It was clear that Belgium had an acute Islamist
militancy problem well before the news that several of those who killed 130
people in Paris on 13 November had grown up in Brussels and possibly plotted
the operation there. In the last 18 months a series of attacks have been
launched in, or from, the country.
Through the last decade, Belgian networks funnelled
volunteers to Afghanistan and Iraq. The current chaos in the Middle East drew a
new wave. Up to 500 Belgians are thought
to have travelled to Syria, one of the highest per capita totals anywhere
in Europe. Among them are around 50 women.
Montasser AlDe’emeh, who recently
wrote a book about it, said that those
young people who do go to Syria often return and try to stay inconspicuous.“They know that ISIS war will continue for
years,” AlDe’emeh said. “They can wait two years
before executing an operation.”
In the first half of the last decade, as European
security services struggled to understand the new threat they faced, and bombs
exploded in Madrid and London, Belgium was largely ignored. But given the
increasingly evident role that the country has played in the Paris
attacks, this
now looks like a mistake. By some estimates, Belgium has supplied the
highest per capita number of fighters to Syria of any European nation –between
350 and 550, out of a total population of 11 million that includes fewer than
half a million Muslims. This number is five times as much as even the British
export to Syria.
Then, since
2 am this morning, Belgium went on terror lockdown.
Any illusion of political unity on the terrorism issue
was shattered, when the main Flemish nationalist party once again accused the
Francophone Socialist party of "Islamo-socialism"
and failed to counter radicalism. This also in the leading
periodical knack: "Twenty years of laxity by the Socialist Party
and of Islamo-socialism have brought us where we
are today, with Brussels as the rear base for Islamic barbarism," lawmaker
Karl Vanlouwe, whose N-VA party is part of the
coalition government of Prime Minister Charles Michel, said in a vitriolic
article. As for the Belgian King, the news was released today that he
and his wife left for relaxation at a British spa.
So how did Belgium become a hotbed of radicalism?
Unlike France, Belgium has no unhealed wounds from colonial wars waged against
Muslims. (Most Belgian Muslims come from Morocco.) Unlike France, its
immigrants are not trapped in remote suburbs (they live right downtown, a few
blocks from the parliament buildings). Unlike France, Belgium has no rigid
national sense of identity that excludes outsiders. Many of its leaders are
tolerant, benign socialists.
In an essay published back in 1998 as part of the
piquantly titled book “Où va la Belgique?”
(Whither Belgium?) the academics Kris Deschouwer and Lieven De
Winter, however, gave a succinct, authoritative account of why Belgium has the
trappings of western political structures, but in practice, those structures
are flawed and have long been so.
Apart from the situation as per 1998, almost from the
beginning, they explain, the state suffered problems of political legitimacy.
Belgium came late, by western European standards, to
statehood. As in Italy, another latecomer, there were already existing
allegiances to the locality, and although Belgium’s liberal elite threw off
Dutch rule in 1830, it could neither uproot nor supplant these attachments to
the local community. That was followed in due course by the development of
a socialist/labor movement with its rival
structures for mutual assurance, cultural associations, newspapers.
Flemings and the Walloons have had to pay a heavy
price for the artificial, 'non-identity' state that the international powers
bestowed on them in 1830.
In “The Sorrows of Belgium”, Martin Conway
furthermore argues that the answers to the question “why did Belgium
fail as a nation-state?” lie first and foremost in the reestablishment of an
already outdated political structure that subsequently was unable to adapt to
further societal change.
As has been stated elsewhere, the
difficulties inherent to the maintenance of a bipolar system forcibly bring
about a zero-sum game.
The Belgian Federation is made up of
three so-called “Communities” - Flemish, Francophone and
German-speaking - and three “Regions” - Flanders, Wallonia (which includes nine
German-speaking municipalities) and Brussels. Broadly speaking, the Communities
deal with “people-related matters,” such as culture, education, youth
protection, etc., but not with social security nor health care,
because there the' solidarity principle' must prevail. The Regions deal with
'territory-related matters,' such as urban planning, environment, economic
development, employment, public works, transport, etc., but not with matters
that are regarded to be of strategic importance such as the railroads, the
postal services and Brussels international airport, which is located
in Zaventem in Flanders.
The Communities and the Regions all have their
parliaments and governments, but those of the Flemish Community and the Flemish
Region overlap, while the others do not. Hence, Belgium boasts six different
legislatures and six executives: apart from the federal parliament and
government, there are also the Flemish, the Walloon, the Brussels, the
Francophone and the German-speaking parliaments and governments. The federal
level decides about constitutional matters, foreign and defense policy, justice, the maintenance of law and
order, economic and monetary policy, and social security plus health care.
