By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
What will the
first two quarters of 2008 be like:
After exactly 60 years of attempting to build a new European structure under
the aegis of the European Union, Europe in 2008 will return to an earlier
geopolitical arrangement: the Concert of Powers. For most of its history,
Europe has existed as a dynamic constellation of states struggling for local,
regional and continental power. The geography of the Continent — packed with
mountains, peninsulas and islands — has made it impossible for any single power
to emerge dominant, while the presence of the Northern European Plain and
myriad rivers has ensured constant contact. The result is that the Continent is
united by trade but divided by war in an ever-shifting array of alliances among
rising and falling powers.
During the Cold War the division and occupation of the Continent by the
United States and the Soviet Union smothered the Concert of Powers, as all of
Europe was forced into one camp or the other. During this period — which in
essence was a fundamentally new political geography for the Europeans — the
various states no longer needed to struggle against each other. In the early
Cold War years, Germany, Austria and Italy were occupied; Spain languished
under dictatorship; the United Kingdom licked its wounds; and all of Central
Europe lay behind the Iron Curtain. Peace of a sort had been imposed and the
Europeans could focus on economic matters. The result — merged with the
ideology of France’s Charles de Gaulle>, who sought to unite Europe under a
single political framework and become a third pole in geopolitics — was the
European Union.
But such a format was only possible so long as the geography of Europe
was superseded by the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall fell and Central Europe
re-entered the equation, the Gaullist dream began to unravel — first with the
failure of the European constitution and then with Gaullist Jacques Chirac’s
departure from the French presidency.
The year 2008 will see the European Union slowly evolve from a
pan-continental government to a glorified free trade zone. We do not mean this
as an insult: Europe’s achievements in the past 60 years — indeed, in the past
10 — have been impressive, bringing Europe peace and prosperity it has never
before possessed without somehow putting some of its own members at a severe
disadvantage. But this affluence and stability was ultimately achieved in the
context of a political geography that no longer exists.
As Europe reverts to the Concert of Powers, there will be irregular and
changing alliances that will advantage — and disadvantage — specific states.
Outside powers, particularly the United States, will find it in their best
interests to manipulate such divisions. Others, such as Russia, will discover
their attempts to do so could actually generate what might seem like a renewed
European federalist impulse. In reality, however, it will simply be a coalition
of powers briefly acting out of their own self-interest. The three states we
expect to be the most active in breaking out of the EU mold are Germany, Poland
and France.
During the Cold War, German national interests were completely
submerged in the idea of “Europe” and, to be blunt, Germany was not allowed to
have an independent military or foreign policy. Yet Germany is the natural
leader of Europe because of its location, population and economic heft. Now
that Germany is reunited, it is attempting to reprise this role, and to do so
in a way that does not generate fear among its neighbors. The trick,
ironically, is ensuring that Germany does not feel militarily threatened. So
long as Germany is surrounded by NATO states and Russia is relatively
quiescent, Germany does not require a robust military. A largely disarmed
Germany is still an economic powerhouse, but while it triggers concern, it does
not trigger fear. German insecurity — and the military consequences that will come
from a rearming Germany — will be a crisis for another year.
Poland is another question altogether. Warsaw is likely to see some of
its worst fears realized in 2008 as a resurging Russia increases pressure on
its western periphery. Part of this evolution is likely to involve some major
advancement of the Russian-Belarus union, and 2008 could well be the year that
the Red Army returns to the Polish border. Poland is already in the midst of a
major military buildup to counter Russia, and its political strength as
Europe’s newest large member is leading it to flex its diplomatic and economic
muscles as well. The combination of a Red Army that shifts west and a Poland
frantic to counter it could well be the issue that forces Germany to rearm
itself.
Finally, there is France. During the past 60 years Gaullist France has
considered itself Europe’s leader. Now under new management, France simply
considers itself France. Having abandoned its unrealistic global ambitions,
Paris is ironically now more capable of exercising its always insightful and
often incisive mix of economic, military and political skills. But instead of
targeting the United States on a host of issues scattered hither and yon, most
of its efforts will now be used against powers closer to home.
Of these three states, France will make the biggest splash. In the
latter half of the year France will hold the EU presidency, and while this
could be viewed as Europe’s last chance to federalize, it is far more likely
that Paris will use it to steer its own nationalist agenda on everything from
immigration to economic policy — particularly targeting China.
One player missing from this mix is the state that used to hold the
balance in most intra-Concert struggles: the United Kingdom. Under Prime
Minister Gordon Brown the United Kingdom is struggling to hive itself off from
Europe politically while still enjoying the economic benefits. Add in Brown’s
inexperience and unpopularity, and the result is a London obsessed with
internal issues. This will not last; London will return and in a very big way
to the Concert. But not in 2008, and probably not under Brown.
The re-emergence of the Concert of Powers is not something that happens
overnight. Indeed, one could accurately argue that it actually began in 2004 when
the European Union expanded to include 10 new states, and intensified in 2005
with the French rejection of the EU constitution — the two events that killed
the possibility of a European superstate. But 2008 will be the first year the
European states — all of them — will act as if the dream really is dead. (This
would have occurred in 2007, but the union was still adapting to the membership
of its newest members, Bulgaria and Romania, and a Gaullist — Chirac — was
still serving as French president for the first half of the year.)
