There are numerous unconfirmed reports about a nationwide strike that was supposed to be observed June 23 but no indications of any successful attempts to mobilize workers. A work stoppage would be one way of avoiding the security crackdown, since it is more difficult for the authorities to make people report to work than to prevent them from taking to the streets.
This non-strike is very telling. Rumors had been spreading that public transportation companies would join the public protest and that their participation would be an important litmus test for the so-called revolution. Now everyone is backing away from the strike claim to avoid the perception that the movement is petering out.
As has been the case with the protests, the public leader of the opposition, former Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, has refrained from getting directly involved in any moves that could provoke the authorities or undermine the political system, which is currently under a considerable amount of stress. As a result, the public unrest appears to be slowly becoming autonomous, and protesters need a symbolic leader to make any headway.
There is a deep rift within the ruling establishment in Tehran however and this will continue to haunt the Islamic republic for the foreseeable future. Ahmadinejad’s policies have been exacerbated divisions that have long existed, especially since the 1989 death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Until fairly recently, his successor, Khamenei, kept this internal dissent contained by balancing between different factions that have controlled various state institutions. During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, the internal struggle has shifted: Where it once was a matter of the policy preferences of rival camps within a conservative-dominated political establishment, it has become a situation in which the nature of the Islamic republic’s political system is in question.
Because he is the first Iranian president who is not also a cleric, Ahmadinejad sought to strengthen his position by claiming that his policies were guided by the highly revered and hidden 12th imam of the Shia, the Mahdi. This claim has unnerved the clerics: It undermines their privileged position, not only in the Iranian political system but also in religious terms. The implication of this is that if laypeople have access to the messiah, there is no need for them to rely on clerics — who historically have had tremendous influence among the masses.
Meanwhile, the elite Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) is emerging as a powerful player in Iran, currently second only to the clerics. But as the clerical community becomes marred by internal disagreements and the aging ayatollahs who founded the republic anticipate the day when they will be succeeded by a second generation, the IRGC is very likely to emerge as the most powerful force within the state. The ayatollahs have used their religious position to control the ideological force; if they should become weaker, the non-clerical politicians and technocrats will have a tough time dealing with the IRGC.
The challenge for Rafsanjani and his allies is figuring out how to combat the growing power of Ahmadinejad without disrupting the systemic balance of power, which has become all the more unsteady in the wake of the electoral crisis, especially since Khamenei has indicated he is in favor of Ahmadinejad as president.
Ahmadinejad’s second term however will continue to see infighting among the rival conservative factions that constitute the political establishment.
The Iranian political system is a labyrinth of competing institutions made up of elected, quasi-elected and appointed officials. It is difficult to brand the Islamic republic as a pure theocracy, democracy or even an oligarchy. In reality, it is a blend of all three, where power traditionally has been concentrated in the hands of the religious elite and the right to rule comes from a mixture of divine right and the people.
Prior to 2005, when Ahmadinejad was elected to his first term as president, the political landscape in the country was roughly divided between reformists (who had risen to power during two-term President Mohammed Khatami’s time in office) and conservatives, who dominated the clerical political establishment. During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, however, a fissure opened up among the conservatives that pitted the so-called pragmatic conservatives, led by Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, against an emergent ultraconservative faction led by Ahmadinejad. This split intensified in the final years of Ahmadinejad’s last term but turned vicious after the June presidential vote.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has long attempted to remain above the fray of Iran’s factional politics, preferring to play the various blocs off each other to maintain his own position at the apex of the Iranian political system. But the fallout from the election was so severe that Khamenei had little choice but to directly intervene. The supreme leader took a calculated risk in coming out in support of Ahmadinejad and the hard-liners. This move prompted Rafsanjani’s pragmatic conservative camp to align temporarily with the reformists in a united front against the firebrand president.
Khamenei has continued to defend Ahmadinejad against powerful figures like Rafsanjani, but the supreme leader also understands that he needs to place limits on the president’s power, and it is to be expected that a third political front will rise loyal to Khamenei’s wishes but act as a counter to both Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani.
