When
I announced this article on 6 Nov I suggested
that the US is quietly starting to back the movement to topple Syria's
President Bashar Assad. His removal would
knock over the Islamic Republic's strongest strategic pillar and sever Tehran's
access to the Mediterranean and direct link to its Lebanese proxy Hizballah, the only credible pro-Iranian military force in
the Middle East.
Yesterday
the Syrian opposition has called
on foreign powers to intervene on their behalf this while Arab League
countries mull ending
all commercial flights to Syria.
What
is more however, intelligence sources claim that units of Western Special
Forces and Persian Gulf nations will start moving into Syria. These small units
are to take charge of Syrian army deserters (transfer them to the military
training camps organized by the Turkish army) and to organize the flow of
weapons from Lebanon and Turkey to the Free Syrian Army fighting inside the country.
But
while these outside powers have a number of options to pressure or directly
take on the Syrian regime, each is fraught with its own risks and drawbacks and
none has a strong potential for success, making it unlikely that any country
will choose to take more assertive action against al Assad at this point.
One
of the less directly aggressive actions outside powers could take would be to
set up a sanctuary for the opposition, including the FSA and the Syrian
National Council, the rebel political body. Ankara already has established five
refugee camps, hosting as many as 15,000 Syrians, on its side of the
Turkish-Syrian border. Though these refugee camps exist to host Syrians fleeing
violence, Turkey could, if it chose to do so, use them as cover for organizing,
training and arming opposition fighters.
After
receiving training, arms and intelligence at these locations, Syrian fighters
could infiltrate their country with relative ease, considering the porous
nature of the border, which has allowed thousands of Syrians to pass through to
Turkish refugee camps. Meanwhile, these fighters could continue to find
sanctuary on Turkish territory and use it as a base of operations. But even if
Turkey decides against directly assisting the rebels (both Ankara and the
rebels claim Turkey has not helped them thus far), it already hosts key
opposition figures, whose presence gives Ankara an opportunity to help shape
the opposition and to influence events across the border.
There
are two main risks associated with creating sanctuaries and arming the
opposition — regardless of whether that opposition is made up of former Syrian
soldiers or of refugees who want to fight. First, the FSA comprises mainly
low-ranking Sunni soldiers who defected from the Syrian army. They typically
are armed with only the weapons and ammunition they were carrying at the time
of their defection. Even if FSA members are given additional arms and training,
every indication suggests that the Syrian army remains far more capable and
united than were the forces of former Libyan leader Moammar
Gadhafi. This leaves even an aggressive effort to
train, arm and advise the opposition with, at best, questionable prospects for
bringing about an overthrow of the regime — and Turkey is unlikely to take such
a provocative action without reasonable expectation for success. Even in the
unlikely event the effort caused the Syrian regime to topple relatively
quickly, ensuing chaos in Syria could lead an overwhelming number of immigrants
to stream into Turkey. Given that preventing instability along Turkey’s border
is its primary interest regarding Syria, Ankara would not want to risk such a
consequence.
Second,
by supporting a Syrian insurrection from within Turkey’s own borders, Ankara
runs the risk of drawing retaliation — from conventional capabilities like
Syria’s ballistic missile arsenal, but also via Syria’s and Iran’s Kurdish and
Lebanese proxies. Kurdish militancy has increased in recent weeks, with an
unprecedented attack in southeastern Turkey on Oct. 19 that killed at least 24
Turkish soldiers. A Kurdish offensive orchestrated by Iran or Syria,
simultaneous with a proxy war run by Turkey on behalf of the Syrian rebels,
adds up to exactly the sort of chaotic deterioration of the security
environment Ankara seeks to avoid.
Special
Operations Infiltration
Another
option for challenging the Syrian regime is the insertion of foreign special
operations forces into Syria. This would bring far more capable forces to bear
against the Syrian military. These forces could advise and assist indigenous
opposition forces more directly, establish better situational awareness inside
the country and help with targeting — or even conduct strikes themselves.
Foreign special operations forces were critical in turning the tide in Libya,
particularly during the invasion of Tripoli.
However,
for a campaign involving special operations forces to succeed, a significant
existing force is required. In Libya, the rebels were numerous and their strength
relative to that of the Libyan military was enough that they would not be
crushed outright. In Syria, the FSA is extremely weak compared to the Syrian
army. Syria’s internal security forces and intelligence apparatus are far more
robust than were those of Gadhafi’s regime in Libya,
so even the insertion of foreign forces would not be enough to seriously
challenge the Syrian regime’s survival — and could put foreign troops at risk
of exposure and capture. Small special operations teams could improve anti-regime
fighters’ asymmetric capabilities — such as ambush proficiency, improvised
explosive device emplacement, raids and small unit tactics — but this alone is
not enough to take down the Syrian military.
