By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

The Taliban

Far from a monolithic movement however, the term “Taliban” encompasses everything from old hard-liners of the pre-9/11 Afghan regime to small groups that adopt the name as a ‘flag of convenience’. Plus the Afghan-Pakistani border is an unnatural political overlay on a fragmented landscape that is virtually impossible for a central government to control.  

The Taliban groups also were never defeated in 2001, when the United States moved to topple their government in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. They largely declined combat in the face of overwhelmingly superior military force. Though they were not, at that moment, an insurgent force, their moves were classic guerrilla behavior, and their quick transition from the seat of power back to such tactics is a reminder of how well, and how painfully, schooled Afghans have been in the insurgent arts over the last several decades. 

While the U.S.-led coalition never stopped pursuing the Taliban, Washington ’s attention quickly shifted to Iraq. In Afghanistan, the mission quickly evolved from toppling a government in Kabul to combating a nascent insurgency in the south and east. U.S. officials, led by the American ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, first began the process of talking to the Taliban on the eve of the invasion of Iraq. All this took place while Washington continued to press Islamabad to do more against the Taliban.

And though it took the Taliban a while to regroup, a considerable vacuum began to grow in which the Taliban began to re-emerge, particularly amid poor, corrupt and ineffectual central governance. As early as 2006, it was clear that the Afghan jihadist movement had assumed the form of a growing and powerful insurgency that was progressively gaining steam; the situation was beginning to approach the point at which it could no longer be ignored. As the surge in Iraq began to show signs of success, the United States began to shift its attention back to Afghanistan. 

It was thus clear to the Taliban long before U.S. President Barack Obama’s long-anticipated announcement that some 30,000 additional troops would be sent to Afghanistan in 2010 that there would be more of a fight before the United States and its allies would be willing to abandon the country — a surge that is an attempt, in part, to reshape Taliban perceptions of the timeline of the conflict by redoubling the American commitment before the drawdown might begin. 

Overall, the Taliban ideally aspire to return to the height of their power in the late 1990s but realize that this is not realistic. That ascent to power, which followed the toppling of the Marxist regime left in place after the Soviet withdrawal and the 1992-1996 intra-Islamist civil war, was somewhat anomalous in that the circumstances were fairly unique to post-Soviet invasion Afghanistan. Today, the Taliban’s opponents are much stronger and far better equipped to challenge the Taliban than in the mid-1990s; this opposing force is as much a reality as the Taliban and has a vested interest in preserving the current regime. The old mujahideen of the 1980s, whom the younger Taliban displaced in the 1990s, have grown steadily wealthier since the collapse of the Taliban regime and are now well-settled and prosperous in Kabul and their respective regions, benefiting greatly from the Western presence and Western money. This is true of many urban areas of Afghanistan that have been altered significantly in the eight years since the U.S. invasion and have little desire to return the Taliban’s severe austerity. In many ways, this fight for dominance is between not only the Taliban and the United States and its allies; it is also between the Taliban and the old Islamist elite, the former mujahideen leaders who did their time on the battlefield in the 1980s. 

So, in addition to fighting the current military battle, there is a great deal of factional fighting and political maneuvering with other Afghan centers of power. At a bare minimum, the Taliban intend to ensure that they remain the single strongest power in the country, with not only the largest share of the pie in Kabul (the ability to dominate) but also a significant degree of power and autonomy within their core areas in the south and east of the country. But within the movement (which is a very diffuse and complex set of entities), there is a great deal of debate about what objectives are reasonably achievable. Like the Shia in Iraq, who originally aspired to total dominance in the early days following the fall of the Baathist regime and have since moderated their goals, the Taliban have recognized that some degree of power sharing is necessary. The ultimate objective of the Taliban, resumption of power at the national level, is somewhat dependent on how events play out in the coming years. The objective of attaining the apex of power is not in dispute, but the best avenue, be it reconciliation or fighting it out until the United States begins to draw down, and how exactly that apex might be defined is still being debated. 

But there is an important caveat to the Taliban’s ambitions. Having held power in Kabul , they are wary of returning there in a way that would ultimately render them an international pariah state, as they were in the 1990s. When the Taliban first came to power, only Pakistan , Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized the regime, and the group’s leadership became intimately familiar with the challenges of attempting to govern a country without wider international recognition. It was under this isolation that the Taliban allied with al Qaeda, which provided them with men, money and equipment. Now it is using al Qaeda again, this time not just as a force multiplier but, even more important, as a potential bargaining chip at the negotiating table. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s central leader, wants to get off the international terrorist watch list, and there have been signals from various elements of the Taliban that the group is willing to abandon al Qaeda for the right price. This countervailing consideration also contributes to the Taliban’s objective, and particularly the means to achieving that objective, remaining in flux. 