Romania managed to keep its fragile government coalition together long
enough to get into the union; however, once it became a member, the political
situation quickly deteriorated and the coalition collapsed.Bulgaria,
too, has been plagued by political chaos and slow reforms. Myriad corruption
scandals have kept Bulgaria from tackling EU demands, and the union is
extremely concerned about growing organized crime in the country, which has
penetrated almost all sectors.As a result member
states France, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands all have
criticized the commission for being too “friendly” with Romania and Bulgaria,
and they are pushing to suspend the aid.
Such a slap on the hand could send these countries’ political
situations into a tailspin, causing all sides to blame each other for the loss.
Moreover, less money means less investment; potential investors likely would be
turned off by both the EU action and the social unrest it could bring. However,
if the European Union does not act to prevent Bulgaria and Romania from getting
worse, it will lose a powerful tool with which to pressure new members to
reform. Suspending these funds also would signal to other EU candidates, such
as Croatia and Macedonia, that the union does not indulge its members or make
concessions. Ultimately, the failure of Romania and Bulgaria could force the
European Union, which already is tired of enlargement and all the headaches
that go with it, to impose more stringent accession requirements on would-be members.And then, of course, there is Kosovo.
Kosovo is not about Kosovo. Kosovo itself is a nearly insignificant
chunk of landlocked territory with minimal economic implications to anyone.
Only one country — the politically and militarily emasculated Serbia — has any
real interest there. And if it were left at that, NATO and the European Union
long ago would have been able to force the Serbs to swallow Kosovar
independence.
Kosovo is about the Russian resurgence and the Europeans’ effort to
resist it. Russian President Vladimir Putin has staked his international
credibility on preventing Kosovar independence. Should it happen regardless of
his objections, the perception of Russian power would be greatly diminished. At
some point early in the year, we expect the Russians to quietly remind the
Europeans of the wide range of tools that Moscow holds that can make life in
Europe very uncomfortable, with mention of Russia’s energy leverage — it
supplies the European Union with one-quarter of its natural gas demand — high
up on the list.
This will end up one of two ways. First, the Europeans will see the
Russians’ point and graciously deny combat, pushing off the issue of Kosovo for
(yet) another day. Alternately, the Europeans will not blink and it will be up
to Russians to figure out exactly how to make them pay for such an
indiscretion.
South Asia
Pakistan ended 2007 with the assassination of opposition leader Benazir
Bhutto on Dec. 27. Though it is not clear who ultimately ordered the
assassination or what they hoped to achieve, the result injected a huge amount
of passion and uncertainty into a situation that already stretched the
definition of “chaotic.”
We expect the Pakistani army — which is to say, the Pakistani state —
to hold together, but just. Political power within the army and governing
institutions has become more diffuse as President Pervez Musharraf’s grip has
slackened, and Bhutto’s assassination has upended many agreements to share
power. With those deals up in the air, Pakistan’s many factions — within and
beyond the military — are now competing with each other with few established
points of reference.
Yet most of this is simply the sound and fury of internal maneuvering;
ultimately, military commanders know that they are the true rulers of Pakistan
no matter what elections produce and realize that, should they fall too deeply
into infighting, they are only hurting themselves. It will likely take months
for this realization to sink in — although general elections currently
scheduled for Feb. 18 will serve as an excellent splash of cold water — and the
political chaos of 2008 will make 2007 seem orderly in comparison. The United
States, of course, stands ready to back nearly whatever actions the military
deems necessary to ensure order — if for no other reason than to ensure that
the Pakistani military continues to act against the jihadists.
Pakistan’s problems will really only manifest geopolitically where they
intersect those anti-jihadist efforts. Though al Qaeda and its allies no longer
constitute a strategic threat to the United States, they are a very real and
present danger in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Confusion and distractions in
Islamabad will greatly reduce the Pakistani government’s ability (and
willingness) to rein in those jihadists — especially in concert with American
forces. We expect the situation to degrade particularly quickly and deeply in
Pakistan’s northwest. Increasing political unrest and instability in Islamabad
could lead to the Pashtun regions becoming ungovernable in this coming year.
Pakistani’s nitial objective — maintaining
the tribal area as a buffer zone between jihadist chaos and civilization as the
Pakistanis know it — will be impossible to achieve. In many ways, that buffer
has already broken down, given that the districts in the NWFP that run along
the tribal belt are already undergoing Talibanization. These include Tank, Lakki Marwat, Bannu,
Kohat, Hangu, Dera Ismail Khan, Peshawar, Mardan, Charsadda, Swat, Malakand
and Dir. Swat is in the most advanced stages of the process.
Beyond Pakistan, the rest of South Asia is obsessed with domestic
issues. An upsurge in Sri Lanka’s Tamil insurgency will generate paralysis
while Nepal’s Maoist movement — still limping toward the murky world of
coalition government — will provide enough ebb and flow to utterly consume any
spare bandwidth in Kathmandu. Hotly contested elections in Bangladesh will
simply mark the newest chapter in a generation-old power struggle between
equally corrupt forces. There will be few changes on the ground in Afghanistan
where a resurgent Taliban and a reinforced NATO — while fighting harder than
ever — appear positioned to continue the stalemate of the last few years. While
there will certainly be successes and failures on both sides, the Taliban is
not in a position to drive NATO from the country this year — or likely in 2009.
But neither is NATO in a position to impose a military solution of its own.
Pakistan Endnote: While most of the world is taking a high-level view
of the growing political instability and jihadist insurgency in the country,
there are a number of other critical economic and social developments taking
place that could accelerate the crisis of governance in Pakistan. Foremost
among these are the huge shortages of flour and electricity throughout the
country.
