It is known that Putin likes to reestablish the former Russian sphere of influence whereby E.Ukraine, after having been occupied by the Ottomans, was next taken by Catherine the Great who titled it Novorossiya. We also can see a development from the Orange revolution to the situation now. Given its inability to prevent the initial ouster of Yanukovych, Russia is probably where it wants to be, as also mentioned here.

The last two days, in a carefully co-ordinated action, groups of men, some armed, took over government buildings in Donetsk, Luhansk and Trans-Dniester declared the “independence” of eastern Ukrainian republics, demanded referendums and called for Russian assistance. They aped the Maidan protesters in Kiev with barricades made of car tyres and the distribution of food. The theatrics were said to be directed from Moscow with money from ousted Ukrainian prime minister Yanukovych and his son, who still control some local mayors in the Donetsk region.

Ukraine’s security service, the SBU on its website and in a youtube, reported two days ago that it had caught a Russian citizen who was registered at the address of Russian military intelligence headquarters. The 29-year-old man, identified by the SBU as Roman Bannykh, had organized and coordinated Russian citizens and Ukrainians into cells that would plan and encourage separatist activities, including mass protests and the seizure of government buildings, the SBU said.

Nationalist Russian websites posted calls to head to eastern Ukrainian cities for weekly rallies. Ukrainian officials say they turn back hundreds of suspicious Russian citizens at the border every day.

At the rallies, a group of several dozen young men led crowds to government buildings, shoving aside listless police and raising Russian flags—scenes that were quickly broadcast in Russia.

The meetings were a mix of aggressive young men chanting "Russia! Russia!" and older men and women who stood back as the men smashed their way into buildings.

Pro-Russian activists on Sunday seized the regional council buildings in Kharkiv and Donetsk, as well as the security-service building in Luhansk.

Pro-Russian activists on the self-proclaimed Donetsk council say they are in touch with Yevgeny Fyodorov, a lawmaker from Vladimir Putin's United Russia party, and Alexander Dugin (whom I reported on in detail) who promotes the creation of a Eurasian empire under Moscow's rule to counter the West.

Experts say Moscow has been infiltrating its neighbors ever more deeply, building its influence amongst security forces, government officials and politicians. That, some say, allows it to stir up instability in locations like eastern Ukraine and create both confusion and potential preconditions to invade.

In addition, NATO says tens of thousands of Russian troops are massed on the border with Ukraine for a potential invasion, yet Western states still lack a strategy to stop Moscow from intervening in its former Soviet neighbours.

With military action to protect non-NATO states effectively ruled out, current and former officials say sanctions and isolation provide the best - and perhaps only - way to pressure Moscow. Ramping up the pressure on the rich and powerful around President Vladimir Putin, they say, might in time push him towards a much more conciliatory approach.

But that, they concede, could prove a long game, and some both in and outside government worry that a more isolated Russia may simply become both more nationalist and self-sufficient. Putting Putin under more pressure, they worry, may give him even more incentive to take a populist, more aggressive approach.

Ultimately, Moscow's commitment to rebuild the former USSR as its own unilateral sphere of influence may outstrip the determination of Washington and its European allies to stop it.

Many Ukrainian observers fear that Russia will use May 9th, Victory Day, to stage more provocations. Russia’s propaganda is based on second world war rhetoric, portraying the government in Kiev as western Ukrainian “fascists” attacking Russian-speakers in the east and the south.

Going forward

So far Moscow is demonstrating to Kiev and the West that it can destabilize its western neighbor through non-military means.

In addition, however, Russian posturing is motivated by one of two things. Either Putin seeks to annex the eastern parts of Ukraine and is contriving the necessary pretense to do so, or he is engaging in brinkmanship to secure a better political deal for Ukraine’s eastern regions (likely in the form of greater devolution of powers), and to prove once more that Russia is too important on the international stage for the West to risk isolating.

Yet even if Putin is going the route of calculated brinkmanship, it’s likely that events will quickly spin out of control and precipitate the first scenario: Russia’s annexation of eastern Ukraine. Or even worse, a civil war. The government in Kiev has a rotted-out foundation, both economically and politically, and it lacks the legitimacy required to use violence against its subjects in the east – no matter how treasonous their actions may be. Without decisive action from Kiev, the protest movement in the east will continue to spread.

Given the high levels of local support for Moscow, it would take Russia publicly disavowing its commitment to the Russian-speaking people of eastern Ukraine for the spiral of instability to grind to a halt. This is not going to happen. Thus, the question becomes: which outside actor is best equipped to bring the situation under control.

The answer is Russia, and this a fact that is surely not lost on President Putin.

According to satellite pictures and military intelligence, some 50,000 Russian troops are massed along the border with Ukraine. The forces represent a substantial fraction of Russia’s 270,000-strong army, and they cannot indefinitely maintain the high state of readiness they have been in since early March, not least because it is now the time of year when conscripts at the end of their term have to be sent home, and new ones trained. Ukraine’s armed forces are, by comparison, small, ill-equipped and out of position.

However, Russian military planners are almost certainly advising Vladimir Putin that, although an incursion with a strictly limited objective against weak defences might easily be achieved, occupying a large tract of land against the wishes of most of the people who live there is far harder. Getting bogged down and exposed to attacks by Ukrainian irregular forces would be all too likely. Stationing lots of troops in Ukraine indefinitely would have ramifications elsewhere, stretching forces in volatile regions such as the north Caucasus and Central Asia. On top of this, Mr Putin cannot be entirely confident about how his forces would perform. Their post-Georgia modernisation is a work in progress, with poor command and control and logistics hampered by incompatible equipment.

Home