By Eric Vandenbroeck
and co-workers
The Kurds Live Under The Rule Of Several
States
To date, Kurds live
under the rule of several states that succeeded the Ottoman Empire: the
Republic of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Kurds also lived in large numbers in
Persia or Iran, and there were smaller Kurdish populations in Russia and
Lebanon. Their population statistics were disputed because the states where
Kurds lived tended to minimize their numbers, but Kurds made up some 20 percent
of the population of Turkey, more than 20 percent of the population of Iraq,
and close to 10 percent of the population of Iran. With a total population of
some 24 million to 27 million by the late twentieth century, Kurds made up the
largest ethnic group without a state in Europe or Western Asia.
Throughout the
twentieth century, relations between Kurds and their rulers were often hostile.
Local uprisings by Kurdish tribes continued after World War I, and from World
War II onward various Kurdish political movements sought to gain self-rule and
independence, especially at times when the governments with power over them
weakened. For their part, the governments that ruled Kurds adopted no single
policy-when weak they sometimes offered concessions to Kurds, but the general
trend was toward repression, forced assimilation, and violent reprisal.
The Forgotten History
The Turkish Republic,
did not acknowledge the existence of Kurds (more related to Middle Eastern
Jews) as a people distinct from Turks. In 1924, Kemal Ataturk set the tone for
Turkish policy when he banned Kurdish publications; denying Kurdish identity
remained a cornerstone of Turkey's treatment of Kurds for many decades. Much
like the Balkan states that sought to force some of their minorities to accept
the dominant national identity, Turkey resorted to cultural repression to try to
make Kurds into Turks. Kurds, according to official parlance, were not Kurds:
they were mountain Turks, and these mountain Turks were not allowed to speak
Kurdish, at least not in public. Indeed, they could actually be fined for using
Kurdish to trade at markets. (The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, ed. Philip G.
Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl,
1992, pp. 73-74.)
Kurdish armed
resistance to the Turkish government occurred in two phases. Kurdish uprisings
followed almost immediately after the founding of the Turkish Republic. These
rebellions in the 1920s and 1930s were not full-scale nationalist revolutions
but regional uprisings that continued the long Kurdish tradition of struggle
against central authority. By 1938 Turkey had finally suppressed this first wave
of Kurdish resistance, but it faced a renewed Kurdish challenge in the 1970s
and 1980s. In 1984 the Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK), one of the most radical
of all Kurdish parties, began a war in Turkey's east that intensified into the
1990s. The PKK attacked Turkish installations and Kurdish guards recruited by
the Turkish government. Both the PKK and Turkish forces carried out killings
and summary executions. Turkey finally gained the upper hand in the late 1990s
and in 1999 captured the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan. (Michael M. Gunter, The
Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, 1990, p. 77.)
Turkey struck against
Kurds in the 1920s and 1930s with deportations and the destruction of Kurdish
villages. These never amounted to full-scale ethnic cleansing; that would not
have made sense given that Turkish authorities repeatedly insisted that Kurds
were Turks. But Turkish policy verged on ethnic cleansing in battle C-zones in
eastern Anatolia. Commenting on a 1927 law that allowed for deportations of
Kurds, British Ambassador Sir George Clerk noted the irony that "the Kurds
who were the principal agent employed for the deportation of Armenians, should
be in danger of suffering the same fate as the Armenians only twelve years
later." Turkish authorities carried out some of their harshest reprisals
in the Dersim, a region of central Anatolia to the
north of Harput, which central governments had
struggled to pacify since Ottoman times. Some Armenians took advantage of the
weak government hold over Dersim by escaping there
during World War 1. After years of unrest, the Turkish government resolved to
pacify the Dersim once and for all. Turkish
authorities renamed the region Tunceli, placed it
under a state of siege in 1936, and carried out a sweeping assault in 1937 and
1938 that included bombing, the destruction of villages, and deportations.
(Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurdish Society,
Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems," in Kurds, ed. Kreyenbroek and Sperl, p. 60.)