And following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the additional
uncertainty the brought, there is a flight of capital out of the country. This
in turn put the real estate market into a plunge. The public mood is also
being described as increasingly pessimistic. There is growing uncertainty
whether elections will be held on the announced date of Feb. 18, especially if
there is large-scale sectarian violence during Muharram, The Islamic New Year
that begin’s on January 11, 2008.
Certainly the jihadists who despise the Shia would like to take
advantage of the situation to increase the level of chaos in the country, and
thus further their own objectives. Derailing the elections would certainly help
them. But the jihadists are not the only ones who might not want the elections
to go ahead.
President Pervez Musharraf’s regime is not exactly looking forward to
the elections because of massive public anger against his regime. Musharraf and
his allies in the pro-government Pakistan Muslim League fear they could be the
target of anti-government public ire in the Feb. 18 vote — not only because of
the Bhutto killing, but also because of the deteriorating socio-economic
conditions in the country. From Musharraf’s point of view The situation is all
the more grave. The president needs his allies in order to secure the
two-thirds majority required to legalize his Nov. 3 move to suspend the
constitution.
This is why the country abounds with rumors that if there is an
outbreak of sectarian violence during the initial days of Muharram, the
government may exploit the situation and further postpone elections. It is not
at all clear, of course, whether this will happen. What is certain, however, is
that conditions are explosive and such speculation is not unwarranted.
Since early spring 2007, Musharraf has gone from facing virtually no
challenge to seeing his hold on power severely weakened and state authority
eroding in a escalating crisis of governance.
Stratfor’s position is that in Pakistan, it is the military that matters. So if
another round of violence threatens to derail efforts to stabilize the
situation, all eyes will be on the army, and on how long it will allow a
particular regime to weaken the state.
And along with the four countries (including Russia) that are on our
list—Pakistan is one more that specifily needs to be
watched during 2008.
India will face more international complications than the other South
Asian states. New Delhi already faces major problems in its failure to stem
insurgent traffic coming in from its border with Bangladesh. With Pakistan in
spasms, militants operating along the Indian-Pakistani border will more firmly
coalesce under the jihadist umbrella, making the Indian-Pakistani border in the
Kashmir region more volatile and thus increasing the ability of Islamist
militants to carry out attacks in major Indian cities. The bulk of these
attacks are likely to remain focused on triggering and exacerbating communal
riots between Hindus and Muslims.
India is furthermore fearful of a larger jihadist spillover from its
border with Pakistan. India’s Kashmiri Islamist groups have already become
heavily influenced by jihadist forces in the Vale of Kashmir, and al Qaeda
propaganda has spread throughout India, particularly in Karnataka, Andhra
Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, where Islamist militants have focused their attacks
on stirring up communal tensions between Hindus and Muslims.
Yet India’s foreign agenda will be held hostage by preparations for
another round of elections. The Indian government (currently led by the
Congress Party) wants to approve a nuclear agreement with the United States in
order to strengthen long-term economic and strategic opportunities.
This is being sabotaged not only by the opposition (currently the Bharatiya Janata Party, whose Hindu nationalist efforts are
likely to foment many riots in 2008), but also by leftist elements within the
governing coalition. Russia will attempt to capitalize on the government’s
failed realignment and reinsert itself into Indian politics, but while the
government’s unity is weak enough to not orient toward Washington, it also is
strong enough to resist the Russian lure. India, strategically, will stall.
And it may well stall economically as well. In 2007 India experienced
myriad economic problems as everything from domestic politics to militants to
power outages seemingly took aim at foreign investments. Investors have begun
to realize that the miracle of Bangalore is not being repeated elsewhere in the
country, even as rising corruption and insufficient infrastructure began to
take the shine off of Bangalore.
Despite much talk of “Shining India,” the national, regional and local
governments have yet to even begin basic work on battling corruption,
coordinating regulations, containing militancy and building infrastructure. In
an election year, the ruling government will be even more gridlocked between
populist and business interests as the issue of land appropriation for special
economic zones continues to flare. The result is that the swarm of investors
that has approached India in years past with the hope of using a toehold in one
region to launch into others will see its optimism die. The realization is
sinking in that doing business in India could be more trouble than it is worth,
and 2008 will be the year that foreign direct investment — and with it, India’s
hopes of advancing economically — gets a rude reality check.
East Asia
The year 2008 is critical for Beijing; it is the year in which China
will finally be showcased as a modern and “big” nation, and one in which the
taints of the Maoist era and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident are distant
memories.
The Olympics is one of the largest foreign public relations exposures
Beijing has invited upon itself in almost 20 years. The central government is
using the event externally to serve as a focus for investment and internally as
a tool for engendering social pride and unity. This latter point is critical as
Beijing struggles with economic and social disparity, corruption and rising
domestic frustrations. China is proving somewhat successful in using a mix of
self-interested foreign investment, large dollops of cash and selective
political repression to steadily whittle away at its financial problems and
head off social explosions — both of Olympic size themselves. Having everyone
rollicking in an eight-month Olympic party is sure to make that job easier.
But there is still work to be done to ensure that nothing goes awry
during that party. The Chinese government has spent much of the last two years
laying down pre-emptive measures against interest groups — from the Falun Gong
to Amnesty International to Taiwanese intelligence — who see the games as a
perfect opportunity to gain publicity and leverage in pressing their causes to
(or against) the Chinese government. High-profile protests and demonstrations
that threaten to provoke the Chinese government’s hand could tarnish China’s
international stakeholder image or offer a potential avenue of release for
China’s simmering pot of social rural-urban tensions. China cannot risk a
crackdown during the games, so it must engage in many before them.