Because the welfare departments are federally organized, the “social transfers”
keep flowing from the Flemings to the Francophones. Fiscal issues have
also remained at the federal level, because, as the Walloon Socialist
leader Elio Di Rupo, said, 'lowering
taxes in Flanders is dangerous for the Belgian Union. This
will jeopardize the Belgian economic and monetary union. Moreover, it
is absurd to introduce divergences in taxation between Flanders and Wallonia at
a moment when a fiscal harmonization process is going on between the member
states of the European Union. (Quoted in De Standaard newspaper,
27 June 2000.) The Communities and the Regions receive most of their money
from the Belgian Federation according to a proportional stipend, with Flanders
receiving 55% from the Community pool and 57.5% from the Regional provisions,
although according to its tax contributions it is entitled to 64%.
In modern history usually, one nation is linked to one
language. The welding together of what shortly before were a part of two
different countries, in the case of Belgium, also became a danger that two
sub-nations would be developing: a Flemish nation and, albeit to a lesser
extent, a Walloon nation. Partly
driven by economic reasons the institutionalization of the territoriality
principle included the implementation of parallel monolingual networks for both
language communities. In doing so, contact between these communities in
official domains has been reduced to a minimum. Moreover, separate school
systems limit contact between the young generations of both language
communities. Language laws, which hamper the acquisition of other languages
than the community language, are not for bridging the gap either. Ironically
Belgium is also an exception in that language censuses are forbidden by
law.
Belgian consociative tradition
pushed toward the creation of two types of federated entities, each overlapping
with the other but placed on an equal footing, is unsustainable over the long
term. Far from solving the discrepancies of vision and ambition of the two main
partners of the federation, this formula has sustained confusion.
While a series of mechanisms of conflict prevention
are anticipated for a case in which a partner perceived a threat to federal
loyalty, these have more to do with consociationalism than with
federalism. In Belgium, this system is very limited, imperfect and does not
guarantee to take into account the whole set of actors within the
federation, notably regarding decisions that engage them.
One possibility is to make each constituent entity
politically responsible: making them participate in political decisions would
oblige them to back and shoulder these decisions. At a political level, the
Belgian solution could be a federal constituency where federal parties can
accrue the electoral legitimacy of representatives by making them accountable
and requiring them to campaign before all citizens and not just those of their
community. Additionally, education should also permit greater familiarity with
the other partners, of their language and reality.
In matters of public finance, it seems unwise to make
certain entities entirely dependent on financial transfers, especially if
powers are transferred but without providing the means to use them. If
asymmetry is not in itself a cause of tension, forced economic asymmetry can
only be problematic. On this particular point, it would be important for
Belgium to learn from foreign experiences, even though it would seem that the
permanent ambiguity between Communities and Regions, as well as the
destabilizing economic situation, are at the heart of the current
blockage.
The institutional complexity of asymmetrical federal
Belgium made its institutions almost impregnable. Political responsibility
became very difficult to pin down. Jurgen Goossens and
Pieter Cannoot have argued for
state reform with the aim of increasing the transparency of the current Belgian
institutional labyrinth.
But unwilling and unable to cut back its “social”
expenditure, the government had for decades neglected the state's primary duty:
the protection of its citizens. Since the mid-1970s, the police, and the
judiciary had no longer been given the necessary funds to function adequately.
The crisis expressed itself as a linguistic-political one in the aftermath of
the 1960s, but its origins lay in the inflexibility of the state to
adapt. Thus, Belgium for years has been the butt of European jokes,
thanks in large part to its dysfunctional politics. In 2010-11 squabbles over
the rights of Flemish-speakers on the outskirts of Brussels held up the formation
of a government for 589 days, a world record.
This also leads to the above question how did Belgium
become a hotbed of radicalism? Some examples will illustrate this:
Born in Tunisia in 1965, in the late 1980sTarek, Maaroufi moved to Belgium. Maaroufi also
masterminded the murder on 9 September 2001 of Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan.Twice, in 1992 and 1996, Tunisia asked the
Belgian authorities to extradite him. Twice Brussels turned the request down.