To understand the Taliban and their current strategy, it helps to begin with the basics. The Taliban are insurgents, and their first order of business is simply survival. A domestic guerrilla group almost always has more staying power than an occupier, which is projecting force over a greater distance and has the added burden of a domestic population less directly committed to a war in a foreign, and often far-off, land. If the Taliban can only survive as a cohesive and coherent entity until the United States and its allies leave Afghanistan , they will have a far less militarily capable opponent ( Kabul ) with whom to compete for dominance. 

Currently facing an opponent (the United States ) that has already stipulated a timetable for withdrawal, the Taliban are in an enviable position. The United States has given itself an extremely aggressive and ambitious set of goals to be achieved in a very short period of time. If the Taliban can both survive and disrupt American efforts to lay the foundations for a U.S./NATO withdrawal, their prospects for ultimately achieving their aims increase dramatically. 

And here the strategy to achieve their imperfectly defined objective begins to take shape. The Taliban have no intention of completely evaporating into the countryside, and they have every intention of continuing to harass International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops, inflicting casualties and raising the cost of continued occupation. In so doing, the Taliban not only retain their relevance but may also be able to hasten the withdrawal of foreign forces. 

Judging from their behavior pattern, what can likely be expected in Marjah and similar offensives in other areas, the Taliban strategy toward the surge will be: 1) largely decline combat but leave behind a force significant enough to render the securing phase as difficult as is possible for U.S.-led coalition forces by using hit-and-run tactics and planting improvised explosive devices; 2) once the coalition force becomes overwhelming, fall back and allow the coalition to set up shop and wage guerrilla and suicide attacks (though Mullah Omar has issued guidance that these attacks should be initiated only after approval at the highest levels in order to minimize civilian casualties). In all likelihood, this phase of the Taliban campaign would include attempts at intimidation and subversion against Afghan security forces. 

Being a diffuse guerrilla movement, the Taliban will likely attempt to replicate this strategy as broadly as possible, forcing ISAF forces to expend more energy than they would prefer on holding ground while impeding the building and reconstruction phase, which will become increasingly difficult as coalition forces target more and more areas. The idea is that the locals who are already wary about relying on Kabul and its Western allies will then become even more disenchanted with the ability of the coalition to weaken the Taliban. However, the ISAF attempting to take control of key bases of support on which the Taliban have long relied, and the impact of these efforts on the Taliban will warrant considerable scrutiny. 

For now, the Taliban appear to have lost interest in larger-scale attacks involving several hundred fighters being committed to a single objective. Though such attacks certainly garnered headlines, they were extremely costly in terms of manpower and materiel with little practical gain. And with old strongholds like Helmand province feeling the squeeze, there are certainly some indications that ISAF offensives are taking an appreciable bite out of the operational capabilities of at least the local Taliban commanders. 

Conserving forces and minimizing risk to their core operational capability are parallel and interrelated considerations for the Taliban in terms of survival. If the recent assault on Marjah is any indication, the Taliban are adhering to these principles. While some fighters did dig in and fight and while resistance has stiffened, especially within the last week, the Taliban declined to make it a bloody compound-to-compound fight despite the favorable defensive terrain. 

Similarly, the U.S. surge intends to make it hard for the Taliban to sustain, much less replace, manpower and materiel. Taliban tactics must be tailored to maximize damage to the enemy while minimizing costs, which drives the Taliban directly to hit-and-run tactics and the widespread use of improvised explosive devices.

There is little doubt that the Taliban will continue to inflict casualties in the coming year. But there is also considerable resolve behind the surge, which will not even be up to full strength until the summer and will be maintained until at least July 2011. Indeed, it is not clear if the Taliban can inflict enough casualties to alter the American timetable in its favor any further. 