While all attention is on the regalia of the Olympic Games, another
normally dominating event — the March National People’s Congress session — will
occur with little public fanfare. But what will happen there is every bit as
important as China’s management of its social and economic ills. Besides
identifying China’s next probable set of , the session will usher in a new
energy law that seeks to create a proper energy ministry. Currently power over
China’s energy sector is scattered among various ministries, bureaus and a
handful of large state energy firms. This format complicates efforts to
regulate prices, limit pollution and ensure product supplies while fostering a
sense among energy big wigs that the central government’s wishes can be
massaged at best or ignored at worst.
The new law seeks to unify the disparate parts into a single office
directly under the authority of the State Council (the equivalent of an inner
circle). Part of the goal is to improve pollution laws to make them consistent
with international best practices. Part is to ensure an end to dangerously
unpopular gasoline rationing and price spikes. Part is to shift some of the
burden for infrastructure and quality upgrades onto foreign firms, even while
encouraging those same firms to compete in subsectors currently dominated by
the Chinese energy oligarchs. Part is to use central fiat to starve out
financially questionable projects that take advantage of the country’s cheap
credit system and end up wasting resources — especially energy — and so
compound both the financial and pollution problems.
But ultimately it is an effort to simply get the energy sector to do what
Beijing wants and impose a single decision-making body that keeps China’s
overarching goals firmly at the center of planning. It is a tall order. The
energy sector is huge and dispersed, and the State Council has been trying this
in small bites for three years. However, there are a lot fewer players in
energy than in the financial sector, and five years into Beijing’s financial
reform/containment effort definite progress can be seen even if the scope of
the problems remains nearly unfathomable.
Beyond China, there is a broader realignment taking place within the
American alliance structure within the Pacific. The Bush administration is
using any chance it can get to solidify the reshaping of the U.S. global
strategic posture, both in Europe and Asia. The five key American allies in the
region have or will soon undergo government changes. In no case will this lead
to any ruptures in relations, but in all cases the shakeup will require a
United States with already stressed bandwidth to allocate fresh resources to
alliance management.
The greatest need likely will be in , where first the outgoing
president might be tempted to rattle China ahead of the Olympics and the
incoming government might be a little too close to Beijing for comfort.
Washington, occupied with all things Middle Eastern, wants exactly zero Asian
crises in 2008 — especially if those crises are fomented by formally
unrecognized allies.
The second shifting ally is Thailand , where the generals who launched
a coup in 2006 have now seen elections bring the politicians they ousted back
to power. The American interest is in keeping things quiet, but domestic
political arrangements in Thailand appear to be moving in any direction but
settlement.
Finally, government shifts in Japan, and Australia will complicate
matters for the United States. While none of these new governments are
anti-American and the states will remain firmly in the U.S. alliance structure,
all of them are working to operationalize newfound pan-Asian sentiments. The
net effect of these states’ pan-Asian policies will not weaken their
connections with Washington, but it will limit their involvement in U.S.-led
multilateral efforts within Asia. Put another way Japan, South Korea and
Australia will still be U.S. allies, but Washington will need to deal with them
individually as opposed to collectively.
Middle East
The Middle East entered 2007 with the United States and Iran circling
each other, searching for weaknesses and opportunities. Ultimately each
attempted to convince the other that it stood ready to create the other’s
worst-case scenario. The Iranians’ threat was to use the Shiite militia to
trigger so much violence that the U.S. military position in Iraq would be
untenable, heralding a surge of Iranian military power that could conquer all
of the Arabian Peninsula. The U.S. threat was to empower the Iraqi Sunni to the
point that the Sunni would again rule Mesopotamia and serve as a check on
Persian ambitions — and there also was the possibility of a U.S. air war
against Iran itself.
Ultimately these positions were the negotiation equivalent of baseball
bats, and by year’s end it became apparent that the two sides had chosen tools
that were more surgical and less prone to acrimonious fallout. Instead of
setting Iraq on fire using its militia allies, Iran dialed back, leading to the
least violent period in post-Hussein Iraq. Instead of endlessly threatening
Iran, the United States proclaimed that it no longer believed Iran had a
nuclear weapons program — much less the weapons themselves — ending any serious
talk of a U.S.-Iranian war. The stage was set for an accommodation.
The broader tapestry of the Islamic world also shifted in 2007. Al
Qaeda’s ultimate goal with the 9/11 attacks was to provoke the United States to
slam into the Middle East and generate such anger that the Muslim masses would
overthrow the local regimes allied with Washington, ushering in a modern
caliphate. In 2007 it became bluntly apparent that al Qaeda’s dreams have been
dashed, and American power is now tightly aligned to all of the Sunni Arab
regimes throughout the region — regimes that, bolstered by record oil revenues
and now married to American security plans, are feeling more secure than ever.
Jihadist-inspired terrorism will continue, but in reaching its strategic goal —
re-creating a caliphate — the ideology of jihadism has been an utter failure.
We underestimated the impact of the 2007 surge of American forces into
Iraq. The surge ultimately proved successful not so much in reshaping Iranian
perceptions, but in reshaping Sunni perceptions of how dedicated the United
States was to Iraq. This is doubly so for the state that served as the
ideological genesis and primary financial support for the jihadist movement:
Saudi Arabia. Because of the Iraq war and fear of an American-Iranian military
conflict — a dominant fear in 2007 — Riyadh has put its hardly minor strengths
behind the American effort. Domestically, the Saudis are trying to reshape
their religious establishment in order to move beyond extremism and terrorism.
