help in waging a “sectarian war” in Iraq. Zarqawi said the extremists failed to mobilize sufficient support inside Iraq, and failed in routing the U.S. forces. The document suggested that a counter-attack be waged against the Shia community in Iraq, a step that would rally Sunni Arabs to the religious extremists. “The solution, and only God knows, is that we need to bring the Shia into the battle,” the letter read. “It is the only way to prolong the duration of the fight between the infidels and us. If we succeed in dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death” at the hands of Shiites.36 Zarqawi offered to the Al Qaeda leaders that “if you agree with it, and are convinced of the idea of killing the perverse sects, we stand ready as an army for you to work under your guidance and yield to your command.”33 In future letters, Zarqawi confirmed his repugnance for the Shias. In a letter to bin Laden dated June 15, 2004, for instance, Zarqawi referred to Shias as “the lurking serpent, the cunning and vicious scorpion, the waylaying enemy, and the deadly poison.”37 Given this high level of dehumanization, the extent of violence, including SAs, aimed at the Shias is hardly surprising.38 While anti-Shia violence in Iraq is certainly in part instrumental, in the sense that it is designed to frighten Sunnis into adopting Salafi-Jihadists tenets,39 the origin of the hatred between the Sunni Salafi-Jihadists and Shiites has deeper, doctrinal foundations. Shiism, which was borne out of the succession crisis that followed the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, implies a challenge to the idea that there can be one Sunni caliphate—a core tenet of Salafism. It is for that reasons that Salafi-Jihadists, which are Sunnis, regard Shias as infidels. Which strategies do Salafi-Jihadist groups endorse to achieve their goal of establishing a caliphate, beginning in Iraq?

The strategy consists not only of fighting the occupation forces and targeting foreigners and Shiites, but also of delegitimizing the existing order by weakening the new Iraqi government financially, attacking construction workers and others involved in the rebuilding of Iraq, creating insecurity among the public, provoking ethnic strife, and weakening the infrastructure. As the system imposed by the United States crumbles, Salafi-Jihadists expect to be able to portray themselves as the only movement able to provide protection for the Sunnis. SAs are part and parcel of this strategy of delegitimation. One of the reasons why the Salafi-Jihadist movement manages to attract a growing number of individuals to its side is that these groups have managed to influence many young Muslims that the United States invasion is an attack on Islam. Under the principle of fard ayn, any attack on Islam must be repelled by waging a defensive jihad against the aggressor. This defensive jihad requires the individual participation of each and every Muslim in the struggle. Rhetorically, Salafi-Jihadists connect the invasion of Iraq with other perceived attacks against Muslims, including in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Bosnia, and other places. The influence of Salafism also extends to groups that do not formally identify themselves as Salafists. Insurgency videos, for instance, often show the mujahideen in traditional Salafi dress code, such as Sarawil pants, which had virtually disappeared in Iraq. Moreover, Salafis reportedly played an inspirational role in the initial phase of the insurgency by posing as early Muslim warriors, duplicating their garbs and religious practices and using traditional, quasi-martial values into the insurgents. Insurgents have produced a lengthy, powerful video on this theme, which mixes contemporary footage of combat in Iraq with pictures from classical movies on the early ages of Islam.39 Most importantly perhaps, Salafi-Jihadism resonates because it provides relatively easy answers to complex questions. It also offers guidelines and recommendations that are relatively straightforward and can be followed by anyone who so wishes. It is thus a potentially inclusive ideology, if one is willing to pay the price. As a report on the insurgency suggests, Salafism benefits from the strength of weak ties, i.e., from its ability to bind together people who may share little else:On the one hand, requirements for being a ‘good Muslim’ (and the best of Muslims) are simple and easily met, since fighting a jihad satisfies the obligations of a pious life. On the other hand, because the focus is on duplicating the personal behaviour and moral code of early Muslims, Salafism is an essentially apolitical doctrine and therefore avoids potentially divisive issues.

Since their first use in late March 2003, SAs in Iraq have shown no signs of abating. On the contrary, one week in late September 2006 saw the highest level of SAs of any given week.40 From studies cited in this chapter, it can be concluded that suicide attackers who have perpetrated attacks in Iraq are largely foreigners, and of those, most appear to be Saudis. Iraqis form a minority of suicide attackers, but there are some indications that their number is rising. Biographies of suicide bombers and a review of published accounts show that suicide bombers in Iraq come from a variety of backgrounds. Suicide bombers are both male and female and some come from poorer backgrounds, while others left promising careers to join the jihad. Some were single, while others were married with children. As far as individual motivations are concerned, the relatively few biographies examined here suggest that suicide attackers act in the name of the defence of Islam in the face of what is clearly perceived as a U.S.-led attack on their religion. SAs create a balance of terror that lets the United States swallow its own medicine. They are a mechanism that helps undo what is frequently cited as the humiliating subjugation of Muslims on the part of the United States, and the West in general. The struggle against this humiliation restores honour and dignity to the suicide bomber and his larger community and avenges those members of the community who sense an injustice that is not necessarily personally, but may be viscerally, experienced. The attempt to restore honour may be coupled with more personal motivations, especially the desire to purify oneself from real or perceived sins that the suicide bomber has committed. In some cases, the suicide attacker appears influenced by a desire to reap additional benefits in paradise.