Turkish forces
carried out even more sweeping attacks and deportations during the war against
the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. The basic Turkish strategy consisted of forcing
out villagers and burning their homes. "They ordered us to leave our
houses," one witness told Human Rights Watch, "and told us to gather
near the school. They told us we supported the PKK, and that they were going to
burn the village." According to witnesses, Turkish soldiers, forces of the
Ministry of the Interior known as Jandarma, special Jandarma units called the Ozel
Tim, and village guards recruited from local residents carried out such raids.
The Turkish air force was also involved. According to Human Rights Watch,
between 1984 and 1995 more than 2,000 Kurdish villages were destroyed, most by
Turkish security forces. Even the Turkish minister of the interior said in 1995
that some 2,200 Kurdish villages had been "emptied or evacuated." All
told, more than 3,000 villages were emptied of their inhabitants dur- ing the war. More than a million Kurds were either forced
from their homes or fled the war zone, and estimates of the displaced reached
as high as 3 million. Many of these internally displaced people left for slums
in Turkey's large cities, including Istanbul. (Norwegian Refugee Council/Global
IDP Project, Profile of Internal Displacement: Turkey. "Compilation of the
Information As of 5 April 2004 available in the Global IDP Database of the
Norwegian Refugee Council).
Turkey also resorted
to political and cultural repression of the Kurds. The most prominent victims
included the Zana family of the city of Diyarbekir in
southeastern Turkey. Mehdi Zana was a Kurdish political activist who had been
elected mayor of Diyarbekir in 1977, but three years
later he was imprisoned. Released in 1991, Zana was returned to prison in 1994
and left for exile in Sweden upon his release in 1995. His wife, Leyla Zana,
only fifteen years old when she married Mehdi, went to school and became a
politician herself. She won a seat in Turkey's parliament in 1991, but her
first act as a deputy created political shockwaves. She wore a headband with
the Kurdish colors: yellow, green, and red, and after taking a loyalty oath in
Turkish she added a few words in Kurdish: she intended to "struggle so
that the Kurdish and Turkish peoples may live together in a democratic
framework." Forced from her political party for this transgression, Zana
and other deputies founded the new Democratic party, but in 1994 the Turkish
Parliament lifted parliamentary immunity for Zana and her fellow deputies,
claiming they were affiliated with the PKK. Leyla Zana and her fellow deputies
received fifteen-year prison sentences. (Ertugrul Kurkc;;u, "Leyla Zana: Defiance Under Fire,"
Amnesty Magazine, 2003).
To the south and east
of Turkey, Kurds also repeatedly clashed with their rulers in Iran and even
more so in Iraq. Iraq, like Turkey, had its origins as a successor state to the
shattered Ottoman Empire. It would have emerged from the empire without a large
Kurdish minority if Britain, for military and economic reasons, had not
insisted on attaching the Ottoman province of Mosul to Mesopotamia. Turkey also
claimed Mosul, but in 1925 the League of Nations accepted the British position,
and Iraq, then a British mandate, received most of the region. Britain soon
entered into negotiations on granting Iraq independence, and the end of the
British mandate in 1930 left the Kurds of the Mosul province in Iraq.
Kurds repeatedly
staged uprisings in Iraq and in adjacent regions of Iran. Typically they
launched rebellions when central goven}ment authorities appeared weak. Thus there is a long
history of Kurdish uprising during or immediately after wars. The early
uprisings were regional and tribal, but Kurdish revolutionary movements became
increasingly nationalist during the twentieth century. Mullah Mustafa Barzani
of the Barzani tribe of northeastern Iraq was the most famous of all Kurdish
revolutionaries. With his elder brother Sheikh Ahmad, he fought the government
of Iraq in an uprising in 1931 and 1932 that was suppressed with the help of
the Royal Air Force. In 1945 Barzani declared revolution but retreated under
Iraqi pressure to the town of Mahabad in northern
Iran. Mahabad flourished as a center of Kurdish
nationalism during World War II after the Soviet Union took control of northern
Iran in 1941. The Republic of Mahabad declared its
independence in January 1946 but soon fell to Iranian forces, and in 1947
Barzani retreated to the USSR. He returned to Iraq from exile in 1958 after a
revolution that briefly led to improved relations between the central
government and Iraq's Kurds, but renewed fighting broke out in 1961.( Jonathan
C. Randal, .After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with
Kurdistan (Boulder, Colo., 1999), pp. 112-131.)