This is an extremely risky move, to say the least. In the coming year, the
Saudis will be heavily engaged in this process and could experience some stiff
resistance.
In 2008 this re-alignment will reshape not just Iraq, but the Muslim
world as a whole while the United States and its allies clamp down on those
entities still resisting American power.
The first of these powers is Iran. While Iran retains many levers in
the Persian Gulf region in general and Iraq specifically, it lacks the strength
to resist the United States when the United States is backed up by the full
constellation of Sunni states. This hardly means that Iran will roll over. The
Shiite militias, Tehran’s relations with Moscow and Damascus, its nuclear
program and a military that continues to build out — all give Iran the ability
to exact from the Americans a price for Iranian cooperation in Iraq. The year
2008 will be about Iran using those tools to determine that price. Part of this
process will formalize not only the drawdown of U.S. forces from Iraq, but also
the level to which U.S. forces will remain in-country for the foreseeable
future. Ultimately, 2008 will be about Iran crafting a compromise that it can
stand, and then preparing its people for a rapprochement with the “Great Satan”
(a difficult task that will be mirrored in the United States).
The second power is Syria, which participates in this drama as both an
object and an actor. Iran uses Syria as a token in its wider dealings with the
United States, and yet Syria’s ability to influence Lebanon, Israel and Iraq
directly enables it to negotiate in its own right as well. In 2008, Syria will
seek a deal with Washington that will allow Damascus pre-eminence in Lebanon
and a leg up in negotiations with Israel in exchange for an end to activities
that complicate the American position in Iraq. Assuming that negotiations
between Washington and Tehran do not fall apart, Damascus will get its wish.
One associated development of this will be a desire on Syria’s part to avoid
provoking Israel on one hand and to reduce the ability of Hamas to maneuver on
the other. Though Damascus will obviously still closely coordinate its actions
with Iran, for its own reasons Syria could seem to start acting like a U.S.
ally.
If there is a state that would suffer from a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement, Syrian domination of Lebanon and the unification of the Sunni
powers of the Middle East into a singular power bloc, it is Israel. Israel’s
midterm goal is to keep the Palestinians ideologically, militarily,
geographically and organizationally divided between Fatah in the West Bank and
Hamas in the Gaza Strip in order to preclude absolutely the formation of a
meaningful Palestinian state. For its own reasons, however, the United States
needs to see at least a modicum of progress on this front.
That places American and Israeli interests in stark opposition in 2008.
A bizarre alignment of interests will see Israel working to keep the United
States engaged in hostilities in Iraq, for while the United States is tied down
in Mesopotamia and a deal with Iran remains elusive, U.S. pressure on Israel to
deal with the Palestinian issue will be light. We do not see this as a
deal-killer for Washington and Tehran, but it is bound to generate unexpected
complications for U.S. efforts to stabilize its Middle East policies. Israel
also will need to keep its eye on Hezbollah this year while the Shiite militant
organization rebuilds itself in southern Lebanon and works with Syria to force
a withdrawal of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon. The pieces are in place for
another outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, but as long as
Israel feels unprepared to deal with Hezbollah politically and militarily, this
conflict could be pushed off another year.
The final entity that will see its fortunes reshaped by the shifting
alignments are the jihadists themselves. For years, many Sunni powers have
exported their militants in order to prevent the eruption of problems at home.
As Iran and the United States begin cooperating in Iraq, Iraq will no longer be
a theater of operations for these jihadists. The year 2008 will see sharply
higher success rates in eliminating these jihadists in Iraq, and rising
security problems in the states of their origin as many jihadists attempt to
return home to unwelcoming governments.
Largely separate from the ongoing Iraqi drama a new power will arise —
or, more accurately, an old power will re-arise. For nearly the past century Turkish power in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean has
been quiescent as the Cold War has dictated Ankara’s security parameters. But
since the Cold War’s end the Balkans have evolved violently, Russia has
retreated and now is resurging into the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Arab
world has witnessed a huge influx of American power, Iran is seeking to expand
its sphere of influence and Iraq has collapsed.
In the center of this storm of activity, Turkey has
strengthened its military and economy and achieved a degree of political coherence
it has not known in decades. For the first time since the end of World War I,
Turkey has the need to be involved in its immediate neighborhood independent of
its alliance structure and the means to be involved decisively. Yet none of the
challenges and opportunities clamoring for Turkey’s attention is mission
critical; all could be ignored. What Ankara lacks is a direction to focus its
efforts. The year 2008 will be about Turkey selecting that direction — specifically,
deciding whether its chosen goals can be pursued within the structure of
alliance with NATO and the United States. Turkey’s full force will not be
brought to bear — and its impact upon the alliance not felt — until at least
2009.
Former Soviet Union
Russia enters 2008 in the strongest geopolitical position it has known
since the Cold War’s end. The rampant decay of its military has largely been
halted, new weapons systems are beginning to be brought on line, the country is
flush with petrodollars, its debt has vanished, the Chechen insurgency has been
suppressed, the central government has all but eliminated domestic opposition,
the regime is popular at home, and the U.S. military is too locked down to make
more than a token gesture to block any Russian advances.
