When I announced this article on 6 Nov I suggested that the US is quietly starting to back the movement to topple Syria's President Bashar Assad. His removal would knock over the Islamic Republic's strongest strategic pillar and sever Tehran's access to the Mediterranean and direct link to its Lebanese proxy Hizballah, the only credible pro-Iranian military force in the Middle East.

Yesterday the Syrian opposition has called on foreign powers to intervene on their behalf this while Arab League countries mull ending all commercial flights to Syria.

What is more however, intelligence sources claim that units of Western Special Forces and Persian Gulf nations will start moving into Syria. These small units are to take charge of Syrian army deserters (transfer them to the military training camps organized by the Turkish army) and to organize the flow of weapons from Lebanon and Turkey to the Free Syrian Army fighting inside the country.

But while these outside powers have a number of options to pressure or directly take on the Syrian regime, each is fraught with its own risks and drawbacks and none has a strong potential for success, making it unlikely that any country will choose to take more assertive action against al Assad at this point.

One of the less directly aggressive actions outside powers could take would be to set up a sanctuary for the opposition, including the FSA and the Syrian National Council, the rebel political body. Ankara already has established five refugee camps, hosting as many as 15,000 Syrians, on its side of the Turkish-Syrian border. Though these refugee camps exist to host Syrians fleeing violence, Turkey could, if it chose to do so, use them as cover for organizing, training and arming opposition fighters.

After receiving training, arms and intelligence at these locations, Syrian fighters could infiltrate their country with relative ease, considering the porous nature of the border, which has allowed thousands of Syrians to pass through to Turkish refugee camps. Meanwhile, these fighters could continue to find sanctuary on Turkish territory and use it as a base of operations. But even if Turkey decides against directly assisting the rebels (both Ankara and the rebels claim Turkey has not helped them thus far), it already hosts key opposition figures, whose presence gives Ankara an opportunity to help shape the opposition and to influence events across the border.

There are two main risks associated with creating sanctuaries and arming the opposition — regardless of whether that opposition is made up of former Syrian soldiers or of refugees who want to fight. First, the FSA comprises mainly low-ranking Sunni soldiers who defected from the Syrian army. They typically are armed with only the weapons and ammunition they were carrying at the time of their defection. Even if FSA members are given additional arms and training, every indication suggests that the Syrian army remains far more capable and united than were the forces of former Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi. This leaves even an aggressive effort to train, arm and advise the opposition with, at best, questionable prospects for bringing about an overthrow of the regime — and Turkey is unlikely to take such a provocative action without reasonable expectation for success. Even in the unlikely event the effort caused the Syrian regime to topple relatively quickly, ensuing chaos in Syria could lead an overwhelming number of immigrants to stream into Turkey. Given that preventing instability along Turkey’s border is its primary interest regarding Syria, Ankara would not want to risk such a consequence.

Second, by supporting a Syrian insurrection from within Turkey’s own borders, Ankara runs the risk of drawing retaliation — from conventional capabilities like Syria’s ballistic missile arsenal, but also via Syria’s and Iran’s Kurdish and Lebanese proxies. Kurdish militancy has increased in recent weeks, with an unprecedented attack in southeastern Turkey on Oct. 19 that killed at least 24 Turkish soldiers. A Kurdish offensive orchestrated by Iran or Syria, simultaneous with a proxy war run by Turkey on behalf of the Syrian rebels, adds up to exactly the sort of chaotic deterioration of the security environment Ankara seeks to avoid.

 

Special Operations Infiltration

Another option for challenging the Syrian regime is the insertion of foreign special operations forces into Syria. This would bring far more capable forces to bear against the Syrian military. These forces could advise and assist indigenous opposition forces more directly, establish better situational awareness inside the country and help with targeting — or even conduct strikes themselves. Foreign special operations forces were critical in turning the tide in Libya, particularly during the invasion of Tripoli.

However, for a campaign involving special operations forces to succeed, a significant existing force is required. In Libya, the rebels were numerous and their strength relative to that of the Libyan military was enough that they would not be crushed outright. In Syria, the FSA is extremely weak compared to the Syrian army. Syria’s internal security forces and intelligence apparatus are far more robust than were those of Gadhafi’s regime in Libya, so even the insertion of foreign forces would not be enough to seriously challenge the Syrian regime’s survival — and could put foreign troops at risk of exposure and capture. Small special operations teams could improve anti-regime fighters’ asymmetric capabilities — such as ambush proficiency, improvised explosive device emplacement, raids and small unit tactics — but this alone is not enough to take down the Syrian military.