When in March 1995 the Belgian police arrested twelve members of
the Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA), Maaroufi was
one of them. By September 1997, however, the twelve had all been set free. The
unwillingness of the Belgian authorities effectively to imprison some of the
most dangerous terrorists, prompted Charles Pasqua,
the then French Interior Minister, to criticize Belgium for its lack of resolve
in the fight against international Islamic terrorism. (Committee I [Standing'
Committee Monitoring the Intelligence Services]. Jaarverslag 2001:
Rapport van het onderzoek naar de manier waal’Op de inlichtingendiensien aandacht hebben voor extremistische
en terroristische islamitische activiteiten activiteiten [Annual Report 2001: Report of the
Inquiry into the Ways in which the Intelligence Services Screen Extremist and
Terrorist Islamic Activivities]. Brussels:
Vast Cornite van Toezicht op
de Inlichtingendiensten,
2002,p.87.) France had been the main target of GIA
attacks, including the bombing of the Parisian Saint-Michel metro station on 25
July 1995 which killed seven people.
The Belgian authorities have always categorically
denied it, but it was rumored at the time
that Brussels had made a deal with the terrorists, agreeing to turn a blind eye
to conspiracies hatched on Belgian soil in exchange for immunity from attack.
In a GIA statement, addressing the Belgian King but posted to the French
Embassy in Brussels in June 1999, the terrorists explicitly referred to such a
deal dating from the summer of 1996.
In January 2001, the American secret services
discovered a plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Rome. According to the CIA, the
attack was planned by an al-Qaeda unit linked to Maaroufi,
who had by now become a Belgian. As such, he could travel freely to Italy. The
CIA informed the Belgian authorities that it would like to question Maaroufi, but Belgium did not comply.
Three months later, the Italian police rounded up an
al-Qaeda cell in Milan. The Milanese cell had been in regular contact
with Maaroufi. On 18 April, the Italian
authorities asked Belgium to arrest and extradite him. Again, Brussels refused,
arguing that it did not extradite Belgian citizens. Meanwhile, Maaroufi had recruited two men to murder Massood. One of them was Abdesattar Dahmane. Born in 1962 in Tunisia, he, too, had become a Belgian
citizen. After receiving training as suicide bombers, the two men traveled to Afghanistan. Posing as Belgian
journalists, they applied for an interview with Massoud.
Once they were in his presence, they detonated the explosives that they carried
on their persons.
The Massoud assassination
preceded the al-Qaeda attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington
by two days. But even after 9/11, Washington had to pressure Brussels for three
months to have Maaroufi arrested. The
Belgian authorities replied that they could not initiate an investigation for
crimes committed abroad. Brussels angered the Americans even more by declaring
that, if al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden were ever arrested in Belgium, he
would not be extradited to the US.
In May 2002, an inquiry ordered by a parliamentary
commission to ascertain what the Belgian secret service had done to screen
Islamic extremists in Belgium revealed that the Sureu:
de l'Etai had remained passive because
there were no indications that the terrorists would attack Belgian targets.
According to the report, the Surete had
allowed the Belgian Muslim community - numbering over 350,000 members to become
heavily infiltrated by fundamentalist extremists. Thirty of Belgium's 300
mosques, the report said, were run by fundamentalist clerics and had become
radical centers. (Committee I, p.
125.) Terrorists were being recruited among Muslims in schools, prisons,
hospitals and sports centers. The biggest mosque
in Belgium, the Great Mosque of Brussels, built in the Jubilee Park with Saudi
money on a piece of land donated by the late King Baudouin, operated its
“Islamic police,” supervising certain Brussels neighborhoods with
a large concentration of Muslims. It even organized paramilitary training. The
report referred to sermons at the Great Mosque calling Brussels “the capital of
the infidels,” openly supporting Osama bin Laden, and admonishing the faithful
to prepare for Jihad. (Committee I, pp. 113,119,
126-7.) According to the report, Brussels had become the ideal
logistics center for international Islamic
terrorist groups.
Other incidents bore this out, for example:
- On the 24th of May 2014: Attack on the Jewish museum
in the Belgian capital of Brussels leaves four killed: an Israeli
couple, a French and a Belgian employee of the museum were shot dead
by French ex-Syria jihadist Mehdi Nemmouche.
- On the 13th of January 2015, the weapons used
in the Charlie Hebdo attack of Jan. 7 were traced back to the
Brussels train station Bruxelles Midi,
where they had reportedly been bought from a local arms trader by Amedy Coulibaly, who committed an attack on a Jewish
supermarket days later, on Jan. 9.
