By Eric Vandenbroeck and
co-workers
While it will have
little effect on the permission for the US to have a transit bases there, it is
clear from the
April 7 revolution in Kyrgyzstan, that Russia is capable of creating “color
revolution”-style uprisings in countries where it wants to increase its influence.
The Kyrgyz uprising
has come to be regarded, as a pro-Russian action on the part of the protesters.
And only months after the reversal of the 2005 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and
Russia’s resurgence in the former Soviet country, the dethroning of the Tulip
Revolution of Kyrgyzstan that brought Bakiyev into power (ironically also in
2005) is seen as another symbol of the reconstruction of Russian power in its
near abroad.
Since Russia began pushing back against ‘Western’ (for
what Russia early on perceived as ‘the West’ see:)
influence in the former Soviet Union (FSU), it has come to realize that it
cannot simply re-establish an empire like the Soviet Union. Each FSU state has
its own internal strengths and weaknesses, and each interacts differently with
both Russia and the West. Thus, there can be no blanket response. This has
forced Russia to tailor its efforts based on the specific circumstances and
characteristics of each country where Moscow seeks to reassert itself.
Two tactics have
proven to be the most effective. The first is using energy to exert pressure.
Whether a country’s energy supplies originate in Russia, transit Russia or are
imported by Russia, Russia is the major energy hub for the region. Moscow has cut
off energy supplies to countries like Lithuania, cut supplies that transit
Ukraine to bring pressure from the Europeans to bear on Kiev and cut energy
supplies that transit Russia from the Central Asian states. This gradually led
to a pro-Russian government taking power in Ukraine and a more pragmatic
government taking office in Lithuania, and has kept Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
beholden to the Kremlin.
The other tactic is
military intervention. In some cases, Russia simply has based its military in the
states, like Moldova and Armenia. In other cases, Russia has gone to war; the
August 2008 Russo-Georgian war ended with Russia technically occupying a third
of Georgia’s territory.
But on April 7,
Russia displayed another weapon in its arsenal that it had not used effectively
since the Soviet era. On that day, after months of simmering unrest among the
populace over poor economic conditions, a rapid outbreak of riots across
Kyrgyzstan led to the government’s ouster. It has become clear since then that the
momentum and organization behind the revolution came from Moscow. This was
Russia using social unrest and popular revolution, in the style of the
pro-Western color revolutions that swept the FSU in the 1990s and 2000s, to
re-establish its hold over a former Soviet state. It was not the first time
Russia has used this tactic; infiltration of foreign opposition or social
groups to overthrow or pressure governments was seen throughout the Cold War.
There are several
former Soviet states where Russia does not hold substantial energy links, where
the pro-Russian sentiment is not strong enough to ensure the election of
Moscow-friendly governments, or where military intervention would not be
feasible or desirable. Fomenting revolutions is a tactic suitable for use in
these countries. Of course, not all of these countries would have a social
uprising with the magnitude or precision of Kyrgyzstan’s, but Russia has
specific kinds of leverage in these countries that it could use to undermine
their governments to varying degrees.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan has the
most to be concerned about after the events in neighboring Kyrgyzstan.
Uzbekistan is geographically twisted into Kyrgyzstan, which means any social
instability could easily bleed over the border. But Tashkent is also concerned
with the tactics used by Russia in its neighborhood because its relationship
with Moscow has not been too friendly in recent years. Uzbekistan has an
independent streak, and it has been pushing to retake its place as regional
hegemon.
Uzbekistan’s peculiar
geography, something arranged by the Soviets in order to prevent Uzbekistan
from becoming a regional hegemon in the first place, makes the country
incredibly difficult to control. The only way Tashkent has kept order in the
country is through totalitarian rule. This has generated a massive culture of
discontent among the general populace, fertile ground for a color revolution.