Yet Russia faces challenges to match its power. Chinese pipelines to Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan (to be constructed in 2008) threaten to divert the energy that
until now could only flow northward and serve Russian purposes. NATO and the
European Union occupy Russia’s entire western horizon and are flirting with
expanding their memberships. Rising defense modernizations in Asia are forcing
Russia to deal with two military fronts — something at which Moscow never
really succeeded during Soviet times. And the European Union plans to separate
Kosovo from Serbia, making a mockery of the Kremlin’s efforts to keep the
province attached. Finally, while Russia’s military is improving, it still
faces massive challenges — ranging from a bloated and unskilled conscription
force to mass corruption within the officer corps that siphons away a sizeable
minority of resources the Kremlin is allocating to the military.
If Russia is to secure its long-term future in the face of a rising
China and ever-expanding EU and NATO, 2008 must be the year of action.
The former Soviet Union region will have three main developments in
2008. First, the consolidation that began in Russia’s energy sector in 2003
will culminate. This will be the year that state giants Rosneft and Gazprom
swallow up — whether formally or through “alliances” — most of the remaining
independent players in the country’s energy industry.
This is being done not just to solidify central control — although that
is a leading reason — but also to strengthen what has become Russia’s most
reliable foreign policy tool. The year 2007, however, could well have been the
high point in Russia’s ability to influence Europe with control of its energy
policies. In 2008 a number of natural gas import projects will begin operation
in Western Europe, reducing that region’s dependency on Russian energy and
allowing the Western European states to be more dismissive of Russian
interests.
Second, and far more important, the Russians need a defining
confrontation with the West. Russian power is at a relative peak, and American
power at a relative low. It is a temporary circumstance certain to invert as
the United States militarily extricates itself from Iraq, and one that Russia
must exploit if it seeks to avoid replicating the geopolitical retreat of the
1990s. By “confrontation” we do not necessarily mean a war — simply a clash
that starkly lays bare Russia’s strengths against Western weaknesses.
This requires adjusting EU and NATO attitudes so they both deeply
consider Russian national interests in their decision-making. The Kremlin must
publicly display that it can make the West back down. Success would adjust
perceptions of pro-Western forces throughout the former Soviet Union and
significantly boost Russia’s efforts to expand its influence. Failure would
entrench the opposite.
There are a number of places where Russia might create such a decisive
challenge, but the most logical place is Kosovo. While the West is prepared to
rubberstamp Kosovo’s independence, there is little of military, economic or
political value there for the West. For Russia — which has publicly invested
much political capital in opposing Kosovar independence — European success
would be more than a slap in the face. It would undermine Russian power at a
fundamental level and demonstrate that even the European Union — whose unity on
issues of foreign policy is shallow and whose military capability as a coherent
whole is negligible — can simply ignore Moscow.
Moscow must prevent this from happening, and it is likely that some
sternly quiet conversations with the Europeans will be successful at (yet
again) pushing back a final decision on Kosovo. Simply put, for the Western
world, Kosovo is not even remotely worth an escalating conflict with Russia.
There are many other options, of course. The former pro-Western Soviet
republic of Georgia, long a thorn in Moscow’s side, has two secessionist
regions that rely on Russia for their economic and military existence. Russia
could easily absorb them outright and thus break the myth that American
protection in the Caucasus is sustainable. Gazprom could swallow up
Russian-British joint oil venture TNK-BP, destroying billions in U.K.
investment in a heartbeat. Union with Belarus would return the Red Army to the
European frontier and turn the security framework of Eurasia inside-out
overnight.
And once again there is Ukraine, which just finally elected the
anti-Russian Yulia Timoshenko as prime minister.
Timoshenko has sworn to counter Russian influence in Ukraine’s energy sector
and push back against Russia’s natural gas price hikes. The year 2008 could
look eerily similar to the end of 2005, when Gazprom cut natural gas supplies
to Ukraine, hitting Europe particularly hard. Then again, Russia could use the
Ukraine conflict as an excuse to cut supplies to Europe anyway.
However, the third trend of 2008 is a monumental obstacle to Russia
achieving its goals: an internal clan war. After years of turning Russia’s
various factions against each other, Putin has finally secured control for his
inner circle. But now that inner circle is tearing itself apart. For the most
part, this is what good governance looks like for an authoritarian leader —
Putin constantly has to arrange for internal feuds to keep the various power
brokers from setting their sights on him. But this has led to fratricide across
the Russian landscape, with the most pitched battles being fought in the
justice, defense and energy spheres, bleeding away energy that could otherwise
be used to further Russia’s international agenda.
There is one final problem that Russia faces, and at present the
Kremlin is unwilling even to admit that problem exists. China is stealing
Central Asia, building a network of infrastructures that will make it more
attractive for the Central Asian states to integrate with China than to use
Soviet-era links to Russia.
The key is Kazakhstan, the only Central Asian state to share a border with
Russia. Should Astana shift into China’s sphere, all of the other Central Asian
states not only will find it in their best economic interests to follow, but
also will enjoy the buffer of the world’s sixth-largest country (in terms of
land area) between them and an angry Russia. It is nearly certain that Russian
diplomats are going to have some very direct heart-to-hearts with their Kazakh
counterparts, and we do not rule out some accidental polonium poisonings in
Astana in 2008. Failing that, this could well go down in history as the year
Moscow “lost” Central Asia.
The Central Asian problem is about more than simply resources. While
Russian diplomats have long waxed philosophic about a multipolar world in which
Russia and China team up to reduce U.S. influence, the truth is that not only
do Moscow and Beijing not trust each other — each would quickly sell the other
one up the river in order to cozy up to the United States. Russia’s need to
pave a path to confrontation to the West almost dictates that China will
attempt to be the best friend Washington could ever have. Russia will have to
play hardball to keep Central Asia, and China will likely have U.S. economic
and political assistance in countering.