- On the evening of the 14th of January, Belgian
police searched several houses in the boroughs of Verviers, unrelated to the
recent Paris attacks. They arrested a group that had planned terrorist attacks
in Belgium, federal police spokesperson Eric Van der Sypt said. During the search warrant in Verviers,
certain suspects immediately opened fire with automatic
weapons at the special police forces, they opened fire for several
minutes before being neutralized. Two of the suspects were killed; a third one
was arrested.
The suspects were known jihadists who had returned
from Syria in the previous month. The Belgian secret service believed they were
about to carry out an attack on a police station and called in special
forces.
- On the 23rd of August, the man who tried to commit a
terrorist attack on board the Thalys train says he found
his Kalashnikov and the ammunition in a park near Brussels Midi. The
Moroccan Ayoub El Kahzzani got
on the train at the Brussels station and initiated the attack shortly afterward.
-On Friday the 13th of November, at least, two
terrorists living in Brussels/Molenbeek traveled to
Paris to cause carnage in the heart of the city. The killing spree took the
life of at least 129 and injured hundreds.
Prof. Ruud Koopmans, an expert on migration
and integration with the Berlin Social Science Center,
conducted a study of Muslim attitudes in several European countries in 2013.
Most of the people he surveyed were of Turkish and Moroccan descent. He found
that Islamic fundamentalism is widespread. Two-thirds of the Muslims
interviewed said that religious rules are more important to them than the laws
of the country in which they live. Three-quarters said that there is
only one legitimate interpretation of the Koran. Both the extent of Islamic
religious fundamentalism and its correlates –
homophobia, antisemitism and “Occidentophobia”
– should be serious causes of concern, religiosity, Prof.
Koopmans added.
In Undercover
in Little Morocco, Moroccan-Belgian journalist Hind Fraihi reported on the prevalence of jihadi attitudes
among young people in Molenbeek, one of Brussels’s largest
Muslim enclaves. She found that the young men in Molenbeek talked
about martyrdom in a way she hadn’t experienced even when she was in Israel.
“They truly dream of their private hero tale,” Fraihi said,
“A few live with their head already in paradise. And yes, they truly believe in
those virgins that wait for you.” Fraihi reported
that the Muslim youth in Molenbeek routinely refer to Belgians as
“unbelievers” and boast about how they rob Belgians to support global jihad.
Jews feel especially besieged. In April 2015, a
Belgian insurance company refused to
renew The European Jewish Kindergarten’s insurance policy. The insurer said
that the recent growth of anti-Semitic attacks on Jewish organizations made the
risk of insuring the school too high. European Jewish Congress chief Moshe
Kantor has said, “It
is clear from the statistics and the feeling on the ground that the situation
for Jews of Europe hasn’t been as bad since the end of the Holocaust.” Belgian
government figures recorded 130 reports of anti-Semitic incidents last year, a
10-year high and a 50 per cent increase on the year before. But also here, of
course, Belgium is typified by a culture of denial, Jew hatred and a belief in related
conspiracy theories is no only shared by immigrants.
Several months ago, federal authorities sent the
Socialist mayor of Molenbeek, Françoise Schepmans,
a list containing 85 names of residents suspected of being radicalized,
including some that had returned from Syria. On the
list: Salah Abdeslam, now one of Europe’s most wanted men for his
suspected involvement in the Paris attacks; his brother Brahim, who detonated a suicide belt
there; and Abdelhamid Abaaoud, a
suspected plotter of the attacks. Also listed was Mohamed Abrini, a returnee from Syria, who was filmed
with Salah Abdeslam at a French gas station two days before the
Paris killings and is now also the subject of an international arrest warrant.
Lacking the power to do more, the commune checked if those suspected of leaving
for Syria were gone, removed those who were from its communal registers, and
left it at that.
Large-scale counter-terror investigations like the
ones that followed the Paris attacks or the Charlie Hebdo shootings
in January are run by the federal police and the state security services. But
the checkerboard approach on the local and regional level has weakened efforts
to stop radicalization in the first place. The problem with Brussels is
furthermore that it has the lowest capacity where it should have the most
capacity. Attempts to combine police forces into one for all of Brussels have
been quashed by the municipal mayors.
A former resident of Molenbeek, the war correspondent Teun Voeten,
however, wrote in Politico: "But the most important factor is Belgium’s
culture of denial. The country’s political debate has been dominated by a
complacent progressive elite who firmly believes society can be designed and
planned. Observers who point to unpleasant truths such as the high incidence of
crime among Moroccan youth and violent tendencies in radical Islam are accused
of being propagandists of the extreme-right, and are subsequently ignored and
ostracized.”