Of the groups that have perpetrated SAs, the majority are clearly Salafi-Jihadist in character. Organizational motivations and goals to engage in SAs, which are distinct from individual motivations, include the tactical benefits of this modus operandi that allow the terrorists and insurgents to achieve maximum effectiveness at a relatively low cost. In the case of Salafi-Jihadist groups, SAs are also employed because martyrdom for the sake of God is elevated as the ultimate sacrifice a Muslim can make for the sake of the umma. SAs are also believed to be the best means to bring about the goal of ending the occupation and establishing the caliphate.They are an integral part of the main strategy to bring about this aim, which involves the delegitimization of the Iraqi government (installed with American help) and the creation of ethnic tensions in Iraq that will portray Salafi-Jihadists as the only movement able to bring about security. And furthermore in the context of the Iraqi insurgency as we have seen, Salafi-Jihadism has been able to dominate other ideologies due to several factors. Salafi-Jihadist strategists and adherents have turned out to be far more Internet-savvy than their Baathist or tribal counterparts. Second, doctrinally, the U.S. invasion of Iraq neatly fits the principle of fard ayn. Salafi-Jihadists had a relatively easy time presenting the American occupation of Iraq as an attack on Islam, making the defense of Islam a rallying cry that was answered by Muslims in many countries. Finally, Salafi-Jihadism is an inherently attractive ideology to disillusioned young Muslims (and increasingly to converts to Islam) who appear to seek a sense of purpose in life as well as a sense of belonging. Salafi-Jihadism offers easy answers based on a simplistic, parsimonious division of the world into good and evil. In extolling jihad for the sake of God, it offers a sense of purpose. In appealing to contribute to the well-being of the ummah, it offers a sense of belonging to a larger, imagined community.

 

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Global Jihad P.7.

Bibliography



1. Murad Al-Shishani, "Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan: From Prison Riots to Suicide Operation Cells," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 9 (7 March 2006).

2. Rana Husseini, "Jordan Charges Five Iraqis, Two Others with Terror Conspiracy," Jordan Times, 7 June 2006.

3. Nir Rosen, "Thinking Like a Jihadist: Iraq's Jordanian Connection," World Policy Journal 23, no. 1 (Spring 2006), 4. "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism," in ICG Middle East Report No. 47 (Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005), 5.

4. "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing with Jihadi Islamism," 3.

5. Ibid. , 5.

6. Ibid. , 8.

7. Abdullah Abu Rumman, interview with International Crisis Group. In Ibid. , 4.

8. Ibid. , 5.

9. Husayn, Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qa'ida , Part 1.

10. Ibid.

11. See Maqdisi’s testimony in Ibid. , parts 6-7. See also Paz, "Islamic Legitimacy for the London Bombings," PRISM, July 2005.

12. Fuad Husayn, interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.

13. Chris Zambelis, "Radical Networks in Middle East Prisons," Terrorism Monitor 4, no. 9 (4 May 2006). See also Al-Shishani, "Salafi-Jihadists in Jordan: From Prison Riots to Suicide Operation Cells," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 9.

14. Nawaf Tell, interview with the author, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, 6 June 2006.

15. Moghadam, "Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide Terrorism,".

16. Ulph, "Al-Qaeda in Iraq Takes Credit for the Amman Bombings," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 21.

17. "Al-Qaeda Explains Amman Bombings," MEMRI, 8 December 2005.

18. Nawaf Tell, interview with the author, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan, 6 June 2006.

19. Fuad Husayn, interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.

20. Bisher al-Khasawneh, interview with the author, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.

21. Fuad Husayn, interview with the author, Amman, Jordan, 7 June 2006.

22. "Jaish Ansar Al-Sunnah Insurgency Group in Iraq Releases Detailed Communiqué and Video on Their Attack against the Us Base in Mosul," SITE Institute [Undated].

23. The article was translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). See "The Iraqi Al-Qa’ida Organization: A Self-Portrait," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 884 (24 March 2005).

24.  Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," 596.

25. International Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words," i.

26. Ibid. , 7.

27. Ibid. , 10.

28. Paz, "The Impact of the War in Iraq on the Global Jihad," , 44.

29. International Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words," 7, fn 49.

30. Quoted in Ulph, "Al-Zarqawi as Master Strategist in Iraq, Rising Leader of the Global Jihad," Terrorism Focus 2, No. 20.

31. Murad Al-Shishani, "Al-Zarqawi's Rise to Power: Analyzing Tactics and Targets," Terrorism Monitor 3,no. 22 (17 November 2005).

32. Paz, "The Impact of the War in Iraq on Islamist Groups and the Culture of Global Jihad" Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 1 (2005).

33. Although some scholars doubt the authenticity of the letter, the U.S. government believes that the letter is accurate, and the letter has been posted on the website of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. For the original Arabic version and a translated copy of the letter, which is dated July 9, 2005, see
http://www.dni.gov/release_letter_101105.html, last accessed 24 November 2005.

34. Quoted in Hafez, "Suicide Terrorism in Iraq," 596-97.

35. "Tape Justifies Killing Innocent Muslims," available at http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/05/18/iraq.main, last accessed 18 October 2006.

36. Dexter Filkins, "U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict," New York Times, 9 February 2004, 1.

37. Ibid.

38. Quoted in Michael Scheuer, "Coalition Warfare, Part Ii: How Zarqawi Fits into Bin Laden's World Front," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 8 (28 April 2005).

39. International Crisis Group, "In Their Own Words," 11.

40. On September 17, for instance, at least ten suicide attacks occurred in a single day "U.S.: Iraq Suicide Attacks Rising During Ramadan," CNN.com, 27 September 2006; Al-Ansary and Adeeb, "Most Tribes in Anbar Agree to Unite against Insurgents," New York Times, 18 September 2006.



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