In early 1985 Indonesia was deeply polarized. Many santri Muslims believed that Suharto intended to declare PancasiIa the state religion. Others maintained that he and his top official Moerdani were promoting Christianity. Moerdani's repeated statements that he was a loyal official who happened to be Christian were greeted with scorn. Javanists, Christians, and Chinese feared an Islamic Revolution.

The most symbolically charged act of violence during that period was the January 22, 1985 bombing of the eighth-century Buddhist monument Borobudur. This structure is regarded by many Javanese as a symbol of the ‘glory’ of Indonesia 's past. It is also the most important pilgrimage site for Indonesia 's Buddhist community which is overwhelmingly Chinese. The symbolic significance of this incident resembles that of the destruction of the Babri Mosque in India by Hindu Nationalists. (See P.1) In both instances a blow was struck at a religious community by attacking one its most sacred shrines. In fact the bombing of Borobudur provoked the same sort of outrage among Buddhists and Javanists that the defilement of the Tanjung Priok Mosque did among santri (madrasah) Muslims.

However a by Muslims, feared Christianization campaign did not take place, in fact in the late 1980s and 1990s Indonesian society, the government, and even the armed forces became much more self-consciously Islamic. Attendance at Friday prayers and the percentage of people fasting during the month of Ramadan increased dramatically. Thousands of mosques were built, some with support from a foundation sponsored by the Suharto family. By the end of the 1980s overflow crowds praying in the streets were a common sight on Fridays. Suharto went on the haj. His daughter Hardiyanti Rukmana, who clearly had political aspirations, began to wear the jilbab (head covering) as did many other Indonesian women. Islamic publishing flourished. Suharto endorsed the founding of the Association of Muslim Intellectuals and the establishment of an Islamic bank in 1990. For details see Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class," Indonesia 56, (October 1993): 1-3; and Robert W. Hefner, "Islamizing Capitalism: On the Founding of Indonesia's First Islamic Bank," in Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought, ed. Mark Woodward (Tempe: Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1996), 291-322.

Nevertheless, when in the summer of 1997 the Indonesian economy collapsed in the wake of the Asian currency crisis, known as Reformasi (Reformation), demonstrations demanded President Suharto's resignation. There were however also serious outbreaks of ethnic and religious violence. The rhetoric surrounding these events in fact was as much religious as it was political and economic.

Unfortunatly on May 12, 1998 security forces opened fire on students at Jakarta 's elite Trisakti University. They were proclaimed Pahlawan Reformasi (Heroes of the Reformation) by the press and the public. The term pahlawan is the same one used to describe those who died in the revolution and is strongly associated with the Islamic concept of martyrdom. Their deaths galvanized the opposition. Faculty and administrators at universities throughout the country joined the students in their call for Suharto's resignation.

While the riots and the rapes that followed were certainly planned, the ability of provocateurs to organize such extreme violence speaks to the intensity of tension between “Chinese” and "indigenous" (pribumi) mostly Muslim Indonesians. Security forces stood by as large segments of Jakarta burned. Some of the worst violence occurred in the oldest portion of Jakarta known as Kota. This area has been among Jakarta 's Chinatowns for centuries. Tens of thousands roamed the street looting and burning Chinese businesses. Supermarkets, banks, ATM machines, and appliance and electronics stores were particularly hard hit. (See "Ethnic Chinese Tell of Mass Rapes," BBC News Online, June 23, 1998, and Asia Week, July 24,1998.)

 

The following is a statement by one of the rape victims:

