By Eric Vandenbroeck
Today is the first of two during which appointments to the new cabinet
are being made.
Surely Theresa May knows that the appointment of Boris Johnson today
will be critically assessed in some countries.
In his recent columns and conversations, he has made it clear that
Britain’s traditional alliances, with the United States, with Europe, mean
little to him. Instead, he has flirted with Putinism, praised Bashar al-Assad and
gone on trade junkets to China. Johnson’s admiration for
rich foreign dictators echoes the views of many leading Tories, even George Osborne, the just-retired chancellor
of the exchequer.
Also commonwealth leaders will not forget his categorically outrageous 2002 column in which he claimed it “is
said that the Queen has come to love the Commonwealth, partly because it
supplies her with regular cheering crowds of flag-waving piccaninnies”.
Hillary Clinton, who may well win the White House in November, will not
have liked his 2007 comparison of her with a “sadistic nurse in a mental
hospital” (although he did endorse her). This is but the tip of an inverted
pyramid of punditry with explosive potential.
Speaking at the G7 summit in Japan on 26 May, President of the European
Commission Jean-Claude Juncker said: "I'm reading in (the) papers that
Boris Johnson spent part of his life in Brussels. It's time for him to come
back to Brussels, in order to check in Brussels if
everything he's telling British people is in line with reality. I don't think so, so he
would be welcome in Brussels at any time."
On one level, it is easy to sympathize with May’s decision. Johnson is
weak and manageable. Packing him off to parts foreign will keep him out of the
way and limit his ability to plot a new path to 10 Downing Street. He will put
a Brexiteer face on a government led by a Remainer. Yet all this betrays an odd
complacency about the drama into which Britain has now thrust itself. Brexit,
believe it or not, is about more than opinion polls and Tory traumas. It is
about Britain’s future: a future that will turn not on the doubtful willingness
of foreign governments to bend over backwards to tolerate British demands, but
on the ability of the government in London to persuade them of its case and
reconcile the desires of the British electorate with those of EU27 electorates.
Brexiteers do not like to admit it, but whether or not Britain gets a deal that
will satisfy its population and rein in the populist surge in the country is
largely a function of that ability.
However much May splices up the government, it is the Foreign Office
that has the skills and experience to make that a reality. Yet by appointing
Johnson, the new prime minister has essentially downgraded the department to a
tool of domestic political management. It is like putting a baboon at the wheel
of the Rolls Royce. Sure, the steering wheel, clutch and accelerator will keep
the baboon happy and busy. But the price in collateral damage could be high.
Even more important than Johnson, however, might be David Davis, the
newly appointed Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union (Brexit
Minister).
In an article written by Davis and posted last Monday on the Conservative Home, he emphasized:
“This is one of the reasons for taking a little time before triggering
Article 50. The negotiating strategy has to be properly designed, and there is
some serious consultation to be done first.”
“In this process, we should work out what we do in the improbable event
of the EU taking a dog in a manger attitude to Single market tariff free
access, and insist on WTO [World Trade Organisation]
rules and levies, including 10 per cent levies on car exports. Let us be clear:
I do not believe for a moment that that will happen, but let us humour the pre-referendum Treasury fantasy.”
This strategy for Brexit, is wildly optimistic and suggests that he is
totally unprepared for the rigors of the negotiation ahead.
This along with the appointment of Boris Johnson suggests that the prime
minister sees Brexit fundamentally as a presentational task. But also that this
government is not simply going to be a female
version of David Cameron's administration. The choices made in this cabinet
reshuffle thus can also be seen as a political aftershock, the unsettling
tremors that somehow keep reverberating in the wake of the political earthquake that was Brexit.
From the moment the results of the referendum were announced on June 24,
May made it clear that the will of the public will prevail and that “Brexit
means Brexit.” There are those who believe that she will not deliver on this
promise. Disgruntled Conservative Leave voters, not to mention many UKIP
members, fear that the revolution (which has already eaten so many of its own)
may now be stolen from them, with UKIP already issuing threats to May if she
doesn’t follow their “red lines.” But these are comparatively marginal voices.
For the time being, the conventional wisdom is that May will follow through on
her promise, which will see her negotiating one of the trickiest obstacle
courses in modern politics.
For one, those who voted Leave often find it hard to pin down any one
cause for their success. Opinion polls suggest that sovereignty and immigration
concerns were foremost in voters’ minds. But so were concerns about the
economy, including workers’ pay. In other words, the reasons for voting Leave
ranged from the grand to the specific. Navigating, and satisfying, that range
of feelings will not be straightforward.
And there is genuine uncertainty over what the public may want. Did
voters want to return to a common trading agreement (taking the United Kingdom
back to the original intention of its membership in 1973) or do they want to
scrap the whole thing? Do they expect to exit via Article 50 or through the
retraction of the entire agreement that took the United Kingdom in 40 years ago
(the former would lead to at least two years of detailed negotiation whereas
the latter would be a blunt but wholesale rejection of all negotiation
processes)? Does an order from the public to exit the EU include an order to
leave the European Convention on Human Rights, or a desire to retain it? None
of this is clear.
A further problem is that many of the causes for Brexit are widely
thought to be in contradiction with each other. For instance, for trade
reasons, the United Kingdom may well choose to remain within the common market.
In that case, though, it would almost certainly have to accept the conditions
that come along with that, not least the condition of free movement of peoples,
which was one of the causes of Brexit in the first place.
These are not unsolvable problems, but their answers are in part
instinctive, which raises the question of how a prime minister can be in tune
with a public attitude she did not herself share. May’s unwillingness to
guarantee that all EU nationals working in the United Kingdom on June 23 could
remain is just one early, jarring, example. Questioned as to why she would not
promise something that all prominent Leave campaigners had called for, May and
her closest colleagues have argued that the presence of EU workers in the
United Kingdom (and indeed British workers in the EU) would be a “bargaining
chip” in forthcoming negotiations with the EU. That explanation left many Leave
voters horrified and it revealed a deep misunderstanding of why they voted out
in the first place.
Finally there is the question of priorities. If the United Kingdom
spends the next four years navigating its exit from the EU, it risks becoming
an inward-looking country at precisely the moment it needs to take wing and
head out into the world, searching for new trading opportunities and reviving
old friendships. It can perhaps do both, but so far May has placed priority on
extrication from the EU over reentrance into the wider world. Whether she
continues to do so will decide the success of this new chapter of British history.
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