Kurdish nationalism
developed a new intensity after the Baath party took control of Iraq in 1968.
At first the new regime in Baghdad, uncertain of its power, offered Kurds in
the north elements of self-rule, but the status of the city of Kirkuk and its
oil fields proved a major problem. Saddam Hussein's regime and Kurdish leaders
disputed whether Kirkuk would lie within the borders of a Kurdish region. In
1974 Baghdad unilaterally announced an autonomy measure that maintained central
control over Kirkuk. Barzani refused to accept these terms and launched his
last uprising. He depended on Iran for support, but Iraq concluded an agreement
with Iran in 1975 and defeated Barzani. (Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of
Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, 1995, pp. 4,19-20).
This was Mullah
Mustafa Barzani's final defeat-he died in 1979 in the United States. But in
1980 Iraq's invasion of Iran weakened the Iraqi military presence in Kurdish
areas and sparked renewed Kurdish revolution by two competing Kurdish parties,
the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) led by Mullah Mustafa's son Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party
(PUK) led by Jalal Talabani.
The governments of
Iraq and Iran both employed selected deportations as a tool to suppress Kurdish
uprisings, but in Iraq deportation gradually developed into ethnic cleansing.
After suppressing Mullah Mustafa Barzani's final uprising, Iraq embarked on a
campaign to remake the population of parts of northern Iraq. The government
destroyed numerous Kurdish villages and provided incentives to Arabs to replace
Kurds. Sunni Arabs from the desert south of Mosul, for example, moved north
into Kurdish lands. As one Arab eXplained of his move
into a Kurdish village in 1975, "We were very happy to go to the north
because we had no irrigated lands in the south." Meanwhile tens of
thousands of Kurds were deported south. In 1978 and 1979 Iraq cleared a zone of
close to twenty miles along areas of its northern border, and destroyed
hundreds more Kurdish villages. All told, Iraq pushed about a quarter of a
million nonArabs, including Kurds, out of their
lands. (Human Rights Watch, Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in
Northern Iraq, August 2004, vol. 16, no. 4 E, pp. 2, 8, 10; and Samantha Power,
"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide , 2002, p.
175.)
Between 1987 and 1989
Iraq carried out an even more violent campaign against the country's Kurds. In
1987 Saddam placed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid in charge of retaking control
over Iraq's north, and in April Iraqi forces first used the weapon that would
give al-Majid the name that made him internationally notorious:
"Chemical
Ali." Iraqi forces released chemical weapons over Kurdish villages in the
valley of Balisan. They also destroyed hundreds of
villages. Peter Galbraith, a staff member for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, saw some of the destruction in September 1987. The Iraqi ambassador
to the United States offered to let Galbraith visit, and Iraqi forces
surprisingly allowed Galbraith and an American diplomat to continue on their
way into the Kurdish region where they found that most of the Kurdish towns and
villages along the road had been destroyed.( Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime
of Genocide, pp. 40-47, 49-51; Power, "A Problemfrom
Hell," p. 183.)
The war against
Iraq's Kurds culminated in 1989 with the Anfal Operation in which Iraqi forces
burned villages, launched chemical attacks, and relocated Kurds. This was an
ambitious program of ethnic cleansing. AI-Majid described his goals in a tape
of an April 1988 meeting. "By next summer," he said, "there will
be no more villages remaining that are spread out here and there throughout the
region, but only camps." He spoke of prohibiting settlements in large
areas ana of mass evacuations: "No human beings except on the main
roads." The most infamous Iraqi gas attack of the Anfal Operation took
place on March 16 at the town of Halabja; many other towns and villages
suffered a similar fate. On the afternoon of May 3, 1988, Kurds at the village
of Goktapa, for example, heard the sound of Iraqi
jets. Goktapa had been bombed many times before, but
this time was different. As one witness recounted, "When the bombing
started, the sound was different from previous times . I saw smoke rising,
first white, then turning to gray . The smoke smelled like a matchstick when
you burn it. I passed out.” (Quoted in Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of
Genocide, pp. 255, 118; Power, "A Problem from Hell," pp. 188-189).