... a huge crowd had gathered around the apartment. They screamed, "Let's butcher the Chinese!", "Let's eat pigs!", "Let's have a party!" ... We were all very frightened. In our fright, we prayed and left everything in God's hands .... We hurried into the room and locked the door tight. At that time, we heard them knock the other rooms' doors loudly, and there were screams from women and girls. The room was filled with fear. We realized that they would come to us. So we spread throughout the room and hid in comers. Inside, we could hear girls, whose age around 10-12, screaming, "Mommy ... Mommy ... ", "Mom ... Mom ... , it hurts." I saw a woman in her 20s being raped by four men. She tried to fight, but she was held tight .... We tried to rescue her, but we had to give up. There were around 60 of them. They tied us - I, my father, my mother, Veny, Dony, Uncle Dodi, Aunt Vera -with ripped sheets. They led us to a room. Uncle Dodi asked what they wanted, but they didn't answer. They cast an evil and savage look. One of them grabbed Veny rudely and dragged her to a sofa. At that time, I knew that she was in danger. I screamed loudly, and one of the mob slapped me. My father who also screamed was hit by a wooden block, and he fainted. My mother had fainted when Veny was dragged to the sofa. I could only pray and pray that the disaster would not befall us ... There were about five people who raped Veny, and before beginning, everyone always said, "Allah Akbar." They were ferocious, brutal. Not long afterward, around nine men came to the room and dragged me. I instantly fainted and everything was blank. I became conscious at around 5 or 6 in the afternoon. My head was in pain, and then I realized that I had no clothes on my body. I cried. I was very depressed. I realized that my family was still there, and obscurely I saw my father hugged my mother and Doni. I also saw that Uncle Dodi was lying on the floor, and Uncle Vera was crying over his body. (For an account of the psychological sufferring by victims, see Asia Week June 19,1998).

In the long run the trauma inflicted on Indonesian Chinese may have done more damage to the Indonesian economy than the looting and arson. Buildings can be reconstructed and shops refilled. It is far more difficult to rebuild trust and confidence in those who have come to be known as perpetrators of physical and symbolic assault. For to find healing victims of violence, first must find safety. Many Chinese business people fled the country, taking their money and their business acumen with them.

Enter Laskar Jihad, founded in 2000 by Jafar Vmar Thalib, an Indonesian of Yemeni descent. (On relations between Yemen and Indonesia, see Michael F. Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: the Umma Below the Winds, 2003).

He was educated in Saudi sponsored schools in Indonesia, the Islamist Maududi Institute, and the Peshawar madrasahs in Pakistan. Teaching a combination of secular and religious subjects, the Madudi Institute is affiliated with Jamaat-I-Islam, known for its support of the Taliban and of the Muslim insurgency in Kashmir. (See W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity, 1988).

In the early 1990s then, Jafar studied with the Islamist Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wad'i in Yemen. Al-Wad'i taught that democracy is un-Islamic because it allows people to choose among moral systems. Freedom of religion is unacceptable because it legitimizes apostasy. Despite this he is considered to be a moderate Islamist because of his understanding of the conditions required for the conduct of jihad. He maintained that while jihad will be necessary to restore the purity of the Muslim community, that time has not yet come because there are too few committed Muslims. However, aI-Wad'i also wrote a fatwa (legal opinion) authorizing jihad in eastern Indonesia. A rising tide of violence next spread to Ambon, Sulawesi and Halmahera, where both Christians and Muslims claim to be the victims. (See K. Schulze, "Laskar Jihad and the Conflict in Ambon," Brown Journal of World Affairs 9, no. I (Spring 2002): 57-69.

And while Christians attempted to link Laskar Jihad with Osama bin Laden, Laskar Jihad linked its own, armed struggle with the global war against "Crusaders and Jews." Of course participants in these discourse systems seek out or imagine the archetypes of evil and brutality, people are not killed, they are slaughtered. And both Christians and Muslims understood violence in eastern Indonesia as an element of a global struggle. (See Zachary Abuza, Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia, NBR Analysis 15, no. 3, September 2004).

Against the background described at the beginning of this four part series, and given the current conditions of social, cultural, and economic discrimination, it would not have been unusual had the Indian Muslims retained some affinity to Pakistan, made common cause with the Kashmiri struggle, and extended support to the international movement of fundamentalist Islam that has swept the Islamic world in the 1990s. The Indian Muslim community in contrast to Pakistan has, however, little to no connections with Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or with Pakistan and its clandestine operations in Kashmir or India. As a large minority, their principle objective seems only to retain a degree of cultural control over their social and personal life. Yet for a large number of Indians, particularly those sympathetic to the agenda of the BJP and its family of organizations (known as the Sangh Parivar), Muslim militancy in Kashmir was in their view the work of the Muslim "fifth column" represented by the 140 million Indian Muslims. Although transnational connections to Hindu-Muslim violence have existed since independence, these have compelled the Indian Muslims to in fact renounce ties with Pakistan or Kashmir.

The destruction of the sixteenth-century mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh in 1992 however, was the result of 60,000 Kar Sevaks being trained by retired Indian military officers prior to the December 6, 1992 onslaught on the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya. (DilipAwasthi and Uday Muhurkar, "Orchestrated Onslaught," India Today, December 31, 1992, 54.)

