He
can't last more than a few months, the experts said. When months flew by, they
said it again: in just a few months he'll be gone. But ten months later,
universally hated and despised for his brutality, Bashar
Assad is still very much in control of his country.
A
few days ago Assad was even blasé enough to open embattled Syria for the first
time to US and European television crews and correspondents. They needed
permission to move out of their hotels in central Damascus – and then only with
Syrian officers in attendance, but they were allowed to interview opposition
members, film freed prisoners who had been tortured, and record the terrible
destruction wrought by the regime's tanks in Syrian flashpoint cities.
In
other words while Assad might have lost most of the Syrian people, he is still
the undisputed lord of his domain. But this might be about to change, yesterday
local residents in
Zabadani, an embattled mountain town near Damascus, say government troops
have pulled out after two days of fighting.
After
five days of alleged fighting in Zabadani, the Syrian
army and rebel forces reportedly reached a cease-fire, and the Syrian army pulled
back Jan. 18. This is a psychological pivot in the 10-monthlong Syrian
uprising. For the first time, the Syrian government conceded territory seized
by a rebel force. Thus events on the surface in
contrast to two month ago, now might start
to turn against Assad’s Alawite regime.
The
continued presence of Arab League monitors in the country could explain the
regime's apparent display of restraint in Zabadani.
The regime may fear that conducting a bloody crackdown, would generate
widespread condemnation of the regime that would turn the international
community further against the al Assad regime. In this scenario, the regime
could negotiate now and strike once the monitors leave. However, the recent
rift between Damascus and the Arab League - the Gulf states
leading the effort to increase Arab pressure on Syria - may not sufficiently
explain this scenario.
This
situation raises a key questions: Are al Assad's
forces capable of retaking Zabadani? Al Assad appears
weak right now. If he is not weak, he will soon act to prove it. Nevertheless,
the Syrian regime's response to reports of rebels taking control of Zabadani brings the Syrian uprising to a defining moment.
Compromise
happens when neither side can impose its will - and when each is afraid of
becoming weaker. A temporary cease-fire is one thing, but negotiations could
end up empowering the opposition, which could try to replicate successful
tactics and pressure the regime into making piecemeal concessions. The regime
can keep reverting to military force, but after 10 months that has not been
enough.
Zabadani
also gives outside powers something to help defend, should they choose to do
so. Intervening in a civil war against weak and diffused rebels is one thing.
Attacking Syrian tanks moving to retake Zabadani is
quite another. There are no indications that this is under consideration, but
for the first time, there is the potential for a militarily viable target set
for outside players acting on behalf of the rebels. The existence of that
possibility might change the dynamic in Syria.
However
the United States is reluctant to engage in yet another complex military
campaign with major spillover effects, along sectarian lines, in the wider
Islamic world. At the same time, the Syrian regime has calibrated its
crackdowns to avoid building the kind of moral pretense that led to the
military intervention in Libya. This dynamic has led the United States to
engage in quieter and less risky efforts to train and supply the Free Syria
Army (see below) in Turkey -- yet U.S. reticence toward military intervention
has also enabled the al Assad regime's survival.
The
al Assad regime can likely hang onto power for quite some time if the United
States continues to lack the bandwidth and political will to intervene in the
country. This is especially true if European powers remain too wrapped up in
their financial crisis to take military action, and as local parties opposed to
al Assad -- including Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia -- don't have the
capability to intervene.
Even
if it survives, the regime's clout in the region will emerge dramatically
reduced. Syria is already losing its leverage with Hamas -- and thus a powerful
tool against Israel -- now that Hamas’ exiled leadership is choosing to move
its headquarters from Damascus. Hamas is warming relations with Jordan, Egypt
and Qatar at the expense of the increasingly unpopular Iranian-backed Syrian Alawite regime.
Syrian
influence in Lebanon remains significant. But rebels are increasingly making
use of supply lines emanating from northern Lebanon, thus casting doubt on the
strength of the usually pervasive Syrian intelligence and security apparatus in
Lebanon. Without a strong presence there, the Syrian regime could see its
influence over its web of militant proxies decline -- and actors such as the
United States and Israel will see less reason to negotiate with Syria if
Damascus can no longer provide a reliable check on Hezbollah’s actions.
The
Syrian regime's diplomatic relationship with Ankara is also badly deteriorating.
Even if a surviving Syrian regime were able to re-establish relations with its
Turkish neighbor, Turkey's long-term priorities will continue to include the
replacement of the Alawite regime with a Sunni
government backed by Ankara.
Finally,
a surviving Syrian regime would be greatly isolated from the Arab world and all
the more dependent on Iran for support. But even Iranian support for the al
Assad clan is not iron-clad: While Tehran wants to maintain an Alawite regime favorable to Iranian interests,
Iran is not wedded to the al Assad clan. Russia, too, wants to maintain a
minority regime on the Mediterranean coast -- a regime more likely to turn to
Russia for foreign backing, rather than the United States or Turkey, and to
allow Russia to maintain a base at Tartus. Rumors
circulating in the region over the past couple of months suggest that Russia
and Iran have consulted on a possible exit strategy for the al Assad clan that
would leave Damascus with an Alawite regime friendly
to both countries. It is still too early to tell whether the al Assad clan
would acquiesce to such a plan while they might yet ride out the crisis. And
even if Moscow and Tehran could help execute a largely superficial regime
change, the move could backfire if new leaders are unable to consolidate
control and civil conflict breaks out. What is becoming increasingly evident,
however, is that survival for the Syrian regime will likely come at the cost of
significantly reduced regional clout for an extended period of time.
Free
Syria Army supply lines
The
Free Syria Army (FSA), consists of Sunni army
defectors and some Libyan mercenaries are backed by Turkey, Lebanon, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia. With a US-NATO-Turkish-Syrian
Rebel operation Center in Southern Turkey.
For
the FSA to hold and defend territory in Syria, it needs lines of supply for not
only weapons, but also food, water, communication devices, medical supplies and
other essentials which currently are as follows.
It
remains unclear whether the network that Syria has long relied on to maintain a
dominant position in Lebanon will be enough to meaningfully curtail support for
the FSA, particularly as the rebels involve sympathetic Sunni majorities near
the border. The large amount of resources needed to combat resistance at home
may be undermining Syrian intelligence efforts beyond its borders and giving
the FSA the space it needs to build up its defenses in Syria. Any rebel supply
lines from Lebanon will remain inherently vulnerable to the Syrian regime, but
the apparently increasing rebel traffic across this border does not bode well
for Syria's defenses at home or for its position in Lebanon.