There is also the underlying issue of sustaining the resistance. Manpower and logistics are inescapable parts of warfare. Though the United States and its allies bear the heavier burden, the Taliban cannot ignore that it is losing key population centers and opium-growing areas central to recruitment, financing and sanctuary. The parallel crackdowns by the ISAF on the Afghan side of the border and the Pakistani crackdowns on the opposite side, where the Taliban has long enjoyed sanctuary, represent a significant challenge to the Taliban if the efforts can be sustained. Signs of a potential increase in cooperation and coordination between Washington and Islamabad could also be significant. 

In other words, despite all its flaws, there is a coherency to what the United States is attempting to achieve. Success is anything but certain, but the United States does seek to make very real inroads against the core strength of the Taliban. One of those methods is to reduce the Taliban’s operational capability to the point where it will no longer have the capability to overwhelm Afghan security forces after the United States begins to draw down. There is no shortage of issues surrounding the U.S. objectives to train up the Afghan National Army and National Police, and it is not at all clear that even if those objectives are met that indigenous forces will be able to manage the Taliban. 

But the Taliban must also deal with the logistical strain being imposed on it and strive to maintain its numbers and indigenous support. Central to this effort is the Taliban’s information operations (IO), conveying their message to the Afghan people. Thus far, the ISAF has been far behind the Taliban in such IO efforts, but as the coalition ratchets up the pressure, it remains to be seen whether the more abstract IO will be sufficient for sustaining hard logistical support, especially with pressure being applied on both sides of the border. 

Similarly, there is the issue of internal coherency. Any insurgent movement must deal with not only the occupier but also other competing guerrillas and insurgents, whether their central focus is military power or ideological. The Taliban’s main competition is entrenched in the regime of President Hamid Karzai and among those in opposition to Karzai but part of the state; at issue are the Taliban’s sometimes loose affiliations with other Taliban elements and al Qaeda. The United States , the Karzai regime, Pakistan and al Qaeda are all seeking and applying leverage anywhere they can to hive off reconcilable elements of the Taliban. 

The United States seeks to divide the pragmatic elements of the Taliban from the more ideological ones. The Karzai regime may be willing to deal with them in a more coherent fashion, but at the heart of all its considerations is the partially incompatible retention of its own power. Al Qaeda, with its own survival on the line, is seeking to draw the Taliban toward its transnational agenda. Meanwhile, Pakistan wants to bring the Taliban to heel, primarily so it can own the negotiating process and consolidate its position as the dominant power in Afghanistan, much as Iran seeks to do in Iraq . Each player has different motivations, objectives and timetables. 

Amidst all these tensions, the Taliban must expend intelligence efforts and resources to maintain cohesion, despite being an inherently local and decentralized phenomenon. As Mullah Omar’s code of conduct released in July 2009 demonstrates, “command” of the Taliban as an insurgent group is not as firm as it is in more rigid organizational hierarchies. The reconciliation efforts will certainly test the Taliban’s coherency.

If history is any judge, in the long run the Taliban will retain the upper hand. In Afghanistan, the United States is attempting to do something that has never been tried before, much less achieved, i.e., constitute a viable central government from scratch in the midst of a guerrilla war. But the Taliban must be concerned about the possibility that some aspects of the U.S. strategy may succeed. Central to the American effort will be Pakistan, and Islamabad is showing significant signs of wanting to work closer with Washington now. 

Geostrategic Predicament of the Current Situation.

Rooting out insurgents is no simple task. It requires at least three things: 

1. Massively superior numbers so that occupiers can limit the zones to which the insurgents have easy access.

2. The support of the locals in order to limit the places that the guerillas can disappear into.

3. Superior intelligence so that the fight can be consistently taken to the insurgents rather than vice versa. 

Without those, and American-led forces in Afghanistan lack all three, the insurgents can simply take the fight to the occupiers, retreat to rearm and regroup and return again shortly thereafter.  

But the insurgents hardly hold all the cards. Guerrilla forces are by their very nature irregular. Their capacity to organize and strike is quite limited, and while they can turn a region into a hellish morass for an opponent, they have great difficulty holding territory, particularly territory that a regular force chooses to contest. Should they mass into a force that could achieve a major battlefield victory, a regular force, which is by definition better-funded, -trained, -organized and -armed, will almost always smash the irregulars. As such, the default guerrilla tactic is to attrit and harass the occupier into giving up and going home. The guerrillas always decline combat in the face of a superior military force only to come back and fight at a time and place of their choosing. Time is always on the guerrilla’s side if the regular force is not a local one.  