Special
operations infiltration would entail an extremely large political risk for
gains that would be uncertain at best. Thus far, no foreign power appears
interested in taking the risk.
Denying
or Seizing Territory
The
Syrian opposition has been clamoring for buffer zones to be established on
Syrian territory, but specifics and serious proposals have been lacking. Buffer
zones could be set up in a variety of ways. Aircraft and artillery operating
mostly outside Syria’s border could be used to deny territory to the Syrian
military; or foreign troops could physically seize territory. The Syrian
opposition’s purported objective for these areas is to create one or more bases
in Syrian territory in which it can mass forces. However, the idea likely
represents more an attempt by the opposition to secure a political commitment
from some foreign power. Essentially, this outside power would be drawn
directly into the conflict, as it would take responsibility for the
opposition’s safety within Syria proper. The opposition likely expects that,
after securing this commitment, it would be easier to escalate foreign powers’
involvement against the Syrian regime.
There
are a number of reasons foreign powers would be reluctant to make this sort of
commitment. First, while mortars and artillery are useful in area denial, they
are less useful in more crowded, complex environments where civilians and
opposition figures are taking shelter. Aircraft or ground troops can be more
discerning tools, though these would entail an invasion of the country or
setting up a no-fly zone or air campaign, even if only on a limited scale. The
risk of being ensnared in a full-scale occupation or of having to fight an
insurgency inside Syria would be enough to deter foreign powers from
establishing a buffer zone on Syrian territory.
No-Fly
Zone
Perhaps
the most assertive option would be the establishment of a no-fly zone or air
campaign — essentially the approach used in Libya. Given its success in Libya,
the possibility of employing this approach against the Syrian regime has been
raised, even though there has been no confirmed use of the Syrian air force
against the opposition. As in Libya, the no-fly zone would also require
extensive suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses, command and
control, and numerous other military targets.
An
air campaign over Syria would have many of the same pitfalls as that in Libya
but could prove even more dangerous, costly and protracted. The Syrian regime’s
opponents are not as capable as the forces fighting Gadhafi,
and unlike the relatively isolated Libya, Syria is in the heart of the Levant.
Possible targets for retaliation sit within range of its ballistic missile
arsenal and within the reach of various proxies and of its own special
operations forces. Potential targets include Israel and the U.S. air base in Incirlik, Turkey.
The
establishment of the no-fly zone in Libya also had a plausible casus belli: the
impending assault on the rebel stronghold in Benghazi. To this point, there has
been no threat on a similar scale in Syria to give foreign powers the incentive
to enact a no-fly zone there. And until a strong opposition force emerges — or
is built with the help of foreign powers — it is unclear what an extended
bombing campaign might achieve.
Prospects
for Intervention
While
more aggressive action against Syria has been discussed, in reality Syria
presents a fundamentally different set of circumstances than did Libya.
Furthermore, the opposition has not fused into the kind of force that could
seriously challenge the regime and thus offer foreign powers compelling reason
to assist it militarily. Though foreign powers can choose from a range of
military options, at this point none have a strong prospect of success and all
entail considerable risks. The strength of the regime — and of its military and
its internal intelligence and security capabilities — continues to provide a
daunting deterrent to foreign intervention.
If
however the current planning for outer
interference where to come to fruition,
then Syria will be partitioned in a manner that recalls the bisection of Libya
last March, when a provisional rebel administration ruled from Benghazi and the
Muammar Qaddafiregime held on for a time in Tripoli.
A northern entity under anti-Assad opposition
rule covering an area with a population of 6.5 million, 30 percent of the
country’s total of 23 million. They will be kept going by assistance coming in
from Turkey and Lebanon; and a southern entity, left initially under the rule
of Bashad Assad in Damascus, until the northern
sector can evolve into a beachhead for capturing the south as well.
Conclusion:
One way to find out is to look for signs that indicate where foreign efforts to
support a particular struggle. Yet we have to see either increased weapons or
external weapons; for example Free Syrian Army (FSA) appears to be using the
weapons with which they defected. Also, if outside powers are going to consider
launching any sort of air campaign — or establish a no-fly zone — they will
first have to step up surveillance efforts to confirm the location and status
of Syria’s air defense systems. This will lead to increased surveillance assets
and sorties in the areas very close to Syria. Aircraft used in the suppression
of air defenses would also be flown into the theater before launching any air
operation, and an increase in aircraft, such as U.S. F-16CJ and British Tornado
GR4s in Cyprus, Turkey or Greece, is a key indicator to watch. Increased EA-6B
Prowler and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, both carrier-based
aircraft that regularly transit the region aboard U.S. Carrier Strike Groups,
would likewise be important to watch. Aircraft carrier battle groups, cruise
missile platforms, and possibly a Marine Expeditionary Unit would also be moved
into the region prior to any air campaign.