Looking across the Demilitarized Zone that separates North and South Korea, one sees a  terrain that looks very dangerous if not scary. Since the end of World War II and primarily through the actions of external powers, the Korean peninsula has been divided-with North and South Korea engaged in a competition for the heart and soul of the Korean nation and international legitimacy. Some experts have referred to the peninsula as one of the last vestiges of the Cold War.

In this context, the United States and other countries are attempting to  convince North Korea to terminate this atomic weapon program, an effort complicated by policy differences between the United States and South Korea regarding the Pyongyang regime.

The United States has said Pyongyang failed to meet a Dec. 31, 2007, deadline to deliver a list of all of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, equipment and materials. However, North Korea has said it met the deadline but the United States is stalling by not moving forward with removal of Pyongyang from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Despite the public bickering, there is a less harried atmosphere behind the scenes as the diplomatic maneuverings continue, albeit at the typical snail’s pace of North Korean negotiation tactics.

In U.S. President George W. Bush’s Jan. 28 State of the Union address was a rather obvious lack of mention of North Korea or the denuclearization process. In each of his preceding State of the Union addresses, North Korea was singled out — either to highlight the multilateral process to dismantle Pyongyang’s nuclear programs (2007, 2005, 2004, 2003) or to criticize North Korea’s regime, human rights practices or highlight its nuclear and weapons threat (2006, 2003, 2002), including the infamous “Axis of Evil” remark in 2002. Bush’s omission raised instant questions as to whether he had abandoned the six-party processes or his focus on nonproliferation and denuclearization. But neither is the case.

Rather, the process has taken on its own purpose - to at minimum manage North Korea, shape the development of Northeast Asian relations and provide an opening, if Pyongyang chooses, to end its nuclear program. There is still quite a bit of disagreement in Washington, Seoul and even Beijing as to whether North Korea - and Kim Jong Il in particular - actually ever plans to peacefully give up its nuclear weapons. Dismantling the Yongbyon nuclear facility is easy - it is outdated and North Korea already has plutonium stored up. Giving up the nuclear devices, on the other hand, is a much more difficult decision to make.
Though there is little consensus on interpreting North Korea’s plans, there is at least tacit agreement that, at least through the end of Bush’s term, there should be a clear demonstration to Kim that the benefits of giving up his nuclear program outweigh the benefits of keeping it. This is certainly a hard sell, but some argue that the process at least keeps the idea on the table and prevents Pyongyang from adding to regional instability. The formalization of the multilateral process serves as an effective management tool and gives greater transparency (relatively speaking, like mud is more transparent than a concrete wall) to North Korean behavior.

But the process also serves another purpose - shaping the evolution of Northeast Asian relations. China likes the six-party process because Beijing takes a central role and can influence Washington’s behavior in the region - at least to some extent. But China also is planning to use this year to step up its relations with its neighboring big powers, particularly India and Japan, while the United States turns inward and focuses on the election and keeps its foreign eye on the Middle East. By using the six-party system, Washington not only keeps an eye on North Korea, but also on the evolving relations in Northeast Asia - and that keeps the United States clearly involved in whatever regional initiatives there may be.

There clearly is no guarantee that the current process of dealing with North Korea will be any more successful than any previous process. Even if the end goal might ultimately prove unachievable and Pyongyang once again takes the incentives and backs out of its part of the bargain, Washington - despite differences of opinion on the subject - has tentatively agreed that maintaining the process offers more benefits than intentionally or inadvertently trying to sink the process. And this means keeping it low-key; neither raising expectations back at home (which might give North Korea a sense of greater leverage) nor criticizing or threatening North Korea and Kim (which simply throws up speed bumps in the process). Having already tested its nuke, North Korea has little ability to escalate the stakes further, so Washington and Seoul have agreed to discount urgency in favor of management. So long as North Korea is engaged in the process, hard deadlines will be allowed to slip while benchmark goals will be the focus.

http://soc.world-journal.net/AsianWars.html


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