Plus from a geostrategic point of view, on the Pakistani side, the northern border is dominated by the FATA and a stretch of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the north. Islamabad has very little presence in the FATA, and while the area belongs to Pakistan in name, much of it is under the de facto control of local tribal warlords. The Pakistani military has managed to take control of an area in South Waziristan, but it remains to be seen how effectively the military can control Pakistani Taliban elements in other FATA districts like North Waziristan, Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, Mohmand and Bajaur. As a general rule, the Pakistani Taliban are stronger the farther west one goes in the Pashtun areas of northwestern Pakistan. The farther east one goes, the more the central government has a presence. 

This devolution of power to the tribal leaders in the FATA, many of whom are now militant commanders, allows for much more unmonitored cross-border traffic through the mountains. This fluidity allows militants fighting Western forces in eastern Afghanistan to work much more closely with militants in the FATA. In a region where few roads exist, inhabitants are very comfortable negotiating mountain paths that were created over centuries of use. Whether they are large enough for a motorized vehicle or barely wide enough for a human on foot, these primitive arteries inextricably link the FATA to its neighboring provinces in Afghanistan.  

It is unreasonable to expect the Pakistani military to patrol all of these paths, even if they could effectively do that, locals have a superior knowledge of the landscape and can quickly adopt alternative routes. The unregulated, unmonitored flow of goods and people across the Afghan-Pakistani border in the north means that counterinsurgency efforts on either side of the border are going to be frustrated by the cross-border support of the insurgent network.

The dominant militant group in the FATA is the TTP, which is a largely indigenous force that has been escalating its insurgent activity against Islamabad since 2007. The group also boasts a large number of foreign fighters from the Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia (e.g., Uzbekistan). Opposite the FATA is the Afghan Taliban regional command in eastern Afghanistan, led by the Haqqani network. This network, the single largest militant grouping within the Afghan Taliban movement, has a significant presence in the FATA that supports operations against Western troops in Afghanistan.  

The TTP emerged as a result of the relocation of al Qaeda from Afghanistan into northwest Pakistan, Islamabad’s alignment with Washington in the war against the jihadists and Pakistan’s inability to balance its commitment to the United States with its need to maintain influence in Afghanistan. The TTP has carried out attacks in Pakistan’s core and has been escalating the frequency of its attacks since the security operation against militants holed up in Islamabad’s Red Mosque in 2007. In recent months it has spread its presence down to Sindh province and Pakistan’s strategic city of Karachi. The TTP has also been weakened, having lost its principal sanctuary in South Waziristan and at least two of its principal leaders.  

In October 2009, the Pakistani military launched a ground operation in South Waziristan to deny the TTP sanctuary and the capability to train and deploy fighters into Pakistan’s core. The success of this mission remains to be seen as the long-term challenges of actually holding territory and controlling and preventing militant forces from returning become all too obvious. The rugged geography and distance from Islamabad (exacerbated by poor infrastructure) will certainly play to the advantage of the local insurgents.  

Separate from the TTP are militant commanders such as Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Nazir, who operate in North and South Waziristan respectively, drawing support from foreign fighters and providing support to Afghan Taliban elements west of the border. These are Pakistani Taliban forces that are focused on the Afghan front and are not interested in fighting Islamabad. At times, the Pakistani military has tried to reach neutrality agreements with such commanders in an effort to isolate the TTP. Although they have not always been successful, current efforts to manage these actors are bearing fruit, and the neutrality understandings seem to be holding.  

To the southwest in Pakistan is the province of Balochistan, which is far different from the FATA in the sense that it is a full-fledged province of Pakistan with multiple layers of governance, including a strong federal presence. Northeast Balochistan province is slightly different, in that it has a large Pashtun population, which links the province ethnically to the FATA, NWFP and neighboring Afghanistan. This section of the province does provide limited opportunities to militant groups operating in the border region.  

However, the Afghan Taliban in southern Afghanistan, adjacent to Balochistan, do not rely as much on the border area as Taliban elements to the north do. Southern Afghanistan, particularly the province of Kandahar, just across the border from Quetta (the provincial capital of Balochistan), is the birthplace of the Afghan Taliban movement and remains its stronghold. Mullah Omar’s Taliban movement originally began in Kandahar in response to the lawlessness brought about under Soviet rule and the resulting civil war after the Soviets left. The Taliban eventually expanded to rule 90 percent of Afghanistan but were pushed back to their southern heartland after the U.S./NATO invasion.  