But Uzbek President Islam Karimov has been able to control this discontent by
clamping down on any hints of social uprisings. In a 2005 uprising in Andijan,
the country’s security services killed hundreds of protesters demonstrating
against poor economic conditions. Another such event looked to be simmering
again when more protests occurred in May 2009 in Andijan. There are suspicions
that Moscow may have been testing the waters in Uzbekistan with the 2009
protests, but no concrete evidence of a Russian hand has emerged.
Uzbekistan is also a
clan-based country where many regional clans in both Uzbekistan proper and the
Fergana Valley form networks of legitimate businessmen, mafia members, drug
traffickers, regional political officials and some Islamists. Clan rivalry
tends to break out frequently over business issues, and the majority of the
clans in the country are staunchly against Karimov. But no organization or
incentive has been set for these clans to rise up against the president, which
could provide an opening for Moscow.
There is another
factor Russia could exploit should it choose to target Uzbekistan next. In
Kyrgyzstan, a successful revolution took place only after the Kyrgyz government
had broken, something Russia also had a hand in, leaving the country more
vulnerable to a social uprising. The government in Uzbekistan has been a
consolidated force under Karimov since the fall of the Soviet Union. This has
allowed Karimov to be able to deploy security forces decisively and crack down on dissent easily. But there are concerns
growing that once the aging president, the oldest leader in the FSU, moves out of
power, a succession crisis will break out. Several figures are already
jockeying for position to succeed Karimov, and Moscow could take advantage of a
fractured government to break Tashkent’s hold on the country as a whole.
But should Russia not
want to wait for an Uzbek succession crisis, Moscow will have to get its hands
dirty by provoking another nasty Andijan uprising or purchasing the clans in
the country.
Tajikistan
Tajikistan is another
country that shares a porous border with Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan is not exactly
a problem for Russia, which holds six bases in the country, but Dushanbe is not
always the most pliant of the former Soviet states either, making it a possible
target for Moscow.
Unlike Kyrgyzstan,
which has an identifiable opposition movement, Tajikistan has extremely
marginalized or almost nonexistent opposition parties. There are, however,
other forces which could challenge the current government’s rule.
Tajikistan is
dominated by clan-based regionalism without much connection between the regions
to create an overriding national identity. The country fought a brutal civil
war from 1992-1997 in which groups from the central and eastern regions rose up
against the president, whose followers hailed from the north and west. Currently,
Tajikistan is not so much a cohesive unit as a state trying to keep its
different areas from fighting each other. It would not take much effort on
Russia’s part, especially via the security services, to be able turn regional
groups against Dushanbe.
Additionally, mixed
into this regionalism is a strong Islamic militant movement, a movement that is
linked to the militancy in Afghanistan. The distinction between the regional
clans and the Islamic militant groups is blurred, and both could rise against Dushanbe.
But as easy as it
would be to push either group into destabilizing the country, controlling those
groups is just as hard, something that Russia knows from the days of Soviet
rule over Tajikistan. Because of Tajikistan’s inherent complexities and the
difficulty of controlling either the regional clans or the Islamists,
traditionally Russia has considered it better to simply influence Tajikistan
via economic and security incentives than try to own it.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan is already
subservient to Russia, and has recently grown even closer to its former Soviet
master by joining a customs union that formally subjugates the Kazakh economy
to Russia’s. Kazakhstan also has no threatening opposition movements, because
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has clamped down on opposition parties
and groups within the country. Occasionally there are small protests in
Kazakhstan, but nothing that could endanger stability.
But Kazakhstan has
reason to be worried about its stability in the future. Nazarbayev is one of
the oldest leaders in the FSU, at 70 years old, an age nearly a decade past the
region’s life expectancy. It is not yet clear who will succeed Nazarbayev, who
has led Kazakhstan since the fall of the Soviet Union. Out of the myriad
potential replacements for the president, many of the front-runners are not as
pro-Moscow as Nazarbayev. Observing Russia’s ability to overthrow the
government in Kyrgyzstan likely is a reminder to the less pro-Russian forces in
Kazakhstan that such a tactic could be used in Astana someday.