In all, Iraqi forces
killed about 100,000 Kurds during the Anfal Operation and forced hundreds of
thousands out of their homes. The final Iraqi campaign to remake the ethnic map
of the country's north followed immediately after the Gulf War of 1991. With
the Allied victory, Kurds staged a nationalist revolution and took over
virtually all of the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. After reaching a
cease-fire, Saddam Hussein struck back against the Kurds. The fall of Kirkuk in
late March to Iraqi forces unleashed a wave of flight. More than a million
Kurds fled north. They crossed by the thousands over mountains to the border of
Turkey. The Turkish government did not welcome the refugees, though local Kurds
did what they could to provide food. One Kurdish baker in southeastern Turkey
increased his bread production more than threefold. "I don't know if it's
enough," he told a reporter. "But everyone from this area is
helping." (New York Times, April 7, 1991.)
This crisis so soon
after the Allied victory in the Gulf War gained international attention. Acting
on humanitarian grounds, the United States, Britain, and France created a
"safe haven" close to Iraq's northern border with Turkey and
established a "no-fly zone" for the Iraqi air force north of the
thirty-sixth parallel. By October 1991 Iraqi forces and authorities withdrew
from most Kurdish regions of Iraq's north with the exception of Kirkuk. The
effective division of northern Iraq into Kurdish and Iraqi zones simultaneously
advanced Kurdish interests and the Iraqi regime's campaign to Arabize the
north. Kurds gained autonomy, but the Iraqi government accelerated its campaign
to remake Kirkuk into an Arab city and region. Iraqi authorities deported
100,000 people from Kirkuk and other communities and encouraged Arabs to move
north to replace them.
Since then, the
Kurds, have been playing their cards carefully to ensure the advances they have
made since the 1991 Persian Gulf War were not lost in the web of negotiations
with the Shia and Sunnis after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Kurds opted
for a more gradual approach in securing their autonomy in northern Iraq,
realizing that an aggressive push for independence in the post-Saddam Hussein
era would only have invited a messy reprisal from Turkey.
Thus, even though it
was a priority for the Kurdish delegation to keep Kirkuk under the control of
the Kurdish regional government, the Kurds where
willing to offer the concession of allowing current oil revenues to filter
through the central government in Baghdad. Displaced Kurds who were driven out
of Kirkuk by Hussein's forces in his bid to "Arabize" the city are
now returning; the Kurdish leadership hopes they will constitute a majority in
the December 2007 census, so that a proposed referendum in the city will allow
them to keep Kirkuk part of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region legitimately. And
Kurdish leaders do not plan on disbanding the peshmerga, but will gradually
integrate its guerrilla forces into the state security apparatus.
Washington likely
will not endorse the Kurdish strategy fully. Kurdistan faces the dilemma of
having its territory spread across four countries -- Iran, Iraq, Syria and
Turkey -- each of which has a core interest in repressing its Kurdish minority
to dampen any separatist tendencies. For its part, the United States has
complex relations with each of these countries, and so cannot afford to promote
the existence of an independent Kurdistan in the region.
Washington's main
goal in the negotiations for the formation of Iraq's full-term government was
to bring the Sunnis into the political fold. This is aimed at quelling the
Sunni nationalist insurgency and bringing pressure to bear on the Sunni
jihadists.
For the Kurds, this
means a considerable number of obstacles lie in their path to regional
autonomy. Earlier, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim -- who leads the main Iraqi Shiite
political party, the United Iraqi Alliance, as well as the Supreme Council for
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) -- loosely supported the Kurds in the
idea of regional federalism during the referendum negotiations. At that time,
the prospect of securing a Shiite enclave in the south looked promising.