Sub-Saharan Africa
The coming year will see the major stakeholders in Africa — France, the
United States, China, Nigeria and South Africa — shift their priorities to
other affairs.
While it still will intervene to protect its citizens and economic interests,
France under a non-Gaullist government will have less time for flag-waving in
its former African colonies. When interference is necessary in Francophone
Africa in circumstances of little obvious payout, Paris will be more likely to
seek international intervention than to keep such actions strictly French
affairs.
The United States will remain engaged in anti-jihadist Special Forces
operations in Somalia, but its actions in Africa will be slight; most U.S.
activity instead will be limited to Saudi Arabia and Iran. What does happen in
Africa from the American point of view will be largely limited to paperwork. In
2008, the Pentagon will launch the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), but little
more than the forging of initial partnerships and the groundbreaking of its
Africa-based administrative headquarters or logistics hub in the region is
likely this year. That base probably will be established in one of the island
states of the Gulf of Guinea: Equatorial Guinea or São Tomé and Príncipe.
China will use its sovereign wealth fund to secure mineral and energy
assets in the region, but these investments will be only a tiny fraction of the
money available to Beijing — most of which will go either to Chinese domestic
investments or to solicit the involvement of Western financial institutions in
Chinese economic reform. In order to avoid abandoning its Olympic moment to
charges of hosting the “Genocide Olympics,” China likely will keep a low
profile on the continent in 2008. Beijing also will use its responsible
stakeholder arrangement with Washington to encourage dialogue between Darfuri
rebel groups and the Sudanese government (though the Darfur conflict itself is
not expected to end any time soon).
Nigeria, often the mover and shaker in West Africa, will appear mostly
introspective in 2008. In the wake of the 2007 elections, the country is in the
process of re-establishing the river of bribes that holds its political system
together, giving it little bandwidth for dealing with extra-Nigerian affairs.
Normally, such a period of transition would be a time of much strife, but the
2007 elections resulted in the political elite of the Niger Delta’s dominant
Ijaw tribe gaining the vice presidency. Add in strong, if slightly lower, oil
prices and the country’s Ijaw nationalists have both representation and extra
cash. The Niger Delta still will be a dangerous place where the military cannot
effectively project power and attacks against energy infrastructure are
endemic, but with the region’s elite occupied in Abuja, these political patrons
and their militant proxies back home have no desire to bring the energy
infrastructure to a crashing halt. They have (most of) what they want. Export
interruptions will be infrequent in timing and intermediate in severity — a far
cry from the major sustained disruptions that occurred in the lead-up to last
year’s presidential election.
South Africa, the final power player, is locked in a succession
struggle that Jacob Zuma seems sure to win, but that process will drag on for
most of the year. (The presidential election is not scheduled to be held until
2009.) The distraction largely will freeze the expansion of South African
influence in southern Africa until Zuma formally takes the place of lame-duck
President Thabo Mbeki.
However, while the normal players are busy with other issues, there is
one new player that will cut its teeth on the African scene: Angola. The
country’s civil war with the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) is over, rebels in the Cabinda province have been bought off or
otherwise pacified (in part by some 10,000 government troops) and its sophomore
oil industry soon will push through 2 million barrels per day of output. Add in
sizable and rising diamond production and the country will be able to have its
cake and eat it too.
Angola will be able to push out on all of its frontiers economically
and politically, and it is almost certain to toe across its borders to pursue the
niggling remains of its rebel movements and pre-empt any efforts to disrupt
Luanda’s plans for its oil and minerals sectors.
But such interventions would not necessarily be viewed as hostile.
Angola would be intervening to reinforce the governments of friendly regimes in
neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe — and especially in the two Congos — in order to deny those UNITA or Cabinda rebels
from using the states as staging grounds. Furthermore, such interventions would
not be limited simply to mitigating the effect of Angola’s own rebels. Should
those neighboring regimes face serious threats to their own grips on power —
for example, should the conflict simmering in the North Kivu region of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo spread westward and threaten President Joseph
Kabila’s government in Kinshasa — expect Angola to intervene to defend what it
sees as its first line of defense: its neighbors.
Normally, such aggressive Angolan activities, which would be tantamount
to establishing a sphere of influence, would be countered by a constellation of
other powers, particularly South Africa — but not in 2008.
Sidebar: While official statements might say otherwise, Sudan will
maintain thousands of troops in the South’s oil-rich states — the country’s
economic lifeline. Khartoum will use a number of excuses but will rely heavily
on the cover of joint patrols with Sudan People’s Liberation Movement units to
maintain its troop presence in the South.
Latin America
Latin American history is dominated by a singular thought: that the
solution to the region’s problems lies somewhere beyond the continent. During the
past few years the region began breaking away from that mindset, with many
Latin American states tinkering with policies to take matters in their own
hands. This occurred on both the left and right. Venezuela sought to use its
energy resources to drive Western oil firms from the region. Colombia buckled
down for war rather than wholly rely upon foreign aid. Argentina walked away
from its foreign debt, and Brazil began building its own infrastructure with
its own money.
Yet Russia faces challenges to match its power. Chinese pipelines to
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (to be constructed in 2008) threaten to divert the
energy that until now could only flow northward and serve Russian purposes.