Unlike in northern Afghanistan, where Western forces are constantly applying pressure to Taliban forces, the Taliban continue to control large swaths of territory in the south. When foreign forces do conduct offensives in the area, Taliban forces can very easily melt into the local countryside. While Taliban activity is concentrated closer to the border in the north, the border has less strategic value for the Taliban in the south, in part because the insurgents continue to control southern territory that Western military forces have been unable to wrest away. Thus they are able to operate much more openly there and do not have the same need to escape across a border when the pressure is applied.  

Moreover, the Taliban’s territorial control in southern Afghanistan does not extend to the border, as it does in the north. The Taliban are largely a Pashtun phenomenon, with the most reach among Afghanistan’s Pashtun population, which does not extend to the border in the south. For the Afghan Taliban, fleeing across the southern border is a long and harrowing trip to a region of Pakistan kept under close watch by the Pakistani military, far different from the situation in the north.  

The Afghan Taliban, however, do maintain a presence in Pakistan. Their political leadership is believed to be somewhere in the greater Quetta area, where they have sought sanctuary from Western military forces in Afghanistan. They do not directly cause violence in Pakistan, though, and since they are in Balochistan, an official Pakistani province, they have not been subjected to the kind of pressure from U.S.-operated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes that are frequently conducted against militants in the FATA. Afghan Taliban leaders in Balochistan do not cross back and forth over the border but remain much more sedentary, blending in with fellow ethnic Pashtuns and staying away from border areas where Western and Afghan forces have much more freedom to target them.  

The largest Taliban regional command structure under Mullah Omar is led by the Haqqani family in eastern Afghanistan (essentially serving as the Afghan Taliban’s eastern “wing”). The Haqqani family has been a powerful force in eastern Afghanistan since well before the Taliban started their rise to power. The Haqqani family also teamed up with al Qaeda and foreign militants in the region before the Taliban did. They assimilated under Mullah Omar’s rule when the Taliban took over in the 1990s, but because of the group’s special status, the Haqqani family was able to maintain a large degree of autonomy in conducting its operations. The Haqqani network also has a significant presence in the FATA, especially in North Waziristan, and has frequently been the target of coordinated U.S. UAV strikes there.  

 

A Fluid Insurgency

None of these groups is monolithic. Just as the border region is fragmented in ways that make it difficult for central governments to control it, so are its main insurgent groups, which do not have clear, hierarchical control over their territories. Rather, they are engaged in a medieval web of allegiances in which various factions are either united against a common enemy or quarreling over territorial control.  

In Pakistan, we saw a tumultuous struggle over leadership of the TTP after its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, was killed by a suspected U.S.-operated UAV strike. We also saw independent warlords like Maulvi Nazir reach oral neutrality “agreements” (more like informal understandings) with the Pakistani government to make it easier for the Pakistani military to move into South Waziristan during its offensive there. Similarly, in Afghanistan, we saw regional commanders continue to carry out suicide bombings in civilian areas despite calls from Mullah Omar to limit civilian casualties by requiring approval for such acts. The Afghan Taliban appear to be unified because they face a common enemy, the United States and NATO in Afghanistan, just as the various elements of the Pakistani Taliban seem to be in concert in their fight against Islamabad. But these groups must be pragmatic in order to survive in a geography that prevents any single power from dominating it completely, and this requires shifting alliances quickly and often, depending on who offers the most benefit for the group at any given point.  

Any insurgent force usually has two kinds of enemies at the same time: the foreign occupying or indigenous government force it is trying to defeat, and other revolutionary entities with which it is competing for power. While making inroads against the former, the Taliban have not yet resolved the issue of the latter. It is not so much that various insurgent factions and commanders are in direct competition with each other; the problem for the Taliban, reflecting the rough reality that the country’s mountainous terrain imposes on its people, is the disparate nature of the movement itself. Its many factions share few objectives beyond defeating Western and Afghan and Pakistani (in the case of the TTP and its allies) government forces.  

Far from a monolithic movement, the term “Taliban” encompasses everything from old hard-liners of the pre-9/11 Afghan regime to small groups that adopt the name as a “flag of convenience,” whether they are Islamists devoted to a local cause or criminals wanting to obscure their true objectives. The multifaceted and often confusing character of the Taliban “movement” actually creates a layer of protection around it. The United States has admitted that it does not have the nuanced understanding of the Taliban’s composition necessary to identify potential moderates who can be separated from the hard-liners.  