Kazakhstan is similar
to Kyrgyzstan in that social and geographic divisions between the country’s north
and south could be used easily to disrupt stability. Russians make up more than
a quarter of the population in Kazakhstan, mostly on the northern border. The
center of the country is nearly empty, though this is where the capital is
located. The population along Kazakhstan’s southern border, especially in the
southeast, is a mixture of Russians, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs, Uzbeks and Uighurs,
making the area difficult to consolidate or control. It would take little
effort to spin up any of these groups, especially Russian Kazakhs, to create
unrest should Moscow deem it necessary.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is
attempting to balance the influence of three regional powers: Russia, Iran and
China. The Turkmen government is not anti- or pro-Russian; it is pragmatic and
knows that it needs to deal with Moscow. Russia, however, has been irritated
over Turkmenistan’s energy deals with China, Iran and the West.
Turkmenistan is
inherently paranoid, and for good reason. The country’s small population is
divided by a desert; half its people live along the border with regional power
Uzbekistan, and the other half live along the border with Iran. Also, the
country’s population is bitterly divided by a clan system the government can
barely control. This has made Turkmenistan uneasy anytime any country is
destabilized by a major power, whether during the U.S. war in Iraq, Russia’s
war in Georgia or the revolution in Kyrgyzstan. Ashgabat knows that it is a
country without a real core, and from this weakness comes a paranoia that it
could be next.
Russia holds
influence over each of the clans in Turkmenistan; for example, the southern
Mary clan has to use Russia for its drug trafficking, and Russia manages energy
exports controlled by the Balkhan clan and provides
weapons to the ruling Ahal clan. Moscow has been the
key to peace among the clans in Turkmenistan in the past, such as when
President Saparmurat Niyazov died in 2006. But Russia could easily use its
influence instead to incite a clan war, which could steer the country in any
number of directions.
Georgia
Since the 2003 Rose
Revolution, Georgia has been one of the most pro-Western countries in Russia’s
near abroad. Its pro-Western stance is a key problem for Russia, since Georgia
is the gateway country for Russia to resurge into the Caucasus as a whole.
Logically it follows that Georgia would be one of the next countries in which
Moscow would want to consolidate its influence.
Georgian political
figures, particularly Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, are notoriously
anti-Russian. However, there is a growing opposition force which, while not
pro-Russian, is willing to adopt a more pragmatic stance toward Moscow.
Three key figures
have emerged as possible leaders of the opposition movement: former Prime
Minister Zurab Nogaideli,
former Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania and former
Georgian Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze. Nogaideli
has visited Moscow several times in the past few months and even formed a
partnership between his Movement for Fair Georgia party and Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin’s United Russia. Burjanadze, one of the most popular
and well-known politicians in Georgia, has also visited Moscow and held talks
with Putin recently. Alasania has also argued for a more pragmatic stance
toward Russia, and will be a key figure to watch as he runs for mayor of
Tbilisi in the country’s upcoming regional elections on May 30.
Although these
figures have gained prominence, they have not yet proven they can attract a
broad movement or consolidate the other opposition parties effectively.
Georgia’s opposition remains greatly divided, with more than a dozen groups
that do not agree on how to deal with Russia, among many other topics. Though
unorganized, protests erupted across Georgia in 2009 and could arise again this
year, especially with regional elections taking place in a month. There were
rumors during the 2009 protests that Russia had funded the opposition’s
activities, unbeknownst to the opposition. It is notable that during the height
of the uprising in Kyrgyzstan, opposition leaders referred to the protests in
Kyrgyzstan as a model for the Georgian opposition to rise up against
Saakashvili.