While SCIRI, an
Iranian creation formed in Tehran in 1982, saw federalism as being in its
interest, Jaafari's Hizb
al-Dawah and the movements of al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani are much
more centered on a strong central government. Thanks to the Shiite failure to
achieve a consensus on the notion of federalism, the Sunnis won a chunk of the
government in the December 2005 elections. When Sunni participation in the election
decreased their influence, Shiite leaders joined al-Sadr's call for a strong
central government. They also openly opposed the Kurdish preference for a
regional federal structure, which essentially provides for an autonomous
Kurdish region in the north that would include all the provinces with sizable
Kurdish populations.
Given the complexity
of the negotiations, the most the Kurds can hope for at this juncture is a
political framework containing as many loopholes as possible to allow for their
continued evolution into a sovereign entity. Moreover, for Kurdish aspirations
to be met, the United States must maintain its military presence in Iraq to
keep regional forces in check. What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is
that Washington's interests in Iraq do not clearly align with Kurdish
interests.
Reports are
circulating that jihadist groups in northern Iraq are in the process of
creating an "emirate," an independent region in the Sunni areas. The
Shia are already in effective control of their own region in the south, and the
Kurds have controlled their region of northern Iraq for an extended period of
time. There are ethnically diffuse and disputed areas in and around Baghdad, so
this hardly solves the problem of sectarian violence, but this regional
autonomy is becoming a de facto reality. We now need to start considering some
aspects of a potential partition.
The most important
issue here is to recognize what the Sunnis already know: a partition based on
current boundaries would make the Sunni region, economically speaking, an
abortion. The Shia control Iraq's southern oil fields. The Kurds control the
northern oil fields. The Sunnis control nothing. If partition occurs in
accordance with current boundaries, the Sunni position will deteriorate and
collapse. Therefore, it is essential for all involved (given the Sunni unrest
and prospects of violence) that the Sunnis have a share in Iraq's oil.
To be more precise,
the Sunnis must control Kirkuk, a center of the oil industry and a city in
which conflict rages for these reasons. The Kurds now hold Kirkuk; the Sunnis
must take it. The Sunnis are fighting on four fronts: against the Shia, against
the Kurds, against the Americans and against each other. The Kurds, on the
other hand, are fighting only the Sunnis at this point. Therefore, logic would
have it that the Sunnis don't stand a chance.
But another element
must be added to this calculus: Turkey. Turkey has tried to keep out of the
Iraq war and, so far, has done fairly well at it. But Turkey does not want to
see the Kurdish autonomous region expand, let alone give rise to an independent
Kurdish state. Such a state would become a focal point for Kurdish nationalism
and, since the Turks would face growing breakaway tendencies in their own
Kurdish region, they would not welcome this development -- particularly if
Baghdad collapses as Iraq's center.
Therefore, the Turks
will want to weaken the Kurds. They also will want to make sure that there is a
strong buffer between them and the Iraqi Shia -- a buffer other than the Kurds.
That would mean that it is in Turkey's national interest to see the Sunnis
strengthened right now. It should be recalled that the Turks intervened
extensively in Iraq prior to 2003. They are old players in the region with ties
to Sunni tribal leaders. If they are facing a Kurdish state, they might well
choose to reassert themselves in the region by strengthening the Sunnis.
Now, the Turks are
vehemently opposed to the jihadists, but in this they share an interest with
Sunni tribal leaders, who see the jihadists as a potential threat to their own
authority. While it is the jihadists who have declared an emirate, neither the
Sunni leadership nor the Turks would want to see the jihadists having any role
to play if independence becomes a reality. The Turks would want to weaken the
Kurds; the Sunnis would want to dominate oil in the north. Alliances have been
formed on less.