The visual pictures of Kar Sevaks destroying the mosque with pick-axes where proved to be inflammatory - all over India, but especially in Mumbai, according to public reports, these were spontaneous reactions. (Sri Krishna Commission, Government of India, Preventive Measures and Riot Control Measures Taken by Police, Chapter 4.)

Riots are not insurgencies however (in the nature of civil wars), and also do not lead to wars with foreign powers. The Kashmir insurgency for example, could not be sustained as we suggested earlier on this website, without support from the Pakistani government. In fact while insurgencies are against a state and usually about territorial control or denying the same to the state, riots are almost always localized and move along a different ladder of escalation compared to insurgencies and wars. Riots are far from controlled events in that even those who initially trigger riots may lose control over the chain of violent retaliations. (See Rajat Ganguly, Kin State Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts, New Delhi, 1998.)

At the same time, riots are not as spontaneous as reported in the press, some element of organization even if it is a jerry-rigged alliance of riot specialists and musclemen. (Judy Barsalou, "Lethal Ethnic Riots: Lessons From India and Beyond," Special Report 101, United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, February 2003, p.1.)

In the wake of the nation-wide campaign to mobilize Kar Sevaks, the Hindus in Mumbai, particularly in strongholds of the extreme Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena (Army of Shiva) political party, had already begun celebration rallies, shouting of anti-Muslim slogans, and aggressive displays of religious rituals in mixed neighborhoods. pitch ... propaganda unleashed by Hindu communal organizations and writings in newspapers like 'Saamna' and 'Navakal.’ ("Bloody Aftermath," India Today, December 31,1992,58-61.)

These riots thus could have been prevented had the initial killing been exposed as an act by criminals and firm action taken to prevent second-stage retaliation. Hence the Human Rights Commission report on Gujarat 2002 went beyond the recommendations made by the SKC, and urged international donors to make all aid conditional upon implementation of many of the above recommendations. (Smita Narula, "'We Have No Orders to Save You' State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat," HRW Report 14, no. 3, Human Rights Watch, April 2002, p.11.)

Where local dynamics are paramount, community perceptions might become linked to national ideologies. The resulting violence then becomes symbolic of a community's identity and its vengeance. But while common interests will put a brake on violence and destruction of property, the connection between economic interests and peace has been tentative at best. Building a violence control system that extends vertically through state and national government as well as horizontally into civil society and party organizations, seems the best solution. (National Commission for Minorities, Second Annual Report, FY 1994-1995, Government of India, 1997, 111-12.)

Greater minority representation in state-level ministries and cabinets as far as S.Asia concerns, is not effective in itself. Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have a far higher percentage of Muslims in the government and ministries but have far higher levels of violence than in Kerala and Bengal where the comparative percentages of Muslim ministers are much lower. Yet Uttar Pradesh and Bihar - were highly successful in preventing violence when clear orders were issued by political leaders to act forcefully. For example Steven Wilkinson, comments that in 1995, "most strikingly the coalition BJP-BSP government successfully prevented a repeat of the Ayodhya violence by restricting VHP plans to mobilize around another disputed religious site at Mathura." (Wilkinson, "Putting Gujarat in Perspective," Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 17, 2002, p. 1579-83.)

Unfortunately one cannot always easily obtain' the kind of political demography and party politics Wilkinson requires for a cross-cutting cleavages to work. Plus his argument that political leaders will hesitate to trigger or encourage riots if minority voters occupy significant position in electoral calculations, presumes the presence of a minority community in significant numbers in a state to be able to make a difference in elections. In addition, this minority had to be united and well organized in a solid bloc to become a swing vote. This combination of factors is present only in some parts of India today. In other places, one would have to fall back on state protection, unbiased policing, political parties and leaders committed to minority rights, and policies that work to ensure a sense of safety and well-being for the vulnerable population. That is, rely on a coalition of anti-riot interests activated well before sporadic violence becomes a full-scale riot.

Elsewhere, Paul R. Brass underscores the importance of anti-riot coalitions in which the state forges a partnership with the civic associations and anti-violence constituencies. (Brass, Theft of an Idol, Text and Context in the Representation of Collective Violence, Princeton University Press, 1997, p.257.) Brass's fieldwork also found that when his interviews respondents were asked why they refrained from second-stage retaliation, the answer invariably was that they felt a sense of trust in the state government and in the local authorities that the situation would be brought under control. (Brass, p. 258.)