Russia would be very
interested in seeing the Georgian opposition coalesce and rise against
Saakashvili. But this would be difficult for Moscow to orchestrate since there
is no real pro-Russian movement in Georgia. The population there has not
forgotten that Russia has already rolled tanks into Georgia, and any move that
is seen as too strongly pro-Russian could serve to alienate those willing to
talk to Russia even further.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is another
country attempting to balance its relationship with Russia against other
regional powers like Turkey, Iran and the West. Its ability to continue such a
balancing act is mainly due to its energy wealth, which gives it cash and
leverage within those relationships. Currently, Azerbaijan maintains a fairly
amenable relationship with Russia, though should it strengthen its ties to the
other powers, Moscow could target the country.
Azerbaijan saw a
possible attempt at a color revolution-style uprising in 2005, leading many to
question whether the West had the country on the same list as Georgia, Ukraine
and Kyrgyzstan. In mid-2005, a myriad of youth movements reportedly inspired by
the Orange and Rose revolutions declared themselves in opposition to the
Azerbaijani government. What began as protesters taking to the streets with
banners and flags escalated into riots. The police quickly clamped down on the
movement before it could organize further. Russia has the ability to organize
such a movement in Azerbaijan, as it has relationships with opposition parties
and youth movements in the country.
In Baku, Russia also
has influence within the minority populations in Azerbaijan, especially the
Dagestani groups in the northern part of the country that are linked to
militant movements in the Russian Caucasus but have been since purchased by
pro-Russian forces in the region. Sources have indicated that Russia has
threatened to use those populations against Baku in the past.
The Baltic States
The Baltic states,
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are a major piece in Russia’s resurgence plans.
Located on the vulnerable North European Plain, and a stone’s throw from
Russia’s second largest city of St. Petersburg, the Baltics are a prime
property for Russia to control. The Baltics’ inherent problem is that they are
so small and weak that they only have two paths to follow: hope someone
protects them, or accept Russian authority.
On the surface, it
looks as if the Baltics have protection, since they belong to the European
Union and NATO. But Russia has its hands in some fairly strong social movements
in these states. Past events have shown that Estonia and Latvia, where ethnic
Russians make up roughly 25 and 30 percent of the population, respectively, are
easy targets for Moscow. Estonia and Latvia both have pro-Russian parties in
their political systems due to the large Russian minority populations. Moscow’s
influence is less strong in Lithuania, since Russians only make up 9 percent of
the population there.
Russia knows that the
Baltics, like Georgia, will never have pro-Russian governments. Instead, Russia
is interested in pressuring the Baltic governments into a so-called
“Finlandization,” or neutrality. This does not mean the Baltics would leave
their Western clubs; rather, they would implicitly give Russia veto power over
any political or security decision.
Central Europe
The Central European
states have seen Russian interference in their social dynamics in the past and
are nervous again after the Kyrgyz uprising. Russian meddling has been a fact
of life for these countries for centuries, even if they were never formally
part of Russia. Russia can mobilize social movements in Central Europe in two
ways: through “charm offensives” and through non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
Russia can use charm
offensives to divide and confuse the Central Europeans. This tactic serves to
undermine anti-Russian elements and paint them as a “phobic” segment of
society. Russia can isolate the anti-Russian sentiments in these countries via
media and investment and by acting as a friendly neighbor. For example, in the
wake of the Polish president’s death, Russia stepped in as a friendly neighbor
symbolically supporting the Polish people, especially the deceased government
members’ families, in their time of grief.
Russia has shown its ability
to direct funds to NGOs, academia and human rights groups, particularly those
fighting for minority rights or against certain military programs, to influence
civil society in Europe. This was a tactic used during the Cold War. Any NGO
that questions either the value of the region’s commitment to a U.S. military
alliance (such as groups opposing the U.S. ballistic missile defense plan) or
the merits of EU membership (groups citing a lack of transparency on some
issues or with an anti-capitalist message) can serve Moscow’s interest of
loosening the bonds between Central Europe and the rest of the West.