The main benefits of waging any insurgency usually boil down to the following: Insurgents operate in squad- to platoon-sized elements, have light or nonexistent logistical tails, are largely able to live off the land or the local populace, can support themselves by seizing weapons and ammunition from weak local police and isolated outposts and can disperse and blend into the environment whenever they confront larger and more powerful conventional forces. The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is ideal terrain for insurgents to play off of three national powers in the region; militants fighting against Islamabad can seek refuge in Afghanistan, and militants fighting the Afghan government can just as easily seek sanctuary in Pakistan. U.S. and other Western forces are then left with the challenge of distinguishing between and fighting the various factions, all the while recognizing (for the most part) a political boundary their adversaries completely ignore.  

 

Conflicting Interests

Of course, the two major actors in the border area are the United States and Pakistan. Pakistan’s objective in the region is to eliminate domestic threats that challenge the state and national security. This objective puts Pakistani forces squarely at odds with the TTP and its allies that have a sizable presence in the FATA, which have increased attacks across a larger part of Pakistan over the past two years.  

However, it is in Pakistan’s interest to maintain influence in neighboring Afghanistan in order to shape the political environment and ensure that pro-Islamabad factions hold power there. This means that Islamabad largely supports the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Omar, including his key subordinates, the Haqqanis, as well as the Taliban assets and allies in Pakistan who support them without stirring up trouble for Islamabad. Other examples of these “good Taliban” are the factions led by Maulvi Nazir, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and other lesser commanders in the FATA.  

Meanwhile, the United States is focused on weakening the Afghan Taliban elements and their central leader, Mullah Omar, in order to weaken the network of support that allowed foreign jihadists to mount transnational terror campaigns from Afghanistan. Although this strategy goes against key Pakistani interests in the region, recent statements by U.S. Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus indicate that the United States is shoring up support for Pakistan. On Feb. 3, Petraeus lauded Pakistan’s counterinsurgency efforts over the past year and suggested that the United States will rely on Pakistan to negotiate any kind of peace deal with Taliban elements that the United States finds agreeable. This would put Pakistan in a solid position to have more influence over the outcome of events in its neighboring country.  

The fact remains that the Afghan-Pakistani border is not a geographical reality. It is an unnatural political overlay on a fragmented landscape that is virtually impossible for a central government to control. In peaceful times, regional powers can afford to ignore it and let the tribal actors tend to their own business. When the stakes are raised in a guerrilla war, however, the lack of control creates a haven and a highway for insurgents. As the United States continues to have a presence in Afghanistan, it will not be able to control the border lands without the assistance of Pakistan, which naturally has its own interests in the region. Negotiations among the United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan and other nearby powers are challenging enough. Factor in an assortment of disparate actors that exist in a separate space and the challenges grow even greater.  

As for the Operation Moshtarak in Marjah southern Helmand province, this battle will not mark the turning of the tide of the war. Instead, it is part of the application of a new strategy that accurately takes into account Afghanistan’s geography and all the weaknesses and challenges that geography poses. Marjah rather, will mark the first time the United States has applied a plan not to hold the line, but actually to reshape the country. We are not saying that the strategy will bear fruit. Afghanistan is a corrupt mess populated by citizens who are far more comfortable thinking and acting locally and tribally than nationally. In such a place indigenous guerrillas will always hold the advantage. No one has ever attempted this sort of national restructuring in Afghanistan, and the Americans are attempting to do so in a short period on a shoestring budget.  

Casualties have been light, but do not read this as a massive battlefield success. The assault required weeks of obvious preparation, and very few Taliban fighters chose to remain and contest the territory against the more numerous and better armed attackers. The American challenge lies not so much in assaulting or capturing Marjah but in continuing to deny it to the Taliban. If the Americans cannot actually hold places like Marjah, then they are simply engaging in an exhausting and reactive strategy of chasing a dispersed and mobile target. 

A “government-in-a-box” of civilian administrators is already poised to move into Marjah to step into the vacuum left by the Taliban. I have major doubts about how effective this box government can be at building up civil authority in a town that has been governed by the Taliban for most of the last decade. Yet what happens in Marjah and places like it in the coming months will be the foundation upon which the success or failure of this effort will be built. But assessing that process is simply impossible, because the only measure that matters cannot be judged until the Afghans are left to themselves.

 

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