There are few
constraints on the Turks. They do not expect to be admitted to the European
Union and, given France's decision to raise the question of the Armenian
holocaust, the Turks have written off accession. Nor do they need it. Turkey
has been doing quite well -- better than France or Germany, economically. As
for the Iranians, they would have no problem with seeing the Kurds seriously
weakened and the Sunni jihadists undermined. So long as the Shia control the
south and the Iranians have influence with the Shia in Iraq, they can live with
Turkish influence among the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the United
States seems to be making plans for deploying forces in northern Iraq. Any such
plan would require Turkish support, as logistical support from Kuwait makes for
a long, tough line. If the United States wants a role in Iraq after
redeployment, they will have to take Turkish interests into account. The United
States previously has backed Kurdish interests. But the Americans need the
Turks and have little to offer them: The one thing the Turks might want -- EU
membership without strings -- is something Washington can't help them with.
It is now time to
turn the focus from Baghdad to the north, and the political evolution there.The Shia are already in effective control of their
own region in the south, and the Kurds have controlled their region of northern
Iraq for an extended period of time. There are ethnically diffuse and disputed
areas in and around Baghdad, so this hardly solves the problem of sectarian
violence, but this regional autonomy is becoming a de facto reality. We now
need to start considering some aspects of a potential partition.
The most important
issue here is to recognize what the Sunnis already know: a partition based on
current boundaries would make the Sunni region, economically speaking, an
abortion. The Shia control Iraq's southern oil fields. The Kurds control the
northern oil fields. The Sunnis control nothing. If partition occurs in
accordance with current boundaries, the Sunni position will deteriorate and
collapse. Therefore, it is essential for all involved (given the Sunni unrest
and prospects of violence) that the Sunnis have a share in Iraq's oil.
To be more precise,
the Sunnis must control Kirkuk, a center of the oil industry and a city in which
conflict rages for these reasons. The Kurds now hold Kirkuk; the Sunnis must
take it. The Sunnis are fighting on four fronts: against the Shia, against the
Kurds, against the Americans and against each other. The Kurds, on the other
hand, are fighting only the Sunnis at this point. Therefore, logic would have
it that the Sunnis don't stand a chance.
But another element
must be added to this calculus: Turkey. Turkey has tried to keep out of the
Iraq war and, so far, has done fairly well at it. But Turkey does not want to
see the Kurdish autonomous region expand, let alone give rise to an independent
Kurdish state. Such a state would become a focal point for Kurdish nationalism
and, since the Turks would face growing breakaway tendencies in their own Kurdish
region, they would not welcome this development -- particularly if Baghdad
collapses as Iraq's center.
Therefore, the Turks
will want to weaken the Kurds. They also will want to make sure that there is a
strong buffer between them and the Iraqi Shia -- a buffer other than the Kurds.
That would mean that it is in Turkey's national interest to see the Sunnis
strengthened right now. It should be recalled that the Turks intervened
extensively in Iraq prior to 2003. They are old players in the region with ties
to Sunni tribal leaders. If they are facing a Kurdish state, they might well
choose to reassert themselves in the region by strengthening the Sunnis.
Now, the Turks are
vehemently opposed to the jihadists, but in this they share an interest with
Sunni tribal leaders, who see the jihadists as a potential threat to their own
authority. While it is the jihadists who have declared an emirate, neither the
Sunni leadership nor the Turks would want to see the jihadists having any role
to play if independence becomes a reality. The Turks would want to weaken the
Kurds; the Sunnis would want to dominate oil in the north. Alliances have been
formed on less.
There are few
constraints on the Turks. They do not expect to be admitted to the European
Union and, given France's decision to raise the question of the Armenian
holocaust, the Turks have written off accession. Nor do they need it. Turkey
has been doing quite well -- better than France or Germany, economically. As
for the Iranians, they would have no problem with seeing the Kurds seriously
weakened and the Sunni jihadists undermined. So long as the Shia control the
south and the Iranians have influence with the Shia in Iraq, they can live with
Turkish influence among the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the United
States seems to be making plans for deploying forces in northern Iraq. Any such
plan would require Turkish support, as logistical support from Kuwait makes for
a long, tough line. If the United States wants a role in Iraq after
redeployment, they will have to take Turkish interests into account. The United
States previously has backed Kurdish interests. But the Americans need the
Turks and have little to offer them: The one thing the Turks might want -- EU
membership without strings -- is something Washington can't help them with.