It thus follows that if the police act with speed and dispatch - banning processions, preventing emotionally charged public rituals, and quickly arresting "troublemakers" (who are the riot specialists to use Brass's term) - the chain can be broken. In other words, the police, the parties, and the state at both local and national level must be involved in stopping the violence. If the local authorities fail, the federal authorities must rapidly step in to fill the power vacuum and watch over the actions of local authorities. Who will make them do this? This is where the horizontal coalition of anti-violence interests and constituencies become critical. They will make the political parties, state authorities, and even federal government pay the price for neglect.

Where democracy is in itself highly desirable, the procedures of democracy have an ambiguous relationship with violence at least in South Asia (and the Middle East, recent example Iraq). Frequently, democracy has meant more competition for office, power, and control over resources of the state. Democracy then tends to be contentious and in a segmented society’s such can lead to conflict and violence.

As for the by now  famous Godhra ‘incident’, it is clear that Home Minister Advani should have refrained from erroneously (before even an investigation had been launched) linking it with Pakistan and its intelligence agencies the day after the burning of the rail compartments and simple was the result of an accident.

For Mark Juergensmeyer, Ashis Nandy, and Partha ChatteIjee if true, the Indian state and its politics are artificial, predatory, and operate in a spiritual vacuum. (Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, 1993; Nandy, "The Politics of Secularism and Recovery of Religious Tolerance," in Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots, and Survivors in South Asia , ed. Veena Das, 1990, 69-93; Partha Chatterjee, "Secularism and Toleration," Economic and Political Weekly 29, 1994, 1768-77.) According to the three cited authors India 's modernist secular declaration prevents it from drawing on the embedded traditions of tolerance and coexistence rooted in the subcontinent's life and society. And a modem urban, middle class Indian as a result, would be ready fodder to the communal nationalism, whether Hindu or Islamic.

It seems however that Gandhian politics wanted to combine rational thought with traditional values of cooperation not competition, tolerance not conversion, sacrifice not aggression. In fact this understanding might have derived from the fact that “India” is a conglomeration of many conflicting factions and interests.

In addition, the Reddy Commission appointed after the September 1969 Ahmedabad riots identified the state government's lack of purpose and clear orders, rather than any lack of state strength, as the key factor prolonging the violence. Evidently a similar pattern of negligence explains the delays in deploying force when riots occurred in Ranchi (1967), Bhagalpur (1989), and Mumbai (1992-93).

Of course where some elements of the state and its agencies may be biased others that are capable of imposing law and order may simple be confused rather than complicit. In this case building a coalition of interested segments that would support reform and checkmate local riot systems by joining other segments within the state that are opposed to the weakening of political institutions could be effective.

For a coalition of anti-riot forces - official and civic – to become stronger than those benefiting from riots and currently in power, furthermore might depend on the system of incentives and rewards that the anti-riot network is able to provide. In other words, the purpose of state and party patronage needs to be reoriented, rewarding those who stand up in a sustained manner for peace as opposed to those who perpetrate violence in pursuit of immediate interests. But might still not work, when the local and central state belongs to the same political party with an agenda (see Gujarat 2002). Riots may not then be prevented in every instance but they can be localized and isolated and prevented from spreading in many more instances than is the case at present. Even such coalitions need nurturing and constant repair to make the pieces fit and work well.

The concern over international image, which is important for a steady flow of global capital, in this case is not sufficient to compel cities and towns to close down riot systems and compete with each other to earn a reputation for probity, prosperity, stability, and efficiency. For as shown in case of the Gujarat riots of 2002 these links can be pernicious. Where the previous decade and a half, expatriate Gujaratis and diasporic Indians, had been investing in real estate and other businesses in Gujarat, and not to suggest by terrorizing the Muslim population they hoped to pick up cheap real estate, a large number among them did supported the BJP and its family of Hindu militant organizations. This also means that state capacity ought to be measured in how efficiently a state is able to resolve conflicts before they go beyond electoral politics.

For as we have seen, institutional capacity to solve tensions at the point where they originate will prevent escalation. Given the coalition strategy proposed above it is limited by the alignment of political and ideological forces at a given time, cannot guarantee peace, it still can prove to be an important learning process even when it fails.

 

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