China
China has many
reasons to be alarmed about Russia’s actions in Kyrgyzstan, with which it
shares a rugged border. China has placed a large bet on Central Asia as the
only secure source for resources without building the sort of naval expertise
that would allow it to protect its sea lanes. China has been slowly increasing
its influence in Central Asia, creating energy links to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan. China has also increased its ties in the region, including
Kyrgyzstan, through rail infrastructure. Russia’s demonstration that it can
throw a quick and tidy revolution puts China’s development and economic
security strategies at risk.
Furthermore, the
tactics Russia used in Kyrgyzstan are troubling for Beijing because of China’s
own problem controlling the myriad groups in the country, including the
Uighurs, Tibetans and separatists in Hong Kong or Shanghai (who are not too
fond of the leadership in Beijing). China is always unnerved when a popular
uprising overturns a government anywhere in the world.
Russia has a long
history with the Uighur populations in China, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In the
1990s, Russia helped fund and organize the Uighurs in order to keep China’s
focus on its own problems at a time when Russia was weak and vulnerable. This
is something it could do again. China fears greater Russian influence over
these communities, especially if it could translate into greater Russian
influence inside China.
Russia is not looking
to overturn the Chinese government; rather, Moscow could use social pressure to
influence Beijing and keep its focus away from former Soviet turf.
But again, the above
simple intends to examine tactics Russia 'could' use to socially destabilize
each of these countries.
As for what happened
so far in 2010 the facts are that Russia has seen four key countries,
Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus, return to the Russian fold. Russia
formed a customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus, beginning the process of
formally reintegrating the countries, and a pro-Russian government returned to
Kiev, officially ending Ukraine’s pro-Western Orange Revolution. Russia has
also continued laying the groundwork to exert more influence in other former
Soviet states, like Armenia and Azerbaijan, with Moscow continuing to be the
hinge from which the Turkey-Armenia negotiations over normalizing relations and
the Armenia-Azerbaijan talks over Nagorno-Karabakh swing.
Moscow still has some
housecleaning to do the next 2-3 months in Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan and Belarus. Government shakeups are taking place in Ukraine and
Kazakhstan as the countries chart their pro-Russian courses.
Belarus is more
subdued and thus also easy for Moscow to control. Russia will also be
watching the next 2-3 months for countermoves to its consolidation
plans in countries that would be supported by foreign powers, like the United
States or the Europeans, though such moves are unlikely. The United States has
been too preoccupied by issues in the Middle East to interfere, and the
Europeans are mired in a financial crisis.
Thus it seems Moscow
feels confident that if either power begins focusing on Eurasia, the Kremlin
has enough momentum to continue its reconsolidation plans.
With Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan, Belarus and Kazakhstan in its grasp, Moscow will start focusing on
the next group of countries on its shopping list: Georgia and the Baltic states
of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. These countries are all vehemently
anti-Russian and will not be as easy to influence as the three major states
already in the Russian fold. Ahead of the second quarter, Moscow was already
focusing on Georgia, forging relationships with various Georgian opposition
groups. Russia has also been formalizing its military hold on the Georgian
secessionist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, over which Russia fought
Georgia in 2008.
Russia does not have as
many tools in the Baltic states, which are NATO and EU members, as it has in
Georgia. Also, Moscow knows that any aggressive actions in the Baltics will
send Russia and NATO, meaning the United States, into direct conflict. Russia
must first roll back Western influence in the Baltics before it can entrench
its own, a difficult task, and not one that the United States and its NATO
allies will make any easier.
During the next 2-3
months, Russia will also focus on its relationships with the Eurasian regional
heavyweights, Germany, France, Poland and Turkey. Russian President Dmitri
Medvedev will hold bilateral summits with leaders from each of these countries
in the second quarter. Moscow knows that for a Russian resurgence in the former
Soviet sphere to succeed, the Kremlin must forge understandings with these
regional powers, which are capable of scuttling or at least greatly obstructing
Russia’s plans.
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