NATO and the European Union occupy Russia’s entire western horizon and are
flirting with expanding their memberships. Rising defense modernizations in
Asia are forcing Russia to deal with two military fronts — something at which
Moscow never really succeeded during Soviet times. And the European Union plans
to separate Kosovo from Serbia, making a mockery of the Kremlin’s efforts to
keep the province attached. Finally, while Russia’s military is improving, it
still faces massive challenges — ranging from a bloated and unskilled
conscription force to mass corruption within the officer corps that siphons
away a sizeable minority of resources the Kremlin is allocating to the
military.
If Russia is to secure its long-term future in the face of a rising
China and ever-expanding EU and NATO, 2008 must be the year of action.
The former Soviet Union region will have three main developments in 2008.
First, the consolidation that began in Russia’s energy sector in 2003 will
culminate. This will be the year that state giants Rosneft and Gazprom swallow
up — whether formally or through “alliances” — most of the remaining
independent players in the country’s energy industry.
This is being done not just to solidify central control — although that
is a leading reason — but also to strengthen what has become Russia’s most
reliable foreign policy tool. The year 2007, however, could well have been the
high point in Russia’s ability to influence Europe with control of its energy
policies. In 2008 a number of natural gas import projects will begin operation
in Western Europe, reducing that region’s dependency on Russian energy and
allowing the Western European states to be more dismissive of Russian
interests.
Second, and far more important, the Russians need a defining
confrontation with the West. Russian power is at a relative peak, and American
power at a relative low. It is a temporary circumstance certain to invert as
the United States militarily extricates itself from Iraq, and one that Russia
must exploit if it seeks to avoid replicating the geopolitical retreat of the
1990s. By “confrontation” we do not necessarily mean a war — simply a clash
that starkly lays bare Russia’s strengths against Western weaknesses.
This requires adjusting EU and NATO attitudes so they both deeply
consider Russian national interests in their decision-making. The Kremlin must
publicly display that it can make the West back down. Success would adjust
perceptions of pro-Western forces throughout the former Soviet Union and
significantly boost Russia’s efforts to expand its influence. Failure would
entrench the opposite.
There are a number of places where Russia might create such a decisive
challenge, but the most logical place is Kosovo. While the West is prepared to
rubberstamp Kosovo’s independence, there is little of military, economic or
political value there for the West. For Russia — which has publicly invested
much political capital in opposing Kosovar independence — European success
would be more than a slap in the face. It would undermine Russian power at a
fundamental level and demonstrate that even the European Union — whose unity on
issues of foreign policy is shallow and whose military capability as a coherent
whole is negligible — can simply ignore Moscow.
Moscow must prevent this from happening, and it is likely that some
sternly quiet conversations with the Europeans will be successful at (yet
again) pushing back a final decision on Kosovo. Simply put, for the Western
world, Kosovo is not even remotely worth an escalating conflict with Russia.
There are many other options, of course. The former pro-Western Soviet
republic of Georgia, long a thorn in Moscow’s side, has two secessionist
regions that rely on Russia for their economic and military existence. Russia
could easily absorb them outright and thus break the myth that American
protection in the Caucasus is sustainable. Gazprom could swallow up
Russian-British joint oil venture TNK-BP, destroying billions in U.K.
investment in a heartbeat. Union with Belarus would return the Red Army to the
European frontier and turn the security framework of Eurasia inside-out
overnight.
And once again there is Ukraine, which just finally elected the
anti-Russian Yulia Timoshenko as prime minister.
Timoshenko has sworn to counter Russian influence in Ukraine’s energy sector
and push back against Russia’s natural gas price hikes. The year 2008 could
look eerily similar to the end of 2005, when Gazprom cut natural gas supplies
to Ukraine, hitting Europe particularly hard. Then again, Russia could use the
Ukraine conflict as an excuse to cut supplies to Europe anyway.
However, the third trend of 2008 is a monumental obstacle to Russia
achieving its goals: an internal clan war. After years of turning Russia’s
various factions against each other, Putin has finally secured control for his
inner circle. But now that inner circle is tearing itself apart. For the most
part, this is what good governance looks like for an authoritarian leader —
Putin constantly has to arrange for internal feuds to keep the various
power brokers from setting their sights on him. But this has led to fratricide
across the Russian landscape, with the most pitched battles being fought in the
justice, defense and energy spheres, bleeding away energy that could otherwise
be used to further Russia’s international agenda.
There is one final problem that Russia faces, and at present the
Kremlin is unwilling even to admit that problem exists. China is stealing
Central Asia, building a network of infrastructures that will make it more
attractive for the Central Asian states to integrate with China than to use
Soviet-era links to Russia.
The key is Kazakhstan, the only Central Asian state to share a border with
Russia. Should Astana shift into China’s sphere, all of the other Central Asian
states not only will find it in their best economic interests to follow, but
also will enjoy the buffer of the world’s sixth-largest country (in terms of
land area) between them and an angry Russia. It is nearly certain that Russian
diplomats are going to have some very direct heart-to-hearts with their Kazakh
counterparts, and we do not rule out some accidental polonium poisonings in Astana
in 2008. Failing that, this could well go down in history as the year Moscow
“lost” Central Asia.
The Central Asian problem is about more than simply resources. While
Russian diplomats have long waxed philosophic about a multipolar world in which
Russia and China team up to reduce U.S. influence, the truth is that not only
do Moscow and Beijing not trust each other — each would quickly sell the other
one up the river in order to cozy up to the United States. Russia’s need to
pave a path to confrontation to the West almost dictates that China will
attempt to be the best friend Washington could ever have. Russia will have to
play hardball to keep Central Asia, and China will likely have U.S. economic
and political assistance in countering.
Continue to our April 2 Update:
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