Whereby in the area of preventive strategies, another
administrative layer, comes into play. Education and social-welfare programs,
government services that could help spot changes in the disadvantaged young men
most at risk of radicalizing, are directed by the country’s three language
communities. Two of these, the Flemish and the French, are active in Brussels,
creating yet another barrier to a coherent anti-radicalization strategy.
The multiple layers of government cost money that ends
up lacking elsewhere. It isn’t that the public sector doesn’t expend ample
funds: close to 55% of the gross domestic product is spent by government. The
Netherlands, a country of 17 million, spends four times as much on its
intelligence service as does Belgium with 11 million people.
Although one could argue it is a Europe wide problem,
Belgium has also been stunningly ineffectual in curbing growing anti-Semitism
in recent years. Between terrorism and rising anti-Semitism, Belgian Jews are
asking themselves how safe they are.*
Jihadist street preachers have used anti-Semitism to
recruit followers. In Europe, religion does not drive young Muslims and
converts to Islam to the flame of jihad. Hatred does. And terrorists and their
supporters have exploited anti-Semitism to justify their violence.
In June 2008 I published an assessment of
Muslim integration in Europe. In it it mentioned
among others: “An anti-Muslim backlash from the extreme right seems probable on
a regional basis; Antwerp (Anvers) serves as an example, as do the Black
Country in Britain and London's East End, as well as Barking and Dagenham
(white working-class neighborhoods), parts of
Birmingham, and the electoral successes of the Front National in France (Drieux, Orange, Vitrolles, and
other cities). But it is doubtful whether this backlash will have decisive
nationwide consequences. Works of political science fiction have presented
scenarios in which Muslims (and Jews) have been expelled on twenty-four hours'
notice from Belgium (Jacques Neirynck, Ie siege de Bruxelles, Paris,
1996)."
In September 2011, a television crew filmed members of
Forsane Alizza, a French
extremist group, chanting for the death of Jews. A commentator on French news
remarked that it had been a while since that call was last heard in Paris. A
list of intended Jewish targets was found in the possession of the leader of Forsane Alizza when he was
arrested. The group was banned in 2012, but the type of Islamist extremism it
represented has only grown. Not to be outdone, right-wing demonstrators marched
through the streets of Paris in January 2014, singing the French national
anthem and chanting, “Juif, la France n’est pas a toi” - “Jew, France
is not yours.” Fouad Belkacem, the leader of
Sharia4Belgium, was initially jailed on hate speech charges related to gays and
Jews.
The members of the Franco-Belgian network responsible
for the Paris attack were all at some point influenced by street preachers
peddling anti-Semitism. Terrorists sent back to Europe by ISIS have
increasingly targeted Jews. Mehdi Nemmouche
shot dead four people outside the Jewish Museum in Brussels in 2014. Jews
were also targeted in the November 2015 attacks in Paris.
And in November last year, a rabbi in Antwerp was
stabbed in the throat on his way to deliver a sermon. Belgian government
figures recorded 130 reports of
anti-Semitic incidents last year, a 10-year high and a 50 per cent increase
on the year before.
Asking about the future, a Belgian friend of mine
opinionated; Belgian elections in four years will be crucial. My presumption it
that the resourcefulness that has seen Belgium through past political crises
can still be put to good use. But this time, cosmetic changes, or the usual
attitude of denial where the world’s ills are blamed on Western foreign policy,
in general, and when it concerns America, in particular, might not be enough.
But despite all the tension between Flanders and Wallonia, it seems unlikely
that the two will split into two countries anytime soon. In fact, everyone I
have asked seems to think it will never happen. When asked why, their answer is
one word: Brussels.
As for ISIS in Syria; like the terrorism expert Clint
Watts reminds us: “If
an extremist group that has seized territory starts to lose it, it will be
highly incentivized to turn to terrorist operations that allow for maximizing
effects at a lower cost.” Advances for the international coalition may
actually heighten the risk of more terrorism in the short run. The relationship
between loss of territory and launching attacks abroad is non-linear, it may
actually look more like a bell curve, and therefore hard to predict. It is fair
to assume, though, that if and when ISIS loses significant territory, it may
decide to compensate in an effort to underscore its relevance and create the
illusion of momentum, if not the substance. Its apocalyptic fantasies might
become more lurid, not less.
*Update, see for
example Belgian
school ignores anti-Semitism to avoid upsetting Muslims.
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