Khamenei understands the risks involved in endorsing a fraudulent election, but he knows the state’s security apparatus is more than capable of putting down the sporadic demonstrations in the streets. His biggest concern is subduing protests from powerful figures in the clerical establishment, including former president and Assembly of Experts chairman Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Majlis speaker Ali Larijani, who view Ahmadinejad as a fundamental threat to the system.
The back and forth over the election investigation will not strip Ahmadinejad of his victory, and Khamenei will not back down from his decision to uphold the results. Instead, the Guardians Council will use the extra time to clean up the books a bit more and make a stronger case that the election outcome stands in spite of the irregularities.
The battle among the ruling elite continues, but has thus far not shown any indication that it will break the regime. Larijani, who has a strong relationship with the supreme leader, continues to tread carefully and has limited his protest to using the Majlis as a forum to condemn the violence committed against protesters on the streets and to highlight the bias in the Guardians Council toward the president. Defeated presidential candidate and former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohsen Rezaie has meanwhile withdrawn his complaints over election fraud from the Guardians Council, stating in a letter to the council secretary, “The [current] political, social and security situation has entered a sensitive and decisive phase, which is more important than the election.” While this indicates that Khamenei’s behind-the-scenes maneuvering has had some effect in taming opposition from within the regime, Rezaie is unlikely to have given up this fight completely. Rezaie, who was IRGC commander during Rafsanjani’s presidential reign and is Rafsanjani’s deputy in the Expediency Council, remains a close ally to Rafsanjani and likely is resigned to working against Ahmadinejad from within the system.
Rafsanjani is still keeping his cards close to his chest. As chairman of two of the country’s most powerful institutions, he has considerable leverage over the supreme leader, but does not have an interest in breaking the core of the Islamic republic. Saudi-owned media have been reporting heavily on Rafsanjani’s actions, going so far as to claim that he is setting up an alternative clerical establishment in defiance of the supreme leader. However, there has been nothing to corroborate this information, and there is an incentive among such media to exaggerate the schisms in the Iranian regime. It appears that Rafsanjani will continue to stick to the confines of the existing clerical establishment to battle Ahmadinejad from within.
The size of the street demonstrations is dwindling, as expected. A small number of demonstrators gathered in Baharestan Square outside the Majlis and Revolutionary Court to protest the results and violence committed by local law enforcement and volunteer Basij militiamen, but the security forces were quick to disperse the crowds. The defiance on the streets, while significant in the longer run, in no way represents a mass revolution in Iran. A much-touted national strike planned for June 23 fizzled out completely, even after many in the Iranian diaspora claimed that the transport unions would take part. The bazaar merchants and other key social groups have not felt compelled to join the protests and take part in the demonstrations that have been dominated by young, educated urbanites.
Moreover, the demonstrators are lacking in leadership. Defeated presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi has not given any indication that he wishes to break with the state by leading violent street protests or by threatening a blow to the economy through a strike. He has thus far remained strictly within the confines of the law, with his newest demand to set up an independent body apart from the Guardians Council to probe the election. Mousavi likely knows by now that he is fighting a losing battle against the regime, and his options are narrowing by the day.
Several thousand miles away, U.S. President Barack Obama is under heavy domestic pressure to take a more forceful stance on the situation in Iran. In a press conference today, the president directly condemned the regime for its actions against the protesters, but was extremely careful not to reject the election results. From the beginning, Obama’s foreign policy agenda has emphasized dialogue with Iran and the president himself made clear that he understood Iran’s foreign policy would not change under new leadership.
Obama is attempting to hold this strategy together by refraining from rejecting the election victory of someone he intends to deal with anyway. However, for a number of reasons — from U.S. domestic pressures to a core Iranian disinterest in making concessions at this point — the U.S. strategy to engage with Iran is already being driven into the ground.
Given the current competition between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani — the factionalization of Iran will continue.