It is now time to
turn the focus from Baghdad to the north, and the political evolution there.The Shia are already in effective control of their
own region in the south, and the Kurds have controlled their region of northern
Iraq for an extended period of time. There are ethnically diffuse and disputed
areas in and around Baghdad, so this hardly solves the problem of sectarian
violence, but this regional autonomy is becoming a de facto reality. We now
need to start considering some aspects of a potential partition.
The most important
issue here is to recognize what the Sunnis already know: a partition based on
current boundaries would make the Sunni region, economically speaking, an
abortion. The Shia control Iraq's southern oil fields. The Kurds control the
northern oil fields. The Sunnis control nothing. If partition occurs in
accordance with current boundaries, the Sunni position will deteriorate and
collapse. Therefore, it is essential for all involved (given the Sunni unrest
and prospects of violence) that the Sunnis have a share in Iraq's oil.
To be more precise,
the Sunnis must control Kirkuk, a center of the oil industry and a city in
which conflict rages for these reasons. The Kurds now hold Kirkuk; the Sunnis
must take it. The Sunnis are fighting on four fronts: against the Shia, against
the Kurds, against the Americans and against each other. The Kurds, on the
other hand, are fighting only the Sunnis at this point. Therefore, logic would
have it that the Sunnis don't stand a chance.
But another element
must be added to this calculus: Turkey. Turkey has tried to keep out of the
Iraq war and, so far, has done fairly well at it. But Turkey does not want to
see the Kurdish autonomous region expand, let alone give rise to an independent
Kurdish state. Such a state would become a focal point for Kurdish nationalism
and, since the Turks would face growing breakaway tendencies in their own
Kurdish region, they would not welcome this development -- particularly if
Baghdad collapses as Iraq's center.
Therefore, the Turks
will want to weaken the Kurds. They also will want to make sure that there is a
strong buffer between them and the Iraqi Shia -- a buffer other than the Kurds.
That would mean that it is in Turkey's national interest to see the Sunnis
strengthened right now. It should be recalled that the Turks intervened
extensively in Iraq prior to 2003. They are old players in the region with ties
to Sunni tribal leaders. If they are facing a Kurdish state, they might well
choose to reassert themselves in the region by strengthening the Sunnis.
Now, the Turks are
vehemently opposed to the jihadists, but in this they share an interest with
Sunni tribal leaders, who see the jihadists as a potential threat to their own
authority. While it is the jihadists who have declared an emirate, neither the
Sunni leadership nor the Turks would want to see the jihadists having any role
to play if independence becomes a reality. The Turks would want to weaken the
Kurds; the Sunnis would want to dominate oil in the north. Alliances have been
formed on less.
There are few
constraints on the Turks. They do not expect to be admitted to the European
Union and, given France's decision to raise the question of the Armenian
holocaust, the Turks have written off accession. Nor do they need it. Turkey
has been doing quite well -- better than France or Germany, economically. As
for the Iranians, they would have no problem with seeing the Kurds seriously
weakened and the Sunni jihadists undermined. So long as the Shia control the
south and the Iranians have influence with the Shia in Iraq, they can live with
Turkish influence among the Sunnis.
Meanwhile, the United
States seems to be making plans for deploying forces in northern Iraq. Any such
plan would require Turkish support, as logistical support from Kuwait makes for
a long, tough line. If the United States wants a role in Iraq after
redeployment, they will have to take Turkish interests into account. The United
States previously has backed Kurdish interests. But the Americans need the
Turks and have little to offer them: The one thing the Turks might want -- EU
membership without strings -- is something Washington can't help them with. It
is now time to turn the focus from Baghdad to the north, and the political
evolution there.
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