Special operations infiltration would entail an extremely large political risk for gains that would be uncertain at best. Thus far, no foreign power appears interested in taking the risk.

Denying or Seizing Territory

The Syrian opposition has been clamoring for buffer zones to be established on Syrian territory, but specifics and serious proposals have been lacking. Buffer zones could be set up in a variety of ways. Aircraft and artillery operating mostly outside Syria’s border could be used to deny territory to the Syrian military; or foreign troops could physically seize territory. The Syrian opposition’s purported objective for these areas is to create one or more bases in Syrian territory in which it can mass forces. However, the idea likely represents more an attempt by the opposition to secure a political commitment from some foreign power. Essentially, this outside power would be drawn directly into the conflict, as it would take responsibility for the opposition’s safety within Syria proper. The opposition likely expects that, after securing this commitment, it would be easier to escalate foreign powers’ involvement against the Syrian regime.

There are a number of reasons foreign powers would be reluctant to make this sort of commitment. First, while mortars and artillery are useful in area denial, they are less useful in more crowded, complex environments where civilians and opposition figures are taking shelter. Aircraft or ground troops can be more discerning tools, though these would entail an invasion of the country or setting up a no-fly zone or air campaign, even if only on a limited scale. The risk of being ensnared in a full-scale occupation or of having to fight an insurgency inside Syria would be enough to deter foreign powers from establishing a buffer zone on Syrian territory.

No-Fly Zone

Perhaps the most assertive option would be the establishment of a no-fly zone or air campaign — essentially the approach used in Libya. Given its success in Libya, the possibility of employing this approach against the Syrian regime has been raised, even though there has been no confirmed use of the Syrian air force against the opposition. As in Libya, the no-fly zone would also require extensive suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses, command and control, and numerous other military targets.

An air campaign over Syria would have many of the same pitfalls as that in Libya but could prove even more dangerous, costly and protracted. The Syrian regime’s opponents are not as capable as the forces fighting Gadhafi, and unlike the relatively isolated Libya, Syria is in the heart of the Levant. Possible targets for retaliation sit within range of its ballistic missile arsenal and within the reach of various proxies and of its own special operations forces. Potential targets include Israel and the U.S. air base in Incirlik, Turkey.

The establishment of the no-fly zone in Libya also had a plausible casus belli: the impending assault on the rebel stronghold in Benghazi. To this point, there has been no threat on a similar scale in Syria to give foreign powers the incentive to enact a no-fly zone there. And until a strong opposition force emerges — or is built with the help of foreign powers — it is unclear what an extended bombing campaign might achieve.

Prospects for Intervention

While more aggressive action against Syria has been discussed, in reality Syria presents a fundamentally different set of circumstances than did Libya. Furthermore, the opposition has not fused into the kind of force that could seriously challenge the regime and thus offer foreign powers compelling reason to assist it militarily. Though foreign powers can choose from a range of military options, at this point none have a strong prospect of success and all entail considerable risks. The strength of the regime — and of its military and its internal intelligence and security capabilities — continues to provide a daunting deterrent to foreign intervention.

If however  the current planning for outer interference where to  come to fruition, then Syria will be partitioned in a manner that recalls the bisection of Libya last March, when a provisional rebel administration ruled from Benghazi and the Muammar Qaddafiregime held on for a time in Tripoli.

 A northern entity under anti-Assad opposition rule covering an area with a population of 6.5 million, 30 percent of the country’s total of 23 million. They will be kept going by assistance coming in from Turkey and Lebanon; and a southern entity, left initially under the rule of Bashad Assad in Damascus, until the northern sector can evolve into a beachhead for capturing the south as well.

Conclusion: One way to find out is to look for signs that indicate where foreign efforts to support a particular struggle. Yet we have to see either increased weapons or external weapons; for example Free Syrian Army (FSA) appears to be using the weapons with which they defected. Also, if outside powers are going to consider launching any sort of air campaign — or establish a no-fly zone — they will first have to step up surveillance efforts to confirm the location and status of Syria’s air defense systems. This will lead to increased surveillance assets and sorties in the areas very close to Syria. Aircraft used in the suppression of air defenses would also be flown into the theater before launching any air operation, and an increase in aircraft, such as U.S. F-16CJ and British Tornado GR4s in Cyprus, Turkey or Greece, is a key indicator to watch. Increased EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, both carrier-based aircraft that regularly transit the region aboard U.S. Carrier Strike Groups, would likewise be important to watch. Aircraft carrier battle groups, cruise missile platforms, and possibly a Marine Expeditionary Unit would also be moved into the region prior to any air campaign.

 

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